There Is a Wound in That Wall: Representations of Islam in Selected Works of Nineteenth-Century British Literature

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THERE IS A WOUND IN THAT WALL: REPRESENTATIONS OF ISLAM IN SELECTED WORKS OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH LITERATURE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and Research
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

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December 2012
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This dissertation addresses two limitations in recent scholarship on the representations of Islam and Muslims in nineteenth-century British literature. It implements a literary critique of the epistemological nature and repercussions of some of these representations from a nuanced historical perspective. And it recovers and recommends for serious scholarly study pertinent texts that are at present neglected or un-canonized. The importance of such texts lies in their subversive nature: the representations they offer of Islam and/or Muslims challenges the dominant nineteenth-century Orientalist, missionary, and historical discourses which pervasively represent them as uncivilized, inferior, or evil. The second limitation is marked by the failure of previous scholarship to accept its pedagogic responsibility. As valuable as recent scholarship is to the Orientalist and scholar of nineteenth-century British literature, it has shown little commitment to extending the scope of research into the classroom order to change the way nineteenth-century British literature is taught in the present-day Western academy. This dissertation, couched in New Historicist methodology, addresses the two limitations in five chapters.

The introductory chapter situates the dissertation in recent scholarship on the representations of Islam in nineteenth-century British literature. Chapter two takes a close
look at the historical presence of Muslims in Britain during the 19th-century, identifying missionary discourse and conversion to Islam as forces which affected some of the textual representations of Islam and Muslims. Chapter three offers a critique of specific literary texts through applying Spivak’s notion of epistemic violence to some of the consistent, reductive representations of Islam and Muslims in nineteenth-century Britain, and argues that this epistemic violence is a requirement in the fashioning of imperial and Jewish identities. Chapter four recovers three nineteenth-century texts, and analyzes the ways in which they subvert dominant representations of Islam and Muslims. Chapter five discusses the pedagogical relevance of these texts, and argues through engagement with canon theory for anthologizing them, including them on reading lists for appropriate courses in history and English departments at American universities, and for making them available in digital format on the World Wide Web for a wider readership.
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“My Lord, grant me that I may be grateful for Thy favour which Thou hast bestowed on me and on my parents, and that I may do good such as Thou art pleased with, and admit me, by Thy mercy, among Thy righteous servants.”

In its conception and spirit, this dissertation is dedicated to voices from the past, to those solitary figures who refused to remain silent in the face of injustice and ignorance, to voices that recognized the power of human agency and the imperative of making a change in the world. To these voices I am indebted, and pray that this dissertation is a step in the path they have drawn.

In the present world, I dedicate the dissertation to my parents. I am grateful for their rich fund of unconditional love, support, trust, and for believing in me.

To my brother Mohammad for his generosity, my sister Hiba for her telepathy, my little brother Ahmad for always calling me Dr. Ghada, I hope I can one day repay you all.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

A few years ago a Facebook friend posted a YouTube link to an interview with Dr. Jack Shaheen, Professor Emeritus of Mass Communications at Southern Illinois University, and former CBS news consultant on Middle Eastern affairs, on the publication on his book, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People*. In the book, Shaheen indicts Hollywood’s unrelenting project of vilifying Arabs by distorting their image on the silver screen through representing them as the West’s, and particularly America’s, “Public Enemy #1—brutal, heartless, uncivilized religious fanatics and money-mad cultural “others” bent on terrorizing civilized Westerners, especially Christians and Jews” (2). Shaheen, who discusses over nine hundred Hollywood films that featured Arabs since 1896, calls this cultural phenomenon “The New Anti-Semitism,” and uses it to describe the systematic way Hollywood has advanced anti-Semitism, “provided the Semites are Arabs” (5). Contextualizing this project, Shaheen argues that Hollywood, and by extension the modern-day West has inherited this body of misinformed knowledge about Arabs from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century French and British literature, and recycled it into the world of motion picture, retaining the same stereotype. Central to Shaheen’s argument is the transparency with which fiction and reality inform each other, especially with the latter being influenced by politics. Shaheen maintains that the increase in Hollywood’s dissemination of Arab stereotypes in the last third of the twentieth century, for example, is partly explained by such events as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iranian Revolution, and the Arab oil embargo.
Incidentally, the post about *Reel Bad Arabs* coincided with my presence in the United States to earn a doctorate in English literature. I was profoundly aware of myself as a minority in a Western setting. This awareness was sharpened by my sense that anti-Muslim propaganda has become a component of Western cultural poetics. On the world scene such events as the 1989 Islamic scarf controversy in France; Pastor Terry Jones’s burning of the Qur’an at his Dove World Outreach Center in Gainesville, Florida on the 9/11 anniversary in 2011; member of the Florida House of Representatives Larry Metz and Senator Alan Hays’s proposition of the bill on banning Shariah law; Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*’s publication of the twelve Islamophobic cartoons depicting Prophet Mohammad in 2005; the unrelenting international war against terrorism, a term which has become synonymous with Islam, among a plethora of other events and phenomena were living examples of this pervasive anti-Muslim propaganda. Inside the classroom, the experience of reading representations of Islam and Muslims in nineteenth-century British literature, since this was my chosen area of specialization, seemed to yield a conclusion which resonates with Shaheen’s: whether in fiction or reality, Islam and Muslims are vilified others.

My awareness of the political dimensions or ramifications of the representations of Muslim subjectivity by the West was enmeshed in certain influences dictated by my social location as an observer of these representations. Of Jordanian citizenship, born to an upper-middleclass family to practicing Muslim parents with a university education brought with it certain privileges both in terms of education and exposure to Western culture, which were not readily available to other Jordanian girls from different backgrounds. Receiving my elementary, middle, and high school education at private
schools, although by no means among the most prestigious in Jordan, automatically equipped me with above average level of proficiency in the English language. And this was a necessary tool for exploring Western culture, which I avidly sought through watching a wide range of sitcoms, soap operas, BBC adaptations of the Classics, as well as through reading magazines like *Readers Digest* and *Cosmopolitan*. Having this second-hand exposure to and fascination with Western culture was an essential ingredient in the narrative of how I came upon the topic of this dissertation. This narrative is also an amalgam of the rich and intense matrix of ethics I was raised on, whereby to do good in life was inseparable from a vigilant observance of truth in manners, intentions, and sayings. This appreciation of truth became a value I sought, not only in relationships, but also in the material I read, whether it was literature, history, or criticism.

Upon conclusion of coursework, when the time came to make a decision about the dissertation topic, I was well aware that the ingredients of my social location would inform this decision, a decision which at the same time complicated by my sense that whatever the topic, it had to address two points: one historical, and the other practical. I do not equate history with trajectory here, but rather refer to the way a nuanced understanding of context can affect a better reading of the literary text at hand. The practical point addresses what I call the “outreach imperative”: the need to extend the reach of scholarship about Islam in such a way that it helps ameliorate the pervasive Western antipathy towards it. Confronted by what I perceived as a predominantly untrue and unjust inscription of Muslim subjectivity in the literature I read, it was at once inevitable that I took up the cause of deconstructing this subjectivity by talking back to Western discourse. My identity as a Muslim, Arab woman was inextricable from the
scholarly, objective persona who will author the dissertation. In this context, reading Edward Said and Stephen Greenblatt was reassuring because they provide in some of their writings a legitimate argument about the involvement of the personal and the biographical in many a scholarly endeavor. In the introduction to *Learning to Curse: Essays on Early Modern Culture*, for example, Stephen Greenblatt explains how storytelling was an essential component in the formation of his identity, and how its role, initiated by the Terrible Stanley stories his mother used to tell him as a young boy, lay in providing a fictional double, a foil of a sort, against which his identity was projected. Greenblatt goes no to conclude that this personal history of his has become an ingredient of his professional self, “for the narrative impulse in my writing is yoked to the service of literary and cultural criticism” (8). Greenblatt’s affirmation is echoed elsewhere in Edward Said’s *Orientalism*. Said asserts,

> No one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life, from the fact of his involvement (conscious or unconscious) with a class, a set of beliefs, a social position, or from the mere activity of being a member of a society. These continue to bear on what he does professionally, even though naturally enough his research and its fruits do attempt to reach a level of relative freedom from the inhibitions and the restrictions of brute, everyday reality. (10)

The brute restrictions of everyday reality for me meant being confronted with Western discourse’s inscription of Muslim subjectivity and its monopoly on the representations of that subjectivity in literature, politics, and entertainment. Such inscription has influenced the way I was perceived in the States among colleagues, professors, and neighbors.
The more I read nineteenth-century British literature, the more I felt the need to historicize, or contextualize. The textual presence of Islam in that literature has left me with two urgent questions about historicity and representation. Was the encounter with Islam in nineteenth-century Britain solely informed by travel narratives and previous texts? In other words, was Islam a distant religion and Muslims distant others? Was any knowledge of them made available only through the textual medium? And did all representations of Islam reflect a monolithic, antagonistic attitude toward that religion and its adherents? Were there voices in that era which articulated a different, perhaps apologetic response to these antagonistic representations? In search of answers, I noticed, perhaps with the exception of Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, that scholarship on the representations of Islam in nineteenth-century British literature addresses either the issue of historicity or representation, but rarely both. Moreover, the scholarship that dealt with how Islam or the Orient was represented in literature has tended to restrict its scope to the major texts, texts which have become canonized as representative of that mode of writing about the East, such as *Arabian Nights* and many of Byron’s poems. Furthermore, this scholarship has lacked the outreach element. In a time when Islam is the West’s “public enemy # 1,” (2) to quote Shaheen again, it constitutes a grave blind spot that scholarship in this field fails to put its findings into the service of reconfiguring the image of Islam in the real world.

While Edward Said did not initially inspire my work, I was deeply influenced by some of his ideas in *Orientalism* (1978). Throughout his book, Said refers to the “system of knowledge about the Orient” which has shaped and continues to inform Western social and political discourses about the East. Said argues that these political and ideological injustices
against the Orient, and especially against Islam, are epistemological in nature, and that they are the product of the imperial apparatus. He discusses, for instance, the idea of “epistemological mutation” and the double standards of Western discourse: “We allow justly that the Holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: Why don’t we accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what Orientalism continues to do?” (xxii). He locates such “distorted knowledge” in Oriental texts which, over the years, have led people in the West to form “textual attitudes” (93) against the Orient and its people, attitudes in which texts rather than actual human encounter are preferred as the source of information (or misinformation) about the East. Later in the book Said explains how Western knowledge of the Orient, and especially Islam, distorted as it is, is deeply connected with reality. Originating in the highly personal impressions of Orientalists who travelled in the East, what starts as a fragment or passing anecdote is quoted in other texts, most likely generalized and made official, and passed down as an inalienable truth. According to Said, these become a reality in Western consciousness, and they feed the antipathy with which the West deals with and thinks about the East.

Before Said, Byron Porter Smith’s book, Islam in English Literature (1939), anticipated some of the concerns of Orientalism, particularly those pertaining to the personal and prejudiced (as opposed to the objective and verified) nature of knowledge about Islam. Smith examines how this knowledge was disseminated in the different genres of literature, including the more factual (travelogues and histories), of mostly English authors from the Middle Ages to the Victorian Age. Arranged within a chronological framework, Smith’s book is seminal to any discussion on Islam and literature, not only for being among the precursors in the field, but also because Smith, in his extensive survey of works in each historical era, brings to life voices
which have been buried in the periphery of history, voices which challenged the dominant anti-
Muslim discourse of the period at hand. The chapter on the Victorian Age is a case in point.
Smith tells us that “Godfrey Higgins’ *An Apology for the Life and Character of the Celebrated
Prophet of Arabia, Called Mohamed, or the Illustrious* (1829) anticipates to a remarkable
degree Carlyle’s argument in *Heroes and Hero Worship*. . . Higgins, like Carlyle, stresses
Muhammad’s sincerity, and points out the improbability of his being able to deceive his
contemporaries by conscious trickery” (163). The argument of *Islam in English Literature*
echoes Saidian ethos in stressing the sabotaging effects of Western ideological injustices in the
representation of Islam in Western historical and literary writings. *Islam in English Literature*
has been a primary reference in selecting the texts for chapter four of this dissertation.

Carrying a more specific title, Shahin Kuli Khan Khattak’s book, *Islam and the
Victorians: Nineteenth-Century Perceptions of Muslim Practices and Beliefs* (2008) builds on
Smith’s efforts in discussing works of literature and the sister arts (music, theater, and the visual
arts) which featured Islam and/or Muslims, highlighting the general misconceptions regarding
Islamic beliefs and concepts in those works, and often rectifying them through recourse to
Islamic primary material (the Qur’an and the Hadith). This makes Khattak’s approach more
conceptual than Smith’s. Moreover, Khattak’s “Afterward” is especially significant, not only
because he places his book among current scholarship about the subject, but also because he
acknowledges that “a vacuum concerning realistic portrayals of Islam has existed for so long,”
and that “the voice of the other side is just beginning” (138). As valuable as Khattak’s book is
to the Orientalist and scholar of Victorian literature, however, the book follows the survey-
comparison approach of Smith’s book in many places.
Mohammad Sharafuddin’s Islam and Romantic Orientalism: Literary Encounters with the Orient (1994) is a close examination of Landor’s Gebir, Southey’s Thalaba, Moore’s LallaRookh, and Byron’s Turkish Tales for the purpose of establishing how these texts, to use Sharafuddin’s words, “mark an advance in the understanding of and sympathy with the Orient” (xviii). This view testifies to Sharafuddin’s break with Said’s argument concerning the nature and purpose of Orientalism. In fact, Sharafuddin’s contribution lies in presenting Landor, Southey, Moore, and Byron (through extensive research of autobiographical background on the writers at hand and how they came to study Islam and the East) as serious and knowledgeable scholars of the East and Islam who demonstrated in the works studied in the book a deep appreciation of Islam which challenged the dominant prejudiced discourse of the time and, which, as in the case of Byron’s Turkish Tales, “completely transformed” the oriental poetic narrative in the Romantic Age (243). Sharafuddin’s close reading of these Romantic texts allows for some detailed and germane explications of issues related to the nature of faith and Heaven and Hell in Islamic thought. This positions the author as a kind of intermediary between these distant texts and a modern-day Western reader, which creates the exact kind of dialogue between text, scholar, and audience needed to broaden the scope of scholarship on Islam in English literature. Despite the fact that Sharafuddin’s work marks a contribution to how existing Orientalist authors can be rewritten in current scholarship, the need still arises in such scholarship to make room for those voices which have remained so far largely unheard, either because they were apologetic in nature, or because they sought to correct prevalent erroneous ideas concerning Islam and Muslims, such as Godfrey Higgins’s An Apology for the Life and Character of the Celebrated Prophet of Arabia, and Thomas Arnold’s The Preaching of Islam.
A seminal contribution to the topic of literary representations of the Orient in nineteenth-century British literature is Muhsin Jassim Al-Musawi’s *Anglo-Orient: Easterners in Textual Camps* (2000). The book is a painstaking investigation of the Western, and especially British, Orientalist canon, couched in, as the book cover declares, “Foucauldian discourse analysis, and familiar enough with Fanon and Edward Said.” The book’s twelve chapters tackle a number of issues, which are all related, whether directly or tacitly, to the ubiquitous influence of *Arabian Nights* on the West’s idea of the East, on Western Orientalist discourse, and on nineteenth-century British fiction. The book surveys a number of genres, including travel narratives, fiction, and author biographies to name a few, in order to demonstrate how themes like English self-fashioning were inseparable from an acute sense of European superiority and a dialectic of hostility and desire for the East in Western discourse.

Another significant work, though purely historical in scope, is Humayun Ansari’s ‘*The Infidel Within*: Muslims in Britain Since 1880’ (2004). The book offers a thorough background on the rise of Islam in Britain in the nineteenth century, at the same time contextualizing the presence of Muslims, whether they were British converts or Muslim immigrants, in Orientalist discourse and the discourse of empire. One of the key notions that the first three chapters rest on is the diversity of the Muslim community in Britain. Ansari reminds his readers that this community is not, and has never been a homogeneous entity, asserting further that British Muslims “have seldom viewed Islam as the sole form of social and political identification, and usually it is not even the primary one” (4). Ansari discusses at some length the difficulties that the earlier Muslim community had to deal with, noting these earlier Muslims’ efforts to establish themselves in the British community at large through the creation of a discourse that
presents Islam, not as some alien religion, but as a culmination of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Among the other ideas discussed in *The Infidel Within* are the factors that led to the rise of Turkish and Indian migrations to Britain during the nineteenth century. The book sheds light on Britain’s attitude toward the Muslim community. This attitude was marked by intolerance as a general rule, but was also affected by other factors such as the race and class of Muslims (in the case of migrants), as well as by the status of political power of the Muslim world. Ansari’s book also lists some of the notable Muslim figures (both immigrants and converts) and highlights instances of their role in the British community, especially in responding to anti-Muslim propaganda, as well as across the border in the establishing of diplomatic relations with Turkey.

As valuable as the above scholarship is to the student of Orientalism, it falls short of raising two pertinent questions. Are there any forgotten texts in the British nineteenth-century oeuvre whose authors wrote against the grain? And how can a consideration of such texts both in scholarship and the curriculum change the way contemporary scholars think about and teach nineteenth-century British literature? This project will explore these questions and suggest answers in the following chapters. Chapter Two offers a historical background about the presence of Islam in nineteenth-century Britain. I discuss such issues as Muslim immigration to Britain, conversion to Islam, and the fear of conversion to Islam (evident in numerous writings such as Thomas Carlyle’s *The Hero as Prophet*) as decisive factors in shaping popular knowledge of Islam during the nineteenth century. In this chapter I argue that religious discourse, partly propelled by the debate between Christian antipathetic and apologetic camps, informed many representations of Islam during the nineteenth century. Clinton Bennett’s book, *Victorian Images of Islam* (2009), forms the primary source for this argument. I close Chapter Two with a brief
discussion of historical consciousness in nineteenth-century Britain in the writings of Thomas Babington Macaulay, Thomas Carlyle, and George Eliot, because the works discussed in chapters three and four deal with historical matter, such as the Muslim conquest of India, the Jewish Question, and many others. Chapter Three examines representations of Islam in two trajectories. The first explores the notion of epistemic violence, borrowed from Gayatri Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in a specimen of works, such as Byron’s *The Giaour* and the anonymous *The Lustful Turk* by identifying some of the ways in which these representations are epistemically violent. I locate this violence in its reductive force, which essentializes Muslim subjectivity, rendering physical violence and sexual license as inherent components of this subjectivity. In the second trajectory I argue that epistemic violence is a pre-requisite for imperial and Jewish self-fashioning in Wilkie Collins’ *The Moonstone* and George Eliot’s *Daniel Deronda*. I discuss the significance of geographical space for a conception of imperial and Jewish identities in the strategies of site-conjuring and site-emptying respectively.

Chapter Four draws on Stephen Greenblatt’s article “The Wound in The Wall” in recovering three nineteenth-century British texts that challenged the hegemonic, epistemically violent, representations of Islam. These works are Julia Pardoe’s *The City of the Sultan and Domestic Manners of Turks*, Godfrey Higgins’ *An Apology for the Life and Character of the Celebrated Prophet of Arabia, Called Mohammad or the Illustrious*, and Thomas Arnold’s *The Preaching of Islam*. Quoting liberally from these works, I demonstrate how each writer, bringing in their unique approach to the study of Islam and Muslims, destabilizes certain misrepresentations of Islam. Chapter Five draws attention to the contribution that these three texts can make to the Western critical colloquy.
concerning Oriental studies. Being the conclusive chapter of the dissertation, its import lies in carrying a futuristic, practical/pedagogical weight rather than offering a summary of the previous chapters. In this chapter I propose curricular reform in the canon of nineteenth-century British literature through anthologizing these texts, including them on reading lists of pertinent course offerings from the history and English departments in the American academy, taking Indiana University of Pennsylvania as a concrete, rather random example, as well as making them available on World Wide Web through the Gutenberg Project, thus extending their scope beyond the limits of print culture, where they can be more easily accessed by the general reader.

This dissertation is indebted to New Historicism in a number of ways. On a nominal level, chapters Three and Four carry titles that borrow directly from some of Stephen Greenblatt’s works, particularly “The Wound in the Wall,” which is an article title in *Practicing New Historicism*; and Terrible Stanley, which is the name of the protagonist of the stories Greenblatt’s mother used to tell him as a young boy, which Greenblatt discusses at length in the introduction to *Learning to Curse*. On a methodological level, the indebtedness to New Historicism lies in refusing to reduce any reading of nineteenth-century literary representations of Islam to an exclusive judgment of their aesthetic merit, and in demonstrating how consistent antipathetic representations of Islam circulated among imperial, religious, and historical discourses of the period. I also historicize the presence of Islam in nineteenth-century Britain, because such history is usually suppressed in Oriental studies. Historicizing nineteenth-century literary representations of Islam means also refusing to accept that these representations mirrored a monolithic attitude toward this religion and its adherents. In this context I offer for
study obscure texts and perform a synchronic reading of their historical specificity as responses to hegemonic Orientalist discourse.
CHAPTER TWO

ISLAM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN: HISTORY, CONVERSION, RESPONSES

Yet, Islam as culture and geographical locale has been there in Europe and, especially, England for some time, passing through stages of rejection, fear, surprise, interest, and need. --Al-Musawi, *Anglo-Orient*.

As these writers were mutually aware of the others’ opinions, a debate developed between them which suggests that last century saw more active thinking about Islam than we usually assume, that theology of religions was of more popular concern than we tend to think and that not everyone accepted without question the attitude of ‘ineffable superiority towards everything non-European” --Bennett, *Victorian Images of Islam*.

Reading representations of Islam and Muslims in nineteenth-century British literature, both as an undergraduate and graduate student, as well as a university lecturer for three years, has been a misleading experience. It produced an alienating effect that seemed to convey the message that Islam and Muslims were distant geographical and cultural entities whose knowledge was made available to the authors of that literature only through the textual medium. The way some of these writers construct Islam and Muslims drove home the impression that they did not know much about these people and about their religion, or so I thought. I read novels such as Mary Shelly’s *Frankenstein*, Wilkie Collins’ *Hide and Seek*, and Charlotte Dacre’s *Zofloya, or the Moor*, to name just a few random titles, and was left with an overwhelming notion that there was a gap
between the textual construction of Islam and Muslims and “Islam as cultural and geographical locale,” as the epigraph describes it. As a reader, I almost forgave certain misrepresentations because in my estimation those authors could not have known better.

It was through the intensive research for background information for this project that I came across some interesting history concerning the encounter between Islam and Christianity in nineteenth-century Britain, such history as discussions of Orientalism in general have overlooked. Making present the context of this encounter in discussions of representations of Islam and Muslims during the nineteenth century places due emphasis on the fear of conversion to Islam, and on antipathetic discourse as propelling factors behind such representations. Part of the contribution of this project to scholarship on Orientalism lies in making available in one place, alongside a discussion of the ways in which Islam and Muslims were distorted in nineteenth-century British literature, a history of the nature of the encounter between Islam and Christianity in Britain itself. A synchronic study of two historical moments, namely, conversion to Islam in Britain, and the religious debate between antipathetic and apologetic discourses within the missionary tradition gives the discussions of epistemic violence in chapter three, and of the “wounds” in the nineteenth-century Orientalist wall a touch of the historical real, therefore illuminating how the texts discussed in these chapters were born of a moment which favored their production. This chapter, therefore, explores the history of the presence of Muslims in nineteenth-century Britain in three ways. It traces some of the origins of this presence on British soil; it discusses the phenomenon of conversion to Islam with some emphasis on major voices and contributions; and sheds light on the heated religious debate in the missionary tradition during the nineteenth century, which split this tradition
into two unequivocal camps. The chapter closes with a brief look at historical consciousness in the nineteenth century as articulated by major voices in the field of historiographical writing. In these articulations such issues as fidelity to historical truth, and the responsibility incumbent on the historian of making available this truth to the audience are emphasized. By shedding light on these issues from the historiographical perspective of major nineteenth-century thinkers, I mean to stress a dichotomy between ideal and practice; an incongruity between nineteenth-century historical consciousness as it construes both the past and the historian, and the actual construction of the past in literary works.

Muslim presence in nineteenth-century Britain was not exclusively textual. Nineteenth-century Cardiff, Manchester, and London were home to Muslims from Arabic and Asian origins. Humayun Ansari’s book “The Infidel Within”: Muslims in Britain Since 1880 gives a thorough background of the history of Muslim presence in Britain. The sources that Ansari cites trace a sporadic, but recognizable presence, which predates the nineteenth century. The famous North African cartographer Al-Idrisi, for instance, is known to have travelled to the west of England in the twelfth century. A Persian emissary is recorded to have visited England in 1238 to ask the support of king Henry III against Mogul threat. In 1626, Persian ambassador Naqd Ali Beg arrived in England on board one of the East India Company ships. In the sixteenth century, Queen Elizabeth I made an alliance with the Ottoman Sultan Murad III, who was identified as a “fellow monotheist,” against the Catholic King of Spain in 1588 (qtd. Ansari 35). Ansari reports that commerce and travel furthered interaction between Britain and the Muslim world until a
permanent Turkish embassy was established in England at the end of the eighteenth century.

The nineteenth century witnessed waves of immigration to Britain by Muslims of different ethnic backgrounds; prominent among these were Middle Eastern, Indian, Turkish, and Moroccan. Middle Eastern merchants established merchant houses in different parts of Britain, the first of which was founded by Abdoullah Yadlibi in Manchester in 1833. The number of Middle Eastern, or Arab merchant houses grew to an impressive 150 by the end of the nineteenth century (Ansari, 34). As far as Indians are concerned, their presence in Britain was recorded as early as 1777 (Ansari, 30). Ansari records some famous names like Sake Dean Mahomed, who set up his bath and shampooing business in Brighton and was later appointed as “Shampooing Surgeon to His Majesty George IV,” (Ansari, 31). Indian students of the middle and upper classes went to Britain to study law at the Inns of Court and other universities. Prominent names include Syed Abdoolah, professor of Hindustani at University College London in the late 1860s (Ansari, 32). While a thin slice of these Indian immigrants were of the educated elite, the majority was composed of poor maritime workers, or lascars. Ansari explains that the East India Company, after establishing factories in some of the strategic coastal points of India in the late eighteenth century, “recruited Indian sailors as cheap labor. These sailors were also taken on to overcome the labor shortage created on trading vessels by the induction of British seamen into the navy for war service against France from the 1760s onwards, as well as by British seamen deserting at Indian ports” (35). The number of these lascars increased remarkably from just 470 in 1804 to 10,000-12,000 in
1855, although by that date, the lascar population included those from Turkey, Malaya, Yemen, and Egypt (Ansari, 35).

On the Turkish front, Ansari groups immigrations to Britain into three waves starting 1823. He organizes these immigrations around political reasons pertaining to the relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. The majority of the émigrés were of the educated class who sought political refuge in Britain from a deteriorating, politically oppressive government back home. The first of these waves took place between 1823-76, during the reign of Sultan Abdulmecit. Names include Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasha, who “escaped to London, where they brought out broadsheets such as Hurriyet (Freedom) protesting at the Sultan’s tyranny” (Ansari, 30). The second wave took place between 1876-1918, during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Ansari identifies the third wave, which started in 1878 after Britain took hold of the island of Cyprus, as composed of students, workers escaping the difficult economic conditions back home, and others, whom Ansari calls “adventure seekers,” who arrived in Britain seeking a more stable life. Many of those married and settled in Britain (Ansari, 31).

The demarcation of immigrants according to ethnicity and social class is significant because these were factors which played a role in determining British engagement with them. A majority of Indian servants, who had served their masters in India, accompanied them upon their return home. These servants were usually brutally treated. The females among them, called Ayahs (the singular form of which is Ayah, designating a lady’s maid), escaped their cruel lives only to lead a life of destitution on the streets. The number of these Ayahs was alarming enough that the Ayah’s Home was established in London in 1890 to accommodate the poor servants. This home
accommodated 100 Ayahs a year. The lascars, regardless of their ethnicity, received the similar cruel treatment. Ansari reports that these maritime workers were usually poorly fed, and many times forced to eat pork, which is a dietary prohibition for Muslims. Proselytization was not an uncommon practice toward these lascars. Many of them escaped, as in the case of Ayahs, lived poor lives, often earning their livelihoods as “street herbalists, sellers of rhubarb, spices and religious tracts, tom-tom players and crossing-sweepers, and even as beggars” (Ansari, 33). Their situation was deplorable enough to drive many philanthropists to urge the British government for relief measures for “the heathens in our midst” (qtd. Ansari: 66). In 1857, Ansari tells us, The Strangers’ Home for Asiatics, Africans, and South Sea Islanders was inaugurated under the auspices of Prince Albert, and it came “to symbolize the relationship between Britain and its poorer colonial subjects” (67).

Popular attitude toward Muslim presence in Britain, Ansari explains, was not monochrome, but oscillating between condescension and a mixture of admiration and awe. Such attitude was contingent on the political scene. Ansari talks about “major transformations” in the perception of Muslims since the late eighteenth century (59). He explains that in the aftermath of the French Revolution, popular British opinion regarded India and Egypt as illustrious, ancient civilizations and thought about the inhabitants of these countries with a degree of respect fitting them as inheritors of such civilization. However, a new sense of cultural superiority was born with the beginning of the nineteenth century, owing to the emergence of Britain as a major colonial power. As a consequence, Ansari maintains, “the Turks, with their turbans and tunics, had become innocuous objects of amusement and caricature at fancy-dress balls” (59). But even here,
Ansari asserts, the social class of those Muslims residing in Britain played a role in determining the nature of the intercourse with the British. Ansari states that Muslims from the nobility were at ease with their own identity, and that they continued to practice their lives as Muslims with confidence. Ansari cites the case of Nawab of Surat, Meer Jaffer Ali, who, even while entertaining British aristocracy, “did not partake of European food though always present at his own table” (69). The dietary habits of these Muslims, such as using spices and ghee were not altered; neither was adherence to the code of dress, as in the case of Oude’s ‘Mohammedan Queen’ and her party (69).

British engagements with the Muslims residing in Britain were of a pronounced stamp in the textual productions of the Victorian period, many of which appeared in response to a growing phenomenon beginning with the mid-nineteenth century, namely conversion to Islam. These attitudes designated two camps, one hostile, and the other sympathetic toward Islam and Muslims. Many exponents of the first camp, Sir William Muir and Stanley Lane-Poole prominent among them, had a first-hand knowledge of Islam either by virtue of having lived in Muslim countries long enough, or through proficient study and knowledge of native languages like Arabic and Urdu. This first-hand acquaintance gave these figures the justification to claim authoritative knowledge on all matters Muslim, and to dismiss as groundless the writings of their sympathetic counterparts, who were labeled pejoratively as apologists. This category included names like Thomas Carlyle, Charles Forster (1787-1871), and John Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-1872).

In his book, *Victorian Images of Islam* Clinton Bennett brings to the foreground an important moment in the history of the encounter between Islam and Christianity
during the nineteenth century through the contribution of Christian mission to Western scholarship about Islam. Bennett’s project is spawned by his conviction that “[Western] present-day attitude towards Islam was fundamentally shaped not by these contemporary events but by our awareness of nineteenth-century attitudes, especially of missionary writing” (ix). For this reason, he explores “a little-known dimension of the nineteenth century debate about the nature of Islam and Christian attitudes toward Muslims” (vii). In his discussion, Bennett brings to the limelight how three Christian scholars attempted an apologetic approach to Islam using the framework of Christian theology (xi). Bennett offers the cases of six nineteenth-century Christian scholars as exemplary of the debate within the missionary tradition, which divided it into two camps: the “confrontational” and the “conciliatory” (x). On the conciliatory front, Bennett studies Charles Forster’s Mahometanism Unveiled (1829), John Frederick Denison Maurice’s The Religions of the World (1846), and Reginald Bosworth Smith’s Mohammed and Mohammedanism (1874). On the confrontational front, Bennett studies Sir William Muir’s “The Mohammedan Controversy” (1845) and Life of Mahomet (1858-61), William St Clair Tisdall’s The Religion of the Crescent (1894), and John Drew Bate’s An Examination of the Claims of Ishmael as Viewed by Muhammadans (1884).

In this comparative study, Bennett offers some biographical background about these authors, their training, contribution to their field, and the responses they generated, both positive and negative, from the periodical press, the missionary community, and the Muslim community in Britain. Placing these two camps vis-à-vis each other, Bennett highlights the moments of dialogue where direct responses were being made across camps. These include whether Prophet Mohammad was descended from Ishmael, the
degree to which Islam was spread through violence, whether Islam and Christianity are sister-faiths (in other words, whether Islam holds some truths which can be traced in Christianity), whether Islam contributed to civilization, and whether Islam is a spiritual religion.

On the confrontational front, Bennett adds that Muir, Tisdall, and Bate’s approaches employed what was called the ‘new methodology’, since their conclusions were based not on medieval myths but on Islam’s own source materials” (16). This reflects an attitude of superiority in the discourse of these confrontational scholars, an attitude that equates knowledge with truth-value, minimizing the role of ideological orientation, which apologetic scholars such as Reginald Bosworth Smith cautioned against. According to Smith, the reason many Christian writers “approached Islam” was “only to vilify and misrepresent it, writing from preconceived positions” (75).

The sense of epistemic superiority in the writings of Orientalists such as William Muir contributed to the creation of a discourse of truth, which Clinton Bennett identifies as the assumption of an “a priori” which inheres exclusively in Christianity, and by extension Western culture, and renders other religions like Islam false (Victorian Images of Islam, 175-7). In his book, The Victorian Mirror of History, Arthur Dwight Culler asserts, “the Victorians believed that what they were saying was true, and that belief is an important part of what they were saying” (7). Truth as an epistemological value and as a scholarly purpose was sought in many of the nineteenth-century representations of Islam and Muslims, and instances of the discourse of truth abound in Victorian writings. John J. Pool’s Studies in Mohammedanism is a case in point. In the Preface, Pool declares, “I have dedicated this volume to Islam in England and to all seekers after Truth.” (xv).
Ironically, this appeal to the truth frames so much of the fiction of the period. The action of Wilkie Collins’s *The Moonstone* commences by the narrator’s pledge of truth in the Prologue. Being John Herncastle’s cousin, and having the privilege of being an eyewitness in the events he will relate later, the narrator tells his readers, “The reserve which I have hitherto maintained in this matter has been misinterpreted by members of my family whose good opinion I cannot consent to forfeit. I request them to suspend their decision until they have read my narrative. And I declare, on my word of honour, that what I am now about to write is, strictly and literally, the truth” (1). This qualitative differentiation between truth and falsity accentuated the binary perspective with which the hostile or confrontational camp approached the study of Islam and Muslims, a perspective which the more conciliatory camp sought to ameliorate. The discourse of truth was written against a backdrop of doubt, antipathy, and superiority, which characterized mainstream critical responses to those productions betraying apologist agenda. Bennett quotes a review of John Frederick Denison Maurice in the *Eclectic*. The reviewer asserts that

> Mr. Maurice has out-Carlyled Carlyle in his defence and admiration of the great Arabian imposter, whom he has converted into a religious reformer and witness of God. . . but still we have to ask why a crafty homicide, who rioted through the whole of the latter part of his life in sensuality and blood, should be canonized in the nineteenth century, as a great reformer or witness of God. (qtd. Bennett 64-5)

The above quote is significant, not only because it exemplifies the antipathy that was characteristic of mainstream responses to apologist writings, but also because it points to
an overriding fear of conversion to Islam among the British, such fear that resulted from the very first encounters between Islam and Christianity.

The encounter between Islam and Christianity was not born in the nineteenth century, but dates back to the appearance of Islam in Arabia in the seventh century, and to the ensuing contact between the new converts and the Christians there. A key moment in this contact (militant, cultural, and ideological) with Islam was the Crusades. From the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries, Muslim presence in Britain was conditioned by the political climate between Britain and the Muslim power that reigned in the East (Spain, India, and Turkey). This presence, as explained earlier, took a sizeable shape in the nineteenth century, particularly the second half of it, and the interaction was a two-way process, meaning that not only did Muslims reside on British soil, but also the British, for diplomatic, missionary, and academic reasons, established residence in Muslim countries. Naturally, this created heightened moments of contact between the British and a nascent migrant population back home, and between the Muslim inhabitants of the East and a visiting British population. Whether this population was composed of Moroccan merchants and sailors, Turkish refugees, or Indian students seeking their education in Britain, or whether this population was composed of English missionaries or consuls, this interaction at some point resulted in conversion to the Islamic faith on the part of the British.

Religious conversion has been a dreaded kind of transformation in British consciousness as long back as the Reformation and Britain’s first contacts with the Muslim sultanate in Turkey, perhaps because religious affiliation was, and still is to this day, a foundational component of identity. Daniel Vitkus’s book *Turning Turk* eloquently
explores how conversion and identity construction were deeply entrenched in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century British conscious. He provides a thorough background on Britain’s relationship with Islam in the Mediterranean and the ensuing fear this created among the British of conversion to Islam. To “turn Turk” became a pervasive trope for this fear in Elizabethan England. He asserts, for example, “what it meant to be a ‘Turk’ was itself disturbingly illusive and unstable identity. This could produce anxiety as well as admiration” (16). In nineteenth-century Britain this dread of conversion informed many a writer’s discourse. Carlyle’s lecture, The Hero as Prophet, for instance, while offering a passionate and shocking praise of Islam and Mohammad (to the British audience of the time), is premised on Calyle’s conviction that his audience is in no fear of being influenced to convert to Islam. He tells his audience, “He [Mahomet] is by no means the truest of Prophets; but I do esteem him a true one. Farther, as there is no danger of our becoming, any of us, Mahometans [emphasis added], I mean to say all the good of him I justly can” (38). Byron Smith, in his book, Islam in English Literature comments on Carlyle’s criterion for selecting the heroes who formed the subjects of his lectures. For Carlyle, Smith explains, longevity is a determining factor in a hero’s success. Smith adds, “Carlyle has a strong case whenever he appeals to the criterion of permanence. The judgment of time is hard to set aside; there is no universally recognized court of higher appeal” (221). Based on the quote from Carlyle above, I would like to argue that longevity was not the sole criterion behind Carlyle’s selection of Prophet Mohammad as an exemplary prophetic hero. In the quote above, Carlyle turns truth into a contingency. Fidelity to historical truth, in this case the truth in the representation of Prophet Mohammad’s character and religion, becomes a possibility only if “turning Turk”
is ruled out. In other words, Carlyle seems to be saying that if he suspected that his audience would convert to Islam upon hearing the lecture on Prophet Mohammad, he would not speak the truth about him. Carlyle’s fear cannot be overestimated, because conversion to Islam was increasing after the second half of the nineteenth century.

In his book, Conversion to Islam, Ali Kose identifies the first “large-scale” waves of conversion to Islam as dating to the late nineteenth century (12). Kose states that the “first conversion of an Englishman in this period was that of a peer called Lord Stanley of Alderley, an uncle of Bertrand Russell. … This was followed by the conversion of William H. Quilliam of Liverpool, a well-known lawyer and an eloquent speaker” (12). Kose goes on to explain the eminent role Quilliam played in spreading “the message of Islam” in Britain, starting with him being an agent in the conversion of his mother and three sons (12). Quilliam was a committed writer, an ardent social worker, and an active spokesman too. Among his numerous writings were booklets, the first of which Kose says, “ran into three editions in English and was translated into 13 languages,” as well as the issuing of the weekly, The Crescent (12). Quilliam established the Medina House, which “was a home for 20 or 30 foundlings who were brought up as Muslims” (Kose, 12). He also lectured widely on Islam in many parts of Britain, “using non-Islamic networks like Manx clubs and Temperance Societies and he claimed up to 150 British adherents” (Kose, 12-13). In addition to Quilliam’s role in spreading Islam in Britain in the latter part of the nineteenth century, other podiums began to appear during this period as well. These included The Liverpool Mosque and Muslim Institute and The Woking Mission.

Conversion to Islam gave rise to fear among the Christian community in Britain. And it gave rise to an extensive activity among the converts to establish their new hybrid
identity in their homeland and within the larger umma; to produce and disseminate a discourse that celebrates the virtues of their new faith; and, beyond the borders of Britain, to forge diplomatic ties with Muslims in the Muslim world, especially in North and West Africa (mainly through the Liverpool Muslim Institute). On the Christian front, a profuse amount of writing appeared (many times comparative in approach) with the aim of trying to win back the converts to the Christian faith. This comparative approach typically set Christianity up against Islam, usually to the effect of providing false information about it to a generally non-specialized audience who did not bother to check the facts. John J. Pool’s *Studies in Mohammedanism* is a case in point. A more thorough and chronological version of *Studies in a Mosque*, Pool’s book shows evidence of antagonistic and self-contradictory attitudes mixed with attempts at objectivity of presentation. Pool’s preface is what concerns us here. In his Preface, he declares, “And I most earnestly trust that the perusal of its pages may be instrumental in deepening the general faith of Christians in Christianity, and, perchance, in leading some of the members of the Moslem Institute at Liverpool back to the faith of their fathers” (xv). Pool appoints himself a champion of truth, and this was not uncommon in British writings of the kind where the authors reflected a deep-seated conviction in a single truth and ascribed this truth to Christianity.

This kind of milieu in which the new converts found themselves facing discursive attacks also produced responses on the Muslim front. These responses were textual as well as social. A number of factors helped solidify their physical and ideological presence in nineteenth-century Britain. One of them was the emergence of a wave of publications, *The Crescent* and *The Islamic World* being the most prominent among them. Editor Brent Singleton referred to *The Crescent* as a source material in the compilation of his book,
These publications, Singleton tells his readers, “were subscribed to by Muslims and non-Muslims alike across the English-speaking and Muslim worlds” (13). He quotes Ansari’s remark that “these publications were on the exchange list of around 100 foreign journals” (qtd. Singleton 13). The poems quoted here originally appeared in one or the other of these publications. Combining a myriad of subgenres such as the allegory, the sonnet, the ode, and the hymn, these poems feature a number of topics with a concentration in religious and political themes.

The religious poetry reveals the aspects of Islam the new converts found appealing. Paramount among them was Islam’s being a monotheistic religion. This is evident in poems like Ahmed Curtis Brann’s (1870-1951) “There is No God But Thee”: “There is no God but Thee; / No partner shares Thy Throne; / Through all, unending times and space, / Thy Glory reigns alone” (17). Another aspect of the faith that many writers dwelled favorably on is its requirement of submission to Allah. William Henry Abdullah Quillium’s poem “Islamic Resignation” is a good example:

Though sore the trials of the day,
Thou has decreed, so I obey,
And murm’ring not at Thy decree,
Allah, my all I yield to Thee.
I know this weary, anxious breast
With Thee will find eternal rest;
And knowing this, I do resign
My will, O Allah! Unto Thine. (134)
It is worth mentioning that in many of the religious poems in this collection, the reader will sense an appeal to truth, which was discussed earlier as a basic component of the anti-Islamic rhetoric of the period. This truth is marketed in these converts’ poetry as the distinctive quality of Islam. This is interesting because it implies a subtle comparison even in Muslim consciousness. It appears in poem titles as “The Creed of Truth” (by William Obeid-Ullah Cunliffe, 1831-1894), and is weaved into the fabric of other poems. An example of this is “A Laudatory Ode” by Smauel (Sami) Pigeon (CA. 1860):

Blessed be the Muslims,
Throughout all the world
Allah, in the Koran,
His wonders hath unfurled.
There, within those pages,
Allah plain hath told
All that men need know—
Truths like shining gold
Muhammed (best of prophets)
Is Allah’s prophet true;
His glorious revelation
Brings peace to me and you. (103)

The political and historical poetry of the new Muslims was diverse in its themes. Some poems pay homage to the political and historical icons of the Islamic faith and present them as brave and descending from a line of noble blood. Others retell key events in Muslim history such as the fall of Granda and the murder of Ali. The following lines
are taken from Yehya-En-Nasr (John) Parkinson’s (1874-1918) “Almansur.” The lines quoted celebrate a historical figure in Islamic history (Al Mansur, 930-1002, was ruler of Andalysia), and list of some of his qualities as a Muslim warrior:

Sons of Islam, knight, commander,

Line on line they outward span,

With the lance of great Almansur

Glittering in the Muslim van,

Defender of the law, Kuran.

Scourge of thy foeman, soldier of Hisham,

Victorious wert thou in every campaign,

Greatest sword that ever Islam

Launched o’er ringing fields of Spain,

Ever drenched her bleeding plain. (76)

The following lines are taken from Amherst Daniel Tyssen’s (1843-1930) “The Caliph Ali’s Hymn”:

“And now approach the murderous band,

I hear their threatening tread,

Their cunning chief his last command

In muttered tones has said.

That band, that chief, I need not fear,

I know, my God, that Thou art near.” (165)

An interesting point to mention about some of the historical and political poems in this collection is the different perspective they offer of some important events that were
memorialized by famous Christian poets such as Shelley. A case in point would be the Greek Revolution, which was the topic of poems as *The Revolt of Islam* and *Hellas*.

This project seeks in part to investigate the dynamics of the representations of Islam and Muslims in nineteenth-century British literature. Those representations written against the backdrop of the discourse of Empire were many times historically charged, both in the employment of some historical tool as the anecdote, or in the use as part of the plot actual events and personages of Islamic history. Engagement with the past was a hallmark of the Victorian, and prominent Victorian thinkers articulated a preoccupation with history, which was at once descriptive and prescriptive. Where Islam and the East were concerned, the past was an amalgam of fiction and fact, and writers like Walter Scott, Charles Dickens, and Wilkie Collins played the two up against each other creatively, yet recklessly, in plots of mystery, detection, and history in such a way which necessitates a closer look at historical consciousness for these Victorians. In the Preface to her book, *The Art and Science of Victorian History*, Rosemary Jann states that the “Victorians plundered the past for the raw stuff of imagination and shaped what they found to their own political, social, and aesthetic ends” (xi). Aside from recognizing this insatiability for the past in the Victorian appetite, and acknowledging Victorian writers as active agents in the reconstruction of the past under study, Jann’s statement is also a comment on historical accounts as end products. Intrinsically, the “raw stuff” is the content, which comprises the events and the agents of the historical field. The content, as well as the manner of relating this content, intertwine in a dynamic where historian and audience stand on opposite receiving ends. Eminent Victorian thinkers and historians
such as Thomas Babington Macaulay, Thomas Carlyle, and George Eliot addressed one aspect or the other of this dynamic in their historiographic writings.

Words like imagination, fancy, and invention were inseparable from the Victorians’ discussion of history. The Victorians viewed historical representation as an act requiring the coordination of two antithetical faculties: reason and imagination. In his article, “History,” for instance, Macaulay states that history “lies on the confines of two distinct territories. It is under the jurisdiction of two hostile powers . . . the Reason and the Imagination” (376-7). This points to an underlying assumption that much more was needed than the identification of the raw facts of the historical field to reproduce the past. Perhaps it is for this reason that Thomas Carlyle calls history art, and places it in a high rank among the other artistic forms (“On History,” 220). Elsewhere, George Eliot weds the antithetical faculties of reason and imagination. In “Historic Imagination,” she uses the term “veracious imagination,” and calls for its exercise in historical representation (92). Eliot defines veracious imagination as “the working-out in detail of the various steps by which a political or social change was reached, using all extant evidence and supplying deficiencies by careful analogical creation” (92). Imagination, as Eliot conceives it, then, serves a gap-filling function. Tacit in the definition is a realization that the past is partly unavailable to progeny. This unavailability accounts for deficiencies, or lost data, which the historian’s imagination supplies through the logical processes of deduction and induction. Moral responsibility is paramount in this gap-filling stage, where the historian’s political affiliation and moral orientation need to be kept at bay if an objective representation is to be produced.
Eliot’s definition provides a relevant transition to the next element in the dynamic of historical representation: the historian. That Eliot charges the historian with the task of exercising veracious imagination implies that the historian in her conception is much more than a passive reporter. He is an active agent in the risk-ridden reproduction of the past, which, due to issues of remove in time and place, lies before the historian as a tremendous raw canvas of color and scape in sore need of reconstruction. As a consequence, this spawned emphasis on truth-value, scale, and selection in historical representation. To capture the truth, in many ways, raised questions about whether the historian could capture the *whole* [emphasis added] truth. For this, selection was considered a necessity. As a method of the historian, then, selection rectified the idea that a historian should aim at the truth as a quantitative, holistic entity. Macaulay argues, “Some events must be represented on a large scale, others diminished; the great majority will be lost in the dimness of the horizon; and a general idea of their joint effect will be given by a few slight touches” (“History,” 388). Carlyle adds to Macaulay’s notion an emphasis on capturing the spirit of the age even when narrating the particular. For this, he distinguishes between the “Artist” and “Artisan of history.” The first represents history mechanically “without eye for the Whole.” The Artisans of history, on the other hand are “men who inform and ennoble the humblest department with an Idea of the Whole; and habitually know that only in the Whole is the Partial to be truly discerned” (“On History,” 222).

History for many Victorians carried a didactic function. In “On History Again,” Carlyle conceives history as “the Letter of Instructions, which the old generations write and posthumously transmit to the new” (88). Carlyle considers history a “philosophy,
“which “teach [es] by experience” (“On History,” 220). This suggests a need to moralize in historical accounts, a need to find a “lesson” in the experiences of past ages. However, what it meant to moralize in Victorian historical consciousness was closely related to how temporality unfolds. While a portion of Victorian thinkers conceived of causality as the model with which to study history, Carlyle seems to disagree. In Carlyle’s view, historians have fallen into the mistake of representing history through narrative, which is a symptom of their causal apprehension of the historical process. In Carlyle’s notion of the “Chaos of Being,” past events are connected through intricate networks extending in breadth, length, and depth in all directions. Causality is therefore insufficient as the model by which to conceive the historical process. The non-linearity of the historical process, therefore, renders narrative as a reductive vehicle for representing history.

The historical context above is meant to place before the reader a historiographic background from which to gain a glimpse at some of the conceptual concerns pertaining to the reproduction of the past in the nineteenth century. In offering the historical narrative described in this chapter, I mean to stress that nineteenth-century Britain did not need to travel to the East to know Muslims, nor depend unequivocally on other authors’ textual constructions of Islam and Muslims. The critiques of the literary texts in the succeeding chapters do not presume that the authors of these texts have read Macaulay, Carlyle, or Eliot. Nor does a foregrounding of the narrative of the presence of Muslims in nineteenth-century Britain form a conclusive historical evidence that fear of conversion to Islam was the motivation behind epistemic violence in the representations of Islam and Muslims. Rather, in shedding light on some of the minutia pertaining to poignant religious, cultural, and textual encounters between Islam and the British, I present
nineteenth-century Britain as a hybrid locale, and as an unstable ideology, which was in certain moments deconstructed from within. In the following chapters, I expand on this narrative by taking a more textual, if critical, approach to the study of a selection of two kinds of texts: those which committed epistemic violence in the representations of Islam and Muslims, and those which defied that violence by deconstructing some of the foundations on which it arose.
CHAPTER THREE

“TERRIBLE STANLEY”: EPISTEMIC VIOLENCE, THE ABSENT REFERENT, AND SELF-FASHIONING

It is part of my argument that the trope Anglo-Orient is not only an imaginary construct outside the immediate imperial centre, or its metropolis, for it resides, too, nearby in Thornfield, or Wuthering Heights, as a margin or a threshold. This liminal space is loaded with significations, but its narrative implications lead us to the very tension, indecision and, also, corruption and evil at the heart of empire.

-- Al-Musawi, Anglo-Orient: Easterns in Textual Camps

My mother was generously fond of telling me long stories I found amusing about someone named Terrible Stanley, a child whom I superficially resembled but who made a series of disastrous life decisions—running into traffic, playing with matches, going to the zoo without telling his mother, and so on. Stanley was the “other” with a vengeance, but he was also my double, and my sense of myself seemed bound up with the monitory tales of his tragicomic fate.

-- Greenblatt, Learning to Curse

Al-Musawi’s insight, laden with implications about the relationship between imperial discourse and the textual construction in literature of an imaginary Orient, is a hallmark articulation of the bulk of Oriental studies. One implication, found in Yumna Siddiqi’s book, Anxieties of Empire and the Fiction of Intrigue, for instance, is that the imperial apparatus was not without angst about its power and domination over its subjects. Such angst was translated toward the end of the nineteenth-century, among other manifestations, into a sense of anxiety in the metropolis about insurgencies in the colonies, and about the apprehension that characterized the integration of Empire’s surviving soldiers, those lucky who did not die, but who incurred injuries which left
them physically deformed, into everyday life of the metropolis. In textual camps, such anxiety found expression in the fiction of intrigue, which included detective and spy genres.

Al-Musawi’s insight, however, treats imperial impulse as the catalyst for the creation of this Anglo-Orient: an imaginary textual space encompassing the domains of fiction, history, and travel writing, where Arabian Nights, a fictional work, acts as a seminal reference for defining the character and temperament of the inhabitants of that textual space (15, 35). In another place in the book, Al-Musawi offers a diagnostic critique of this mode of writing about the East. He says,

Eastern writings served and still serve some kind of manipulation, satirical, moralistic or political, along with that personal irresistible urge of the imaginative. Misrepresentation is only part of this impulse. For information works according to the benefit of the user and the manipulator. But whenever this information blends with the personal and the latent, it partakes of that Anglo-Orientalization where “dim mingling of identities” takes place. Hence, this Anglo-Orient eludes accusations of intentional misrepresentation, even among critics of Orientalism. Belonging to European and, specifically, English cultures, and assuming its characteristics in terms of “national inheritance,” this Orient has nothing to do with its referential East. (54)

Central to Al-Musawi’s argument above is the location of three foundations of the phenomenon he terms “Anglo-Orient”: a referential East; a writer, who is labeled as “user” and “manipulator” of information; and a message whose information is
fabricated to serve the user’s agenda. Motivated by the “urge of the imaginative,” the user and manipulator, according to Al-Musawi, builds a new Orient by taking from the geographical Orient its mere referentiality, and blends fact with fiction in an act of “intentional misrepresentation.” Al-Musawi’s diagnosis points to the agency of the user, or writer about the East, by implicating this user in what he calls “intentional misrepresentation,” and by drawing attention to the immunity with which the writer about the East escapes criticism. This last notion recalls Gayatri Spivak’s in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” where she discusses the role of Western intellectuals’ (French poststructuralists) “implication in intellectual and economic history” (272).

In pointing to the role of Indian scholars of Sanskrit in enforcing the hegemony of Empire through their collaboration with English colonial administrators regarding the abolition of sati, Spivak identifies an epistemic violence, which, she argues, lies in effacing the “itinerary of the subaltern subject,” the Indian woman who undergoes immolation at the pyre of her husband (287). Epistemic violence for Spivak in this context is one of ventriloquization and subject effacement. The working-class Indian woman is spoken for, or represented by the dominant male, whether he is the Western intellectual, or the indigenous colonial administrator, and is thus “doubly effaced” (287). Spivak concludes that “both as object of colonialist historiography and as subject of insurgency, the ideological construction of gender keeps the male dominant. If, in the context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern female is even more deeply in shadow” (287). Valid beyond its Marxist framework, Spivak’s theory of epistemic violence resonates well with Al-Musawi’s in
implicating the agency of the Western intellectual in shaping/constructing the subjectivity of the Other, which is, in Al-Musawi’s case, the East and its inhabitants.

This chapter historicizes the representation of Islam and Muslims in nineteenth-century British literature by discussing epistemic violence in a specimen of works that undertook such project, and by exploring the idea of self-fashioning in Wilkie Collins’ *The Moonstone* and George Eliot’s *Daniel Deronda*, as necessitated by an encounter with the Muslim Other. Self-fashioning will be discussed in terms of its need of an “other” as well as its relation to geographical space in terms of the functional strategies of site-emptying and site-conjuring. The selection of the works for this chapter is by no means exhaustive, but rather representative of that nineteenth-century-British frame of mind which sought to morph Islam and Muslims into an essence that emanates qualities rejected by nineteenth-century British ethos, such as sexual license, physical violence, and political and social oppression. I draw on Gayatri Spivak’s notion of the implication of the Western intellectual in the act of epistemic violence, and expand her idea beyond its gender, class, and geographical designations by applying it to the representation of Islam and Muslims in nineteenth-century British literature. I also borrow Al-Musawi’s term, Anglo-Orient, to part with Spivak about the construction of subaltern subjectivity. My analysis locates epistemic violence in those works whose representation of Islam and Muslims shows Western discourse’s reduction of Muslim subjectivity to an essence that is the very projection of sexual license, physical violence, and political oppression. The second part of the chapter is inspired by Stephen Greenblatt’s book, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, and will apply his analysis of the “governing conditions” (9) of self-fashioning in sixteenth-century
British literature and culture to the textual construction of identity in two Victorian novels, George Eliot’s *Daniel Deronda* and Wilkie Collins’ *The Moonstone*.

Representation is an equivocal act of meaning making. A favorite topic among the practitioners of postcolonial theory, New Historicism, and anthropology, among others, representation, whether in the sense of speaking for as Spivak sees it; or incarnation as Euerbach conceives it; or interpretation as Geertz presents it, always presupposes a subject, or a referent. As an end product, representation carries with it the will, or desire to fashion the subject. It presupposes a triangular dynamic among representer, referent, and message. Within the context of nineteenth-century British literature and culture, this desire is located in imperial, as well as religious impulses, the latter manifested in the nineteenth-century religious debate and encounter with Islam, and the ensuing fear of conversion, discussed in the previous chapter. The representation of Islam and Muslims in this context is an act of subject-construction, its composing unit is the episteme: a crafted idea about a real or imaginary Muslim figure, site, or historical moment. Within the vast temporal, spatial, and cultural range of Muslim identity and history, their representation in nineteenth-century British literature and culture employs epistemic violence in as much as it seeks to collapse this rich range of socio-economic, gender, and ethnical strata of Muslim identity and history into a storehouse of messages, which, despite the minutiae specific to each example, become a stand-in for all that is negative: bloodshed, sexual license, and political and social oppression.

To get a nuanced picture of the ubiquity of this epistemic violence, one needs a closer look at who these representers were, or in what capacity they took upon
themselves the task of speaking for Islam and/or Muslims; the specificity of the referent; and the message that was passed by these representations. Representers in nineteenth-century writings about the East were men and women of letters; travelers; scientists; Biblical scholars; and critics and essayists for the periodical press. What these writers represented about Islam or Muslims reveals a commonality that overshadows occasional difference.

Lord Byron and Felicia Hemans, for instance, were among nineteenth-century poets who contributed to the creation of this Anglo-Orient by representing it as a site of strife and death. Byron’s rather long poem *The Giaour* is, to quote Al-Musawi’s valid point, “a Romantic valorization of passion, sustained by agonized memory, brooding melancholy, and a sense of guilt” (42). The Giaour narrates a tragedy that is one embodiment of the tension between the East and the West, as described in the chapter’s epigraph. Nowhere does the poem so eloquently sum up this tension than in the final two lines: “This broken tale was all he knew / Of her he loved, or him he slew” (219. 1333-34). The giaour in these lines becomes an active agent and embodiment of the West in its relation to the East, which is in this example, gender-oriented: the her of the pervious line, the Oriental female, becomes a site of interest, a predicate for the active agency of the male Westerner who seeks to possess her; the him of the line is the Oriental male, a not-so-worthy opponent who must be slain, or eliminated from the Eastern space. In this poem, Turkey becomes both a bloody battlefield where the giaour levels his revenge against the despotic Hassan, and a site of memory that bears witness to his doomed love for Leila.
Felicia Hemans’s poem “The Indian City” articulates a more or less similar message. With the Western character absent from this representation, India appears as a site of revenge and bloody war between native creeds. Hemans’s language portrays a moving story of a mother’s “deep heart wrung,” while at the same time presenting India as an unpredictable, mysterious site where murder lurks everywhere on the borderline between creeds (Hinduism and Islam). Religious intolerance, rekindled every time a blind murder takes place (in this example the murder of the Muslim boy who trespasses on Hindu territory), is the message in this representation. The speaker in the poem paints a vivid picture of this message,

Through the gates of the vanquished the Tartar steed
Bore in the avenger with foaming speed;
Free swept the flame through the idol fanes,
And the streams glowed red, as from warrior veins,
And the sword of the Moslem, let loose to slay,
Like the panther leapt on its flying prey,
Till a city of ruin begirt the shade
Where the boy and his mother at rest were laid. (180)

In these lines Islam is reduced to a tool of violence, which wreaks death and ruin wherever it is let “loose to slay.” In the construction of Anglo-Orient in the Byron and Hemans’ examples, epistemic violence essentializes the geographical Muslim site by identifying its two characteristics: death and love.

It is the domestic site, however, as represented by the harem, where the work of epistemic violence is most evident. Designating the female sphere of the Muslim
household, the harem acquired much significance in nineteenth-century British representations due to its peculiar status of being entirely closed to the male gaze, European and Eastern alike. In these representations, the harem becomes a synecdoche for the entire domestic space in the Muslim world. In nineteenth-century representations, the harem usually includes hidden recesses, locked chambers, and high walls that limit and control outside access. The inaccessibility of this private space had a twofold particularity: it spawned much curiosity about the identity of the women inhabiting it, their status in the social hierarchy of the household, and the kinds of activities that took place within its walls. The harem also defied verification. The absence of an authoritative validation system of the truth-value of any representation of the harem, which, depending on the socio-economic status of the family was not a standard component in the Muslim domestic sphere, makes the discussion of the representations of the harem difficult.

In her book, *Multiple Wives, Multiple Pleasures: Representing the Harem, 1800-1875*, Joan DelPlato articulates the difficulty with which an investigation of the representation of the harem is fraught. The absence of a frame of reference, a prototypical kind of harem, complicates the research, especially because the majority of nineteenth-century British and French representations revealed great “preoccupation with accuracy, a positivist principle that characterized much official and popular culture” (9). DelPlato declares, “A hunt for the truth about the harem is not only impossible, but a scholar’s obsession over it could preclude investigation into broader questions of epistemology and British and French self-reflexivity” (9). DelPlato makes the connection between the gaze of these writers, whom she calls “cultural purveyors,” the representative text as a product for the market, and the real space of the harem, “… editors of French
and British newspapers who agreed to publish travel accounts about the harem put forth notions of the harem space that evolved from their own agenda to capture the attention of a reading public and sell ‘news’” (10).

DelPlato’s remarks carry serious implications. One implication is that this Muslim domestic space is transformed into a product for sale in the British market. To give the harem this economic demarcation means to subject it to the demands of the market. And DelPlato’s last remark makes clear that newspaper editors and publishers are implicated in a potentially corrupt project. In other words, those editors and publishers put forth for consumption ideas that were guaranteed to sell, but were not necessarily true. Another implication of DelPlato’s last remark is that the authorization of these representations about the harem could not have materialized without some tacit immunity. When an author writes under the realization that no authority will question the integrity and truth-value of what they write, and when this writer markets him or herself as a first-hand witness about the harem, this creates a huge margin of textual freedom. Except in the very few works which have attempted otherwise, an example of which is Julia Pardoe’s *The City of the Sultan and Domestic Manners of the Turks*, which is discussed at length in the next chapter, most textual nineteenth-century British representations of the harem were epistemically violent in rendering this space a site of sexual license and social oppression, as manifested by slavery.

A pertinent example is *The Lustful Turk*. An anonymous erotic epistolary novel first published in 1828, and later reprinted by William Dugdale (who was prosecuted for publishing this obscene novel in 1857), *The Lustful Turk* tells the story of the abduction, rape, and sexual awakening, of the British Emily Barlow. Sailing from England to India
in 1814, Emily’s ship is attacked by Moorish pirates; Emily and her maid Eliza are taken as slaves to the harem of Ali, the Dey, or ruler, of Algiers. Through a series of letters to her friend Sylvia Carey, Emily tells the story of her rape, and sexual awakening by Ali Dey. After first resisting Ali’s advances, Emily starts responding to him, eventually enjoying and seeking intercourse. Emily also tells the story of the rape of other European slaves, who become the major inmates in Ali’s harem. Ali intercepts one of the letters sent by Sylvia one day, and outraged by Sylvia’s indignation, he arranges for her abduction from Toulon, France where she is visiting at the time. A graphic adventure ensues, where Sylvia is sold into the slave market, bought by Ali who disguises himself as a Frenchman, taken into his harem and raped. The novel is replete with graphic details that describe rape scenes and Ali’s sadism. The harem, both Ali Dey’s and Muzra Bey’s (Muzra is another male character in the novel, as well as ruler of Tunis), becomes the chief crime scene in *The Lustful Turk*, where physical torture, sexual license, and slavery are everyday practices. It is portrayed as the place where European females are turned from virtuous victims into lustful whores. 

As can be glimpsed from the plot summary, this novel draws an image of the harem as the quintessential locale of sexual license and social oppression. Interestingly, the source of Ali Dey’s sexual transgressions is not rooted in imperialist dogma. The anonymous author of the novel does not portray the relationship between the Turkish ruler and the European slave in colonizer-colonized terms. In the depiction of the dynamic power structure, the emphasis is on religion as a motivating force. This makes the effect of epistemic violence twofold: while asserting the existence of sexual crimes inside the harem, epistemic violence locates them in Muslim doctrine, and thus gains the
advantage of vilifying Islam. Ali Dey’s palace is represented as a locked-in prison where the European slave, whether of British, Italian, or Grecian origins, enters a virtuous virgin and is transformed through the sexual transgressions of the master into a whore. This transformation takes place under the sanction of Islam. In the opening pages of the novel, Ali Dey writes a letter to his friend the Bey (ruler) of Tunis in which he communicates gratitude for the present of a Grecian slave. In the letter Ali anchors his far-from-honorable intention toward the Grecian maid by telling his friend, “The Grecian slave, I rejoice to say again, I found a pure maid; her virginity I sacrificed on the Beiram feast of our Holy Prophet” (9). The Beiram is the Turkish name for Eid Al Fitr, the holiday which marks the end of the Muslim month of fasting, Ramadan. Ali Dey is celebrating a religious occasion by raping his Grecian captive. In the numerous scenes that portray the sexual encounter between Ali Dey and his captured victims, we hear this Dey pouring forth invocations for blessing from Prophet Mohammad. In describing the rape scene of Emily, the narrator, no other but the victim herself, tells the reader, “Every thrust he made was followed by some ejaculation, such as, ‘Delicious creature, . . . Holy Mohamet, I thank you” (25).

Islam is also recalled in the practice of naming. It is the habit of Ali Dey to give his female slaves Arabic names after he possesses them. The Grecian slave’s new name is Zena (10). The novel gives no explanation of the meaning of the name, but Zena is Arabic for adultery. Moreover, the novel makes frequent uses of verbal signals of religious identity, such as Christian and Turk, as if to frame the encounter between characters in a religious contest where the hierarchical power structure favors Islam. In one of their conversations, Ali tells Emily, “Lovely Christian, it is not the pleasure of our
Holy Prophet that I should at present be indulged in the enjoyment of your beauties” (20). In another place, Emily refers to herself as a martyr when she relates the story of her rape by Ali Dey to her friend Slyvia, “Stretched beyond bearing, as I may say I was, by the instrument of my martyrdom before my second fainting, I now in spite of my suffering could not help being considerably surprised at the very great alteration I experienced” (26). This religious context is more poignantly evoked in one of the illustrations within the pages of *The Lustful Turk*. One illustration describes the rape of an Italian slave, Honoria Grimaldi, where she appears to have been forced to lie naked on the bed, in full submission to Ali, who, equally naked, prepares to penetrate her. The illustration captures only a small corner of the room where the bed is located, but appears to be nonetheless richly decorated. In the lower right-hand corner, a maid sits on a carpet, facing the audience, and plays some string instrument for the amusement of Ali. The upper right-hand corner of the drawing reveals part of the room’s window, which overlooks a mosque with a dome and four minarets. In this highly suggestive illustration, the author drives home the idea that rape takes place under the condoning eye of Islam.

In Ali Dey’s harem Islam is represented not only as the condoner of rape, but the name behind which murder is committed. Toward the middle of the novel, Adianti the Grecian slave narrates her story to Emily. She tells her how the governor of the island of Macaria, who was a Christian “turned Turk” (67), tries to stop the marriage of Adianti to her love, Demetrius. Ozman (the governor) arrives at the head of a small troop at the church where the ceremony is held, and a bloody confrontation ensues. Demetrius kills one of the guards, and Ozman replies, “He has struck a Mussulman; he has outraged the law of the Prophet; he has polluted the person of the representative of the Commander of
the Faithful. Hew him to the earth! Cut him into atoms! Scatter his flesh to the beasts of
the field” (69). Demetrius is, of course, brutally killed shortly after Ozman’s order, and
Adianti is taken to the palace of Ali Dey where she is raped, brutally whipped for
resisting, and made one of the slaves of the harem. In Ali Dey’s harem, political
oppression is perpetuated in the large-scale practice of slavery. In *The Lustful Turk* two
kinds of revenue supply slaves: piracy, and the slave market. Ali’s fleet raids the seas,
and his pirates attack ships for booty and slaves, which is how Emily gets captured. The
captured slaves are then dispatched to the slave market where they remain until
purchased.

The slave market is portrayed as a bazaar where female captives lose their
humanity and become merchandise for the sale of the wealthy Muslim master. Ali Dey
recounts to Emily how he contrived to abduct Sylvia from Toulon, and he describes the
scene where Sylvia is put for sale in the slave market, “Next morning she was brought on
shore and placed in one of the slave Bazaars, under the direction of Abdallah. She was
stripped entirely naked, then a silk cloak was given her to wrap herself in, until my
eunuch Cameto examine whether she was worthy of being sent to my serial, as I had first
choice” (126). In this quote the slave market becomes a dehumanizing agent, a site where
Sylvia is reduced to the status of object. Stripped of her clothing, and therefore of her
humanity, she is wrapped in silk, as if a present, for the buyer with the highest bid. As in
the illustration that suggests Islam’s condoning of rape by establishing its looming
presence in the background of the rape scene, this scene points to Islam as the perpetrator
of slavery by giving the agent of its execution, Abdallah, a Muslim identity.
Not all representers of the East were writers of fiction. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain sent to the East a remarkable flux of travelers, scientists, and Biblical scholars who went back home with an impressive amount of information to share. Such information, according to Al-Musawi, while driven by a curiosity toward “scientific accuracy and reliable information” at the beginning, was later replaced by a passion for the exotic and fanciful, thanks to the pervasive influence of Arabian Nights (92). This in turn, affected the truth-value of the message that was articulated in the representation. In light of this, Al-Musawi identifies two modes of representation, or writing about the East in English writings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: The Oriental mode of writing, which is more factual, is that which appears in translations and adaptations from literatures of the East; and the Pseudo-Oriental mode of writing, which is more fictitious in nature and does not carry “enough grounding and knowledge” (36). In her article, “English Travelers and the Arabian Nights” Fatma Moussa-Mahmoud discusses the role Arabian Nights played in infiltrating even the seemingly more factual travel accounts of some of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers. For instance, she discusses how James Capper’s express recommendation of the necessity of reading Arabian Nights (a fictional work, let’s not forget) by the traveler to the East in his Observations on the Passage to India through Egypt, affected the truth-value of the content of the book (qtd. Moussa-Mahmoud 98).

Both Al-Musawi and Mahmoud’s note about blending fiction into factual writings about the East points to a general sense of ambivalence about the truth-value element in these writings. Chapter two discussed historical consciousness for some of the major nineteenth-century British thinkers, such as Matthew Arnold and George Eliot, for whom
adherence to historical truth was an ethical responsibility of the historian. Ambivalence is another form of epistemic violence, which, although does not take a reductive attitude toward the representation of Islam, does nevertheless reveal indifference about blending factual with fictional, or subjective information. A case in point is Stanely Lane-Poole’s *Studies in a Mosque*. A rather extensive representation of Islam on a myriad of topics ranging from the history of Islam in Arabia to the Shiya Schism and other, more specialized topics like The Brotherhood of Purity, Lane-Poole’s book is a mixture of partial, contradictory, and ambivalent attitudes about Islam. For instance, the author declares that his book is intended for the general reader. He uses this intention as an excuse for “omitting important developments of the Mohammedan religion” while dedicating about forty pages to discussing topics like The Persian miracle play.\(^5\) This process of selection and inclusion is dictated by the author’s ambivalence, as in Lane-Poole’s declaration that “Mohammad in part destroyed the Arab when he created the Muslim” (33). Does this statement mean that the Arab character was a rigid essence, an isolated system, which had to be destroyed in order to create its Muslim foil? Is Lane-Poole saying that without certain qualities the Arab is no longer Arab? And what are those qualities? According to Poole’s statement, are the designators Muslim and Arab mutually exclusive? This ambiguity, whether intentional or not, presents Islam as a destructive force, which, because Lane-Poole does not explain it, stands as an example of epistemic violence.

Moving to the domain of the periodical press, Paul Auchterlonie’s article, “From the Eastern Question to the Death of General Gordon: Representations of the Middle East in the Victorian Periodical Press, 1876-1885,” discusses the significant role which some
of the major Victorian periodicals played in infiltrating national opinion through the
dissemination of anti-Muslim ideology in England from 1867-1882. The author surveys
ten of the most widely read periodicals during this fifteen-year period. These periodicals
are Blackwood’s Magazine, Contemporary Review, Fortnightly Review, Nineteenth
Century, Fraser’s Magazine, Macmillan’s Magazine, Edinburgh Review, National
Review, Quarterly Review, and Cornhill Magazine (9). Auchterlonie provides a useful
table of the frequency of the most popular topics related to Islam that were published by
these periodicals. The Middle East, North Africa, and Islam, for example, appeared in
353 articles and reviews between 1867-1882 (9).

Auchterlonie’s article, significant for its survey of the most popular topics which
informed the political controversies of this late Victorian era, points to the critical role
which the periodical press played as a “medium for the exchange of ideas by the political
and intellectual elite in Britain” (5). The political scene, then, played a great role in
veering public opinion against Islam and Turkey, especially that the fifteen-year-period
which Auchterlonie studies has witnessed a number of events, such as the Russo-Turkish
war, and death of General Gordon in Khartoum, and the revolts of Bosnia and Bulgaria.
Auchterlonie goes on to site Prime Minister Gladstone’s contribution to the dissemination
of a fundamentally anti-Muslim sentiment in such racist remarks as his articulation that
the Turks are “one great anti-human specimen of humanity,” or that Turkey is the “most
cruel and mischievous despotism on Earth” (qtd. Auchterlonie 19). Auchterlonie cites
other public figures who made a similar contribution, such as war correspondent
Archibald Forbes, who maintained that the Turks as “Barbarians pure and simple”;
Edward Freeman, professor of Modern History at Oxford, who described the Bulgarian
massacres as “the foulest fabric of wrong the world ever saw”; and Stanford Canning, once ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, who maintained that the young Turks, “who have acquired some rudiments of civilization, chiefly from European adventurers have adopted all the vices of semicivilization” (qtd. Auchterlonie 11). Going back to Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” where she stresses the implication of the Western intellectual in the hegemonic project of subaltern subject-formation, Auchterlonie reiterates Spivak’s idea more simply, yet as powerfully. He goes on to cite the example of John Morley, editor of the *Fortnightly Review*, and a liberal cabinet minister, who spoke of his contributors being entrusted with the “momentous task of forming national opinion” (qtd. Auchterlonie 8). The periodical press, in Morley’s remark, was considered by Britain’s educated elite as a podium for shaping national opinion, whose support was significant for Britain’s imperial agenda. For such support to materialize, Al-Musawi argues that the creation of an inferior other is necessary. He states that Empire needed the “Other, not only for the sake of identification but also to achieve growth, and expansion” (20). If imperial agenda and religious debate (as discussed in the previous chapter) are constructed around the idea of an encounter between two opposites, whether it is Britain vis-à-vis the East, or Christianity vis-à-vis Islam, the contest is settled, through the representations of Islam and Muslims discussed thus far, by epistemically shaping the image of Islam and Muslims to stand in direct contrast to the qualities upheld by British or Christianity ethos. When works like *Arabian Nights* become a staple read, even in British nineteenth-century educated circles among such authors as Charles Dickens and Charlotte Bronte, according to Al-Musawi (page number), then this gives a fairly accurate idea about the pervasiveness of such images in British culture. This idea of the
necessity of the other, a perceived difference who illuminates by his very difference the identifying qualities of the Self is explored at length in Stephen Greenblatt’s *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*.

In the book, Greenblatt describes “some of the mechanisms of identity formation in the Renaissance” both in life and in writing (xvi). He successfully argues that this identity formation took place in lieu of, as in the case of Thomas More, a self-conscious awareness of the limitations of the private humanistic self vis-à-vis the power of the royal court and its demands for submission from its subjects. The other examples which Greenblatt discusses in the book drive home the argument that self-fashioning during the Renaissance was built around a perceived awareness of such hierarchical binaries as secular/religious power, private/public self, and Catholicism/Protestantism, and that the existence of such binaries was essential for the conception of self for these Renaissance figures. He explains at the beginning of his book what he calls the “governing conditions” of self-fashioning (9). Two of these governing conditions are pertinent here: “Self-fashioning is achieved in relation to something perceived as alien, strange, or hostile”; and “Self-fashioning occurs at the point of encounter between an authority and an alien” (9). Within the context of nineteenth-century British literature, epistemic violence creates hostile entities and potential threats of Islam and Muslims, as in the case of Gladstone and Forbes’ remarks above. Once this is established, self-fashioning needs only a setting to stage the encounter with that other. It would be unsafe to talk about nineteenth-century British self in the singular as if it were a unified entity. Such generalization or essentialization collapses the heterogeneity that is fed by the socio-economic, gender, and religious strata into one lump, and would therefore render any interpretation based on
such essentialization inaccurate. It is sound, however, to specify a certain context and examine British imperial identity, or British religious identity, for example, in terms of the politics and poetics that shaped that identity; and in terms of the major voices that attempted to articulate the variables and challenges at work in the construction of that identity.

A conception of self in nineteenth-century British literature was sometimes impossible without a certain conception of geographical space as a host for that self. This geographical space was not always immediately present as a lived reality, but was nonetheless necessary for self-fashioning because it provided a setting for contact with the other, which in turn, provided the contending element vis-a-vis which that self took its definition. And since that geographical space was not immediately present to host the self and its other, this entailed certain strategies of grappling with it. I identify two strategies that were necessary for the fashioning of imperial and Jewish identities in Wilkie Collins’ *The Moonstone* and George Eliot’s *Daniel Deronda*, namely, site conjuring, and site emptying. In the first novel, Collins conjures Somnauth and Seringapatam in an anecdote he commences his plot with. The conjuring of these cites provides a convenient setting for epistemic violence against Muslim conquerors, so that when the plot of *The Moonstone* commences, imperial identity, in the general character of the British army under General Baird is redeemed, by virtue of its contrast from its Muslim counterpart as civilized. The character of Herncastle, whose violence and greed propel the action of the novel with his theft of the Moonstone during the siege of the Palace of Tippo Sultan, is treated as an exception to a transparent British imperial self. In the case of *Daniel Deronda*, the fashioning of Jewish identity is inseparable from the
dream of proclaiming the Promised Land, which necessitates the conception of Palestine as an empty site, thus rendering its native inhabitants as absent referent.

Much of the appeal of Wilkie Collins’ *The Moonstone* stems from its being among the precursors of the detective novel (Introduction, *The Moonstone* vii). Collins’ style and his way of handling historical material have the merit of inviting a variety of interpretations. Yumna Siddiqi, in her book, *Anxieties of Empire and the Fiction of Intrigue*, for example, argues that Collins’ novel is ambivalent about Empire because it refrains from vilifying the Indian characters of the novel, given that the novel appeared during the post-Mutiny period (34). Siddiqi’s argument is valid if applied to the Indian priests who travel to London to retrieve their stolen Moonstone. However, Siddiqi overlooks the significance of the antecedent history that Collins uses to frame his plot. This history, encapsulated in the anecdote that relates the history of India under Muslim rule, which frames the Prologue of *The Moonstone*, conjures the sites of Somanuth and Seringapatam, to redeem British colonization that is at the heart of Empire.

The novel’s Prologue contains a family paper written by an anonymous narrator, a cousin of Herncastle’s, the character whose theft of the Moonstone sets the action for the entire plot. Collins bases his fictional novel on a historical anecdote, giving it roots that extend back to the eleventh century. The anecdote recounts the history of the horrific siege of Somnauth in the eleventh century by Muslim army under Mahmoud of Ghazna, the murder and ruin they wreak on the city, and the sacrilege they commit on the Hindu temples which they crown with the theft of a yellow diamond, The Moonstone, from the head of a much-revered Hindu deity. In his relation of the anecdote, the narrator fast-forwards to the seventeenth century to highlight the havoc which marked the reign of
Mogul Emperor Aurangzebe, then to the eighteenth century, which marked the defeat of Tippo Sultan of Seringapatam by the British army under General Baird, marking thus the end of Muslim rule in India.

The anecdote provides not only a suspenseful beginning to a sensational story whose events take place in London, it also functions as a historical stage for the encounter between the British and Muslim armies, which is a necessary validation mechanism for the moral indictment of Muslim conquest. As will be discussed further, the novel’s imperial discourse, epistemically violent, reduces Muslim character to greed and violence, thus serving to establish their otherness and difference, then to undermine Herncastle’s crimes. The anecdote becomes the workshop where the identity of the British imperial soldier is fashioned. At the moment of contact with his Muslim counterpart, the British soldier is vindicated from the violence associated with conquest. Herncastle’s case is treated as an exception. The murder of the Indian guardian of the Moonstone at his hands, and the premeditated theft of this diamond are ameliorated in his being shunned by his own family. British imperial identity is fashioned by its very difference from Muslim identity in the context of conquest. Epistemic violence, which is the prime agent of rendering the difference of this Muslim identity, appears in Collins’ choice of the primary sources for his historical data.

The “Note on the Composition” of The Moonstone informs the reader that Collins’ sources for the historical data contained in the Prologue include J. Talboys Wheeler’s The History of India from the Earliest Ages (qtd. Collins xxxi). Not quoting directly from his primary source, Collins instead creates an anonymous fictional narrator who becomes the agent of historical representation. A few lines into the Prologue, this narrator, who, by
virtue of his being a soldier under Baird is an eyewitness, asserts, “And I declare, on my word of honour, that what I am about to write is, strictly and literally, the truth” (1). Masquerading behind his agent of representation, Collins weaves the anecdote of the siege of Seringapatam from Wheeler’s *History*, a work whose authenticity was questionable in its day. In 1876, *The Athenaeum* published a review of part I of the forth volume of Wheeler’s book, which outlines the history of Muslim rule in India. The reviewer begins,

This is a most interesting and most disappointing volume. …one constantly meets comparatively insignificant facts unduly magnified, whilst matters of importance are frequently alluded to in a few brief sentences. … and he deals in the most sweeping assertions. … yet he persists in being a strong partisan of one of the sects of that religion, and has little good to say of those Mussulman leaders who were not strict favourers of the sect he patronizes. This book may best be described as an elaborate attack on one phase of the Mohammadan faith. (528)

The reviewer’s take on this part of Wheeler’s book is its highly subjective nature. Accusations of “sweeping assertions” and “strong” partisanship certainly collapse this part of his history’s claims to objectivity, which, in nineteenth-century British historical consciousness was essential, as discussed in chapter two.

Further on in the same article, the reviewer criticizes Wheeler’s inconsistent spelling and transliteration. Wheeler is described as “never sober and measured in his language. He must be ‘graphic,’ or nothing at all; and constantly repeats his pet sentences” (529). The reviewer has obviously given Wheeler’s volume a close study and is confident
in drawing conclusions about the author’s anti-Muslim sentiments that cloud his objectivity, as well as about his incompetence as a scholar. The review ends with a cautionary statement which expresses concern should Wheeler’s book achieve popularity, Mr. Wheeler’s book—it is to be feared—will probably become an educational power in India. Not only ‘Native Students’ will have to get it up for examinations, but Englishmen will be told it is an ‘authority.’ Instead of being regarded as an historical novel, smartly written, with an eye to effect, it will be said that the author is an eminent historian, staid, accurate, learned—which Mr. Wheeler certainly is not” (529). This castigation of Wheeler’s book recalls Al-Musawi’s critique of Anglo-Orient, it is an imaginary construction of the East by mingling fact with fiction, and creating as a result undemarcated fields which disseminate anti-Muslim ideology which is epistemically violent at heart.

Directly after the narrator’s pledge to truth, he conjures the colonial site, India, in order to prepare the ground for fashioning the British imperial self and its Muslim counterpart. The narrator explains, “In order that the circumstances may be clearly understood, I must revert for a moment to the period before the assault, and to the stories current in our camp [my italics] of the treasure in jewels and gold stored up in the Palace of Seringapatam” (1). The conjuring of Seringapatam takes place through slippage into subjectivity. The narrator’s assertion about the truth of his anecdote is completely undermined by a source as subjective as, “stories current in our camp.” The orality of these stories makes them susceptible to addition, deletion, and distortion, which are inevitable byproducts of orality as a medium of recording truth. Nevertheless, the narrator begins his anecdote in the eleventh century of the Christian era, “At that date, the
Mohammadan conqueror, Mahmoud of Ghizni, crossed India; seized on the holy city of Somnauth; and stripped of its treasures he famous temple … of all the deities worshipped in the temple, the Moon-God alone escaped the rapacity of the conquering Mohammedans [my italics]”(2). The conjuring of Somnauth becomes an epistemic necessity. Without anchoring Hernacastle’s theft of the Moonstone (an act which takes place in the late eighteenth century) in a grander scheme inaugurated by the rapacious Mohammedans, no such amelioration of British imperial guilt would have been possible. Mahmoud of Ghizni and his army must be implicated first.

A more historical account of the conquest of Somnauth, The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians by Sir H. M. Eliot, tells a different story. What makes this source more objective is that it is written in the annalistic mode of representation, “In the year 414 H. (Muslim calendar, corresponding to the eleventh century A.D.) Mahmud captured several forts and cities in Hind, and he also took the idol called Somnat” (8. 468). Eliot cites a history titled Tabakat-i Nasiri in which the “rapacious conquering Mohammedans” are just “the army of Islam” (qtd. Eliot 474). No word painting or sentimentality such as those which characterize the narrator’s anecdote appear in this source. In another history titled Habibu-s Siyar, by the historian Khondamir, which also appears in Eliot’s History, the conquest of Somnauth, sometimes referred to as Somnat, is related as follows, “The army of Ghaznin, full of bravery, having gone to the foot of the fort, brought down the Hindus from the tops of the ramparts with the points of eye-destroying arrows, and having placed scaling-ladders, they began to ascend with the loud cries of Allah-u-Akbar (i.e., God is greatest)” (4. 182). Despite the fact that this second Indian history is narrative in its mode, both histories take a more distanced, disinterested
approach in their representations of that part of the history of Somanuth. The subjective nature of the narrator’s anecdote in *The Moonstone*, on the other hand, borrows from the real event its historical referentiality.

The narrator’s anecdote continues, “One age followed another until the first years of the eighteenth Christian century saw the reign of Aurungzebe, Emperor of the Moguls. At his command, havoc and rapine were let loose once more among the temples of the worship of Brahmah” (2). The narrator attributes the “havoc and rapine” to Muslim actions as displayed in conquest, and this, in turn, serves to establish their difference from those displayed by British empire. The narrator’s political partisanship becomes evident if compared with the record of the same account in Indian histories. Eliot’s *History* cites a source titled *Mir-At-I Alam*, a history by Bakhtawar Khan. In a long extract about the character of Emperor Aurungzebe, Khan explains,

> Be it known to the readers of this work that this humble slave of the Almighty is going to describe in a correct manner the excellent Character, the worthy habits and the refined morals of this most Virtuous monarch, abu-l Muzaffar Muhiu-d din Muhammad Aurungzebe Alamgir, according as he has witnessed them with his own eyes…He gave Away in alms before his accession a portion of his allowance of lawful Food and clothing, and now devotes to the same purpose the income of a Few villages in the district of Delhi … He appears two or three times a Day in his court of audience with a pleasing countenance and mild look, to Dispense justice to complaints who come in numbers without any Hindrance, and as he listens to them with great attention … he is never
Displeased, and he never knits his brows. (7. 158)

The quote above draws a sketch of emperor Aurangzebe which is hard to reconcile with that drawn by the narrator in The Moonstone. Collins’ sources are, after all, questionable, at least as far as Wheeler’s history is concerned. The native Indian historian, Bakhtawar Khan, is conscious of the significance of the truth-value of his narrative, and is careful to communicate that this truth-value is closely observed by virtue of his being an eyewitness, as well as through establishing himself as a “slave of the Almighty,” which in Muslim poetics means that he submits his narrative to the omniscient authority of God.

The narrator’s word painting and political/moral partisanship take an extreme turn when his anecdote gives an account of the Moonstone when it reaches the hands of Sultan Tippo of Seringapatam. The narrator asserts, “The generations succeeded each other; the warrior who had committed the sacrilege perished miserably; the Moonstone passed (carrying its curse with it) from one lawless Mohammedan hand to another [my italics] …” (3). Collins’ narrator deals with sweeping generalizations: the history of Muslim rule in India is the history of plunder, murder, and lawlessness. The metonymy in the phrase conveys the idea of continuity; the change of time has caused no change in the character of Muslim conquest. On the other hand, the story of the English soldiers’ assault on Seringapatam is told in a distanced manner. The narrator says, “I never saw him [Herncastle] when we forded the river; when we planted the English flag in the first breach; when we crossed the ditch beyond; and, fighting every inch of our way, entered the town” (3). A quick glance at word choice proves that the narrator is not just telling two historical narratives. In one, the list includes “seized, stripped, rapacity, havoc, and rapine.” In the other, the choice of words gives the impression of brave warfare, “planted,
crossed, fighting, and entered.” British imperial self is fashioned, thus as being the contrast of its Muslim counterpart.

The story of the English assault on Seringapatam continues,

It was only at dusk, when the place was ours … We were each attached to a party sent out by the General’s orders to prevent the plunder and confusion which followed our conquest. The camp-followers committed deplorable excesses; and, worse still, the soldiers found their way, by an unguarded door into the treasury of the Palace, and loaded themselves with gold and jewels. (4)

The narrator employs a number of interpretive practices that betray the subjective nature of his account of the siege of Seringapatam by the British army. The first practice appears in the use of the possessive pronoun “ours.” Verbs such as seize and strip which are used to describe Muslim conquest are absent in this part of the anecdote. Instead, the narrator chooses the pronoun ours and appends Seringapatam to Empire’s possessions in a way that suggests positive agency. In the second interpretive practice the narrator admits that plunder occurred as a result of British conquest. However, the word plunder is coordinated with the word confusion, which suggests lack of agency, as if the narrator is saying that conquest is traumatic enough to deprive the British of their own agency, so that when they commit crimes such as theft, they elude conviction. In the narrator’s third interpretive practice, it is only “camp-followers” who carry it out, not the “rapacious” Christians, or the “lawless” English.

The narrator goes on to add, “Herncastle’s fiery temper had been, as I could plainly see, exasperated to a kind of frenzy by the terrible slaughter through which we
had passed” (4). In the narrator’s own words, slaughter does occur with the British conquest of Seringapatam. Here again, he acquits the British army by turning them into spectators rather than active agents when he treats slaughter from an effect of imperial causality into a site which “they pass through.” In the narrator’s words, British imperial identity is fashioned by absolving it of the murder and plunders which lie at the heart of empire. It is fashioned against its Muslim foil. The lawless Mohammedans, by contrast, “pollute” the shrine of the four-handed god by the “slaughter” of sacred animals and the “breaking into pieces” of the images of the sacred deities (4).

A sense of moral anarchy pervades the anecdote of the Prologue. In the narrator’s narrative, the history of India from the eleventh to the eighteenth century is the history of two contenders, Muslim conquest and British Empire, where the latter, in the person of Herncastle, if not entirely acquitted, is at least given the benefit of the doubt, and the former, personified by Mahmoud of Ghazni, emperor Aurungzebe, and the entire Mohammedans are collectively indicted. The narrator’s omniscience turns into uncertainty when it comes to Herncastle. In one of the final scenes of the anecdote, Herncastle succeeds in stealing the dagger that holds the Moonstone from an Indian soldier who appears to have been guarding, and who lies bathed in his blood, alone in the scene with Herncastle who holds the now dripping-with-blood dagger. The narrator admits,

Whether this be true or not, I cannot prevail upon myself to become his accuser—and I think with good reason. If I made the matter public, I have no evidence but moral to bring forward. I have not only no proof that he killed the two men at the door; I cannot even declare that he killed the
third man inside—for I cannot say that my own eyes saw the deed committed. It is true that I heard the dying Indians’ words; but if those words were pronounced to be the ravings of delirium, how can I contradict the assertion from my own knowledge? (6)

The narrator’s self-conscious realization of his limited knowledge makes him hesitant about passing judgment on Herncastle. The circumstances of stealing the Moonstone in this final scene push the odds against Herncastle, but the narrator refrains from holding him accountable for the murder of the dying Indian soldier, whose voice is silenced in the quote and whose own testimony is dismissed as the “ravings of delirium.” The narrator exercises caution in accusing one man who represents Empire, and calls for the necessity of material evidence before announcing any verdict against him. Such caution is entirely absent from the representation of Muslim conquest. The narrator’s uncertainty turns into omniscience, and he liberally indicts the Mohammedans as lawless, even in the absence of the evidence, which he admits is crucial.

In her article, “Wilkie Collins’s “Secret Dictate”: The Moonstone as a Response to Imperialist Panic,” Vickie Corkran maintains that The Moonstone is a politically subversive text. Her contention is that through the use of a mixed-race character, Jennings, Collins’ “Secret Dictate” is to appeal for an attitude of racial tolerance and an abdication of imperialist superiority. Corkran’s argument is grounded in the manner Collins handles the end of the story. This argument does not hold in light of what has been thus far discussed. The Moonstone fails to subvert imperial superiority, or to show ambivalence about Empire. On the contrary, through the conjuring of colonial site, India, British imperial self is fashioned, in the absence of material evidence against it, as
morally superior to its Muslim counterpart in an anecdote that serves to validate this self-fashioning through appeal to historical truth. It is irrelevant that upon his return to London Herncastle is shunned by his family for his theft of the Moonstone because they ultimately accept his theft/gift upon his death (In his will, Herncastle’s instruction is that the Moonstone goes to his niece Rachel as her birthday present).

If site-conjuring in *The Moonstone* plays Empire up against Muslim conquest in order to fashion a guilt-free imperial identity, site-emptying in *Daniel Deronda* consummates Jewish identity through the conception of the Promised Land as an empty space in which this Jewish identity is finds its definition. *Daniel Deronda*’s hegemonic discourse employs a number of mechanics for discrimination against the inhabitants of Palestine, thus foregrounding Eliot’s philosemitism. These mechanics include: an invocation of Jewish past, suppressing Jewish counter arguments about nationality, and speaking of the East (Palestine) as if it was vacant of its native inhabitants. In her article “The Modern Hep! Hep! Hep!” Eliot preaches the necessity of a Jewish awakening that could one day restore the Jewish people to their Promised Land. She endorses the need for “an adequate community of feeling . . . and the hope that there may arise some men of instruction and ardent public spirit . . . who will know how to use all favoring outward conditions. . . and steadfastly set their faces towards making their people once more one among the nations” (146). This dream of a future which will see the Jews restored to Palestine is validated through a constant invocation of a past, sometimes distant past, which serves to showcase the inheritance of Jews (443), as well as create a stepping stone for the Jewish dream of establishing continuity after disruption for the people of Israel. From artists and martyrs to political leaders and philosophers, *Daniel Deronda* is filled
with examples of Jewish figures who made a difference in their day by breaking a stereotype or rendering service to their people.

From the onset of the novel, Daniel is accredited with having a deep interest in history. In Book II, the narrator shows him reading Sismondi’s *History of the Italian Republics in the Middle Ages* (144). A few pages later, the narrator informs the reader that Daniel, a mere boy then, would rather be the medieval warrior Robert the Bruce than an English gentleman (149). The subtle association here between Robert the Bruce (the Scottish warrior leader who made his people a nation) and Daniel Deronda serves to foreshadow his journey to the East and establish him as a hero of Jews. Daniel is associated with Moses (161) and Ibn-Gebirol; Mira is compared to Berenice (406); Mordecai teaches little Jacob Hebrew poetry “after the model of Jehuda ha_Levi” (422); and the text’s many epigraphs and passages make frequent references to the sack of Babylon (199). Perhaps a more prominent, and arguably symbolic, reference to the past is Daniel’s connection with Kalonymous, his grandfather’s friend, and the sacred box he reclaims toward the end of the novel. During one of the confrontation scenes between Princess Halm-Eberstein (Daniel’s mother) and Daniel, she informs him that his grandfather Daniel Charisi had left his grandson a box which contains family records and preserved manuscripts pertaining to the history of Jews, documents which would aid them in the quest for restoring their lost land. The box is described as follows: “It was not very large, but was made heavy by ornamental bracers and handles of gilt iron. The wood was beautifully incised with Arabic lettering” (632). This outwardly embellished box is a literal and metaphoric unifying agent of Jews. On the literal level, the deciphering of some of the documents becomes the catalyst that joins Ezra Lapidoth, Mordecai, and
Daniel. This may well symbolize a desire to unite Jewish past, presence and future, making a whole circle of the Jewish Question.

The second mechanic of discrimination, which is part of the epistemic violence of the text of Daniel Deronda, is the suppression of counter arguments about Jewish nationality. In Book VI, Mordecai takes Daniel to one of the meetings he holds with some of London’s Jewish philosophers at the Hand and Banner Inn. Eliot uses the meeting scene to point to the ongoing debate among Jews about nationality. One particular Jew, Gideon, represents the rational side of the debate, which does not advocate the founding of an exclusive national home for Jews. Throughout the meeting, Mordecai engages in animated conversation with the philosophers, the chief participant among whom is Gideon, about the importance of reviving the Jewish spirit. Mordecai is portrayed as speaking with especial zeal in this particular meeting, having brought along with him Daniel, on whom he pins high hopes for the realization of the dream. Gideon confirms:

I’m a rational Jew myself. I stand by my people as a sort of family relations, and I am for keeping up our worship in a rational way. . . But I am for getting rid of all our superstitions and exclusiveness. There’s no reason why we shouldn’t melt gradually into the populations we live among. That’s the order of the day in point of progress. (465)

Gideon’s confirmation gains force when taken along with another one he makes a couple of pages later that the association of the Jews with Palestine is but a literal translation of Jewish liturgy, “perverted by superstitions” (471). Gideon makes sure to remind the philosophers at the meeting that in reviving Jewish memory and inheritance, they should
acknowledge that Jewish hatred goes hand in hand with it: “It isn’t all gratitude and harmless glory. Our people have inherited a good deal of hatred. There’s a pretty lot of curses still flying about . . . How will you justify keeping one sort of memory and throwing away the other?” (474). That the text acknowledges this other side of the debate is not an indication of its impartiality, because the final say in the meeting is given to Mordecai, with the narrator concluding that it “was as if they had come together to hear the blowing of the shophar, and had nothing to do now but to disperse” (476). The horn-sounding proclamations of Mordecai are the ones which the novel espouses: the newly married Daniel and Mira head for the “East” to realize the age-long dream of founding a national home for the Jews.

Whether the text of Daniel Deronda is busy invoking Jewish past, or suppressing counter arguments of Jewish nationality, the unrelenting assumption one is left with is that Palestine, or the East, is vacant of native people. Nowhere in the novel is any mention of the East as being inhabited. This violent act of erasure is complicit, historically speaking, with Britain’s political view, which transpired in its support of Jewish immigration to Palestine. This view is represented in the text by Sir Hugo and Lady Mallinger’s wedding present to the newlyweds: “Sir Hugo and Lady Mallinger had taken trouble to provide a complete equipment of Eastern travel” (709). A historical look into some of the reasons behind British, and by extension European, support of Jewish immigration is explained in Issa Nassar’s article, “In Their Image: Jerusalem in Nineteenth-Century English Travel Narratives.” Nassar argues that nineteenth-century European knowledge of and attitude toward Palestine was “textual” (3): it was built on an already existing corpus of European texts. European travelers to Palestine saw the
Palestine that existed in the Bible, for example, rather than the contemporary Palestine they saw before their eyes. Nassar adds, “Jerusalem was presented as almost an empty place. This emptiness, however, did not necessarily mean that Palestine had no native population. Rather, it is possible that emptiness meant that it had no “civilized” population since it was not yet subject to European political control” (8). This hegemonic idea becomes a measure of existence. Oriental people are not acknowledged unless they are “civilized” by European standards, which only seek to “tame” them into subjects. This attitude serves to filter European consciousness of the guilt that may be associated with Empire, and ennoble the Jewish quest that sought, to borrow a famous quote, “to offer a land without people for a people without land.” The discourse which constructs the characters who carry out the dream offers them as benevolent, philanthropic types.

Iveta Jusova and Dan Reyen, in their article, “Edward Said, Reuben Sachs, and Victorian Zionism,” second this opinion when they argue that “the Jewish types Eliot so favorably parades about in Daniel Deronda come across as . . . inventions, fabricated to provide the counterpoint of an ethical high ground against which to judge what Eliot saw as the increasingly morally bankrupt materialism of mainstream British culture” (6).

Edward Said explains the erasure of Palestinian population, both in Daniel Deronda and Western political discourse, as a result of Zionist conspiracy. In his book, The Question of Palestine, he contends that Zionism is a hegemonic project, an extension of European colonialism. He adds that “very little is said about what Zionism entailed for non-Jews who happened to have encountered it” (57). The rationale behind this, according to Said, is that the inhabitants of Palestine are “irrelevant” (55) to Zionists such as Mordecai and Deronda. Speaking in numbers, Said mentions that travel guides like the
famous Baedeker ascertained that Palestine was inhabited in the 1880s, for example, “by 650,000 mostly Arab people” (71). Nassar also adds that travel books like Murray’s Handbook for Travellers, establishes the number of Muslims in 1875 at 4,000, as opposed to 10,000 Jews (14). By contrast, the Ottoman population estimate of 1847 places the number of Muslims in Jerusalem at 25,000, as opposed to 10,000 Christians and 10,000 Jews (14). The point here, regardless of which figures one is inclined to believe, is that the land of Palestine was occupied by native peoples whose erasure becomes a necessity for the construction of Jewish identity. The act of site-emptying renders them inevitably as absent referent.

Reading Daniel Deronda as a hegemonic text raises questions about the repercussions of the act of epistemic violence that the text perpetrates. What does it really signify that the novel foregrounds some stories while repressing others? How is such reading of the novel and the consequent view of Eliot informed by shedding light on the subaltern groups which the novel successfully dims? Zionism did exist outside the pages of Daniel Deronda, and so did the land it sought and the people it erased. In this sense, the novel becomes an ideological apparatus, a sort of podium from which Eliot preaches her philosemitic agenda, which was enforced by such factors as her long-term relationship with Lewes, her admiration of Jewish historical figures like Spinoza, and her extensive study of Judaism. Furthermore, the benevolent fictional Deronda whom the novel hails as the awaited hero of the Jews is a prototype, although not as benevolent, for the historical Jewish immigrants to Palestine. Enforcing the dream of the Promised Land took place through an act of physical erasure. The non-fictional Derondas committed a series of cold-blooded massacres against the native inhabitants of Palestine, the first of
which was the Massacre of Deir Yasin (1948) by Haganah soldiers. Hundreds of the city’s civilian inhabitants were exterminated as a result.

In his introduction to *Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture*, Stephen Greenblatt explains how his sense of his own identity was sharpened by the story telling which his mother engaged him in as a child. A recurrent character in his mother’s story was Terrible Stanley, “a child whom I superficially resembled but who made a series of disastrous life decisions—running into traffic, playing with matches, going to the zoo without telling his mother, and so on” (6). Greenblatt rationalizes the function of Terrible Stanley in these stories by concluding that he “was the ‘other’ with a vengeance, but he was also my double, and my sense of myself seemed bound up with the minority tales of his tragicomic fate” (6). In Greenblatt’s personal life, his mother was the omniscient creator and narrator of his childhood stories. Behind the cautionary façade of these stories must have resided the mother’s best benevolent interests. The authors discussed in this chapter weave a similar story of Islam and its inhabitants. They are the Terrible Stanley who is patronized by Christian Britain’s literature. Cautionary as this Terrible Stanley may have been for the young Greenblatt, his creation was harmless because he was a mere figment of his mother’s imagination. All benevolence disappears, however, from the stories of this chapter, because the Terrible Stanley in them is real.
CHAPTER FOUR

“THE WOUND IN THE WALL”: ISLAM, REPRESENTATIONS, IDEAS

Amidst this general ignorance there were some solitary figures who, inspired by their own philosophical reasoning, meditated deeply on the problem of the rise of Islam. Doubtful of the integrity of the current opinions, they proceeded to institute a new inquiry, to which the introduction of Oriental Study also gave a strong support.

--Introduction, An Account of the Rise and Progress of Mahometanism

The above solitary figures, who forged a new path of inquiry about Islam through the critical works they produced, are the concern of this chapter. Inspired by Stephen Greenblatt’s article, “The Wound in the Wall,” in Practicing New Historicism, Chapter Four treats these solitary figures, or rather their works, proverbially by naming them “wounds.” The wall in this case, is not the literal wall in the panel of Paolo Uccello’s predella, which is the article’s critique interest, but a metaphor for the bulk of works written in nineteenth-century Britain, encompassing oriental studies, and the literature that represented Islam and Muslims. Greenblatt’s article is relevant in a number of ways. It lends the works discussed in the chapter a name and a trajectory which draw on New Historicism. In the article, Greenblatt comments on the blood in Uccello’s predella by telling us that this blood, which runs on the floor of the Jewish desecrator’s room, indicating a defiant, or skeptic activity (the burning of the wafer as a sign of doubt concerning the doctrine of Real Presence) which is not immediately visible to the outside world, “gathers together into a narrow stream, runs down across the tiles, and seeps out of the house through a passage resembling a bruise or wound, the size of a mouse hole in a cartoon, in the front wall near the door” (97). By metaphorical extension, what brings the works in this chapter together is that they contest some of the prevalent ideas about Islam
and Muslims. These works, by their departure from mainstream oriental studies and literature, channel into a metaphorical path, creating a force which causes a disruption, or “bruise,” in the wall of Oriental studies and literature. In the same way that the blood in the original painting reveals to the spectators outside the Jew’s room an ocular activity, the works that challenged the integrity of what the author of the epigraph calls the “current opinions” concerning Islam, reveal a kind of inner disquiet among some authors who tackled the subject of Islam in particular, and the East in general. On the other hand, the article, by submitting to close reading Joos Van Gent’s altarpiece and Paolo Uccello’s *predella*, juxtaposes two modes of representation; the one structural, or synchronic, the other narrative, or diachronic, and plays the practices of representation and interpretation up against each other, conjuring the context of the persecution of Jews in fourteenth-century Urbino, as well as Eucharist doctrine, in order to draw conclusions about anti-Semitism and the dynamic of doubt and faith in Christianity. In a similar manner, this chapter is a synchronic examination within the larger body of nineteenth-century British Oriental writings of text-specific moments. This synchronic examination takes a text-by-text approach, attempting to capture the mini-narrative each writer constructs in his or her counter-representation of Islam. These texts are Julia Pardoe’s *The City of the Sultan and Domestic Manners of the Turks* (1836); Godfrey Higgins’ *An Apology for the Life and Character of the Celebrated Prophet of Arabia, Called Mohamed or the Illustrious* (1829), and Thomas Walker Arnold’ *The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith* (1896). In inflecting wounds in the wall of Oriental studies, these three authors bring to their works the tools of the ethnographer, the erudite scholar, and the historian respectively.
Chapter Two discussed the historical encounter between Islam and Christianity in nineteenth-century Britain, and argued how the encounter contributed to the flow of the discourse of truth which argued an a priori essence whose source was proclaimed by the contesting adherents to belong either to Christianity or Islam. Within the rich corpus of British nineteenth-century Oriental studies, this discourse of truth was a pivot around which many writers hinged their narrative of Islam and Muslims. In that context, a strong undercurrent of competition among authors was taking place. Writers about the East did engage in discursive debates over representation, and each contending writer claimed the authority of their accounts through appeal to the truth. First-hand knowledge of one of the native languages of the East, such as Arabic, as well as residence in the East and interaction with its inhabitants were indeed strong claims among the writers who could boast any of them. The competition was perhaps felt most acutely among the less celebrated authors who sought to carve a niche for themselves among writers of the stamp of Lady Mary Montagu and Lord Byron, especially when their writings challenged the veracity of their competitors’ works. These less celebrated authors articulated the need to question the integrity of current opinions about Islam and Muslims by constructing counter representations which were anchored either in direct encounter with Muslims on Muslim soil, as in the case with Julia Pardoe, or in a scholarly revision of Muslim source material, as in the case with Godfrey Higgins and A. W. Arnold. Their approach can be said to be corrective, which is a term these authors use, in that it deconstructs particular ideas, or images of Islam or Muslims, and transcends the binary model of conception and representation. In these counter narratives, Islam appears as a tolerant religion. It is situated within the Judeo-Christian tradition, and treated more as a
culmination of that tradition rather as demonic religion. Prophet Mohamed is represented as a messenger, or “resoul” of God. The female private spaces of the harem and the bath are exonerated from charges of licentiousness, and Muslim women are modest in both behavior and dress. Slavery, polygamy, and a host of other issues pertaining to Islamic history are renegotiated in the works for discussion in this chapter. The fact that these works had publication dates ranging from 1829 to 1896 is testimony to the force and ongoing status of this discursive debate.

Chapter Three identified epistemological violence in hegemonic (Christian and colonial) representations of Islam in nineteenth-century British literature and argued the necessity of this violence for the fashioning of imperial and Jewish identities. This chapter, after the fashion of Greenblatt’s article, brings to the foreground three works which challenged these hegemonic representations, and constituted, as a result, a disruption in the bigger hegemonic matrix of British Oriental studies and literature. These works are Julia Pardoe’s *The City of the Sultan and Domestic Manners of the Turks* (1836), Godfrey Higgins’ *An Apology for the Life and Character of the Celebrated Prophet of Arabia, Called Mohamed, or the Illustrious* (1829), and Sir Thomas Arnold’s *The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith* (1896). The selection of these works was prompted by Byron Porter Smith’s pioneer contribution to the field of Oriental studies in his book, *Islam in English Literature* (1939), which appears in the literature review of chapter one. This chapter, in addressing how the authors above disrupt mainstream representations of Islam in British nineteenth-century Oriental studies and literature, historicizes these works through brief biographies of the authors, and a general look at their reception both in their day and in recent scholarship.
Due to the modern-day obscure status of these works, their inclusion in this chapter functions as recovery work. For this matter, and for a fuller grasp of the idea under discussion, a synopsis of the works is provided. Longer quotes from these recovered works will appear frequently throughout the chapter.

When the nineteenth century commenced, the debate over the veracity of Europe’s opinions concerning Islam and the East was already in circulation. In 1838, a writer for the British and Foreign Review opens his review of Julia Pardoe’s The City of the Sultan with a diagnostic look at the epistemological and political crisis which characterizes these representations. The review states that the “assertion that the Mussulmans are a race of barbarians encamped in Europe has at length been called in question” (86). He adds that the “anathema which Christendom proclaimed against the followers of the prophet, and which united our armies and navies in another crusade against the crescent, has already been regarded by our people as a disastrous stroke of policy” (86). The reviewer’s statement points to the Crusades as a historical catalyst for the encounter between Christianity and Islam, which, through time has acquired an emblematic name and become trope for a relationship, marked on the Christian front by anathema and condescension. As the epigraph of this chapter states, the nineteenth century witnessed, perhaps not the birth, but the burgeoning of a path of inquiry about Islam and the East, a path whose purpose was to put into question the validity of this trope.

The first work is Julia Pardoe’s The City of the Sultan and Domestic Manners of Turks. Julia Pardoe (1806-1862) was born in Beverley, Britain, the second daughter of Major Thomas Pardoe of the Royal Wagon Train, and niece to Captain William Pardoe of the Royal Navy. A memoir of Julia Pardoe in Bentley’s Miscellany commends the
reputation of her father by stating that “It is doing but bare justice to this amiable and excellent man to say that he was as much beloved by the men whom he commanded as he was popular among his fellow-officers, and his honorable retirement is still cheered by the regard and respect of all who have known him” (323). Pardoe was a prolific writer whose successful career showed promise from an early age (“Memoir,” 323). She is considered by the Short Biographical Dictionary of English of English Literature to be a “voluminous and versatile writer.” Her books include Traits and Traditions of Portugal, The City of Magyar, The Confessions of a Pretty Woman, Louis the Fourteenth, and Francis the First. Parode’s works were well received and her ability as a historical writer was praised in a review in Bentley’s Miscellany. The review pays tribute to Pardoe’s Louis the Fourteenth and Francis the First: “The amount of information displayed in these volumes is really stupendous, and the depth of research necessary to produce it, fully entitles Miss Pardoe to take a very high rank among the writers of history” (324).

Based on a personal journey with her father to Constantinople in 1836, Julia Pardoe’s book The City of the Sultan and Domestic Manners of Turks appeared the same year in three volumes. It describes Pardoe’s experience of Istanbul (this is the word Pardoe uses throughout her book) through a host of tours. The destination of these tours included the harem of a prominent Turkish merchant, a Turkish bath, the Military College, and several other places in both the Turkish and Greek quarters of Istanbul. Despite the fact that recent scholarship has paid no attention to Julia Pardoe, her works achieved a degree of popularity in her day. The City of the Sultan is one of Pardoe’s most celebrated works, as the reviews of the book in the periodical press demonstrate. A common feature in these reviews is their situation of Pardoe’s book within contemporary scholarship on the
subject of Turkey and the East, which, as one reviewer asserts, exists among a “dearth of trust-worthy books of travel” (“Article III,” 94). The reviewer for Reynolds’s Miscellany of Romance and General Literature, Science, and Art, for instance, calls The City of the Sultan “the best book ever written in respect to Turkish manner, habits, and customs” (322). In another place, a memoir of Pardoe in Bentley’s Miscellany testifies that the descriptions in The City of the Sultan, because of their “vividness,” as well as “evident truthfulness, … raised her to the height of popularity” (323). While the above reviews commend the qualitative contribution of Pardoe to the literature on Turkey, a more skeptic and lengthy opinion of The City of the Sultan appeared in the British and Foreign Review in 1838, which refuted Pardoe’s arguments by using the Western paradigm of historiography as a frame of reference in one instance, and the Muslim economic legislative system in another. The general patriarchal tone of the review, which claimed no intention of showings “forbearance for the sex of the writer” (96), proceeds by turning Pardoe’s reservations against her.

Residence in Turkey and first-hand interaction with its inhabitants, which is the argument Pardoe uses to further her arguments, is dismissed in this review as insufficient for a faithful representation of Turkey (96). The subtext of the review points to an overriding fear of losing ground to apologetic discourse. Prompted by the fact that The City of the Sultan has gone through a second edition, along with the realization that the book is gaining popularity and being “quoted as authority” on the subject of Turkey, the forty-two-page-long review employs the rational model of historiographic causality to deconstruct Pardoe’s ideas. In the opening pages of The City of the Sultan Pardoe condemns the excessive rationality of Western discourse and its driving causality, and
makes an appeal for a Romantic approach to the world which emphasizes the role of imagination and intuition. The reviewer uses Pardoe’s condemnation to attack her claims to factuality, stressing that a book which purports to tell the truth, should not attack European reason:

These are rather startling doctrines to begin a matter of fact work with; they display an originality which is quite heroic: this detestation of reason—of candidly tracing effects to their causes—in short, this liberal contempt for plain truth, may be abundantly convenient for varnishing up a work of fiction; but we confess that it does not increase our confidence in the conclusions of the “honest chronicler,” who promised to give her readers a “more complete and just insight into Turkish domestic life” than they “had hitherto obtained.” (96)

On a different level, the reviewer grounds the points Pardoe admires about Turkish character in the larger matrix of Turkish, or Islamic, legislation. For instance, Pardoe reflects on her experience at the Customhouse at Galata and commends Turkish civilized manners as evidenced in their respect of the passengers’ private property, as well as in the absence of fastidious inspection of luggage. The reviewer justifies these manners by anchoring them in the Islamic economic legislation of direct taxation, or compulsory alms levied on the able, adult Muslim, implying that the officers at the Customhouse did not perform a thorough inspection of passengers’ luggage because the bulk of the Turkish government’s revenue comes from direct taxation of its citizens, and not because the civilized manners of the officers prohibit them from searching the passengers’ private property. Had this not been the case, the reviewer suggests, the Turkish government
would probably look for customs as a source for its revenue, which would as a result cause the manners of the officers of the Customhouse to resemble their British counterparts (98-100). This review, in turning Pardoe’s appeal to Romanticism against her, and in situating Turkish civilized manners in the public space of the Customhouse in a legislative apparatus is meant to assert the established European opinions of Turks by showing them as conclusions which proceed from a false hypothesis on Pardoe’s part. A close reading of the text of *City of the Sultan*, however, reveals more merits than the review is ready to proclaim.

In the book, Pardoe emerges as an ethnographer whose tools are first-hand observation and a mental framework disengaged from the subjectivity of preconceived conclusions. Pardoes’ thick descriptions of Turkish character, customs, and religion challenge hegemonic representations. Her vivid use of detail and her portrayal of local color in a place so big and diverse as Istanbul commend the power of her observations. The ease with which she moves between public and domestic spaces, and between the Greek and Turkish quarters of Istanbul lend her account of Turkey this insider perspective, and the openness and conscientiousness with which Pardoe describes the various tour destinations, such as the Military College, the plague hospital, the *Kourban Bairam* (this is the Turkish name for Eid Al Adha), as well as the domestic spaces of the harem and the bath capture the diversity of Istanbul beautifully. On a more general level, Pardoe openly situates her book amidst popular contemporary scholarship on the East. She admits, “But, nevertheless, like the mouse in the fable, I may myself succeed in breaking away a few of the meshes that imprison the lion” (84). Pardoe’s social location, both in terms of her gender and economic ability, the last enabling her to reside in Turkey
for a few months, are strong advantages over other writers, advantages which enable her to “refute the errors of some of my predecessors, and to advance opinions, as well as to adduce facts, according to my own experience” (84).

In her engagement with popular works about the East, Pardoe concedes that misrepresentation is a staple characteristic. Replete with erroneous information and condescending judgments, these writings disseminate ideas so powerful and subtle in their effects that they carry what Pardoe calls “repercussion on public opinion” (84). This repercussion, as Pardoe adds, appears in the confusion in these writings between fictional ideas, such as the ones that permeate works like *Arabian Nights* about geniis and enchanted castles, and factual information that deals with the manners and habits of the inhabitants of the East, the tenets of their religion, and so forth. Pardoe implies that this confusion, which should keep two essentially antithetical modes of writing, the fictional and the factual, at bay, deceives the European mind. She declares, “The European mind has become so imbued with ideas of Oriental mysteriousness, mysticism, and magnificence, and it has been so long accustomed to pillow its faith on the marvels and metaphors of tourists, that it is to be doubted whether it will willingly cast off its old occasions, and suffer itself to be undeceived” (85).

Pardoe’s declaration raises serious questions about demarcation, and points to a causal dynamic in the relationship between the reader and the text. When differentiation between fictional and factual information in a text about the East becomes ambiguous, words such as Orient, Turk, and Islam, for instance, become imbued with loose significations associated with mysticism, exoticism, and sensuality. In Chapter VI,
Pardoe articulates the difficulty with which a European can undo such deception. Drawing on her personal experience, Pardoe tells the reader,

The very term “Oriental” implies to European ears the concentration of romance; and I was long in the East ere I could divest myself of the same feeling. It would have been easy for me to have continued the illusion, for Oriental habits lend themselves greatly to the deceit, when the looker-on is satisfied with glancing over the surface of things; but with a conscientious chronicler this does not suffice; and, consequently, I rather sought to be instructed than to be amused, and preferred the veracious to the entertaining. (102)

Pardoe’s confession implies a duty incumbent on the traveller to, and writer about the East; a responsibility to look beyond appearances, to question long-established notions of Easternness, and to aim for the factual as opposed to the fictional.

In deploring the crisis of misrepresentation in her predecessors’ writings about the East, Pardoe identifies two factors responsible for this misrepresentation: the language barrier, and the subjectivity of the writer. In the Preface to *The City of the Sultan*, Pardoe owns that unfamiliarity with the language of Turkey, and by extension, any native language a European traveller needs in order to communicate with the inhabitants of the Eastern country he or she is visiting, creates an alienating effect between that native and the traveller. An interpreter is needed in such cases, and this presents disadvantages to the faithful communication of ideas between the native and the traveller (v). Later in the book, Pardoe returns to the issue of interpretation and places more agency on the role of the interpreter, whose own mood and prejudices color the interpretation at hand. As a
result, Pardoe adds, “Flung back, consequently, upon his own resources, … the traveller hazards undigested and erroneous judgments on the most important facts, … and, deciding by personal feeling, condemns much that, did he perfectly and thoroughly comprehend its nature and tendency, he would probably applaud” (83).

Prompted by her status as an active eyewitness on the life and habits of Turks as she comes to know them through her journey in Istanbul, Pardoe sets out correcting some of the popular misconceptions about the Turks and about their religion. In this sense, The City of the Sultan is significant for a number of reasons. It brings to light a specimen of writers whose works carried misrepresentations of the East, and holds these writers accountable for the general antipathy and condescension with which Europe looks on the East. In this regard, the book shows the discursive conversation among writers at its best. The book’s contribution lies not only in articulating eloquently the problem of misrepresentation in nineteenth-century scholarship about the East, but also asking the readers to question previously held judgments on Turkey and its inhabitants. Issues such as polygamy, the harem, slavery, the Turkish bath, religious freedom and tolerance of other creeds, the manners and habits of Turks, which feature prominently in European mainstream writings are contested throughout the pages of The City of the Sultan.

Pardoe’s engagement with nineteenth-century scholarship about the East is at once poignant and uncompromising, with an air of moral responsibility pervading her responses, which encompass aesthetic, religious, moral, and political topics. Her approach combines a tone of general disagreement with recent scholarship, with a more fastidious attention to particular authors and works. Nowhere in the book is this fastidiousness more assertive than in Chapter VIII about the Turkish bath. In refuting the
general ideas of sensuality which have mistakenly come to be associated with this site,

Pardoe closes the chapter with a critique of Lady Mary Montague:

I should be unjust did I not declare that I witnessed none of that unnecessary
and wanton exposure described by Lady M. W. Montague. Either the fair
ambassadress was present at a particular ceremony, or the Turkish ladies have
become more delicate and fastidious in their ideas of propriety.
The excessive exhaustion which it induces, and the great quantity of time
which it consumes, are the only objections that can reasonably be advanced
against the use of the Turkish bath. (130)

In other places in the book, Pardoe’s responses are more general. For instance, in Chapter
V, she takes the caique (a small boat) on a tour around Istanbul. Since the tour falls on
the first day of sunshine since her arrival in Turkey, Pardoe looks around with the
questioning eye of the traveller, alluding to works which presented an exaggerated
description of mosques in Turkey. Her response is decisive: “I looked around me in order
to discover the “gilded domes” of which a modern traveller has spoken; but, alas! —the
truth must be told—not a mosque in Stamboul has a gilded dome” (63). In Chapter VII,
Pardoe describes with admiration Turkish dinner as she experiences it at the hospitable
house of Mustafa Effendi, the Egyptian Charge d’Affaires in Istanboul. On finishing her
dinner, she concludes, “when I laid aside my gold-embroidered napkin, and wiped the
rose water from my hands, I could but marvel at the hyper-fastidiousness of those
travellers who have affected to quarrel with the Turkish kitchen; or infer that they had
only “assisted” at the tables of hotels and eating-houses” (110). Pardoe’s description does
reveal this admiration for the lavishness of the dinner ceremony, which point to the social
location of her host, limiting thus any claims to generalization. Pardoe’s observations in this context do not refer to a poor, or middle-class Turkish Kitchen, but to wealthy Turkish kitchen.

On yet another level, *The City of the Sultan*’s merit lies in its deconstruction of those misconceptions that have become the staple accusations by which nineteenth-century mainstream discourse condemned the East. Polygamy, the Harem, slavery, the Turkish bath, the oppression of Islam, and the general manners of Turks are some important misconceptions, which Pardoe attempts to demystify by examining them from a different perspective. The gist of Pardoe’s representations drives home the messages that Turkish women are more modest than mainstream representations have painted them; that Turkish manners are in many comparative examples more civilized than those of Europeans; and that an understanding of some of the Islamic practices, such as polygamy, requires a sort of paradigm filter which situates them in the Islamic socio-economic context.

Throughout the book, Pardoe makes frequent references to polygamy as the occasion presents it. Her references indicate how European public opinion, as she terms it earlier in her book, has been deceived into viewing polygamy as the default practice among the inhabitants of the East. Pardoe’s demystification of polygamy situates this practice within the larger socio-economic Islamic matrix, where it is conceived as a transaction, patriarchal notwithstanding, whose motives transcend male libido. Pardoe declares:

The instances are rare in which a Turk, save among the higher ranks, becomes the husband of two wives. He usually marries a woman of his own rank; after which, should he, either from whim, or for family
reasons, resolve on increasing his establishment, he purchases slaves from Circassia and Georgia, who are termed *Odaliques*; and who, however they succeed in superseding the Buyuk Hanoum or head of the harem, in his affections, are, nevertheless, subordinate persons in the household. (97-8)

On the issue of slavery, Pardoe’s approach is more comparative. She frequently sets slavery in Turkey up against slavery in the West in order to stress some cogent points. Prominent among those is the relatively voluntary status of slavery. In Pardoe’s depictions, slavery is called a “mere name” (109). It is depicted as a non-coercive transaction entered into between two partners: a Turkish buyer, and this includes both males and females, the latter usually the wife of some high-ranking Turk, and a Georgian or Circassian family (this is generally where female slaves were bought). In this context, Pardoe clarifies the word “bought.” It does not entail ownership on the master’s part. The money paid for the slave’s family, and this is usually a handsome amount, is an advanced payment for that slave’s labors. And here, Pardoe adds that the family of the slave enjoys unconditional freedom in choosing the master. Throughout her observations of slaves and how they function in the domestic sphere, Pardoe highlights the humanitarian element in the relationship between master and slave. Slaves are treated kindly, fed and clothed generously, and are never subjected to hard labor. A sub-class of the female slaves is the *Odali*ques: those who voluntarily agree to a marriage proposal by the master of the house or his son. Interestingly, as Pardoe states, these *Odali*ques, upon giving birth to a son, earn their freedom and the privilege of upward mobility in the social hierarchy of Turkish society. In Chapter VI, Pardoe admits:
Where I a man, and condemned to an existence of servitude, would unhesitatingly chuse that of slavery in a Turkish family: for if ever the “bitter draught” can indeed be rendered palatable, it is there. The slave of the Osmanli is the child of his adoption; he purchases with his gold a being to cherish, to protect, and to support; and in almost every case he secures to himself what all his gold could not command—a devoted and loving heart, ready to sacrifice its every hope and impulse in his service. Once forgot that the smiling menial who hands you your coffee, or pours the rose-water on your hands from an urn of silver, has been purchased at a price, and you must look with admiration on the relative positions of the servant and his lord—the one so eager and so earnest in his services—the other so gentle and so unexacting in his commands. (99)

Two of the most misrepresented spaces of the Eastern world, the harem and the Turkish bath are powerfully demystified in The City of the Sultan. Despite the fact that Pardoe does not refrain from criticizing objectionable practices in these spaces, such as the overall state idleness of women and heavy smoking, her depictions challenge the hegemonic, usually patriarchal, representations of the European gaze. In these hegemonic representations, sensuality is the dominant characteristic. In Pardoe’s observations, sensuality and nudity are absent from these private spaces. In her descriptions of the Turkish bath, for instance, Pardoe pays considerable attention to the physicality of the space: its architecture, operation, and general atmosphere. Pardoe’s impression of the general atmosphere of the Turkish bath is one of merriment, and her descriptions draw attention to the scrupulous care about hygiene, both of the premises, and of the female
body. Overall, in Pardoe’s representation, the Turkish bath becomes a neutralized site, and with the exception of slaves who are the only females whose half nudity (from the waist upwards) is accepted, this private space emerges as one of society’s facilities, just like the hospital and the school; its only restriction lying in the observation of the Islamic etiquette of segregation where the female body appears in such a manner which violates the code of modesty. In the opening paragraph of Chapter VIII, Pardoe tells the reader:

The first bath-room which I saw in the country was that of Scodra Pasha; and, had I been inclined so to do, I might doubtlessly have woven a pretty fiction of the subject, without actually visiting one of these extraordinary establishments. But too much has already been written on inference by Eastern tourists, and I have no wish to add to the facts, by suffering imagination to usurp the office of vision. Such being the case, I resolved to visit a public bath, in company with a female acquaintance, and not only become a spectator but an actor in the scene, if I found the arrangement feasible. (123)

Pardoe employs the same questioning stance in her descriptions of the harem, which is defined in the book as “women’s apartments” (16). Here too, sensuality and licentiousness are absent from the general atmosphere of the harems which Pardoe visits. Through the connections of her father, she gains valuable access to these private spaces, and shares some rich insights pertaining to their size, design, and furnishings. Pardoe marvels on the beauty of Turkish women and describes their dress in detail. Her experience is not only that of the looker-on, but that of the participant. She takes part in the activities of the harem, for instance, fasting (her visit to Turkey falls on Ramadan, the
Muslim month of Lent) and listening to the massaljhe, or tale-teller (24). First a guest at the house of Usuf Effendi, a respectable merchant, then at that of Mustafa Effendi, the Charge d’Affaires in Istanboul, Pardoe deconstructs hegemonic representations of these harems which equate them with prisons. She responds to this claim in the part of Chapter VI which she titles, “Inviolability of the Harem”:

If, as we are all prone to believe, freedom be happiness, then are the Turkish women the happiest, for they are certainly the freest individuals in the Empire. It is the fashion in Europe to pity the women of the East; But it is ignorance of their position alone which can engender so misplaced an exhibition of sentiment (96).

Pardoe’s conditional sentence constructs a comparison between Turkish women men, and between Turkish and European women. In Pardoe’s eyes, Turkish women appear as happy individuals because they enjoy a wide margin of freedom, which includes, though not listed the above quote but in another place in the book, the freedom to enter and exit this space in order to socialize and shop (95).

Moving from her specific remarks about the harem, Pardoe makes observations about the position of Turkish women in society, about European misconceived ideas concerning religious intolerance of Muslims, and popular claims of their barbarism. In The City of the Sultan, Turkey is portrayed as a melting pot where Christians and Jews coexist with Muslims under no pressure to convert. In Chapter III, Pardoe relates the story of the sisterhood of Genoa, who sent a petition to the Sultan of Turkey in 1818, asking aid against the French Republicans who had done harm to their convent. The Sultan responded favorably by sending a present of rich Turkey carpets for the renovation of the
floor of their chapel. Pardoe concludes the anecdote by calling the present a “magnificent
donation by which a Musselmaun Emperor contributed to the adornment of a temple
dedicated to Christian worship” (50).

_The City of the Sultan_ is filled with statements of admiration about the civilized
manners of Turks. Pardoe uses the term “barbarism” ironically in order to thwart its
hegemonic definition. Among the praise-worthy manners of Turks, Pardoe includes
respect for animal rights, as exemplified by the phenomenon of “straw huts,” so
popular along the streets of Istanbul, for the benefit of homeless dogs (12-13). The
civilized manners of the officers at the Customhouse at Galata are contrasted with
those of the British in a passage of condemnation of the latter:

I could not avoid contrasting this mode of action in the “barbarous” East,
With that of “civilized” Europe, where even your very person is not sacred
From the investigation of low-bred and low-minded individuals, from
whose officious and frequently impertinent contact you can secure
yourself only by a bribe. (11)

This interesting play on the word “barbarous” appears frequently throughout the book.
An outstanding example is in Chapter VI, where Pardoe commends the depth of the
Turks’ parental affections and the gratitude with which they treat their mothers: “These
are strong traits, beautiful developments, of human nature; and if such be indeed the
social attributes of “barbarism,” then may civilized Europe, amid her pride of science and
her superiority of knowledge, confess that herein at least she is mated by the less highly-
gifted Musselmauns” (94). Pardoe’s disgruntled comparison between European and
Muslim domestic manners collapses not only the hegemonic definition of the word
barbarism, but also by extension, the Western paradigm of nation taxonomy into Western, and therefore, advanced and superior; and Eastern, therefore, uncivilized and inferior. Underneath Pardoe’s comparisons throughout City of the Sultan lies deep skepticism of established ideas, which takes a more effective turn, because documented from Western and Islamic primary sources, in the next work for discussion, Godfrey Higgins’ An Apology for the Life and Character of the Celebrated Prophet of Arabia, Called Mohamed, or the Illustrious.

The difference between the two works is that of approach; where Julia Pardoe’s is that of the ethnographer, Godfrey Higgins’ is that of the erudite scholar. Higgins was born the only son to Godfrey Higgins Esq. in 1772. He went to Cambridge in 1790, and later studied law at the Inner Temple. He was a prolific writer, an archaeologist, and a social reformer, whose activities, when he acted in the capacity of magistrate of York, included campaigning for parliamentary reform against such abuses as the exploitation of children in factories; heavy taxation; and the cruel treatment of pauper lunatics at the York Lunatic Asylum. His works include The Celtic Druids (1827); Horae Sabbaticae, a study of the Sabbath (1826); and Anacalypsis, published posthumously in 1836.7 When Higgins died in 1833, his obituary in the Doncaster Gazette described him as a “much esteemed and respected gentleman ... cheerful and kind-hearted ... an assiduous and able magistrate, quick to discover the right, and firm and fearless to promote and to maintain it.”8 An Apology for the Life and Character of the Celebrated Prophet of Arabia, Called Mohamed, or the Illustrious was published in 1829 as a small tract in the structure of numbered paragraphs totaling 237 whose aim, as Higgins asserts in the opening page of his tract, is to correct the prevalent inaccurate ideas concerning Islam (vii). Higgins’
merits as a competent scholar and historian have sadly gone unnoticed in recent scholarship, but were commended in the nineteenth-century British periodical press. While the recognition of *Apology* does not go beyond that of register, Higgins’ other works, and his life and character in general were the subjects of a number of articles and reviews in nineteenth-century British periodical press. The author of an article in the famous journal, *The Academy and Literature*, for instance, describes Higgins as “eccentric,” in reviewing his book, *Anacalypsis* (R. C. Brown, 234). *The Gentleman’s Magazine* published an obituary of Higgins in 1833, in which it is declared, “his opinions, both in religion and politics, were leveling and destructive; but his personal manners were mild and courteous” (371). In the *Edinburgh Review*, Higgins is described as a “man of curious and discursive learning. His books contain so much strange and out-of-the-way knowledge, especially in matters inconceivably remote from those which he professes to have under discussion” (49).

In *Apology*, Higgins reveals formidable competence in Islamic history, theology, and doctrine. The depth and breadth of his knowledge of the Western and Christian traditions, as well as of Latin, French, and Hebrew, as evidenced in the following discussion, enable him to make frequent quotes from primary Muslim and Western sources with great facility, as well as to point out pertinent blind spots in these sources. In *Apology*, Higgins reconstructs the image of Prophet Mohammad and of Islam using the tools of reason: close reading of primary sources, questioning, and drawing valid conclusions based on textual evidence.

Higgins’ engagement with scholarship on Islam and the East follows Pardoe’s in responding to particular authors and works, but transcends it in taking a more defined
turn by addressing a particular audience: the members of the Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Higgins begins with a direct and sincere appeal to the Society to consider his tract as a serious attempt at correcting popular misconceptions about Islam and Prophet Mohamed. He writes:

To you, my Lords and Gentlemen, I take the liberty of dedicating this small Tract, because I am desirous of correcting what appear to me to be the erroneous opinions which some of the individuals of your Society (as well as others of my countrymen) entertain respecting the religion of many millions of the inhabitants of the Oriental Countries, about the welfare of whom you meritoriously interest yourselves; and, because a right understanding of their religion, by you, is of the first importance to their welfare. I do it without the knowledge or approbation of the Society, or of any of its Members, in order that they may not be implicated in my sentiments. (vii)

Higgins’ address is at once rooted in the discourse of Empire in stressing its civilizing mission and its implications of hegemony over the inhabitants of the East, which only a seasoned scholar can use so efficiently to demystify the prevalent misconceptions about his topic. The purpose of his address, according to Higgins, is to indicate that the only way in which they can effectively fulfill their purpose of ensuring the welfare of Oriental countries, is by obtaining, through his scholarly discourse, a truthful knowledge of their religion and history. A few pages later in his tract, Higgins explains the difficulty which accompanies a truthful investigation of Islam, Prophet Mohamed, and Muslim history. The available Western sources on the subject, according to Higgins, are fraught with
prejudice and animosity, which puts into question the objectivity and trustworthiness of these sources. He asserts:

I know no man concerning whom it is more difficult to form an opinion than of Mohamed, the celebrated prophet of Arabia. Bigotry on one side, and malice on the other, have obscured the history of this extraordinary person, that it is very difficult to come to a certainty as to the truth of most circumstances respecting him. The facts stated to his disadvantage by Christians, it is clear on sound reasoning, can no more be admitted as evidence against him, than those can against Jesus Christ stated by Jews; unless in each case this exceptionable evidence by some other means receive confirmation. (2)

Establishing this difficulty at the outset, Higgins sets out to expose the falsity, contradiction, and prejudice in some of the established sources and authors of the Western and Christian traditions. These include the Bible, Humphrey Prideaux’s Life of Mahomet (1697), Rev. Joseph White of the Bampton Lectures (1784), George Sales’ translation of the Koran (1734), Dr. Samuel Lee’s Controversial Tracts Relating to Christianity and Mohamedans (1824), Edward Gibbon’s The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-1789), among many others.

In Apology Higgins proceeds in a scholarly manner, through direct quotes from and references to specific sources, to clarify some of the common misconceptions concerning Islam and Prophet Mohamed. These include the importance of morality in Islamic doctrine, the meaning of the prophethood of Prophet Mohamed, the role of coercion and the sword in the dissemination of Islam, polygamy, Islam’s sensual paradise,
religious intolerance, and the Bible’s foretelling of the mission of Prophet Mohamed.

Higgins’ methods in addressing these misconceptions include finding the common
ground between Christianity and Islam; direct quoting and interpretation of primary
Islamic sources, such as the Koran; using the Western paradigm of causality to refute or
vindicate a certain point; exposing the double standard of Christian discourse;
comparison and contrast; direct questioning; and appeal to history. In Higgins’ tract
history is deployed as a text and an archive. The textuality of the historical record enables
Higgins to use it as a frame of reference, which he consults to settle a point of dispute. In
other places in *Apology*, Higgins considers history as an incomplete archive, a record
with gaps, which he fills in through his close readings of both Muslim and Christian
primary material.

A characteristic of Higgins’ approach is finding the common ground between
Islam and Christianity. In establishing the excellent character of Prophet Mohamed,
Higgins stresses the importance of drawing on the testimony of the “unwilling witnesses”
(5). These are Western writers who, despite their antipathy, could not evade moments of
appreciation and/or praise of Islam or its Prophet. Higgins informs his audience that
morality is an essential component of Islam, and that there is no “moral precept” taught
in Islam which was not preached by Christianity as well. He fortifies his argument
through an anecdote from Muslim history, and through reference to Edward Gibbon’s
*The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776-1789).

Higgins maintains:

45. In our endeavours to find out the true character of Mohamed, it is, in
my opinion, of the first-rate consequence to inquire what was the general
tendency of the doctrines which *all parties* agree that he taught. His
morality is allowed to be excellent. There is no moral precept in the
Christian religion which is not found to be inculcated by the Mohamedan,
and, in some instances, finely ornamented and embellished by the poetic
genius of Arabia. A pretty story is told by Gibbon. A slave of Hassan, the
son of Ali, dropt, by accident, a dish of scalding broth on his master; the
heedless wretch fell prostrate to deprecate his punishment, and repeated a
verse of the Koran: *Paradise is for those who command their anger*. I am
not angry, said Hassan. *And for those who pardon offences*. I pardon your
offence. *And for those who return good for evil*. I give you your liberty
and four hundred pieces of silver. Whether the story be true or not is of
little consequence; the doctrine of commanding the temper and returning
good for evil is finely taught.

46. When the numerous, lengthened and almost unintelligible creeds of the
Christian religion are contemplated, a philosopher may perhaps be
tempted to heave a sigh of regret for the beautiful, plain, intelligible and
unadorned simplicity of the Mohamedan profession of faith: *I believe in
one God, and Mohamed the apostle or messenger of God*. (28)

Higgins’ source for his anecdote, Gibbon’s *History*, fortifies his point about the
significance of morality in Islam. The example he sights on the necessity of commanding
one’s anger functions as a common denominator in Christianity and Islam. Higgins hints,
however, that the Islamic code of morality in this area supersedes that of Christianity in
being simpler and more intelligible.
The temptation to “heave a sigh of regret for the beautiful, plain, intelligible and unadorned simplicity of the Mohamedan profession of faith,” which seals the previous quote, takes a passionate, articulate turn when Higgins defends Muslims against the charge of “pandering to their base passions” (35). Throughout his tract, Higgins encloses this phrase in quotes, as an indication, perhaps, that he is responding to a specific charge which Higgins assumed his readers were familiar with, although he does not cite a particular source from which he pulled the phrase. To refute the charge, Higgins has Muslim doctrine for his primary source:

59. But if the allowance of a plurality of wives to his followers, though guarded with many very strict regulations, may afford to the Christian priests a momentary triumph; yet there are some other of his precepts which may induce the cool inquirer after truth to doubt, or perhaps to deny altogether, the charge of pandering to their passions. The fast of Ramadan, which, by the circulating effect of the lunar year, must often fall in the hottest period of an Asiatic summer, when the pious Musselmen are forbidden to taste a morsel of food, or even a single drop of water to quench their parching thirst, from morning to evening, for thirty days together, is surely something not very like pandering to their passions or appetites. What will the votary of pleasure, the indolent son of luxury, say to the pilgrimage to Mecca? Mohamed surely will not be accused of pandering to the pleasure in ordering, if indeed he did order (which I doubt), this terrible journey.
60. By the law of Mohamed all games of chance were expressly prohibited: the beneficial tendency of this law surely no one will deny. He is refused all merit for his morality, because it is said that he only copied it from the Bible. I have not observed the prohibition of this vice either in the decalogue or the gospels; but as he admitted the divine missions of both Moses and Jesus, and professed to build his religion on them as a foundation, it does not seem to me that he did any wrong, or acted in any way inconsistently in adopting such parts of both these religions as appeared to him to be their pure and unadulterated doctrine. Indeed, as he was in fact a Christian, I do not see how he could do otherwise. (35-36)

Higgins’ quote captures the discursive debate in heightened moments of loss and triumph. If polygamy in Islam is valid proof for indulging the passions of its followers, which Higgins accepts only conditionally, then, according to him, the fast of Ramadan, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the prohibition of games of chance are three stronger points of triumph for apologetic discourse, which Higgins expressly subscribes to. His argument is clear and simple: A religion whose pillars require the deprivation of food and water in fasting; the trying journey to Mecca to perform a rite which demands the abandonment of the worldly aspects of human life; and the prohibition of pastimes which depend on chance, cannot be a religion which sinks its followers in indulgence of base passions.

Another instance of referring to Islamic source material, here the Muslim Profession of Faith, occurs in Higgins’ explanation of the meaning of the prophethood of Prophet Mohamed. The gist of his argument is that the appellation “prophet” implies no
ideas of supernatural powers, such as foretelling the future. Higgins argues convincingly that Mohamed was a prophet in the sense of preacher, or messenger. He explains:

And I think we shall see that, at least in the beginning of his mission,

Mohamed pretended to nothing more than this—merely that he was sent by God, or inspired, moved in spirit, by God, to preach a reformation in the idolatrous practices of his countrymen. As every man may be said to be moved by God who feels a wish to perform a good act—as our criminal indictments say a man is moved by the devil, who wishes to do a bad one—so the view which I take here of the prophetic part of his character is strengthened by the circumstance, that he is not said by his followers ever to have foretold, or pretended to foretell, any event.

6. Respecting the word Prophet and the Mohamedan profession of faith, it has been observed, “One element certainly is to know what this profession of faith is. Its first member is, that there is no God but God. The second is, that Mohamed was a sent (resoul) of God: not a prophet of God, as sometimes rendered, nor THE sent; for the word is not prophet, and the definite article is excluded by the declaration of Mohamed, that the resouls are many and their number unknown. Koran, iv. (4-5)

In quoting the Koran, as is clear from the above passage, Higgins takes a common ground with his audience by finding the Koran verse in a Western source. Higgins’ argument is that the misunderstanding around the meaning of the appellation “prophet” is due to a mistranslation from the Arabic word “resoul,” which denotes a messenger rather than a prophet. Higgins reminds his readers that the Islamic Profession of Faith
does not use the definite article, which, when added in the translation of the profession into English, implies Mohamed’s exclusive status as a “resoul.” This, Higgins’ soon refutes by referring to Chapter IV, *The Women*, of the Koran. The verse captures God’s address in the first-person plural pronoun: “And [We sent] messengers about whom We have related [their stories] to you before and messengers about whom We have not related to you. And Allah spoke to Moses with [direct] speech” (163). The verse designates the appellation “resoul,” or messenger, for the sent of God. And it makes clear that Mohamed was but one example.

One of Higgins’ approaches in correcting a misrepresentation concerning Islam and Muslims is the Western paradigm of causality. Higgins discusses the common accusation in Western and Christian discourses that coercion, for which the sword has become a trope, was the vehicle for Islam’s dissemination. In responding, Higgins alerts those who subscribe to these discourses that they are mistaking the cause for the effect:

152. When the Christian priests maintain that the doctrine of Mohamed was indebted solely to the sword for its success, they evidently put the cause for the effect. The sword is of no value without a hand to use it; and it was the enthusiasm of the persons who used it which gave them the victory; and this enthusiasm was produced by a lively faith in the truth of Mohamed’s doctrine. Paradise, instant and future happiness, and that for ever, was believed to be the lot of the true believer who fell in the cause of the one only God, and in defence of his prophet. How absurd, and unprofitable too, it was, then, not to brave all dangers, secure the glorious
reward, and enhance the merit by the utility of their exertions in the cause; particularly when it was known that the final, inevitable lot of every man was fixed, predestinated before the creation of the world, which nothing could prevent or delay! In the bed or in the field, a man must die in the manner predestined. No care, no danger, could change the inevitable decree. The contagious or epidemic nature of enthusiasm is well known, and in Mohamed’s case it seems to have been exhibited in a very wonderful manner. As we have seen, the city of Medina was won before the Prophet’s sword was drawn; therefore to the sword the conquest cannot be attributed. His first expedition consisted of only thirty eight men, a very small force with which to begin the conquest of the world; his second of three hundred; and thus every battle, whether won or lost, seems to have increased the number of his soldiers. It will be said that it is no uncommon thing for victory to increase the number of a general’s soldiers. This is very true; but he took no recruits into his ranks who did not at least profess to believe in his religion—that God was God, and Mohamed was his prophet,--a plain, simple dogma, certainly not difficult to comprehend or to remember. (70)

Higgins argument, while finding affirmation in the paradigm of causality which teaches that every effect or result in the natural world has by natural law an antecedent cause, points to a confusion in naming the effect and the cause of the dissemination of Islam. Higgins argues that Islam, at least in its early stages, spread due to the influential simplicity of its doctrine. This simplicity, along with the promise of a reward in the
afterlife (Paradise) has won Islam its ardent, devout followers. Higgins adds that Islam teaches its adherents to believe in predestination: the idea that one’s life, death, and the manner of death are pre-registered by God. This, Higgins teaches his audience, is the reason why Muslims have defended their religion with avid enthusiasm. In other words, conversion to Islam was the cause (it came first) behind the Muslims’ support of their religion, militant activity being only one facet of it.

In addition to the paradigm of causality, exposing the double standard of Christian and Jewish discourses is another approach used by Higgins. In this approach he employs historical evidence in order to seal his argument with the stamp of causality. Two instances stand out; the first one concerns the charge of the sensuality of Muslim Paradise, and the second concerns the charge that intimidation has been the tool of Islam’s dissemination. Of the first charge, Higgins states:

63. Persons prejudiced against Mohamed may condemn him for his sensual paradise; but, in fact, no paradise can be imagined which is not sensual, because (as Mr. Locke has proved) no idea can be entertained by man except through the medium of his senses; it, therefore, necessarily follows, that if he be to have any idea of a paradise at all, it must be sensual. (37)

65. But Mohamed was so far from making all the happiness of a future life to consist of low corporeal enjoyments, that the highest pleasure and reward of the faithful was to consist in the contemplation of the face of God, which was said to give such exquisite delight, that in respect thereof all the other pleasures of paradise will be forgotten and lightly
esteemed . . . The reader will please to understand that I mean to cast no adverse reflection on these figurative accounts, but only to observe, that it is very absurd and unjust to approve the one, the Christian, and to condemn the other, the Mohamedan (38).

The fact that Higgins’ reference to Locke is general in the above quote, indicates that he assumed his audience were familiar with Locke’s particular work pertaining to his understanding of the significance of the senses in the promised Christian paradise. That Higgins marshals Locke’s insights on the subject can be understood as a technique to appeal to the his audience whose affiliations are to the champions of Western thought. The overall implication of the above quote is that a promised paradise has to be sensual. His departure lies in proving that, while the Islamic Paradise rewards the senses, its description in the Koran, unlike its Christian counterpart in the Bible, does not violate the code of modesty. A couple of pages later, Higgins explains that the women of the Islamic Paradise are virgins, and sets out to contrast them with the women of the Christian Eden:

But they have neither necks like towers of ivory, nor mouths that cause the lips of those that are asleep to speak, nor bosoms like clusters of the vine, nor breasts like two young roses that are twins feeding among lilies, nor the joints of their thighs like jewels, the work of the hands of a cunning workman . . . The spouses of the Arabian teacher sit with their dark eyes cast down modestly in the presence of their husbands, like pearls concealing themselves within their shells. (40)

68. “. . . If a translation of the Hebrew Scriptures were published, in which every word capable of the change was altered from the reserved and
decent one to that which was vulgar and immodest, and where a licentious commentary was attached to every passage where the subject could, by any perversion, be made the vehicle, attended with insupportable mistranslations for the sake of hanging an odious meaning upon the writer,—it would give some idea of the medium through which the Koran was introduced to Europe. It was thus that juggling monks played their low machinery, that what they called the alter and the throne might flourish, by setting one half of mankind to hate and worry the other.” (41)

A footnote to the above page informs the reader that the quote is taken from “Translation of Maracci,” referring most probably to the famous Italian Orientalist Louis Maracci’s (1612-1700) translation into Latin of the Koran. The juxtaposition of the quote is clear. In demystifying the Muslim sensual Paradise, Maracci, and by extension Higgins, points to the ideological dynamic which has produced this misrepresentation. The dynamic involves a motive and a medium. Antipathy motivates the manipulation of primary sources through mistranslations, which indeed depend on the medium of language. The quote’s subtext is that translators, due in part to their exclusive privilege of knowledge of a foreign language, and due also to the large rate of illiteracy in seventeenth to nineteenth-century Europe, enjoyed a great monopoly on interpretation. Driven by antipathy toward Islam, rather by a sense of responsibility toward protecting the veracity of the text under translation, these translators, not only cared very little about the accuracy of the translated texts, but also sought actively to pervert their original meanings in order to further their anti-Islam ideologies. This resonates with Pardoe’s idea about the responsibility of the historians and translators.
The double standard of Christian discourse is also exposed concerning the popular belief that intimidation was the tool of Islam’s dissemination. Higgins says:

85. The Christian priests, in their writings against Mohamed, constantly accuse him of making converts by intimidation; by threats of hell and eternal punishment to those who do not adopt his religion. This is true with respect to some parts of the Koran, and is directly in contradiction to other parts, where it is admitted that Christians, Jews, and Sabeans, if they performed good works, need not be afraid. But admitting that it is really the doctrine of the prophet, it seems rather extraordinary that it should be brought as a charge against him by those who receive the gospels and epistles, where the doctrine is laid down in the broadest language: He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved: but he that believeth not, shall be damned. (46)

The above quote achieves two purposes: it exposes the double standard of Christian discourse, the architects of which are, according to Higgins, are the Christian priests who place the Bible at a disadvantage when they attack Islam for the use of intimidation to acquire converts. Higgins highlights a passage in the Bible which flatly announces the curse of damnation on any creed other than the Christian. The quote also demonstrates Higgins’ favor for the Kor’anic address over the Biblical regarding this point. In exposing the double standard of Christian discourse, Higgins challenges the popular misunderstanding that Islam’s method is that of intimidation by stressing the value it places on good works. The verse in the above quote reveals a counter hegemonic
representation of Islam where other creeds which inculcate the importance of good works along with faith are accepted.

In other places in *Apology*, Higgins takes a direct comparative approach in addressing a misrepresented idea concerning Islam, such as polygamy. Higgins argument is quoted in full:

52. . . . But why the allowance of plurality of wives should be visited with such very harsh censure, I do not know. Surely the example of Solomon, and David, the man after God’s own heart, which he had found to fulfill his law, might plead fro a little mercy, particularly as Jesus no where expressly forbids it in any one of the twenty gospels which were written by some or other of the multitude of sects of his followers to record his commands. Biologists and natural philosophers have found other reasons which might serve as some apology for this allowance, which will not apply to us cold-blooded, frog-like animals of northern climates, though they may be applicable to the descendants of Ishmael, natives of the scorching sands of the desert. (32)

In contesting popular, established notions about polygamy in Islam, Higgins places the practice within the larger matrix of the Judeo-Christian tradition. His argument is revisionary, asking readers to revisit the Bible and question glossed-over understandings of the Biblical text. Higgins point is both affirmative and negative. It affirms that polygamy is a condoned practice of the Patriarchs of the Bible, and also negates its prohibition by Jesus. On another level, Higgins’ comparison takes affirmation from
scientific discourse. By consulting the findings of biologists and natural philosophers concerning the effect of climate on human temperament and biological needs, Higgins’s rhetoric points to the significance of situating polygamy within the larger context, which includes biology in this example. Consulting biologists and natural philosophers, does not make the argument more or less accurate, but it does indicate that Higgins’ approach calls for the necessity of stepping outside one’s paradigms and consulting new frames of reference when critiquing foreign cultures, practices, and faiths.

Higgins’ practice of situating the text under study within its relevant context appears in his appeal to history. His historical approach in correcting a misrepresented idea concerning Islam is two-fold: in one instance, history is an archive and a reliable register of events, and in another it is an incomplete record which has room for addition and modification. In the first instance, Higgins calls forth historical evidence to correct the misrepresentation of Islam as an intolerant religion. He says:

99. Nothing is so common as to hear the Christian priests abuse the religion of Mohamed for its bigotry and intolerance. Wonderful assurance and hypocrisy! Who was it expelled the Moriscoes from Spain because they would not turn Christians? Who was it murdered the millions of Mexico and Peru, and gave them all away as slaves because they were not Christians? What a contrast the Mohamedans exhibited in Greece! For many centuries the Christians have been permitted to live in their peaceable possession of their properties, their religion, their priests, bishops, partriarchs, and churches, and at the present moment the war between the Greeks and Turks is no more waged on account of religion,
than was the late war between the Negroes in Demerara and the English.
The Greeks and the Negroes want to throw off the the yoke of their conquerors, and they are both justified in doing so. Wherever the Caliphs conquered, if the inhabitants turned Mohamedans, they were instantly on a footing of perfect equality with their conquerors. An ingenious and learned Dissenter, speaking of the Saracens, says, “They persecuted nobody; Jews and Christians all lived happy among them.” (51)

Higgins finds the above testimony of Muslim religious tolerance in a Western source, thereby rendering it admissible to his audience. The source is Robert Robinson’s *Ecclesiastical Researches*, published in 1792. At the heart of the above testimony from history is a comparison between the practices of Muslims and Christians, which not only corrects the dominant misrepresentation that Islam is intolerant, but also registers Higgins as an admirer of Islam. Higgins provides another evidence from history to refute the charge of persecution against Muslims. In this example, history appears as an anecdote which Higgins pulls out from three Western sources:

Alexander Dow’s *The History of Hindostan*, in three volumes (1803), Humphrey Prideaux’s *Life of Mahomet* (1697), and a work by John Frederick Maurice, which Higgins abbreviates into “Ind. Ant. Vol. IV. p. 410” in a footnote of the same page (59). Higgins recounts the story of emperor Akbar with the King of Portugal:

119. It is a well-known fact, that the enlightened emperor Akber, great grandfather to Aurengzebe, dispatched an embassy, in the year 1595, to the king of Portugal, to request that missionaries might be sent to instruct him in the Christian religion, in order that, after he had carefully inquired,
he might choose the religion which appeared to him to be the true one.

Three Jesuits of high character were sent. When they arrived at Agra they were very kindly received, and had a church built for them, at the charge of the Mogul, with many privileges and immunities, all which were continued to them by the successor of Akber, Jehan Guire, in 1604. The Jesuits published two works for the use of the Emperor and the Musselmen, which were answered by a Persian nobleman named Ahmed Ebn Zin Alabedin. It is very evident that the followers of the prophet obtained as decided a victory by their pens, as they had previously done by their arms. Prideaux cannot conceal his chagrin.

120. He says that the work of the Jesuits unluckily (and why unluckily?) fell into the hands of this learned Persian, who, to use his words “made terrible work with the Jesuits.” The priests not liking “this terrible work,” by orders of the pope and the college de propaganda fide at Rome, a learned friar undertook to answer it. But this still not being satisfactory, another learned man was chosen, whose work was translated into Arabic and sent into Asia, but this, Prideaux says, did “by no means answer the design.” How unfortunate that they did not send to Norwich! I wonder whether the learned Dean would have succeeded better than the Pope, the College, and the Jesuits. (59)

Higgins takes an active role in addressing this misrepresentation about Islam. He questions Prideaux’s ambiguous use of the word “unluckily,” which seems to suggest the role of chance or accident in determining the outcome of the debate between the Jesuits
and the Persian scholars. In Higgins’ analysis, Prideaux’s verdict is undermined: the Jesuits failed to convert emperor Akber and his court of scholars by persuasion, which, Higgins implies, is the result of fundamental contradiction or irrationality in Christian doctrine.

Higgins’ implication takes a provocative and pronounced tone with his critique of history, here Christian history, as an incomplete record. In his defense of the prophecy of Mohamed, Higgins shakes Christian theology by its spine when he collapses the trustworthiness of the Christian priests who translated the Bible. Following is Higgins argument:

156. . . . But there is another very striking argument, an argument of the first importance, which aided him [Mohamed] very much with the Christians, which has been recorded both by friends and foes, but to which the latter have not paid so much attention as it deserves. It was the universal tradition, as well as the words of the record, the gospel histories, that Jesus, before his ascension, promised his disciples that he would send a person to them, in some capacity or other; the Greek of our Gospels says, as a [Higgins provides the Greek word in Greek calligraphy], translated as Comforter.

157. The Mohamedans maintained, and yet maintain, that Mohamed was this person foretold by Jesus Christ, the same as Cyrus was by Isaiah—both by name; —that he was called by Jesus, not by a word which ought to be rendered in the Greek language, as in our gospel histories, [another word in Greek calligraphy] but [Greek calligraphy], which means not
comforter, but famous or illustrious, and which, in Arabic, is the meaning of the word Mohamed; that the gospel of the Christians had originally the latter of those words, but that it was corrupted to disguise the truth (73).

158. . . Those who would destroy the ancient manuscripts of the gospel histories, would not scruple at rewriting a skin of parchment on which an ancient father’s work was written; and it is admitted by the first divines of the Christians that they have been corrupted to serve other purposes: [the quote here contains a documentation of Higgins’ reference, which is Herbert Marsh’s translation of Michaelis’ Introduction to the New Testament] and those who would do it in one case would do it in another. That the word being confessed to be Hebrew, if it be wrong written, it is much more likely that the early Christian writers, the greatest liars upon earth, should lie to serve their own purpose, than that St. John, a Hebrew, understanding both Hebrew and Greek, (even without allowing to him the gift of tongues,) should have made a mistake, and rendered the word, by wrong Greek letters, [Greek calligraphy] instead of [Greek calligraphy]—and that, therefore, it follows that the text of John has been corrupted. (74)

185. . . Many very extraordinary circumstances united to justify his [Mohamed’s] belief. In the first place, I repeat, the word Prqlit [Hebrew word used by Jesus to foretell the next messenger] had the same meaning as the word Mo-Ahmed/ and he might conceive himself to be thus foretold in Haggai by name, as Cyrus was of old by Isaiah. Secondly, the necessity of someone to reform and correct the abuses which had crept into
Christianity and deluged the world with blood, was sufficiently evident; and, thirdly, his success might appear to him to prove the truth of his mission, and lead him to exclaim, If this continue, it will continue to prove that I am, as I believe I am, a resoul or person sent by God, or pre-ordained to this service. (84)

In the above quotes biblical history is called forth as a site of conspiracy the chief architect of which is St. John. The gist of Higgins’ argument is that the original autographs of the Bible were intentionally destroyed, and the message of Jesus to his disciples concerning the prophet who will follow him was tampered with in order to serve the ideological purpose of the priests. This argument recalls Higgins’ point, and Pardoe’s for this matter, about the role of translation in perverting knowledge. In Higgins’ analysis, the Christian priests who translated the ancient gospel histories from Hebrew into Greek, whom Higgins calls the “greatest liars upon earth,” made a conscious, premeditated mistranslation of the word *Periclyte* (Greek for Arabic Ahmed, or English illustrious), which Jesus used to identify his follower prophet, into *Paraclite* (Comforter), which collapses the designation into some general attribute instead of a specific name.

Higgins’ *Apology* does not have a conclusion. The book ends with the discussion of the last point, which carries the number 237. However, this does not undermine the significance of Higgins’ work, especially because the gist of his argument is captured by the two key words of the title, “Apology” and “Illustrious.” The first word recalls the debate between antipathetic and apologist discourses, implying, of course, an antecedent error in antipathetic discourse, and a responsibility, a consequent course of action (apologizing). The second word registers one of Higgins’ contributions to the debate, the
wound he inflicts in the wall; namely that Jesus prophesied Prophet Muhammad in name to his disciples. If Godfrey Higgins, thus, corrects dominant misrepresentations of Islam with the tools of an erudite scholar while Julia Pardoe addresses contemporary literature on Islam with the precision of an ethnographer, T. W. Arnold, author of the last work for discussion in this chapter, does that in the capacity of the historian.

Sir Thomas Walker Arnold (1864-1930) was a prominent Orientalist and historian of Islamic art. He taught at various universities in India and London, including The Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (Aligarh, India), Government College University in Lahore, and was Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at University of London and University College. In 1909 he was appointed as the Educational Advisor to Indian Students in London. And in 1920 he was the Advisor to the Secretary of State for India. Arnold was the first English editor for the first edition of *The Encyclopedia of Islam*. The first edition of Arnold’s book *The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith* was published in 1896 in 467 pages, and went through a second edition in 1913. Of encyclopedic length and scope, Arnold’s history carries the reader, in thirteen chapters and three appendices, on a journey of the propagation of Islam throughout the world since its revelation in Arabia in the seventh century. Arnold’s history is a diachronic narrative, spanning Arabia, western and central Asia, Africa, Europe, India, China, and the Malay Archipelago.

Arnold’s academic merits have received recognition in both twenty-century scholarship and in the academic circles of his day, as indicated in the reviews of *The Preaching of Islam* in the British periodical press. In these reviews, full credit is given to the scope of Arnold’s knowledge and his mastery of the subject matter. However,
rejection of his unconventional arguments is the dominant opinion by the critics who read him. The reviewer for *The Athenaeum*, for instance, dismisses Arnold’s arguments; namely that Islam was spread through persuasion, that the instances of violence in Muslim history should be viewed as exceptions, and that Islam was disseminated largely through the efforts of missionaries than conquerors, as “novel theses” supported by “curious evidence” (438). The reviewer adds, “While allowing all due credit to Arnold’s careful and sympathetic statement …we cannot but think he has given a little too much weight to the theory of the Koran . . . We know but too well that a religion may preach tolerance . . . and yet be propagated by authorized bloodshed and tortures” (438). The reviewer in *The Academy*, on the other hand, calls Arnold’s “an original book” (206). And while believing that Arnold has underestimated the role of persecution in the dissemination of Islam, the reviewer makes sure to close his review with a final indebtedness to Arnold’s contribution, “Professor Arnold has written a book of good faith, which may be commended alike for its historical research, its severe impartiality, and its easy style. The list of authorities at the end adds not a little to its permanent value” (206).

This permanent value of Arnold’s book has been acknowledged in twentieth-century scholarship. F. W. Buckler, in his review of the third edition of *The Preaching of Islam*, calls the book a “classic work” (185). In commending Arnold’s contribution, Buckler states, “Prior to the appearance of *The Preaching of Islam*, stray echoes of suspicion of the validity of the view were abroad, but Arnold was the first to handle the whole field systematically” (186). A more extensive examination of Arnold’s life and works appeared with Katherine Watt’s “Thomas Walker Arnold and the Re-Evaluation of Islam, 1864-1930.” In describing the influence of Arnold’s work on Oriental studies and
on Western discourse in general, Watt affirms, “Thomas Arnold’s work impinged on and responded to leading political and intellectual issues of the day” (3). Watt’s article gives a detailed biography of Arnold’s life, and situates his works in prevalent nineteenth-century Orientalism. For example, Watt compares Arnold’s work with that of a famous Orientalist scholar, William Muir, and locates them on opposite ends by concluding that “Arnold’s work was the history of individual efforts; Muir’s that of mass violent conflicts” (12).

As the title indicates, the subject matter of the book is specifically the history of Muslim mission, or as Arnold himself makes clear in the Preface, “confessedly, as explained in the Introduction, a record of missionary efforts and not a history of persecutions” (viii). Arnold’s history is not a mere chronicle, but an emplotted narrative. His history of Muslim mission is the history of triumph and heroism, because it is premised on his argument that Islam was, despite political, social, and ideological challenges, successfully spread throughout a great portion of the world by peaceful means of preaching and debate among Non-Muslims. In other words, Arnold’s argument is that Islam was predominantly propagated through the voluntary conversions of the people to whom Islam was preached. Arnold treats the documented, historical instances of violence where oppressive rulers who do not represent the Muslim missionary spirit forcefully imposed Islam, as exceptions, or transgressions from the injunctions of the Qur’an and Prophet Mohammad. Through unraveling the identities of Muslim missionaries, who, driven by honest zeal to spread what the believed to be the message of truth, and who weathered numerous hardships in the process, constructs a history of epic scope. His history is the history of the triumph of these individual protagonists, who are
presented to the reader as real personages who undertook to fulfill the mission established in the injunctions of the Qur’an and manifested in the example of Prophet Muhammad.

In laying before the reader the fruit of a stupendous scholarly effort, documented from a wealth of sources both Western and Arabic, Arnold addresses some of the major issues which have come to be associated with the propagation of Islam, such as the Jizyah, or tribute levied on Non-Muslims by the Muslim government, and violence as the tool of propagating Islam, for which the Muslim sword has become a trope in Western discourse. In Arnold’s epic history of the triumph of Muslim mission, Islam is presented in two major ways. In one, it appears in a contending relationship with the religion it sought to displace. In the other, it is presented as the result of the zealous efforts of agents in a cause-effect relationship. In this light, Hayden White’s theory of tropes in historical writing in *Metahistory* is of value. White maintains that if the data of a historical field are apprehended as bearing an object-object relationship where they are presented as being similar to, or different from each other, then the trope that is used to characterize the relationship is Metaphor (34). If, on the other hand, the data are presented as bearing an agent-act or cause-effect relationship, the trope is Metonymy. On another level, White discusses the numerous genres which have been used by historians to emplot their histories, and explains the “governing presuppositions” of the Epic genre as following: “The Epic form represented a doctrine of continuity as its informing ontological principle . . . Its notion that all changes are nothing but transformations by degrees from one state or condition to another of a “nature” whose essence changes not at all” (45). In outlining the history of the propagation of Islam, Arnold makes sure to point out moments of political weakness in Muslim history, as well as instances of divergence from
the injunction to spread Islam peacefully, “ Summon thou to the way of they Lord with wisdom and with kindly warning: dispute with them in the kindest manner” (Qur’an, xvi. 126). Nevertheless, and on the whole, Arnold’s narrative, which spans twelve centuries and covers three continents, is the narrative of Islam’s success, and a translation of that essence of kindness, wisdom, responsibility, and zeal established in the Qur’an. The instances of political weakness and divergence from that Qur’anic essence are presented in Arnold’s history as exceptions and disruptions in an overall peaceful process, as the book’s concluding paragraph states. Ending with a brief discussion of two religious reform movements in the Islamic world at the close of the nineteenth century, the Wahhabi and the Pan-Islamic movements, Arnold concludes:

What further influence these two movements will have on the missionary life of Islam, the future can only show. But their very activity at the present day is a proof that Islam is not dead. The spiritual energy of Islam is not, as has been so often maintained, commensurate with its political power. On the contrary, the loss of political power and worldly prosperity has served to bring to the front the finer spiritual qualities which are the truest incentives to missionary work. (426-7)

It is this optimistic open end which invokes the doctrine of continuity explained by White. The hope, which Arnold pins on the future for the continuation of Muslim mission, renders his an epic narrative of the history of the propagation of Islam. His narrative challenges the dominant representations of Islam by bringing forth from the margins of historical documents a narrative which represents Islam as a non-militant religion, and argues that conversion to Islam was the result of conviction and a voluntary act. In what
follows, Arnold’s representation of Islam as a contending force and as a result
Metaphoric and Metonymic relationships will be discussed.

From the beginning of Arnold’s history, Islam is placed vis-à-vis another
religion, mostly Christianity, but sometimes Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and paganism in a
contrastive relationship, where Islam emerges as tolerant and thriving, and the other
religion as oppressive and decaying. The instances of this relationship are too many to be
all discussed here, therefore, a few selections, which demonstrate the diversities of this
relationship, will be highlighted. In Chapter III, which outlines the propagation of Islam
among the Christian nations of western Asia, Arnold discusses the oppressions
committed by the emperors of the Byzantine Empire. In the following quote, he captures
a moment in the dark history of this oppression, whose victims were the subjects of the
bigger Roman Empire. He states:

In 532 the widespread dissatisfaction in Constantinople with both church
and state, burst out into a revolt against the government of Justinian,
which was only suppressed after a massacre of 35,000 persons. The
Greens, as the party of the malcontents was termed, had made open and
violent protest in the circus against the oppression of the emperor, crying
out, “Justice has vanished from the world and is no more to be found. But
we will become Jews, or rather we will return again to Grecian paganism.”
The lapse of a century had removed none of the grounds for dissatisfaction
that here found such violent expression, but the heavy hand of the
Byzantine government prevented the renewal of such a outbreak as that of
532 and compelled the malcontents to dissemble, though in 560 some
secret heathens were detected in Constantinople and punished. On the
dangers of the empire, however, at a distance from the capital, such
malcontents were safer, and the persecuted heretics, and others dissatisfied
with the Byzantine state-church, took refuge in the East, and here the
Muslim armies would be welcomed by the spiritual children of those who
a hundred years before had desired to exchange the Christian religion for
another faith. (72-3)

The struggle of the people of Constantinople in the above quote exemplifies the long-
brewing dissatisfaction with religious and political oppression, for which Emperor
Justinian is a stand-in. Although Muslims, or “the Muslim army,” appear at the end of the
quote, it is in highlighting the manifestations of Christian oppression, namely murder,
persecution, and injustice, that the contrast becomes clear. In this metaphoric
representation, Arnold portrays Muslims as the haven, or “refuge” from the oppression of
the Byzantine Empire. In this metaphoric representation, the contrast is one of sites, and
full agency is given to the people of Constantinople, who are portrayed as, first, seeking
the Muslim site for security, and second, as inviting that site to take precedence in a
process of gradual replacement of a decadent site.

In Chapter V, “The Spread of Islam Among the Christians of Spain,” Arnold
gives full expression to this metaphoric representation in which a contest of civilizations
results in the triumph of that of Muslim Arabs:

But the majority of converts were no doubt won over by the imposing
influence of the faith of Islam itself, presented to them as it was with all
the glamour of a brilliant civilization, having a poetry, a philosophy and an
art well calculated to attract the reason and dazzle the imagination: while in the lofty chivalry of the Arabs there was free scope for the exhibition of manly prowess and the knightly virtues—a career closed to the conquered Spaniards that remained true to the Christian faith. Again, the learning and literature of the Christians must have appeared very poor and meager when compared with that of the Muslims, the study of which may well by itself have served as an incentive to the adoption of their religion. Besides, to the devout mind Islam in Spain could offer the attractions of a pious and zealous Puritan party with the orthodox Muslim theologians at its head, which at times had a preponderating influence in the state and struggled earnestly towards a reformation of faith and morals. (140)

In the above contest, the Muslim Arabs appear as patrons of a civilization fully-equipped to win: with the aesthetic appeal of its arts and literature, the intellectual rigor of its philosophy, a military apparatus which features a sought-after code of chivalry, and a tolerant theological worldview which gives a free invitation to inter-faith dialogue, Muslim civilization topples over its Christian contestant. Arnold documents another instance of agency where the audience in this battle of civilizations makes a voluntary decision to convert to Islam.

Along with outlining the epic history of Muslim mission through metaphoric exposition, Arnold uses metonymy to bring to the foreground the identities of Muslim missionaries who were the agents of its propagation. These identities are divided into four groups. In one, they are anonymous persons who are known through the trace they leave, but are nameless. In another, they are grouped as belonging to a religious class, or ethnic
group, and are still documented in history without a name. In the third group, they are
specific individuals whose names, dates of birth and death, and tombs are known and
documented. And the last group of Muslim missionaries comprises women. This part of
the chapter discusses the role these four groups of agents had in affecting the propagation
of Islam.

The first groups of Muslim missionaries, the anonymous heroes, are introduced
when relating the encounter between Islam and Christianity during the Crusades in
Chapter III. In this part of Arnold’s chapter, the influence Islam had on the religious
opinions of the Crusaders is discussed. Arnold rightly concludes, based on the appearance
of a group of Crusaders in the twelfth century who were derogatively named renegades (a
term which referred those Crusaders who converted to Islam), “It would indeed have
been strange if religious questions had not formed a topic of discussion on the many
occasions when the Crusaders and the Muslims met together on a friendly footing, during
frequent truces, especially when it was religion itself that had brought the Crusaders into
the Holy Land and set them upon these constant wars” (90). Arnold adds that the number
of these renegades was sufficient enough to warrant their mention in the Assizes of
Jerusalem (90). To this result, Arnold attributes the anonymous agency of Muslim
missionaries, “It would be interesting to discover who were the Muslims who busied
themselves in winning these converts to Islam, but they seem to have left no record of
their labours” (90). Arnold’s conclusion, while pointing to a gap in historical record, is
also an indicator of the sincerity of many of these missionaries whose identity remained
anonymous, because it suggests that theirs was not a propagandist agenda, but rather a
spiritual enterprise dictated by a genuine interest in materializing a Qur’anic injunction than documenting numbers of conversions.

The second group of Muslim missionaries, which Arnold assigns to certain religious and ethnic classes, is frequently found in his history. The Mulas are one example. The word Mulla is derived from the Arabic word mawla, which denotes a vicar or guardian, and has come to refer to a Muslim man educated in Islamic theology. In Chapter VIII, Arnold stresses the operative role the Mulas had in spreading Islam in among the Kirghiz people of Central Asia, “One of the most curious incidents in the missionary history of Islam is the conversion of the Kirghiz of Central Asia by Tatar Mulas, who preached Islam among them in the eighteenth century, as emissaries of the Russian government” (245). In Chapter VI, which outlines the spread of Islam in Europe, Arnold commends the attributes of the Mulas in Albania, “If Islam in Albania had many such exponents as the Mulla, whose sincerity, courtesy and friendliness are praised by Marco Bizzi, with whom he used to discuss religious questions, it may well have made its way” (183). In this quote, Arnold records the words of a historical eyewitness, the Italian author Marco Bizzi, who commends the sincerity, courtesy, and friendliness of the Mulas in attracting the Albanians to Islam. In the same chapter, Arnold records the role a small group of Bulgarians had in spreading Islam in Hungary. He quotes an account narrated by an Arab geographer and biographer, Yaqut al-Hamawi, (1179-1229), in his book, *Mu’jam al-Buldan (Dictionary of Countries)*. In the account, Yaqt meets a group of men during his journey to Aleppo in 1228, “with reddish hair and reddish faces,” who later tell Yaqt that they are Hungarians. A man in the group relates the story of his people’s conversion to Islam:
I have heard several of our forefathers say that a long time ago seven Muslims came from Bulgaria and settled among us. In kindly fashion they pointed out to us our errors and directed us into the right way, the faith of Islam. Then God guided us and (praise be to God!) we all became Muslims and God opened our hearts to the faith. We have come to this country [Aleppo] to study law; when we return to our own land, the people will do us honour and put us in charge of their religious affairs. (qtd. Arnold 194)

In this account, which is related by a prominent Arab traveller, particular emphasis is placed on the human heart as the seat of faith, and the kind character of the nameless Bulgarians in the above quote is described as the instigator of a change in heart which led the Hungarians to convert to Islam. This emphasis on kind character is an indicator of the exemplary role it plays in propagating Islam among non-Muslims. Arnold points to moral superiority as a companion to kind character in spreading Islam. Among the nameless agents of Islam, traders occupy a paramount place. In the chapter on the spread of Islam in Spain, Arnold explains how the great tolerance of the Muslim government, the high morality and learnedness of the Muslims brought about an impressive degree of assimilation in both the Muslim and Christian communities of Spain. This assimilation was manifested, among other phenomena, in the coinage of the term Muzarabes, or Arabicized, which designated the Spanish Christians living under Arab government (137); and in the frequency of inter-marriages, such as that of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the son of Musa, with the widow of King Roderic (136).
The third group of heroic Muslims, who were the agents of spreading the message of Islam are specific individuals whose names, dates of birth and death, and location of tombs Arnold gives credit to. In tracing the introduction of Islam into Malabar, Arnold quotes the famous Arab traveller Ibn Batutah, throughout whose journey to Malabar, he met a number of Arab merchants and theologians, The Zamorin of Calicut being a “chief patron of Arab trade” who is said to have been a primary agent in conversion to Islam in Malabar (265). On the spread of Islam in Southern India, Arnold records a number of communities, such as the “Ravuttans,”

who ascribe their conversion to the preaching of missionaries whose tombs are held in veneration by them to the present day. The most famous of these was Sayyid Nathar Shah (A.D. 969-1039) . . . Sayyid Ibrahim Shahid, . . . whose tomb is at Ervadia, . . .Shah al-Hamid (1532-1600).

(267)

At Dahanu still reside the descendants of a relative of one of the greatest saints of Islam, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Qadir Jilani of Baghdad; he came to Western India about the fifteenth century, and after making many converts in the Konkan, died and was buried at Dahanu. (271)

On the spread of Islam in China, Arnold mentions Sayyid Ajall, a citizen of Bukhara who, upon his death in 1270 left behind him “a reputation as an enlightened and upright administrator” who “built Confucian temples as well as mosques in Yunnan city” (298). Arnold states that Ajall’s descendants “played a great part in the establishing of Islam in China” (298).
The fourth and last group of missionaries who were the agents of spreading Islam around the world is women. In the Conclusion of *The Preaching of Islam*, Arnold gives full credit to the role women played in bringing about the conversion of non-Muslim men. Arnold’s history in this light acquires an additional import in bringing to the foreground the active role of group of society which has been predominantly marginalized in the Western tradition on the one hand, and used on the other as a pretext to stigmatize Islam as oppressive. The portion of the Conclusion on the role of women is declarative and eloquent. It is worth quoting at length:

It is interesting to note that the propagation of Islam has not been the work of men only, but Muslim women have also taken their part in this pious task. Several of the Mongol princes owed their conversion to the influence of a Muslim wife, and the same was probably the case with many of the pagan Turks when they had carried their raids into Muhammadan countries. The Sanusiyyah missionaries who came to work among the Tubu, to the north of Lake Chad, opened schools for girls, and took advantage of the powerful influence exercised by the women among these tribes (as among their neighbours, the Berbers), in their efforts to win them over to Islam. In German East Africa, the pagan natives who leave their homes for six months or more, to work on the railways or plantations, are converted by the Muhammadan women with whom they contract alliances; these women refuse to have anything to do with an uncircumcised kafir, and to escape the disgrace attaching to such an appellation, their husbands become circumcised and thus receive an entry
into Muslim society. The progress of Islam in Abyssinia during the first half of the last century has been said to be in large measure due to the efforts of Muhammadan women, especially the wives of Christian princes, who had to pretend a conversion to Christianity on the occasion of their marriage, but brought up their children in the tenets of Islam and worked in every possible way for the advancement of their faith. (410)

Arnold adds to this illustrious list the role of the Tatar women of Kazan (411). What is interesting about the list is its demonstration that woman’s agency in propagating Islam was not restricted to a social class. Moreover, it points the high sense of discipline enjoyed by these Muslim women, a sense which must have had its appeal among the non-Muslim men who came into contact with these women to the point where it effected their conversion. Furthermore, Arnold’s illumination of this page of Muslim history counteracts the dominant representations of women in nineteenth-century British literature as licentious creatures.

Along with constructing the history of the propagation of Islam as the history of the triumph of mission over sword, Arnold, in numerous places in his book, dispels with decisiveness misconceptions pertaining to the Jizyah, or tax levied on the non-Muslim inhabitants of the Muslim empire. In Arnold’s defense, the Jizyah is cleansed of its oppressive connotations. Arnold explains that by definition, this pecuniary stipulation is not an act of punishing those who refuse to convert to Islam, but is a payment exacted for a service rendered by the Muslim government. This service includes the protection of life and property of the non-Muslim citizens who choose not to enlist in the Muslim army. Arnold explains
This tax was not imposed on the Christians, as some would have us think, as a penalty for their refusal to accept the Muslim faith, but was paid by them in common with the other dhimmis or non-Muslim subjects of the state whose religion precluded them from serving in the army, in return for the protection secured for them by the arms of the Musalmans . . . and it is very noticeable that when any Chrisitan people served in the Muslim army, they were exempted from the payment of this tax. Such was the case with the tribe of al-Jurajimah, a Christian tribe in the neighbourhood of Antioch, who made peace with the Muslims, promising to be their allies and fight on their side in battle, on condition that they should not be called upon to pay jizyah and should receive their proper share of the booty. (60-62).

This unconventional, though documented, defense of a significant component of Muslim legislative and military systems is further enforced by Arnold’s addition that Jizyah was by no means a burdensome tax. In the chapter on the spread of Islam in western Asia, for instance, Arnold states, “this jizyah was too moderate to constitute a burden, seeing that it released them [non-Muslims] from the compulsory military service that was incumbent on their Muslim fellow-subjects” (59). Arnold makes another significant addition in the illumination of this Islamic practice; namely that it did not apply to all non-Muslim citizens. Other people exempt from payment of jizyah, the first being those who choose to serve in the Muslim army, were women and children, “the poor, the blind, the lame, the incurables and the insane, unless they happened to be men of wealth” (60).
CHAPTER FIVE

WHAT NEXT?

When challenge comes from a group that is truly outside the class and power structure of the academy, …broad and fierce hegemonic resistance is evident in the responses.
--Kaplan & Rose, *The Canon and the Common Reader*

“Tradition” changes. It is not outside history. It has changed in the past, is changing now, and will change again.
--William E. Cain, “Opening the American Mind”

When John Morley, editor of the *Fortnightly Review* (and quoted in chapter three) spoke of the “momentous task of forming public opinion” in the nineteenth-century, (qtd. Auchterlonie 11) he was anticipating Robert Scholes who, about a hundred and fifty years later in his book, *Textual Power*, voiced a similar sentiment, though not as boastfully, acknowledging both, the manipulative power of texts, and the need to inculcate in students a resisting attitude against textual power. This attitude, according to Scholes, is acquired when students are taught the skill of criticism: “In an age of manipulation, when our students are in dire need of critical strength to resist the continuing assaults of all the media, the worst thing we can do is to foster in them an attitude of reverence before texts” (16). Scholes’s statement about the transparency between the outside world and the classroom, underlines the danger posed by the media, indicating a three-tiered dynamic at play inside the classroom: the text, the reader, and the teacher. The text, as it is offered for consumption inside the classroom, should not, according to Scholes, be accepted to hold impeccable truths. Scholes cautions against a reverential attitude toward texts, perhaps because reverence breeds submission to the
ideology espoused by the text, and submission is a great enemy of the kind of change that emergent voices within the academy and the profession of letters in general are advocating. On the other hand, the reader in Scholes’s statement is the object of the manipulative power of media outside the classroom context, where ubiquitous ideological currents are capable of shaping this reader’s opinions in a way that requires a certain kind of classroom instruction, training in criticism, to undo. The teacher, in Scholes’s statement then, is a facilitator of social change, even though his role is exercised inside the classroom, within the walls of the academy.

But the academy is not an isolated system on the periphery of society. What happens outside in the world: wars, new legislations, scientific discoveries, religious and human rights movements, have often influenced what gets taught and who teaches it inside the academy. This emphasis on the transparency between the academy and the world outside recalls the opening paragraph of chapter one, where Jack Shaheen draws attention how “The New anti-Semitism,” (5) or what chapter three has termed epistemic violence against Islam and Muslims, flows among discursive fields. Travel narratives and other texts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have informed how Islam and Muslims are constructed and vilified as a group by Hollywood. In the academy, scholars such as Edward Said have articulated the dynamics of the Western construction of the East, and critiqued the imperial apparatus at the heart of such construction in Orientalism. Despite being of Arab origin, Said enjoyed a privileged status in the Western academy and his voice was heard. Critiques of Western ideological hegemony present their own difficulties, especially to voices located outside the power structure of the academy, as the epigraph states. And one needs to identify oneself as belonging to a group, whether
cultural, academic, racial, or religious, in order to mount an attack on any form of
hegemony. Robert Scholes reminds us, “We can criticize only as representatives of a
group or class” (49); therefore, it is with the full realization of my status as a Muslim
scholar with an emerging academic voice, trying to find a niche in the academy by
submitting job applications to universities and hoping for the best, that I approach this
last chapter of the dissertation. In this conclusive chapter, I take a futuristic look at what
can be done with the texts of chapter four rather than sum up the main ideas of the entire
dissertation. I discern a grave injustice in the ideological construction of Islam and
Muslims in the West, an injustice that has become part of the West’s cultural capital. The
dynamics of this injustice within the walls of the Western academy dictate certain texts
on classroom syllabi; such texts as only aggravate “public opinion” against this class of
people. Chapter Four recovered three nineteenth-century texts whose authors sought to
undermine the epistemic violence wrought by the mainstream against Islam and Muslims.
Any project which seeks to address this injustice, both inside the classroom and in the
academic settings of conferences and journals needs to understand the difficulties this
project is fraught with, and needs to be equipped with the necessary tools/training to
propose change. Epistemic violence against Islam and Muslims can be counteracted, as
far as the Western academy is concerned, by advocating curricular reform through, first,
the inclusion of Julia Pardoe’s The City of the Sultan in The Norton Anthology of
Literature by Women, and of Godfrey Higgins’ An Apology and T.W. Arnold’s The
Preaching of Islam in The Longman Anthology of British Literature, as well as making
them available in electronic format on Project Gutenberg; and second, through the
integration of these texts on classroom syllabi. This curricular reform is structured around
recognition of both the extrinsic and the intrinsic aspects of a question that needs to be asked: What can educators in the Western academy do inside the classroom in order to foster in their students, as Scholes recommends, “a resisting attitude” against textual and other media representations of Islam and Muslims? In proposing curricular reform, I will shed light on the academic forces whose weight and influence have a say in classroom text selection. The argument for the three texts’ integration in the two anthologies will form a segue to the exploration of the intrinsic assets of these texts which recommend their inclusion on reading lists inside the university classroom. Here, I shall be making concrete examples on how these texts can be used in course offerings at the English and History departments inside the American academy, selecting Indiana University of Pennsylvania as a random, concrete example.

In their chapter “The Power of the Common Reader: the Case of Doris Lessing,” Carey Kaplan and Ellen Cronan Rose discuss the influential role the MLA plays in setting the “acceptable parameters of scholarly and critical discourse and the roster of authors and books deemed worth studying” (66). They go on to acknowledge the different venues which the MLA provides, such as its annual convention, regional associations, and the Committee on Teaching and Related Professional Activities, and how these venues raise a certain author or text to a status of academic recognition high enough whereby it becomes acceptable, even expected to teach that author or text (66). What is interesting about the chapter is its reiteration of Scholes’s point about the transparency between the outside world and the classroom. Kaplan and Rose highlight the commercial, or material aspect of this transparency. In their argument, a text or author must travel a certain path before it is finally initiated into the academy. This commercial
aspect, which recommends the text or author into bestsellerdom, according to Kaplan and Rose, is contingent on the decision of a group of people which, although identified roughly by its gender, race, and class contours, remains largely anonymous, “… a book’s success depends on its being bought, read, and recommended by a fairly small but highly influential group of people, “of better-than-average education (most had finished college), relatively well-to-do, many of them professionals, in middle life, upwardly mobile, living near New York or oriented, especially through the New York Times, to New York life” (68). The forming of public opinion is a two-way process: if a text is bought by a large enough number of readers, it merits review in the New York Times Book Review; and at the same time, if a text makes the Book Review or any of the other “seven gatekeeper journals,” then it is deemed by public opinion as worthy of notice (70). It is this realization of the powerful influence of these journals on book sales, according to Kaplan and Rose, which drives the “publicity departments of most trade publishing houses” to exercise their marketing skills of persuasion on the editors of these journals to write about a certain text (68).

In stressing this material aspect of a text’s path to public recognition and academic recommendation, Kaplan and Rose make an important caveat. The reading public’s freedom of selecting a work is not unconditional. They draw on the work of Richard Ohmann to agree that this reading public does not “‘freely’ choose its favorites from the total number of novels written in a given year but rather from the small proportion of those novels published and promoted by a powerful circle of agents, editors, advertisers, and journals” (73). Kaplan and Rose’s caveat does not hold much promise for the case of The City of the Sultan, An Apology, and The Preaching of Islam. If the “small but
highly influential group of people” who is calling the shots about how Islam and Muslims are represented in Hollywood, who is establishing the parameters for political and religious discourse concerning them, is commensurable with the “small but highly influential group of people” who determines a text’s initiation into the university classroom, then the odds are not high in favor of these texts, because antipathy, or at best, indifference, remains by and large the driving force behind such representations and selections. What does raise the stakes in favor of these texts, on the other hand, is what Ohmann calls “personal meaning” for the common reader (Kaplan & Rose, 73). A determining factor in a work’s salability is its capability for resonance with the reader’s life; the potential it holds for answering the question, “What does this say about my life?” (Kaplan & Rose: 73). Julia Pardoe, Godfrey Higgins, and T. W. Arnold, in creating their counter-hegemonic narratives of Islam question their previous assumptions about this religion and its adherents, and in doing so ask their readers to “re-examine [their] ideology, to ‘explore [their] class biases, sexual biases, and ethnic biases’” (qtd. Kaplan & Rose 76). When Pardoe, for instance, expresses respect for Muslim prayer despite her disagreement with it as a form of worship, she is urging her readers to look outside their own value system by not projecting the Christian model of evaluation. Pardoe admits:

I am by no means prepared, nor even inclined, to attempt a Quixotic defense of the very extraordinary and bizarre ceremonial to which I was next a witness; but I cannot, nevertheless, agree with a modern traveller in describing it as “an absurdity.” That it does not accord with our European ideas of consistent and worthy worship is not only possible, but certain; yet I should imagine that no one could feel other than respect
for men of irreproachable character, serving God according to their means
means of judgment. (43-44)

Despite the fact that Kaplan and Rose’s analysis above generally concerns recent
works whose authors are alive at the time of the publication of their work, their analysis
is valid for works of the past which have fallen into obscurity. For a text to acquire
candidacy status on a course reading-list, a certain degree of luck is required. Wendell V.
Harris, in his article, “Canonicity,” calls this “fortunate sponsorship,” and states that it is
contingent on the “skill with which [a text] is brought into the critical colloquy” (112).
For these texts to merit serious attention, they will need to be inducted into this critical
colloquy through conference presentations or journal submissions, in the hope to bring
them to the attention of the MLA and any of the “gatekeeper journals,” namely “the New
York Times Review; the New York Review of Books; the New Republic; the New Yorker;
Commentary; the Saturday Review; the Partisan Review; and Harper’s” (Cronan & Rose
70). These presentations and submissions will need to demonstrate the significance,
better, the significances, these texts hold for inclusion in anthologies and on classroom
syllabi. Such demonstration needs to be conscientious of what Kaplan and Rose call the
“entrenched academic hegemony” (The Canon and the Common Reader, 157), which is
best confronted by a methodology of addition and expansion rather than replacement.
Prominent voices in canon theory, such as John Guillory, are advancing the notion that it
is not so much the intention of exclusion as that of inclusion that lies behind canon
formation (“Canon, Syllabus, List,” 43). And anthologies of literature, although not
synonymous with the canon in the sense of being an all-inclusive-register of the texts that
constitute that canon, if ever there is such a list, are usually the sites where a required
addition to that canon is made. In the following section of the chapter, I shall advance the	ontion that including Julia Pardoe’s *The City of the Sultan* in *The Norton Anthology of
Literature by Women*, and Godfrey Higgins’ *An Apology*, as well as T. W. Arnold’s *The
Preaching of Islam* in *The Longman Anthology of British Literature* illustrates the agenda
of the editors as stated in the Prefaces of these anthologies, while at the same time
serving as a platform for the dissemination of these works, which facilitates their
availability to a wider reading public.

In the Preface to the first edition of *The Norton Anthology of Literature by Women*,
Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar write convincingly that in making available in one
place a body of works that celebrate the female literary tradition, theirs is in part a
recovery project that boasts multiple significances, “By gathering in a single volume a
range of literary works in which women writers have expressed their sometimes
problematic, sometimes triumphant relationship to culture and society, our collection
seeks to recover a long and often neglected literary history” (xxvii). Chapter Four of the
dissertation has shown how, despite the fact that Julia Pardoe’s *The City of the Sultan* was
acknowledged by the periodical press at its publication and despite its going through a
second edition, and that Pardoe’s reputation as novelist well established, the work has
received no attention in recent scholarship. The inclusion of Pardoe’s book in *The Norton
 Anthology of Literature by Women* enforces the editors’ project of making their anthology
a site of recovered works. The anthology’s methodology is to include only excerpts from
longer works, so for the case of The City of the Sultan, I propose including the Preface;
Chapter I, “City of the Sultan”; Chapter VI, “Turkish Character”; and an excerpt from
Chapter V, “The Greek Carnival,” which falls from page 73 to 81.
Explaining the rationale behind their selections for the anthology in the Preface, Gilbert and Gubar state, “…we believe that throughout this anthology we have reprinted works whose historical, intellectual, or aesthetic significance seems to us clearly to merit their inclusion” (xxx). These three criteria of selection, a work’s ability to say something about the historical moment in which it is born or the tradition it comes from, its intellectual rigor, and aesthetic qualities as a literary work make Pardoe’s *The City of the Sultan* a strong candidate under the section, “Literature of the Nineteenth Century,” among the myriad of authoresses which this section hosts, like Linda Brent, Christina Rossetti, and Dorothy Wordsworth.

*The City of the Sultan* is not only a record of a Western woman’s impressions on visiting an Eastern country, it is a distinguished specimen, not only among women authors of the stamp of Harriet Martineau and Lady Mary Montagu, but also among the seasoned travellers and men authors of the nineteenth century like Lord Byron, of travel literature. In the book Pardoe situates herself as writer and traveller in two traditions: Orientalism, and travel literature. Pardoe’s observations about Turks and about their religion undermine some assumptions within these traditions, and in doing so register a female voice within the history of criticism in general. The Oriental tradition in the nineteenth century presented to a Western audience an image of the Oriental domestic sphere in which polygamy, slavery, oppression are perpetrated by the patriarch of that sphere, and where licentiousness and submission are staple characteristics of the female population. *The City of the Sultan* replaces this image by offering an alternative one in which licentiousness is absent among the women of the harem, slavery redefined and the circumstances of which renegotiated
and polygamy situated in the socio-economic matrix of Turkish life, as Chapter Four discussed at length. In doing so, Pardoe deconstructs that aspect of the Oriental tradition in which the exotic elements of fictitious works such as Arabian Nights were blended into those works that aspired to objectivity.

In this context, Pardoe’s observations mark a response to travel literature as well. In The City of the Sultan, Pardoe raises pertinent questions about translation and the language barrier, about objectivity, and the traveller/writer’s parameters of describing a foreign culture. Among the traditions and establishments rejected early in The City of the Sultan is European Orientalism itself. Pardoe dismisses the fallaciousness of the content matter of the bulk of European accounts about the East on grounds of accessibility:

It is also a well-attested fact that the entrée of native houses, and intimacy with native families, are not only extremely difficult, but in most cases impossible to Europeans; and hence the cause of the tissue of fables which, like those of Scheherazade, have created genii and enchanters … in every account of the East. The European mind has become so imbued with ideas of Oriental mysteriousness, mysticism, and magnificence, and it has been so long accustomed to pillow its faith on the marvels and metaphors of tourists, that it is to be doubted whether it will willingly cast off its old associations, and suffer itself to be undeceived. (85)

In rejecting this blending tendency in European Orientalism, Pardoe indicates that responsibility is the duty of the traveller to and writer about the East. The implication in Pardoe’s quote above places travel writing in a field that ought to be clearly demarcated. The numerous occasions in The City of the Sultan in which Pardoe is in dialogue with
other travel writers, some mentioned by name while the others by way of general
reference, is historically significant because, it shows, as Gilbert and Gubar declare in the
Preface, “women writers [who] have expressed their sometimes problematic, sometimes
triumphant relationship to culture and society,” thus demonstrating how these women
writers can be best contextualized (xxvii).

Pardoe concedes that the bulk of Oriental literature, especially that which offered
representations of the female population is erroneous. In her concession she touches on
some of the requirements that travellers ought to have at their disposal, namely time, and
knowledge of the native language, and in the absence of this requirement, knowledge of
the limitations that the alternative, a translator, presents:

There is, perhaps, no country under heaven where it is more difficult
for an European to obtain a full and perfect insight into the national
character, than in Turkey. The extreme application, and the length of
time necessary to the acquirement of the two leading languages, which
bear scarcely any affinity to those of Europe, render the task one of utter
hopelessness to the traveller, who consequently labours under the
disadvantage of explaining his impressions, and seeking for information
through the medium of a third person, inferentially, and it may almost be
said totally, uninterested in both. (82-3)

To these Pardoe adds another hurdle that makes a truthful investigation of the female
quarters of Turkey (the harem and the bath) more difficult, and this is the inaccessibility
of these spaces to the majority of Europeans. The earnest with which she communicates
her resentment of prejudiced representations of the East is equaled by her resolve to
divest herself of preconceived judgments about the character and religion of these people, and to withhold judgment until proper time and observation have been applied:

… I suffered myself to be misled by the assertions and opinions of prejudiced and party-spirited persons, and still maintained the same purpose. But, when awakened to a suspicion of the spirit-thrall in which I had been kept, I resolved to hazard no assertion or opinion which did not emanate from personal convictions, and I found that I could not prove an honest chronicler if I merely contented myself with a hurried and superficial survey of a country constituted like Turky. (x)

That The City of the Sultan demonstrates the intellectual rigor of its author is clear in Pardoe’s engagement with issues of import. Her residence in Turkey gives her the opportunity of getting acquainted with the Jewish, Armenian, Greek, and of course, Turkish communities in Constantinople, where she combines a perspective of objectivity with her skills of observation and narration to comment on topics such as the state of education in Turkey, healthcare, and politics. Perhaps a standing instance is Pardoe’s account of the Greek insurrection. In her account of the revolution, which is usually portrayed in the literature of the nineteenth century as a story of the heroism of the Greek people, Pardoe traces its origins to conspiracy and treason. The Greek and Turkish subjects of the Sultan Mahmoud Halet Effendi, minister of the Sultan, and Michel Suzzo, principal of Moldavia are the prime offenders (50-2). Later in Chapter X, “Greeks at Constantinople,” Pardoe cushions her previous account of the revolutions in a comparison of the character traits of Greeks and Turks, in a character study of the Greeks, making sure to explain their life circumstances under Turkish rule:
There are so many spies in the camp—so many breaches in the fortress—
And, with the helm of affairs, although not actually in their grasp, at least sufficiently within their reach to enable them occasionally to make the vessel of state policy swerve towards the course whither they would fain direct it, they are no contemptible allies to any foreign power that may need their services. The Turk probably possesses the soundest judgment, but the Greek is more subtle and quick-witted, and dazzles even where he may fail to convince.
Under these circumstances, partially trusted by the Turks, and enriched and employed by other nations—gifted with subtlety, energy of character, and that keenness of perception and quickness of intellect for which they are remarkable—the Greeks would be dangerous, if not fatal, enemies to their Moslem masters, had they not, like Achilles, one vulnerable point—they are not true, even to each other. Dissimulation is the atmosphere in which they live—jealousy is the food on which they prey—and, while they are urging on the chariot of their own fortunes, they are sure to have some luckless rival impaled upon one of the spokes of its uncertain wheel.
Hence, all those overwhelming revolutions which render the tenure of wealth and honours among them almost as precarious as among the Turks Themselves. The tolerance of the Sutlan’s government has conceded to them a magistracy and an ecclesiastical power as distinct as though they were a free people and the denizens of a free country. (150-1)
An insight such as this could serve for juxtaposition purposes with other texts as Shelly’s *Hellas* and *The Revolt of Islam* which present a unified image of the Greek on the one hand, and a antagonistic image of Turks on the other. Anthologizing Pardoe’s opinion of the Greek insurrections and of Greek character in general gives students and teachers alike a wider perspective from which to critique a significant moment in the history of Greece and Turkey as recorded in the literature of the nineteenth century.

So far, the explication of the historical and intellectual significances of *The City of the Sultan* has aimed at arguing the case for according them a place among the texts of *The Norton Anthology of Literature by Women*. The last merit that Gilbert and Gubar have selected as a criterion for the selection of their works is their aesthetic value. Alongside the serious topics that Pardoe explores with the eye of an “honest chronicler” as she calls herself (X), *The City of the Sultan* contains descriptive paragraphs which attest to the literary abilities of a distinguished woman writer. Chapter one begins with a portrait of the Golden Horn (the port at Constantinople) and the City of Galatta, among other places, painted by an artist with a discerning eye for beauty. Pardoe’s description of Stamboul is a case in point:

Queenly Stamboul! They myriad sounds of her streets came to us mellowed by the distance; and, as we swept along, the whole glory of her princely port burst upon our view! … Here and there a cluster of graceful minarets cut sharply against the sky; while the ample dome of the mosque to which they belonged, and the roofs of the dwellings that nestled at their base, lay steeped in the same chill livery. (2-3)
The same methodology which I employ for the case of *The City of the Sultan*, namely, using the editors’ own argument to advocate the inclusion of the work, can be made for integrating excerpts from *An Apology* and *The Preaching of Islam* in *The Longman Anthology for English Literature: The Victorian Age*. Editors Heather Henderson and William Sharpe explore the Victorian Age under six major “Perspectives”: “The Industrial Age,” “Religion and Science,” “Victorian Ladies and Gentlemen,” “Imagining Childhood,” “Travel and Empire,” and “Aestheticism, Decadence, and “The Fin De Siecle”; and I will argue that the additions can be made under “Religion and Science.”

Part of the reason why Henderson and Sharpe arrange their anthology under these perspectives rather than chronologically is stated in the Preface, where they reveal their strategy of placing the literary works they offer in their contexts: “This anthology pursues a range of strategies to bring out both the beauty of these webs of words and their moments of contact with reality” (xix). And despite the fact that religion’s hold on truth, both historical and natural, was severely undermined in the religion-science debate which was championed by prominent Victorians like Charles Darwin and William Paley, it was also questioned through other venues furnished by Empire. Mission accompanied imperialism, and in this created moments of dialogue between Christianity and the religions of imperial subjects. Islam was under direct attack by missionary discourse, and Victorian responses polarized into antipathetic and apologetic camps, as Chapter Two discussed at length. In the introductory page to the section, “Religion and Science,” Henderson and Sharpe explain the many areas where Christianity was loosing ground in the face of the growing hold of scientific evidence, which led scientists, as Henderson
and Sharpe maintain, “to question the evidence of God’s artistry” (1273). The Bible’s narrative of Creation was not the only area where science dealt a striking blow. Biblical criticism, led by such scientists as Charles Lyell, “treated Scripture like any other text, probing into questions of dates and sources, authorship and authenticity,” and going as far as “den[y]ing that Jesus was the son of God” (1273). On the missionary front, despite the fact that Christianity was valorized for the sake of converting imperial subjects, the debate between antipathetic and apologetic discourses concerning Islam sometimes found itself taking the same route as scientific discourse. Certain voices within the Christian tradition, and sometimes from other fields of interest such as history, carried out research that put Christian doctrine and history under scrutiny and severe criticism. Godfrey Higgins’ *An Apology* and Thomas Arnold’s *The Preaching of Islam*, being responses to antipathetic discourse, are full of such examples. An anthology of the Victorian Age cannot neglect to acknowledge this significant perspective from which Christianity was revisited. Among the numerous excerpts of texts such as David Friedrich Strauss’s *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined* and Arthur Hugh Clough’s *The Latest Decalogue* which appear under “Religion and Science,” I propose including paragraphs 156, 157, and 185 from Higgins’ *An Apology*, and an excerpt from the chapter “The Spread of Islam in Europe” in Arnold’s *The Preaching of Islam*.

The excerpt from Higgins concerns a crucial moment in Biblical history, which relates to the ascension of Jesus Christ and to the gospel histories. In this excerpt Higgins revisits the moment before the ascension of Jesus, affirming the Qur’anic narrative in which he informs his disciples that a prophet, Mohamed, will succeed him. In the second excerpt Higgins exposes a premeditated corruption of gospel history, namely the
destruction of autographs on the one hand, and the mistranslation of the word “illustrious,” which would be rendered Mohamed in Arabic to the word “Comforter.”

It was the universal tradition, as well as the words of the record, the gospel histories, that Jesus, before his ascension, promised his disciples that he would send a person to them, in some capacity or other; the Greek of our gospels says, as a [Higgins provides the Greek word], translated Comforter.

157. The Mohamedans maintained, and yet maintain, that Mohamed was this person foretold by Jesus Christ, the same as Cyrus was by Isaiah—both by name;—that he was called by Jesus, not by a word which ought to be rendered in the Greek language, as in our gospel histories [Higgins provides the incorrect and correct Greek words], which means not comforter, but famous or illustrious, and which, in Arabic, is the meaning of the word Mohamed; that the gospel of the Christians had originally that latter of those words, but that it was corrupted to disguise the truth. They also allege that the Christians cannot deny that there are corruptions, or various readings, in their present copies, and they say that the autographs were destroyed to conceal this passage. The fact of the loss of the autographs cannot be denied, and is a fact very difficult satisfactorily to account for; and as for ancient copies, there does not exist one before the sixth century. (73-4)

158. In reply to this it will be said, that it may be proved, by passages in Tertullian and other ancient fathers, that the true reading of the gospel
histories was anciently, long before the time of Mohamed, as it is now, and, therefore, that they have not been corrupted. But it will be necessary to shew that the works of these ancient fathers have not been corrupted, which they may have been. Those who would destroy the ancient Manuscripts of the gospel histories, would not scruple at rewriting a skin of parchment on which an ancient father’s work was written: and it is admitted by the first divines of the Christians that they have been corrupted to serve other purposes: and those who would do it in one case would do it in another. That the word being confessed to be Hebrew, if it be wrong written, it is much more likely that the early Christian writers, the greatest liars upon earth, should lie to serve their own purpose, than that St. John, a Hebrew, understanding both Hebrew and Greek, (even without allowing him the gift of tongues,) should have made a mistake, and rendered the word, by Greek letters [Higgins provides both the corrupted and correct Greek words], and that, therefore, it follows that the text of John has been corrupted. (74)

These excerpts, not only collapse a cornerstone in Christian history, but in doing so incriminate the very gatekeepers of this history. They also reveal a moment of dialogue between Islam and Christianity, which shows congruity between the two religions. Jesus prophesied Mohamed by name, and the Moslems have it in their history that Jesus prophesied Mohamed by name. This congruity forfeits those accusations of antipathetic discourse that Mohamed is an imposter. Their contribution to the religious controversy
during the Victorian Age, therefore, increases their candidacy for inclusion under the “Religion and Science” perspective of this anthology.

The excerpt from Arnold’s *The Preaching of Islam* relates to the abuses and corruptions in the Greek Church from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. In the passages below Arnold revisits a segment of Christian history in which oppression is practiced from within rather without the Christian community, i.e., by the hands of the Turks:

Another feature in the condition of the Greek Church that contributed to the decay of its numbers, was the corruption and degradation of its pastors, particularly the higher clergy … The evidence of contemporary eyewitnesses to the oppressive behavior of the Greek clergy presents a terrible picture of the sufferings of the Christians. Tournefort in 1700, after describing the election of a new Patriarch, says: “We need not at all doubt but the new Patriarch makes the best of his time. Tyranny succeeds to Simony: …he imposes a tax upon them [The Prelates], and enjoins them very strictly by a second letter to send the sum demanded, otherwise their dioceses are adjudg’d to the highest bidder. The Prelates being used to this trade, never spare their Suffragans; these latter torment the Papas: the Papas flea the Parishoners and hardly sprinkle the least drop of Holy Water, but what they are paid for beforehand. If afterwards the Patriarch has occasion for money, he farms out the gathering of it to the highest bidder among the Turks: he that gives most for it, goes into Greece to cite the Prelates. (166-7)
Though the masses of the parish clergy were innocent of the charges brought against their superiors, still they were very ignorant and illiterate.

At the end of the seventeenth century, there were said to be hardly twelve persons in the whole Turkish dominions thoroughly skilled in the knowledge of the ancient Greek language; it was considered a great merit in the clergy to be able to read, while they were quite ignorant of the meaning of the words of their service-books.

While there was so much in the Christian society of the time to repel, there was much in the character and life of the Turks to attract, and the superiority of the early Ottomans as compared with the degradation of the guides and teachers of the Christian Church would naturally impress devout minds that revolted from the selfish ambition, simony and corruption of the Greek ecclesiastics. Christian writers constantly praise these Turks for the earnestness and intensity of their religious life; their zeal in the performance of the observances prescribed by their faith; the outward decency and modesty displayed in their apparel and mode of living; the absence of ostentatious display and the simplicity of life observable even in the great and powerful. (169)

Arnold’s assertions, as well as Higgins’, question some of the basic assumptions of antipathetic discourse concerning the truth-value of significant moments in Christian doctrine and history; therefore, undermining it as unstable. The value of these critiques increases because they come from voices within Christian history.
The case for anthologizing Pardoe, Higgins, and Arnold is only one step in addressing epistemic violence in the representations of Islam and Muslims in nineteenth-century British literature. Such a project makes them available for a specialized academic audience in print format. Addressing an issue as pervasive as epistemic violence against Islam and Muslims requires an approach whose aim is a wider audience and whose tools transcend those of print culture. Until these texts make it to the critical colloquy and their value recommended, time can be invested by making them available on another platform: World Wide Web. Sites like Project Gutenberg publish books in electronic format and offer them to the reading public for free, at least in the United States. The World Wide Web and other digital technologies are offering quicker and more efficient access to content than print culture in ways that is making even the most entrenched institutions like the academy rethink its approaches to the creation, distribution, and evaluation of knowledge. For this purpose, and because Project Gutenberg’s founder Michael Hart establishes a set of criteria in his mission statement for the project which encourage using it, Project Gutenberg is a strong candidate as a host for Pardoe’s, Higgins’, and Arnold’s texts. Hart declares that the mission of his project is “to encourage all those who are interested in making eBooks and helping to give them away.” ¹² He adds that Project Gutenberg is “powered by ideas, ideals, and by idealism … and not powered by financial or political power” (see footnote 12). Hart’s mission makes his site a safe zone from which to launch the three texts. The wide range of formats which Project Gutenberg offers for the display of texts, such as HTML and PDF, is another bonus for considering it as a dissemination tool.
The inclusion of Pardoe’s, Higgins’, and Arnold’s texts in these anthologies, as well as on Project Gutenberg, while serving to make them available to both the specialized reader and the general public, in both print and electronic formats, means very little if they are not taught. To put these works on the syllabi of university courses would mean, to quote John Guillory again, “to interrogate some of the historical assumptions dictating the current program of canonical reform, and determining as well the terms by which the political effects of reform are typically represented” (“Canon, Syllabus, List,” 36). Socially defined minorities of class, gender, and race have fought for their share of representation on the canon, and Muslims, as a misrepresented group on that canon, perhaps not as authors but as subject matter, have a long way to go yet. To excise the epistemic violence disseminated in typically anthologized and taught texts such as Mary Wollstonecraft’s *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, in which she constructs a foil, misinformed as it is, in the Muslim tradition, takes time.13 And what would lie at stake would be the very poetics of hegemonic Western discourse, these poetics that have authorized the vilification of Islam and Muslims in literature, politics, and on the silver screen. Canonical reform in areas so entrenched; even fossilized, as cultural capital requires time and the consistent effort of dedicated professionals and educators to find replacements for those texts which radiate epistemic violence.

“Tradition changes,” as William E. Cain asserts in “Opening the American Mind: Reflections on the “Canon” Controversy.” “It has changed in the past, is changing now, and will change again” (6). The method of curricular change that I propose next, depends on the efficiency with which the argument is made for these texts. The initiation of Pardoe, Higgins, and Arnold’s texts into the critical colloquy, and by extension their
introduction on course syllabi depends on persuading the colloquy of the multiple significances of these texts, and depends on what Harris calls “fortunate sponsorship” (“Canonicity”: 112). In doing so, I shall demonstrate the relevance of *The City of the Sultan*, *An Apology*, and *The Preaching of Islam* for course offerings at Indiana University of Pennsylvania, considering it as a potential sponsor for the curricular reform proposed throughout this chapter.

In his article “Canonicity,” Wendell V. Harris discusses some conditions that determine “how much interest [a] text can sustain over how long a period” (112). Among those Harris identifies “the historical resonance of a text, … the possible multiplication of its significances, … and the congruence between its possible significances and critics’ current preoccupations” (112). In what follows I shall explain how Pardoe’s *The City of the Sultan*, Higgins’ *An Apology*, and Arnold’s *The Preaching of Islam* meet the conditions that Harris identifies. The historical resonance of a text, or “the degree to which it explicitly relates to other texts” (Harris: 112) is the reason why they were chosen for discussion in chapter four. These “wounds” in the Orientalist wall constitute a response not only to Oriental literature and studies of the nineteenth century, but are also in some moments, responses to specific authors or genres. As responses to Oriental literature and studies, these wounds articulate the need to acknowledge a general crisis in the representation of Islam and Muslims. Higgins addresses the “Noblemen and Gentlemen of The Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland,” where he explicitly expresses the desire of “correcting what appear to me to be the erroneous opinions which some of the individuals of your Society (as well as others of my countrymen) entertain” concerning Muslims (vii). Arnold undertakes his project for the purpose of bringing forth
a narrative of the spread of Islam through “the quiet, unobtrusive labours of the preacher and the trader who have carried their faith into every quarter of the globe” (5). And Pardoe repeatedly tells readers throughout her book that political prejudice and party allegiance have informed how the West has represented the East. In terms of subject matter, these texts construct counter-representations, which are based on first-hand contact with Islam and Muslims, and on extensive scholarly research. They are, therefore, subversive of the Oriental tradition as it was written in the nineteenth century. When Pardoe declares, based on her observations, that polygamy is not a commonplace in Turkey, and that slavery is a mere name and a far cry from slavery as practiced in Europe; when Higgins maintains that polygamy has always been practiced in the Christian tradition and is mentioned in the Bible; when he argues that Jesus did prophecy Mohamed by name; when Arnold argues that the reason Islam enjoys a great sway on a great portion of the inhabitants of the Earth is owed to the peaceful missionary efforts of traders and preachers, and not a byproduct of militant conquest, they are all deconstructing the very terms by which Orientalism has constructed the East in the nineteenth century.

In the context of theoretic approaches to literary studies, then, these texts deconstruct established notions about Islam within the Orientalist tradition, and contest what has been conceived and accepted about Muslims as violent, polygamous, and oppressive of women and other religious identities, which makes them relevant primary material on the syllabus of a course on deconstruction. These primary texts can change the way modern scholarship thinks about nineteenth-century Oriental literature, both in terms of their content matter, and in terms of the efficiency of the apologetic voice in which this content
matter is delivered. When these texts are taught instead of, or at least alongside other
Orientalist texts that have become staple readings on the subject, such as those by Byron,
Martineau, and Wollstonecraft, among many others, they offer both the teacher and the
student a wider range for comparison, and a critical perspective from which to question
their own assumptions about how Islam and Muslims are represented in modern-day
Western politics, literature, and the media. Drawing on Scholes again, his insight that
“school is the one place where our major concern is to study what we don’t know, to
confront Otherness” is valid in the context of making these texts available for
consumption in the classroom (*Textual Power*, 59).

The second condition identified by Harris for determining the longevity of a text is
“the possible multiplication of its significances (the degree to which it is multivalent)”
(112). The multiple significances of *The City of the Sultan, An Apology*, and *The
Preaching of Islam* lie in their teachability, both wholesale and in excerpts, on different
kinds of courses in subject areas as feminism or women’s studies, literature, and history.
At the Department of English, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, *The City of the
Sultan*’s significance for a graduate course such as ENGL 872, Topics in Women’s
Literature, which could carry the subtitle, “Women’s Voices in Nineteenth-Century
British Literature,” or “Women Writers and Travel Literature,” can be demonstrated in at
least two areas.14 In one, the book’s inclusion on the syllabus of this course can
demonstrate a woman’s voice in a tradition (travel and Orientalist literatures) where the
contribution is predominantly male. And this serves the recovery agenda which this
course, and similar other courses usually advocate. This contribution is even more crucial
to such courses in as much as Pardoe sets herself up against this tradition and questions
its integrity. In another area, Pardoe’s work is significant to such a course because a good portion of its subject matter deals with women. Pardoe’s representation of women defies the image of women as a disenfranchised group by some theoretic, historical, and sociological approaches to literature. If combined with Arnold’s section on the contribution of women to the spread of Islam throughout history, this gives both the teacher and the students a nuanced historical perspective from which to question the hegemonic placement of Muslim women as an oppressed group by their very religious identity.

Higgins’ and Arnold’s texts fit well some of the course offerings at the department of History at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. The undergraduate course, History of the Islamic Civilization (HIST 330), for instance, is a good candidate. The course’s description, as posted on the university’s website, states that it is “[a]n approach to learning about a non-Western culture: Mohammad, Arabs, and Muslims as creators of a great civilization from [the] rise of Islam to 1800; emphasis on cultural institutions of Islam and their interrelationships within Middle East.” An Apology and The Preaching of Islam illustrate this side of Muslims’ history as that of “a great civilization,” with the advantage their approach is comparative with other civilizations and empires. From another angle, Pardoe’s, Higgins’, and Arnold’s books could serve the objectives of such courses as ENGL 864, Topics in British Literature Since 1660, with a subtitle like “Islam in Nineteenth-Century British Literature.” A text-counter-text approach for this course serves to highlight the antipathetic-apologetic debate concerning the representation of Islam and Muslims, where William Muir can be read vis-à-vis Higgins or Arnold. These works could also serve as the historical context to illuminate a literary text. Shelly’s The
Revolt of Islam, for example, could be read against Pardoe’s account of the Greek insurrections.

The possibilities for teaching these texts are not exhausted in the above discussion. Nor is the exploration of the representations of Islam in nineteenth-century British literature all-inclusive. Epistemic violence against Islam and Muslims is an issue of social injustice, and some of the voices that have been diligent in redressing it come from the Western tradition, the very perpetrator of this violence. The perspectives from which Julia Pardoe, Godfrey Higgins, and Thomas Arnold contest previously held assumptions about Islam and Muslims do suffer blinders and limitations, which are dictated by various elements in these authors’ social location, such as gender, social class, and education. The discussion of these authors in Chapter Four is by no means complete, and I did not proceed from any assumption that these authors’ construction of Islam and Muslims is more truthful than its hegemonic counterpart. What makes these voices worthy of study within the walls of the Western academy is that they ask their audience to step outside their own paradigms and question settled assumptions. And for this reason, they should be heard, not only in the specialized settings of literature courses and academic conferences, but also on a general scale by the general reader in the West. And their availability in electronic format on the World Wide Web serves well to extend their reach beyond such specialized settings. These texts, because they emanate from a refusal to take for granted what has come to be accepted about Islam and Muslims, are exemplary narratives, asking readers, to stop and think every time they witness instances of the media constructing and recycling representations of Islam and Muslims, which, despite their regenerative nature, often spring from the same seed which Orientalism has
devotedly nurtured. The suggestions in the last chapter have acknowledged one obstacle that confronts such a project. Sponsorship by professionals inside the Western academy is crucial. I go back to my social location, which facilitated my exposure to Western culture at an early age and gave me a perspective from which to seek truth-value even in the literature I read. My social location, which has played a positive role in the conception and writing of this dissertation, poses a limitation in another area, a limitation related to voice. The advancement of the curricular reform which I have discussed in this chapter is likely to find resistance from a foreign voice who asks that the Western academy, and by extension the West at large, abandon a portion of the historical baggage it has brought thus far into the critique and representation of Islam and Muslims. I like to believe that there is hope, because, as William Cain asserts, “Tradition … has changed in the past, is changing now, and will change in the future.”
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1 For more information on Shaheen’s biography and Reel Bad Arabs, see

2 Clinton Bennett is a fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society, ordained Baptist minister, associate professor, and author of numerous books and articles on religions of the East, inter-faith dialogue. His graduate research focused on the influence of colonialism and Christian mission on Western approaches to Islam. He travelled extensively in the Arab world. <http://www.clintonbennett.net/>.


4 *ibid*

5 The Persian miracle, or passion play commemorates the martyrdom of Imam Hussein bin Ali and his family in the Iraqi desert of Kerbala.

6 This book is an index in eight volumes of history books written by native Indian historians.

7 For more information on Higgins, visit <http://www.theohistory.org/thcovers/thscan103.html#Anchor-of-47942>

8 Also visit <http://burghwallis.com/village/articles/higgins.htm>

9 <http://www.aim25.ac.uk/cgi-bin/search2?coll_id=171&inst_id=19>

10 Musa bin Nusayr (640-716) was general and governor of the Muslim provinces of North Africa under the Umayad caliph, al-Walid I.


13 “In a treatise, therefore, on female rights and manners, the works which have been particularly written for their improvement must not be overlooked; especially when it is asserted, in direct terms, that the minds of women are enfeebled by false refinement, that
the books of instruction, written by men of genius, have had the same tendency as more frivolous productions; and that, in the true style of Mahometanism, they are treated as a kind of subordinate beings, and not as a part of the human species, when improveable reason is allowed to be the dignified distinction which raises men above the brute creation, and puts a natural scepter in a feeble hand” (Norton Anthology,139).

14 See the graduate program requirements and course offerings on the Department of English’s page: http://www.iup.edu/page.aspx?id=97082

15 See course description at http://www.iup.edu/page.aspx?id=36429