Towards a Grammar of Leadership

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TOWARDS A GRAMMAR OF LEADERSHIP

A Dissertation
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and Research
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education

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August 2008
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Contemporary (empirical) leadership study (CLS) is beset with the inability to define its object efficiently. Consequently, CLS has generated hundreds of so-called leadership “definitions” with no end in sight, leaving the field in disarray. This situation of definitional indefiniteness is due to a lack of a fundamental (philosophical, non-empirical) theory of leadership that articulates a universal leadership reality that grounds and provides referential stability for empirical study. This essay is an attempt to provide this fundamental theory, viz., the Grammar of Leadership.

Essentially, the Grammar is a philosophical hypothesis about what is the ontological “depth” that underlies all the variety of phenomenal “surfaces” of leadership. This hypothesis represents a way to delimit the proper domain of the scientific-empirical study of leadership, to “qualify” socialities for that domain so that scientific-empirical study can proceed confidently and efficiently with the effort to define leadership. It is precisely due to the lack of this philosophical foundation that CLS is in chaotic disarray.

The exposition of the Grammar proceeds first by a discussion of the formal “syntactical” elements that obtain in any instance of leadership. Then there is a “semantic” application of this syntax to analyze actual situations in an attempt to show
the explanatory power of the theory. Results of the analysis include disqualification of
one situation from the domain of leadership study but the inclusion of the other. These
results are characterized as the “disciplining” of the concept of leadership that remedies
the definitional indefiniteness of CLS and thereby gives it a proper theoretical basis as a
project of scientific-empirical research.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Chapter I | THE PROBLEM……………………………………………………1 |
| Organization of the Essay…………………………………………6 |
| Chapter II | WHAT IS LEADERSHIP?..............................................................7 |
| A Disciplined Concept of Leadership……………………………………. 7 |
| Realism and Universalism…………………………………………10 |
| Reckoning with Realism and Universalism……………………………..... 14 |
| Incompleteness…………………………………………………. 18 |
| The Grammar of Leadership…………………………………… 25 |
| Chapter III | SYNTAX………………………………………………………..28 |
| Social Ontology…………………………………………............29 |
| Leadership and the Normal Social State of Affairs……………. 38 |
| The Coming of Leadership…………………………………….. 42 |
| The Objective Circumstances of Disruption………………... 42 |
| The Subjectivity of Disruption…………………. 47 |
| Summary……………………………………………………. 50 |
| The Leader’s Work………………………………………………... 51 |
| Diagnosis…………………………………………………… 52 |
| Enacting the Critique……………………………………….. 55 |
| The Leadership Entity…………………………………….... 56 |
| The New Normal and the End of Leadership………………….. 64 |
| Chapter IV | SEMANTICS………………………………………….............. 69 |
| Introduction……………………………………………………. 69 |
| The US Sociality……………………………………………….. 69 |
| The Idea of the US Sociality………………………………… 70 |
| The Declaration of Independence……………………………... 71 |
| The Articles of Confederation……………………………... 74 |
| The Constitution…………………………………………… 75 |
| Unionizing Structure………………………………………. 75 |
| An Articulated Federalism…………………………………. 76 |
| We the People…………………………………………... 77 |
| Two Planks of the Idea……………………………………... 78 |
| Andrew Jackson and the Nullification Crisis…………………………... 78 |
| Contradictions in the Idea………………………………… 78 |
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figures</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I: THE PROBLEM

The problem with which this essay is concerned is the theoretical incompleteness of the contemporary empirical-scientific study of leadership. By this incompleteness I mean the lack of a theory that provides the basic principles and elements of leadership, what I’ll call a grammar, that can be used to explain the existence-emergence of any possible leadership phenomena. Leadership phenomena, of course, are the proper objects of empirical leadership studies that seek to define, or discover commonalities, relationships, generalizations in, leadership.

As it is now, I claim, the empirical study of leadership approaches leadership phenomena without having any critically defended idea about just what leadership is. There is simply no theory of universal leadership reality in terms of a set of basic principles and elements that in some sense qualifies-controls-delimits a precise domain of social phenomena as “really being” leadership phenomena. Thus contemporary empirical leadership study involves the presupposition that the phenomena being studied are really instances of the same leadership. But without a controlling-delimiting-qualifying basic leadership theory, the empirical study of leadership (as well as common language) has no way to tell if that presupposition indeed implies the same thing in every instance. My sense is that there are several different presuppositions in play, a situation that accounts for the generation of a seemingly endless number of ambiguous, contradictory and fragmented “definitions” of leadership (Bennis, 1989). The problem, then, is that the contemporary empirical-scientific study of leadership (what I’ll refer to henceforth as CLS) is fundamentally inefficient regarding its exploration of leadership phenomena. It
does not seem to have a common reference to unify and discipline its efforts in order to converge on its proper object. CLS, accordingly, is left in chaotic disarray (Wren, 1995).

The theory put forth in this essay is offered as a solution to the theoretical incompleteness described above. That is, a grammar of leadership will be offered as a basic leadership theory that can “discipline” the meaning-concept of leadership as well as articulate a set of principles and elements that can explain the emergence-existence of any possible leadership phenomena (and thereby represent the “intelligible form” of those phenomena). The Grammar, however, is put forth only as a philosophical hypothesis, as a possible way to address the problematic incompleteness of CLS. Other “grammars” or basic theories are certainly possible. And the problem itself, the theoretical incompleteness, might be rejected, as will be discussed later. Nevertheless, what I’m offering here is a way to conceive how to remove the definitional indefiniteness, ambiguity, contradictoriness, and chaotic disarray of CLS, a state of affairs that I assume is troubling for most serious and reflective leadership theorists.

Let me turn to my methodology. I have already indicated that the solution to the problem of CLS is a philosophical solution. By this I mean a theorizing at a level logically more basic than empirical research. Why? It is because the problem at hand indicates the need for a theory of the universal while empirical research presupposes the universal in its treatment of particulars. The provision of such a theory is the bailiwick of philosophical reflection. If the Grammar, therefore, were only another empirical study it would have the same problem (namely, the lack of an account of the universal implied by the presupposition that what it was about was really leadership) as any other empirical leadership study. The methodology of this essay, therefore, is not that of any sort of
quantitative or qualitative empirical-scientific research, but of a philosophy-theory of that empirical-science, a critical examination of the underlying logical requirements of doing that sort of empirical-scientific research coherently. One of those requirements is a theory of the presupposed universal, what I call a grammar, and of the relationship between the universal and the phenomenal field it ground-delimits-controls (Rescher, 2000; Maxwell, 1998; Popper, 1963; Trigg, 2001).

Now, someone might ask and insist that I answer the following questions: How is it that you came up with this grammar, this basic theory of the universal leadership reality? Where did your ideas come from? Aren’t they out of the blue? Out of your own head? Why should I take seriously what you are saying? Well, I can answer that that my ideas both did not and did come from any empirical leadership research. On the one hand, if the ideas were the result of empirical study, the question-problem of this essay would be begged. Have I not explained this sufficiently, that the problem is that empirical research presupposes a universal concept of leadership and so cannot itself generate that concept? On the other hand, though the grammar certainly is somewhat “out of the blue” or “from my own head,” and so is a kind of conjecture, even a bold conjecture, it is nevertheless a philosophical act that is not wholly adventitious. It didn’t start from nothing. In light of a wide reading in leadership studies I noticed that leadership invariably involved change, influence, agency, and always occurred in a social state of affairs. Furthermore, it was plain that leadership was not an ordinary thing, that it was in some sense extraordinary and peculiar. Why indeed would leadership be of such interest that entire university departments are devoted to it? These “clues,” then, derived from the extant body of empirical leadership studies became the point of departure for my reflection on the
theoretical problem of CLS, a non-empirical philosophical reflection that eventuated in the conjecture of a basic set of rules and principles that were at the bottom of and could explain and be used to identify any leadership phenomenon. So it is, by this methodology, that this essay proceeds. And should anyone actually read it, she would notice how the empirical clues gleaned from CLS are integrated into the philosophical Grammar, how the philosophical conjecture not only is informed by the logic of the problem but also by the “wisdom” of the empirical research tradition.

Perhaps this essay appears like groping. But I believe that if it is groping, it’s a groping well-founded both on the tradition of CLS itself (as I just explained) and on respectable non-traditional (relative to CLS) sources, such as social theory. This groping is really a bid to advance at least an idea of how to solve a significant problem and to approach something like the truth of leadership. I make no apology for this groping, even if I cannot say, and never intended to say, that the results have unimpeachable authority. What I offer is for the critical appraisal of others who might read it carefully. It is a kind of suggestion of a notion that might illuminate a domain of reality in some interesting way so as to provoke thought and further questions. My intention is only to explore an unknown area to try to learn something truly interesting about leadership that will increase the effectiveness of CLS (Popper, 1963).

Before continuing, I should like to elaborate a little more on some terms and phrases that already have been used but will become increasingly significant in the discussion: Grammar: The set of relationships, elements, principles, and rules that articulate the universal leadership reality to which every leadership phenomenon refers and that explains the process and conditions for the existence-emergence of any leadership
phenomena. To unfold and exhibit this set as the solution to the theoretical incompleteness of CLS is, of course, the purpose of this essay.

*Contemporary empirical study of leadership (CLS):* This includes the whole body of quantitative and qualitative empirical-scientific leadership studies. CLS, to be sure, is a wide-ranging field of inquiry. But, as it isn’t the point of this essay to deal directly with any empirical theory or approach to leadership, this omnibus term will be sufficiently precise.

*Social state of affairs (SSOA, later sociality):* This is a crucial term-concept in the grammar. Every leadership phenomenon occurs in and essentially concerns the “good” of some distinct social reality. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the criteria for there being a distinct social reality and to see what constitutes its *normal* functioning. These criteria are in fact given in the section on social ontology that enables us to see the relationship of leadership with a SSOA’s normal functioning, especially when that normalcy is disrupted.

*Leadership entity (LE):* This is the closest thing to a neologism in the essay. It refers to the SSOA in the “thrall” of leadership, when the normal functioning of the SSOA is disrupted in some basic way such that leadership agency is called for to address that disruption. The leadership entity represents the precise “time of leadership” when the structures of the SSOA are explicitly affected by the peculiar-extraordinary agency of the leader.
Organization of the Essay

The primary purpose of this essay is to offer a solution to the problem of CLS’s theoretical incompleteness. This solution will be the Grammar of Leadership that is essentially a metaphysic of leadership that constitutes the universal concept of leadership. This concept refers to what is meant whenever anyone asserts, “This is leadership.” The universal concept of leadership captures what any leadership study is “about” and, accordingly, provides a proper domain that is presupposed by anyone, anywhere who undertakes to study leadership in any context. Chapter II, then, is a fuller characterization of the problem. Chapters III and IV are the crucial parts of the essay. Chapter III is an exploration of the outlines of the Grammar including a discussion of methodological implications with respect to how any instance of leadership must be analyzed-explained to reveal the universal ground; and Chapter IV is an attempt to apply the Grammar to analyze-explain two examples of actual social states of affairs so as to “prove” or at least demonstrate the Grammar’s theoretical power. Chapter V will attempt to bring together the grammatical analysis with CLS. This is an effort to show how CLS is completed by the Grammar and to suggest a new more comprehensive research paradigm for leadership study. Chapter V will also include a concluding review and consideration of how the Grammar might be more fully developed. Finally, there is an appendix that gives a schematic representation of the application of the Grammar in a hypothetical SSOA.
CHAPTER II: WHAT IS LEADERSHIP?

A Disciplined Concept of Leadership

We believe that leadership can be predicated of a wide range of social realities: street gangs, research traditions, art movements, churches, corporations, classrooms, families, schools, social reforms, armies, nations, etc. This belief doesn’t seem strained or obviously incorrect. And so, we might reasonably ask: What is it that we see or recognize in persons-agents (their manner and actions) or in a social state of affairs (the character or quality of its structure) that prompts us to believe that in all these contexts leadership is at hand? This question, however, is not easily answered; the attempt to provide answers has spawned a vast and, I think, frustrating literature. The idea of leadership has such a wide-ranging application and means “so much” that it’s notoriously hard to articulate just what it is, even if we still do think that we use the term correctly.

The use of “leadership” is so facile that the common-sense idea, or “theory,” of leadership is nearly transparent and, ironically, useless at least as a way to grasp or frame or refer to something definite (viz., leadership) that is thereby distinguishable from other social realities and can become the articulated object of rational discussion. The common idea of leadership, in fact, seems so fragmented and indefinite that one is tempted to think that it might not be an idea of leadership at all. Anyway, what is definite (albeit trivially) is that leadership involves certain persons-agents, so-called leaders, whose actions in a social state of affairs change that state of affairs in some presumptively recognizable way. Are these persons special in some way? And what is it about their actions that in heterogeneous social states of affairs exhibit leadership? Is it that these are peculiar-special actions that “do something” peculiar-special to the social state of affairs
including other agents-participants and various “component parts” of the social state of affairs) such that we can see, regardless of phenomenal differences, that leadership is “happening”? But how is it that across very differently appearing social contexts, for example a street gang and a research tradition, person-agents can be acting in their respective social states of affairs in such a way that, without equivocation, we are correct to call them both leaders or assert that leadership is happening in both contexts? These questions, as before, are notoriously difficult to answer. Perhaps we need to leave it like this: We can’t tell you what leadership is, but we know it when we see it; we can’t describe a prototypical leader, but we know a leader when one emerges.

But I don’t intend to leave the matter this way. The present essay, without intentionally disrespecting the expansive, diverse, rich, and ordinary application of the concept of leadership, nevertheless seeks to “discipline” the concept, or “salvage” it from the vagaries on common usage so that it does indeed pick out or refer to something quite specific, namely leadership, a disciplining that amounts to discovering (inventing?) a technically precise and articulate meaning-theory of leadership that serves the purposes not only of rational discussion but also of a properly scientific study of leadership reality. This discovery, among other things, will imply that leadership is something really quite extraordinary; much of what is commonly believed to be leadership is something else. This isn’t to say that leadership does not occur, as is ordinarily believed, in a wide-range of social states of affairs, but only that its actual, bona fide occurrence is not nearly as frequent as is commonly believed: There are not that many leaders nor, as a result, are there that many social states of affairs characterized-qualified for and by leadership.
Of course, we might think that those engaged in the “scientific” study of leadership over the last 70 years or so would already have discovered a disciplined, technical sense of the concept of leadership, an explicit, scientifically serviceable leadership theory. Yet this is not the case. Contemporary leadership study (CLS) certainly has tried, literally hundreds of times, and continues to try, to “define” leadership for scientific purposes, but has had much difficulty in reaching any consensus as to which definition is the right one. It seems indisputable that leadership researchers, just like ordinary folks, recognize that in quite heterogeneous social circumstances leadership is “there,” but have had trouble in coming up with a description of a common leadership reality that all the research supposedly is “about” or presupposes. A disciplined leadership concept, then, would go ahead and posit (offer a philosophical theory about) this reality and describe it “schematically,” as something to be filled in later by the results of “usual” empirical research (Wisdom, 1987; Maxwell, 1998; Ortega, 1961). This disciplined concept of leadership would in effect provide the boundaries and guiding referential context of the domain of concern; with this concept inquirers would have criteria with which to see why they were mistaken if they asserted that there is leadership when there is not or why a given inquiry into leadership is correctly about leadership. Otherwise, predicating leadership of anything would, at worst, be meaningless or arbitrary, and, at best, be vague and indeterminate.

So, what is this disciplined concept of leadership? Why hasn’t CLS come up with it? Is it, after all, possible or even desirable to achieve this concept?
Realism and Universalism

Before answering the questions just posed, we must notice that the pursuit of a
disciplined concept of leadership assumes that leadership is real and universal.
Leadership is an independent “something” to which the concept-term “leadership” refers
unambiguously regardless of context. We mean this rather than that. Leadership refers to
a consistently recognizable objective reality characterized by a specific sort of agency
and a specific quality of the social state of affairs in which that agency takes place.
Leadership is “there” so as to become the objective or “prey” of the rational inquirer.
There is an unequivocal answer to the question: What is leadership? And statements-
ideas asserted about leadership are true or false depending on how they correspond or
don’t correspond to leadership reality. Leadership, then, for the realist-universalist is
what it is regardless of where it appears and without respect to who is inquiring after it. It
is an independent objective social reality that may be detected by rational-scientific
analysis that establishes whether or not certain ontological criteria are met. The task of
this essay, of course, is to delineate those criteria (Trigg, 1991; Archer, 1991; Archer,
2000; Rescher, 2000; Trigg, 2001).

That leadership is real and universal also means it has a unique existence. That is,
leadership is only like itself. It can’t be assimilated to another sort of social reality and it
can’t be reduced to the agency of leaders (that could be studied as a kind of psychology)
or to the social structure that is being qualified-affected by leaderly agency (that might be
a topic of sociology). Rather, leadership is an emergent agency-structure complex-whole
that demands to be treated as such (as the exclusive topic of leadership research that of
course may involve sociological and psychological “moments” but is not reducible to
either). Otherwise what would be the point of leadership studies? What would be the “objective” of those studies if not the elaboration of true statements about a unique domain of reality (Archer, 1995; Trigg, 2001; Polanyi, 1558; Wisdom, 1987)?

Consider an analogy: Water (H2O) emerges from the combination of hydrogen (H2) and oxygen (O2) gases under ascertainable conditions. But the qualities of water are in no way reducible to those of hydrogen and oxygen taken separately or to the energy-structure that binds them in the water molecule. Water is a complex element-structure reality that must be taken in terms of its own emergent qualities. Moreover, water is what it is regardless of where it appears. Water cannot be assimilated to any other molecule or to any other liquid. Water is only like itself. The question, then, What is water? has an unambiguous answer; and statements about water are true or false as they correspond or don’t correspond to the reality of water. Just so with leadership. It is a social reality that cannot be reduced or assimilated either to its components or to other sorts of social realities; it is what it is and must be treated as such. This isn’t to deny that leadership study isn’t related to other sorts of inquiry, like sociology and political science, but only that the intelligibility of leadership cannot be delivered by anything that isn’t theoretically commensurate to its unique reality. The chemist’s study of water certainly is related to the physicist’s study of the elements, but the latter’s theoretical apparatus is inadequate to the chemist’s qualitative molecular analysis (Little, 1998; Bunge, 1979; Archer, 2000; Maxwell, 1998).

Why is it important to call attention to these assumptions? It is because the study of leadership, if it is to be rational and scientific in any usual-traditional sense, and if it is to be generally instructive, must be based on realist and universalist commitments. Indeed,
as we’ll see, the trouble with CLS, what I’ll characterize as theoretical incompleteness, is precisely a function of its not adequately reckoning with these assumptions. CLS, in my view, doesn’t seem to take itself seriously as a scientific-rational project that normally presupposes a universal object-reality, that is, as a project of empirical inquiry intended to reveal-uncover the nature or essential-universal characteristics of some reality, viz., leadership. Think of empirical psychological research that seeks to uncover the nature of trauma regardless of where and to whom it happens. This research of course concerns itself with the appearances of trauma in particular contexts, but it presupposes that there is such a “thing” as trauma and that there is, underneath and behind the empirical research, a philosophical theory that posits-hypothesizes the ontological contours of a universal trauma reality that can “show up” in a variety of contexts. This, then, is what CLS lacks: A philosophical theory that posits-hypothesizes the ontological contours of leadership reality in order to provide a proper reference and ground for empirical leadership research (CLS). As it is, without this ground, CLS is delivered into “post-modern” anti-realist particularism, a main symptom of which is definitional indefiniteness (Popper, 1972; Sklar, 2000; Bernstein, 1983; Collin, 1997). Let me explain.

Without a healthy appreciation of the realist-universalist assumptions of normal scientific-empirical inquiry, both quantitative and qualitative, studying leadership is reduced to studying whatever is said or considered to be leadership. Leadership, then, becomes a function of a particular “language game” that happens to obtain in a particular sociality. Without a realist-universalist theory that posits a universal leadership object(ive), there simply is no other reference for the study besides what appears to be leadership.
Thus there is no warrant, no logical or ontological ground, for expecting leadership to be
the same across social contexts, nor would there be, literally, any basis in reality for
thinking that when one asserts that leadership is at hand that “leadership” is any more
than a linguistic sign describing a context-specific activity designed for the particular
purposes contingently held by some social cohort. Plainly, therefore, if realist-universalist
assumptions are ignored or underestimated (such that there lacks an articulate
philosophical theory of leadership), the study of leadership becomes a chaos of
descriptions-definitions, “texts,” of all the alleged “leaderships” that appear in any
number of socialities. Without a unifying leadership concept that posits a universal
leadership reality, all we can do is catalogue a virtually infinite number of biographies,
narratives, testimonies, surveys, statistics, etc., all of which amount to nothing more than
an incoherent and ever-increasing collection. Further, without a universal objective
reference, CLS can assert the reality of leadership only relative to the pragmatic purposes
of a particular sociality. Leadership is no more real that its contingent appearance here
and now. Each study of leadership, then, is strictly perspectival and thereby
incommensurate with any other. No one “leadership” can be compared meaningfully with
any other, generalization across contexts is ruled out in principle, and there can be no
truth about leadership, at least not in any traditional sense. Now, isn’t this the state of
things in CLS, the reason why there are “350 plus definitions [of leadership] with more
coined by the dozen each month”? I think so (Wisdom, 1987; Rescher, 2000; Rorty,
1991; Wittgenstein, 1953; Ortega, 1961; Kuhn, 1970; Benson & Stangroom, 2006;
Archer, 2000).
Reckoning with Realism and Universalism

I have said that the central problem of CLS is its theoretical incompleteness and that this incompleteness is largely a function of not reckoning with the realist and universalist assumptions just discussed. Naturally, if the anti-realist particularist view is adopted, we should expect CLS to be nothing more than a never ending production of leadership “definitions,” narratives, testimonies, and ethnographies, as well as an indefinite number of quantitative “scientific” studies (based on some leadership “definition” or another). Each of these must be seen as a self-contained expression of some unique perspective; even science is merely the preferred language game of a particular linguistic community and is only arrogantly and ignorantly-mistakenly seen, usually by Western “conservatives,” as a universal epistemology (Maxwell, 1998; Trigg, 1993; Archer, 2000; Habermas, 1973; Rorty, 1991). For anti-realist particularism there is no “view from nowhere,” no universal rationality that everyone has that grounds all inquiry, although it is hard to see how this denial could be taken (as it is intended) as true by everyone (Nagel, 1997). Does not the assertion, that there is no universal rationality, if we are to take it seriously as a true assertion, presuppose universal rationality (Benson & Stangroom, 2006; Rescher, 2000; Rorty, 1991)?

Anyway, with regard to CLS theorists themselves, many of the most prominent don’t seem to be talking like anti-realists. Consider this statement, (Bennis, 1989) “Without question ‘leadership’ is the most studied and least understood topic I can think of. To start with, there are more than 350 definitions with more coined by the dozen each month.” Why is this of concern? For the anti-realist this lack of understanding and definitional indefiniteness are precisely what should happen, even be “celebrated” and
certainly tolerated. But Bennis clearly seems to presuppose a realist and universalist ontology. He must believe that leadership is the real and universal objective of inquiry into leadership and accordingly is frustrated by the inability of CLS to capture and articulate-understand that universal reality. If he didn’t believe this, why would he be frustrated with CLS? This inability of CLS, of course, as just discussed, is a function of an exclusive focus on the phenomenal, on the multitudinous appearances of “leadership” without any referential guidance. What Bennis pines for, I believe, but what Bennis himself doesn’t provide and perhaps doesn’t realize needs to be provided, is a philosophical theory of universal leadership reality that posits a non-observable framework that will control-end definitional bad infinity and provide a context-independent ground and finite boundary for the observable context-dependent expressive-phenomenal leadership field. It is the purpose of this essay to provide this theory, the Grammar of Leadership, that hopefully can rescue CLS from being an anti-realist particularist chaos of perspectives (Rescher, 2000; Nagel, 1986; Nagel, 1997; Ortega, 1961; Maxwell, 1998; Rorty, 1991; Sklar, 2000).

Statements by other prominent CLS theorists reveal the same realist and universalist commitments: “There are about as many different definitions of leadership as there are people who have tried to define it…many of the definitions are ambiguous” (Bass in Wren, 1995); “Leadership remains an ambiguous, amorphous, and frequently misunderstood concept” (Chemers, 1997); “The contemporary empirical literature on leadership often seems fragmented and contradictory” (Northouse, 2001). The overall impression of CLS is “chaotic disarray” (Wren, 1995). No one who doesn’t hold realist and universalist assumptions would be bothered about conceptual ambiguity.
(incommensurability), irreconcilable differences (contradiction), fragmentation, chaos, disarray, amorphousness, etc. Moreover, no one except a realist/universalist would care that empirical studies, focused as they are on manifest-expressed-phenomenal particulars, seem fragmented, discrete, incomparable, and contradictory. This care implies that there is a universal non-empirical real ground that should be able to unify empirical diversity and resolve superficial differences and contradictions (Maxwell, 1998; Ortega, 1961; Trigg, 1993; Noble, 2000; Rucker, 1983).

Here’s yet another lament by a CLS theorist that reveals a significant point: “When one seeks advice on leadership…one often finds a distressingly shallow treatment” (Wren, 1995, italics mine). For anti-realism the idea of shallowness or superficiality doesn’t exist. Without the realist-universalist posit of a universal leadership reality, all there is of leadership is a surface or appearance. The purpose of any “study” is to present this surface, to examine the context-specific rules of its construction as they are observationally-expressively available. But to expect these surfaces-appearances to reveal-uncover anything else, either to a universal (via generalization) or to a depth that “has” a surface-expression is to make an error. The analysis-description of surfaces yield neither to cross-context generalizations nor to a real universal ground but only to other particular surfaces until, like peeling away onion skins, there simply is nothing (cf. Rorty, 1991 and Ortega, 1961). Particular (context-dependent) expression-construction-appearance-surface is all there is—even the person-agent is a particular construction-appearance. What is meant by reality is exhausted by appearances, there is nothing that appears; there is just appearance-expression; we can ‘judge’ or ‘know’ only in terms of the spectacle of appearances—and since there is no transcendent real universal ground we
cannot judge-know between appearances: no appearance is “truer” or “better” than any other; we must be careful to practice “tolerance” (Rorty, 1991; Debord; Nagel, 1986; Nagel, 1997; Wisdom, 1987). All this is over against the realist-universalist view that there is, somehow behind the surfaces-phenomenal, a common unexpressed-unconstructed grounding reality, a depth that “causes” and explains and underlies all the expressed-constructed surfaces. Those who understand the realist-universalist assumptions of normal scientific inquiry know that although reality is what appears, it is not exhausted by its appearances; social phenomena, like leadership, even if expressively-phenomenally diverse, are grounded-origined in, caused by, and thus ultimately explained in terms of trans-phenomenal, non-appearing reality. Not to reach this depth (of the agency-structure complex reality of leadership), then, is to be “shallow.” Only those committed to realism and universalism could be concerned about being shallow in this way (Little, 1998; Archer, 1995; Archer, 2000; Trigg, 1993; Nagel, 1997; Ortega, 1961).

My point in the last few pages has been simply this: The problem with CLS, as I see it and as it is framed by the theorists quoted above, although inadequately due to a lack of philosophical awareness, is only a problem for leadership theorists who are realists and universalists. CLS has the problem of being theoretically incomplete only if it is taken seriously that leadership is some sort of universal reality that transcends social-contexts and is not ontologically exhausted by its appearances (by perspectival accounts, however so many there are). For the purposes of this essay, then, we shall take this seriously. This implies that CLS is essentially an incomplete social scientific treatment of a unique domain of social phenomena due to a lack of a realist-universalist philosophical
foundation, a metaphysics-ontology, necessary for true knowledge of that phenomenal domain (Burns in Wren, 1995; Maxwell, 1998; Trigg, 1993; Archer, 1995; Wisdom, 1987; Sklar, 2000; Bernstein, 1976; Nagel, 1986). [Note: Naturally, I cannot here fully defend the realism-universalism position or the correspondence theory of truth that it implies. Nor can I fully characterize the “post-modern” anti-realist particularism that I believe spawns a pernicious relativism that represents a threat to the idea of the Truth. I contend, however, that the following is the indispensable presupposition of normal serious rational-scientific inquiry: There has to be a universal X in order that empirical inquiries about X, producing statements about X, can correspond to or not and thus uncover something true or false about X.]

Incompleteness

Let’s now try to be more specific about what is theoretically missing from Contemporary Leadership Study (CLS). First, while CLS, as far as it goes, that is, as empirical inquiry, might very well present an impressive body of research and substantive knowledge of the nature of leadership, it cannot account for the obvious and taken-for-granted fact that leadership is, that leadership exists such that it can be recognized-identified as a specific phenomenon, as a kind of social reality distinguishable from other social kinds. When the CLS researcher comes on the scene to study particular phenomena, leadership plainly is “already there,” “happening,” a manifest phenomenal field. Somehow, intuitively or a priori, the CLS researcher knows that leadership is there, available at hand to be observed-described, to become empirical data that may be analyzed in various ways that refer to or are relevant to leadership (Rescher, 2000; Trigg, 1993; Trigg, 2001; Popper, 1972).
But what is the basis for this a priori knowledge, this intuition of relevance? What is the explanation for the recognizability-identifiability of certain social states of affairs as particular instances-occasions of leadership? Clearly, since CLS as empirical inquiry presupposes this identifiability-recognizability, CLS as a posteriori empirical inquiry cannot account for it. My contention is that there is a real, ontological basis for this a priori identifiability-knowability, a universal “quality” of leadership reality, some sort of common process-dynamic that is “involved” with and fundamentally defines-qualifies social states of affairs as leadership phenomena. It should be obvious, then, since it is presupposed by empirical inquiry or is the condition of the possibility-rationality of empirical inquiry into leadership, that this universal quality of leadership reality, even if somehow phenomenally manifest, is not empirically accessible like other phenomena. To account theoretically for the universal leadership quality, then, requires a categorically different effort than the usual sort of empirical, observation-based scientific analysis. This means that CLS, as standard empirical inquiry, logically and methodologically misses, overlooks as it presupposes, the universal leadership quality. Thus, insofar as the universal quality-reality of leadership is involved in every particular leadership phenomenon, the analysis of leadership must be incomplete if CLS is not supplemented by a meta-scientific or philosophical account of this universal reality-quality. Again, this is not to assert that CLS as empirical social science is necessarily wrong or inaccurate in itself, but only that, as it stands, it is superficial and requires supplemental philosophical theoretical treatment if it is to avoid the indictment of being fragmentary, chaotic, and doomed to definitional indefiniteness (Little, 1998; Maxwell, 1998; Morgan, 1986; Goldstein, 2005; Rucker, 1983; Nagel, 1997). It should be recognized, however, that this
philosophical treatment, the Grammar, could indicate that some instances of CLS are concerned with phenomena that are *not* appearances of leadership. CLS right now has no way to distinguish between appearances.

Here another question arises indicating the second missing piece. How does the trans-phenomenal universal leadership quality *get* involved with the particulars of a social state of affairs? This is, of course, a question of genesis. How are leadership phenomena generated? Somehow there must occur the application or imposition of the universal leadership quality onto actual concrete circumstances (social, institutional, personal, etc.) such that these circumstances are informed—"caused"—to become instances of leadership reality or, as I shall call them, leadership entities, the manifest phenomena with which CLS as empirical inquiry is concerned and recognizes-identifies a priori as leadership instances (Wisdom, 1987; Bunge, 1979; Searle, 1995; Simmel, 1971).

Naturally, if CLS, even if it presupposes it, has not yet reckoned theoretically with the universal quality of leadership, it will also not have theoretically accounted for the generational-causal field wherein social states of affairs are qualified as leadership entities. As before, CLS as empirical inquiry simply takes the genesis of leadership phenomena for granted, or presupposes this genesis. And, again as before, since this genesis is presupposed, it is logically-methodologically a priori for CLS and therefore is missed in principle from CLS’s a posteriori empirical analysis of leadership. I propose, then, to provide a philosophical/meta-scientific theoretical account of the generational-causal process that introduces the universal leadership quality to the particulars of a social state of affairs. The provision of this account, once more, is not intended as a direct criticism of CLS, but only as a supplement intended to advance, deepen, and complete
CLS’s status as a realist-universalist social scientific project of knowledge. To anticipate a bit, the complete account that I propose will represent the emergence of a central unifying concept or definition of leadership, a new “paradigm” of sorts that puts the scientific study of leadership on a properly deep philosophical foundation that will reveal a previously unthinkable research horizon (Kuhn, 1970; Sklar, 2000; Trigg, 1993).

In order to clarify and refine the foregoing, consider figure 1:

**Figure 1:** The domain of leadership reality.

The whole circle symbolizes the domain of leadership reality. The outer ring (A) represents social states of affairs qualified as leadership entities-phenomena. This phenomenal region constitutes a specific kind of social reality that CLS as empirical inquiry has for its proper object. These leadership entities exhibit an impressive diversity: Leadership appears in the classroom, in the boardroom, on the battlefield, within research communities, in politics and science, in art and philosophy, on the street, and even in the theoretical study of leadership. And leadership entities are generally complex, involving some combination of persons (agency), interpersonal relationships, structures, language,
values, power, authority, and motives. Region A, then, is what is “already there” when
the CLS empirical inquirer comes on the scene.

Now, different CLS theories, based on generalizations from observations and/or
results of previous empirical research, postulate that one or another aspect or facet of a
leadership entity is most important or central. This aspect amounts to a “definition” of
leadership employed in the formulation of various hypotheses that guide empirical
research. For example, Trait theories hypothesize that a certain set of innate qualities and
characteristics of leader-persons, so-called “great persons,” is of central importance to, or
defines leadership. Accordingly, Trait researchers will be concerned to discover-confirm
this set of personal traits by analyzing empirical data derived from various surveys,
observations, and self reports of persons appearing to be leaders in leadership entities
(Northouse, 2001; Chemers, 1987; Wren, 1995). Or, Style theory asserts that what is
central to leadership is not a certain set of leader-person characteristics, but a
characteristic-universal set of leader behaviors; empirical research is then a matter of
developing behavioral data of so-called leaders in various leadership entities. Or,
Contingency theory postulates an optimal match between leaders’ styles and particular
contexts; empirical research accordingly focuses on the analysis of “good and bad”
leaders’ styles in a variety of contexts in order to achieve “empirically grounded
generalizations” about the hypothesized optimal style-context match. Still other theories,
such as Path-goal, Leader-member exchange, Transactional, and Transformational
emphasize the relationships between leaders and followers. Data about these relationships
are developed with reference to the peculiarities of the particular theory. Much of this
research involves the empirical analysis of the quality of leader-follower relationships
using the data of self reports (via surveys, questionnaires, transcripts concerning intentions, motivation, perceptions), as well as an analysis of the manifest-expressed discursive and structural features of the leadership entities in which these relationships occur (Wren, 1995; Northouse, 2001; Chemers, 1987).

There are, of course, many more CLS theories. But it should by now be easy to see, given the virtual infinity of possible leadership phenomena and the inherent complexity of the leadership entity, that any number of aspects or combinations of aspects might become the defining focus of research into leadership phenomena for some CLS theory. Also, given the infinity of possible empirical data, any one of these theories is underdetermined in principle and thus is as falsifiable or confirmable as any other (Sklar, 2000; Maxwell, 1998; Bunge, 1979; Rucker, 1983; Rescher, 2000; Popper, 1972). Hence the logical undecidability about just what aspect of the leadership entity is central as well as the “bad infinity” of leadership definitions lamented, as we saw, by important CLS theorists.

My main interest with Figure 1, then, is to illustrate the fact that as long as CLS remains focused on region A, on, that is, the phenomenal surface of leadership reality, it is subject to an impossible completeness (=an in principle incompleteness), to an infinity of possible data that in principle yields nothing truly definitive. The seemingly unending spate of so-called leadership definitions could be taken as a “symptom” of this incompleteness. But there is hope (for theoretical completeness) if we notice, remembering our realist/universalist ontological commitments, that precisely because region A is a surface, it is the surface of “something.” This something with a surface must be a sort of depth. Indeed, what is a surface without depth? I am positing, then, that each
leadership entity is a surface or “surfacing” (to capture the idea of its genesis) or instantiation or expression or manifestation of a deep leadership “quality,” represented by region C. That leadership phenomena have this same deep, trans-phenomenal quality (or formal property) is what enables CLS inquirers to identify-recognize leadership entities (and leader-persons), regardless of their phenomenal diversity, as a kind or form of social reality that is relevant to leadership research. And, insofar as region C is the same, is universal, despite the diversity of the phenomenal surface, a theoretical account of region C, supplementing CLS’s empirical analyses, has the potential to unify the analysis of leadership and thus to “save” CLS from superficiality, the bad infinity of “definitions,” the indefensibility of emphasizing any one aspect of the leadership entity, the appearance of theoretical chaos, as well as from “post-modern” anti-realist perspectivism.

The circle in figure 1 also has a region B that lies between the diversity of the phenomenal surface, region A, and the universal quality, region C. Region B represents the “causal field” where the universal quality of leadership somehow is imposed on or introduced to the particulars of a social state of affairs resulting in a definite leadership expression-phenomenon-entity. Now, it is obvious that CLS as empirical inquiry presupposes region B, just as it presupposes region C. That is, the fact that leadership phenomena in region A are recognizable and taken for granted as actual-existing instances of leadership “already there” also presupposes the genesis of these leadership instances. But, as before, as long as CLS is restricted to the empirical, a posteriori investigation of the phenomenal surface, it neglects to provide an account of the very coming-into existence of these phenomena “out of the depth.” CLS, therefore, not only can be supplemented by a theoretical account of region C but of region B as well. The
The final theoretical product, what I call the grammar of leadership, will be offered as a framework for a complete analysis that encompasses the whole domain of leadership reality. We turn now to a brief overview of this framework.

The Grammar of Leadership

The grammar of leadership is offered as a theory of the universal leadership quality and the causal-generative field wherein this universal leadership quality and a particular social state of affairs are combined to produce a leadership phenomenon-entity (=a social state of affairs qualified as a leadership entity). The grammar, then, represents in principle, logically, a framework for the complete explanation of leadership phenomena, “top to bottom,” which is or ought to be the ultimate goal of CLS as social science. As it stands, however, as superficial “standard” empirical inquiry, no matter how mathematically sophisticated or how many cases are considered or how descriptive it is, CLS proceeds without an adequately deep conceptual framework. We might say that CLS approaches the phenomenal surface of leadership from the “outside” and thus is relegated to describing-counting and generalizing about the observable regularities, patterns, correlations, testimonies, etc. of surface particulars (See figure 2 below). This standard empirical approach has some merit, of course, but, as was discussed, is fundamentally, even ironically, limited by the unlimited number of possible data as well as by the lack of the theoretical self-appropriation of its realist/universalist presuppositions. The result is that CLS uncritically and self-defeatingly attempts to explain surface particulars in terms of surface particulars, and in principle never arrives at the universal precisely because the universal is not a particular surface phenomenon but is the quality of the set of particulars of a social state of affairs that is presupposed by CLS. CLS simply fails to see that
surface phenomena are *surfaces already qualified* as the expression or “un-folding” of what is trans-phenomenal, non-surface. The grammar, on the other hand, approaches the reality of leadership from the “inside” depth, showing how the qualification of a phenomenal surface as an instance of leadership is possible and what are the “in-folded” principles and processes whereby leadership’s un-folding/surfacing occurs, how the quality of leadership is imposed onto the particulars of a social state of affairs (Morgan, 1986). The grammar’s deep insider account, therefore, admittedly a philosophical-metaphysical or meta-scientific account, might be added to CLS’s superficial outsider account to achieve a total picture of the depth and surface of leadership reality and to suggest a unifying, properly grounded framework for the scientific study of leadership.

[It occurs to me now that, once the Grammar is in place, many CLS studies presumably about leadership will be revealed to be about something else; that the CLS researcher assumed that leadership was at hand when it wasn’t. This winnowing of the CLS corpus will be another benefit of the Grammar’s discipline.]

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**Figure 2**: Explanatory direction.
The depth that the grammar plumbs also can be characterized as the transcendental, necessary conditions for the emergence of leadership, what *must be there* structuring, underpinning, founding, and most basically defining-qualifying every leadership entity regardless of the diversity of the particular circumstances in which leadership entities appear. Additionally, and centrally, the depth of leadership includes the “causal pathways” along which the transcendental-universal-necessary conditions (=the quality of leadership) are interpreted or communicated to a particular social state of affairs in order to transform that state of affairs into a functional leadership entity. This communication is mediated by the agency of certain persons (leaders) primarily through a specific sort of *discourse* (including both actions and language). The grammar will be especially concerned with the “syntax and semantics” of this discourse as the indispensable universal medium of the constitution-genesis of the kind-species of social reality, the leadership entity, that we seek to explain top to bottom (Fairclough, 2001; Rescher, 2000; Archer et al., 1998). It should be noted too that one of the tasks of the grammar will be to develop a “critical” or theoretically completed-enhanced empirical method with which to identify-reconstruct-recover-recollect-reveal this constitutive universal discourse in leadership phenomena. In this way the empirical results of CLS can be salvaged and the grammar can be empirically vindicated as a research paradigm. I shall have more to say about this later (Cassirer, 1955; Bayer, 2001; Maxwell, 1998; Little, 1998; Wisdom, 1987; Fairclough, 1992; Bunge, 1979; Noble, 2000).
CHAPTER III: SYNTAX

It is a truism that, whatever else it is (e.g., a process, a project of realizing a purpose), leadership always has to do with, “influences,” a social system, an organized group of people, a social reality, what I call a social state of affairs (SSOA). In every instance leaders influence “someone and something.” This complex, this “someone and something,” is the SSOA, an integrated social whole consisting of persons and structures that leadership is concerned to influence-change in some presumably specifiable-peculiar manner. A SSOA is where, explicitly or implicitly, leadership necessarily “happens.”

That leadership is connected with a SSOA is perhaps too obvious to point out. Nevertheless, the connection is rightly emphasized in “definitions” of leadership supposedly “widely accepted” by a majority of CLS theorists (Chemers, 1997), although, owing to their vagueness, I am disinclined to call these proper definitions, certainly not for the purpose of providing a referential boundary for the study of leadership reality. Anyway, consider, “Leadership is a process of social influence” (Chemers, 1997). Or, “Leadership is a group activity” (Chemers, 1997). Or, “[Leadership is] the process of influencing an organized group” (Hughes et al. in Wren, 1995). Or, “Leadership is a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals” (Northouse, 2001).

Leadership, then, when it is asserted-recognized is always asserted-recognized in connection with or reference to, and even as a function of, a SSOA. Leadership does not and cannot take place in a social vacuum (Bennis, 2003).

What does this mean? It means that a philosophical theory of leadership reality, like the Grammar, presupposes a theory of social reality, a social ontology. That is, if the
Grammar is concerned to explicate the universal reality of leadership (the peculiar “influencing” of a SSOA), it must first explicate the universal reality (the essential intelligibility) of the indispensable context of leadership, namely, a SSOA in which leadership’s activity always occurs.

Social Ontology

A social ontology is a theory of the universal constitution or normal existence of social states of affairs (SSOAs). It attempts to answer questions like: What are SSOAs in general made of? How are they normally structured? What usual sorts of deviations-deteriorations from normalcy occur? Clearly, since leadership’s activity necessarily has to do with a SSOA, we must have some grasp of how SSOAs normally (or ideally) work or don’t work so as later on to be able to differentiate a SSOA wherein leadership is present or not present. Is leadership present in all SSOAs or only in some?

For us, then, the task of a social ontology is to demonstrate the ordinary-normal or “baseline” status of SSOAs so as to provide a kind of primary context within which leadership can be seen or not seen. [Incidentally, it should be noted that a lack of an explicit social ontology is another aspect of CLS’s theoretical incompleteness. Also, we should observe that the normative use of social ontology to help detect deviation isn’t unknown to sociology and psychology and even political theory (Voegelin, 1952;1991). And, of course, the pursuit of a normative social ontology is motivated by the realist and universalist presuppositions discussed above; that is, it assumes that SSOAs are real and have an essence or nature that can in principle be known by universal reason.]

We have already noticed that a SSOA is a complex reality, composed of “someone and something.” There are, that is, two main divisions of components of a SSOA; we
shall call these persons and structures. Every SSOA, then, is some sort of mix of persons
and structures, or is describable as an integrated whole consisting of persons and
structures related in some way. Both persons and structures are real insofar as each has
its own irreducible ontological status. A person can exist independently of a SSOA’s
structures and a SSOA’s structures (e.g., institutions) have an emergent existential status
that cannot be wholly explained in terms of persons’ activities (Collin, 1997), even
though obviously social structures have their origin in persons’ activities and are
dependent for their enactment on these activities. This robust personal realism flies in the
face of the post-modernist and “methodological holist” attempt to dissolve persons into
social structures: [Consider, “Socialization…goes all the way down” (Rorty, 1989 in
Archer et al., 1998). “A self [person] does not amount to much” (Lyotard, 1984 in Archer
et al., 1998). “I believe the ultimate goal of the human sciences to be…to dissolve man
[persons]” (Levi-Strauss, 1966 in Archer et al., 1998).] And the realism of structure is
posited over against “methodological individualism” that would deny that SSOAs are
anything more that an aggregate effect-construction of persons’ activities that disappears
with the cessation of those activities [Cf. “All social phenomena, and especially the
functioning of social institutions, should be understood as resulting from the decisions
etc. of human individuals “(Popper, 1962). “’Army’ is just the plural of ‘soldier’ and all
statements about the army can be reduced to statements about the particular soldiers
comprising it” (Jarvie, 1959 in Archer et al., 1998). See also Collin, 1997; Archer, 2000;
Watkins, 1952.] Engaging the important and voluminous philosophical discussion about
all of this is, of course, beyond the scope of this essay. For our purposes, however, the
independence-objectivity of the reality of both persons and structure will be respected
[and since an argument for this respect, this ontological “generosity,” has not been put forth over against those who would deny the reality of either the person or of social structure, this respect must be seen as a presupposition of the present investigation.] We reject, therefore, both the notion that persons are nothing but functions of social structure and the notion that social structure (including language, institutions, roles, protocols, and a constitution) is nothing but the ephemeral product of individual persons’ current activities. This means that a SSOA has a stratified composition that cannot be analyzed-described exclusively in terms of what can be predicated of persons (consciousness, emotions, intentions, actions, beliefs, motives, interests, ideas) or exclusively in terms of what can be predicated of structures (practices, conventions, institutions, language, symbols, roles, protocols). Rather, the analysis of a SSOA must be dualistic, reflecting the specific and irreplaceable-irreducible contributions of personal and structural strata as well as their interplay (Archer, 1995; Trigg, 1993; Bernstein, 1976; Collin, 1997; Polanyi, 1958; Archer et al., 1998).

Figure 3: Schematic of a Social State of Affairs (SSOA): P=persons; lines=various structures.
Now, so far the *normal* SSOA has been schematically depicted as a stratified social object that functions through the relationship of independently real persons participating (acting) in a context of emergently real social structures (see figure 3). Let us make a few more observations to fill in this somewhat amorphous schematic to give it more definition.

First, [leaving the question of the “very first” SSOA aside] social structure is the *pre-existing* context-condition of persons’ activities even though at any given time this structure is dependent on persons’ activities for its enactment (existential representation). Relatively “new” persons (with regard to the time of beginning their careers in the SSOA) find the structure of a SSOA (e.g., a high school) as a field of order, a setting of regular protocols and action-pathways, symbols, and recurring schemes of social life, *already there*. That is, the structure of the SSOA has “lastingness” prior to and beyond personal existence and imposes boundaries-limits-conditions-order on persons’ activities. Any person who joins a SSOA discovers that the possibilities of [legitimate-relevant] action are pre-defined by the SSOA’s structures. One can’t legitimately do anything she likes. Relatively “old” persons (already engaged in the delimited activities of the SSOA) inhabit the SSOA for a time only to leave it to the new to take over, to continue to enact the structure. It is in the sense of the SSOA’s lastingness (persistence in time as an integrated field of order, recurring schemes of social life, regularities of procedure, a characteristic symbolism-language) that it possesses an emergent ontological status irreducible to persons’ activities, although, again, for its enactment (existential representation) at any given time it clearly depends on those activities (Collin, 1997; Voegelin, 1991; Searle, 1995; Ranieri, 1995).
Second, a SSOA has a logos, a “theory” of itself, a spiritual-creative center, a basic idea. It is this idea that is intended to be enacted. This idea encompasses the meaning-intelligibility-essence-purpose of the SSOA and is articulated-illuminated by a symbolism: a defining “language game” or ideology. This symbolism clarifies-delineates relations between persons-participants, internal structure, and provides a rationale for roles, power distribution, protocols-procedures, and the purpose of the SSOA (its “mission,” the telic horizon of its movement-activity). The idea of a SSOA can be more or less luminous for persons-participants, and can be more or less attuned to circumstantial exigencies. The effective interpretation and communication, the coherent expressive representation, of this idea for participant-persons is obviously crucial to the order of the SSOA. But perhaps most important is the effective existential representation of this idea, the efficient functioning of the SSOA to realize its idea concretely-practically to some sufficient degree (Voegelin, 1991; Wittgenstein, 1953; Ranieri, 1995; Voegelin, 1952; Cassirer, 1955).

The idea of a SSOA may also be described as its constitution. This constitution is the blueprint [DNA] of the SSOA’s life-form and includes the rules/laws that prescribe and proscribe possible actions and interactions related to articulating this way of life. These rules/laws, that is, are the SSOA’s “morality” that indicate what ought and what ought not to be done to create and regulate the order-arrangement of persons and structure that realizes the good-purpose-telic direction of the SSOA. Actions that ought to be done are “right” and those that ought not to be done are “wrong.” There may be some schedule of rewards and punishments administered (through the use of force) to persons corresponding to their right or wrong actions. Further, the constitution of the SSOA
expresses various acceptable protocols or sequences of actions and interactions as well as arrangements of agents in their roles possessing various distributions of power (Voegelin, 1991; Ranieri, 1995; Lewin, 1997).

Third, a SSOA exists in an environment of other SSOAs and various political, economic, material, and ideational circumstances. A SSOA’s integrity (as a stratified person-structure reality) can be affected by this environment for better or worse. The external environment’s effect on a SSOA is a matter of the SSOA’s “attunement” to the environment. This attunement concerns the compatibility of how the SSOA’s purpose, its “idea” or logos, is being enacted with regard to environmental exigencies and inputs. A lack of environmental attunement (funding dries up, demand for the SSOA’s “product” declines, enemies emerge) can threaten the SSOA’s existence to the point of requiring an adjustment of its most basic functioning (how its persons-participants enact the SSOA’s purpose and/or the basic arrangement of its structure) as well as a revision of the SSOA’s purpose (its constitutive idea-logos). Nevertheless, one way or another, a SSOA must make and maintain a logical and/or concrete-material place for itself in its environment (establish its proper territory; its placement in the environment must make sense) (Searle, 1995; Simmel; 1972; Lewin, 1997; Noble, 2000; Voegelin, 1991; Ranieri, 1995).

Fourth, a SSOA has an external appearance, a manifest phenomenal presence accessible to empirical study like any other natural phenomenon. But, besides its “outside” accessibility, and perhaps most importantly, a SSOA also is an ordered whole (cosmos), a form of life, its own “world,” that is illuminated with meaning-intelligibility from within by the persons who believe in their participation in the life of the SSOA. A SSOA, then, is more than what can be discovered through an external empirical inquiry;
the reality and meaning of a SSOA are not exhausted by the SSOA’s phenomenal appearances. The complete understanding of a SSOA requires, in addition to empirical study, an appreciation of the experience-consciousness-cognition-commitment of participant-persons who employ a symbolism-language to express and make rational sense of the meaning-purpose of the SSOA. Importantly, this inner-conscious life of the SSOA is the portal through which questions, reflections, feelings, and various other mental-spiritual productions can be imported that, when expressed, can disrupt or even destroy the normal symbolization of the SSOA’s idea. Alternatively, consciousness is also the source of innovative-creative thoughts-images-symbols that engender-bolster-defend-enhance-transform the idea and thus the SSOA itself. [This will become especially significant when it comes to the differentiation-transcendence required for leadership.] (Voegelin, 1952; Voegelin, 1991; Marcel, 1970; Ranieri, 1995; Wittgenstein, 1953; Cassirer, 1955; Bernstein, 1976; Searle, 1995).

Fifth, persons are participants in or are agents-members of a SSOA only if they formally belong to that SSOA. This formal belonging involves being identifiable as a member-participant-agent of the SSOA. There are, then, identity criteria for this agency-membership; meeting these criteria means that one occupies-enacts an aspect in the SSOA’s structure such as a role (e.g., teacher). Agency-membership may imply having other qualifications as well, such as a kind of knowledge or credentials (e.g., teaching certificate) sanctioned-authorized in the SSOA, formal acceptance (e.g., being hired), and generally the willingness and ability to follow established rules-protocols. A person who meets these criteria is able-empowered to act legitimately with regard to the function-purpose of the SSOA. This person thus becomes an agent of the SSOA; this agency is
specific to the logic-idea of the SSOA and makes sense only within the SSOA’s structure. This is not to say that the person who becomes an agent is no longer a person with an identity and sense of self independent of the SSOA, but only that, in addition to a private identity, the person has added a \textit{social identity} through formally belonging to a SSOA (Collin, 1997; Cassirer, 1955; Habermas, 1973, McCarthry, 1978).

Sixth, the SSOA’s enactment involves the exercise of \textit{power}. This power cannot be exercised willy-nilly but is distributed among agents according to the logic-idea-constitution of the SSOA. Thus a particular agent uses some quantity of power \textit{legitimately} if that agent is doing so precisely \textit{as} that agent, that is, if that agent is acting within the space-parameters (role) that the SSOA’s idea specifies. This specification amounts to the \textit{authorization} of the distribution to the agent of some quantity of power. A particular agent has authority to use a quantity of power only if the SSOA’s logic-idea provides for this use—legitimizes it (Voegelin, 1952; Voegelin, 1991; Habermas, 1973; Ranieri, 1995; Bernstein, 1976; Searle, 1995).

Seventh, the overall composition of the normal SSOA, its integrity, is relatively \textit{rigid-fixed-frozen}. The normal SSOA, that is, has an identity that persists over time, a lastingness, because it maintains its form both internally, in terms of the arrangements and interactions of its structures and agents, and externally, in terms of how it appears-functions-is placed in its environment. This stability of form, this well-orderedness, is essentially related to the efficient functioning of the SSOA to fulfill its purpose and maintain its directionality towards its telos (Bourdieu, 1998; Lewin, 1997).

Eighth, a normal SSOA is \textit{self-regulating, self-organizing, and self-sustaining}. It possesses mechanisms, especially rules/laws and the use of force, whereby, in an
“impersonal” way, it maintains its basic order by constant-timely replacement of person-agents, fortification of structures, reinforcement of recurring habitual schemes of action, administration of a “legal code” consisting of sanctions for (wrong) actions that violate the SSOA’s idea and rewards for (right) actions that articulate that idea, and the implicit or explicit ideological justification of its idea (Lewin, 1997; Voegelin, 1991).

Ninth, persons-agents of a normal SSOA (what I’ll also call E) are conscious of (experience) themselves as agents unselfconsciously. That is, they experience no tension in their existence as agents of the SSOA; they don’t have troubling-problematic-anxious thoughts about their roles. Agents in E are not bothered by any moral sense that the way it is isn’t more or less the way it ought to be. That is, even if the purpose of the SSOA is never fully realized, the perceived-experienced discrepancy between what agents actually are achieving at any given moment and how it ideally ought to be, is not a source of anxiety-disappointment, and in fact may serve a positive motivation just to “keep doing what you’re doing.” Their consciences are clear and tranquil regarding the good-purpose of E and how their participation in E fits into E’s form of life. This is not to deny that an agent of E might not suffer as a private person from participating in E, and this suffering could indeed become a concern for E’s form of life. The point here, however, is that, ceteris paribus, agency in E is not characterized by anxious self-consciousness (Lewin, 1997; Voegelin, 1952; Wolin, 2004; Simmel, 1971).

Thus we have the more differentiated normal SSOA with clear internal structure, precisely defined agency, and an overall bounded-rigid shape (placed within some environment), all of which is superintended by a characteristic logic articulated by the
SSOA’s idea. (See figure 4 that is posed in contrast to the amorphousness and lack of differentiation of the social entity depicted in figure 3).

![Diagram of SSOA's Idea](image)

*Figure 4:* The normal SSOA (E): Definitely shaped-bounded, with precise internal structure-agency superintended by a characteristic logos-idea.

Leadership and the Normal Social State of Affairs

Now that the normal-ideal SSOA (E) has been characterized, we can turn to leadership. A question immediately faces us: Is leadership present in E? To answer, we must look at leadership a little closer. We first noted that leadership has necessarily to do with a SSOA; accordingly we took time to offer a social ontology to get a sense of what this necessary venue of leadership’s activity normally is. The result was E. E, then, is where leadership’s activity, its “influencing,” might paradigmatically be expected to appear. But not so fast.
What is “influence”? It is the capacity to induce a change in the course or direction or flow of something. So, here leadership’s influence is the capacity to induce a change in the course or flow or direction of the SSOA. Our question therefore is this: Is leadership’s activity, simply as influencing, intended to change the course of a SSOA, present in E? Does E “call for” such activity-influence? Does E imply a need for activity intended to change its course-direction-flow?

Now, recall that E is a well-ordered entity that involves arrangements (“mixes”) of agency and structure as well as environmental attunement that enables the SSOA to function (move, flow) efficiently to realize its good. The efficient functioning of E is stable over time almost to the point of operating automatically and unselfconsciously (not unconsciously, but agents are not conscious of things motivated by an anxious concern to analyze one’s role and purpose in the SSOA). E is a habitual form of life. E “knows” already where it’s going; there is no trouble with its inner life, no anxiety, no disturbance in the expressive and existential representation of its idea. The normal-ideal SSOA, E, simply enacts its proper course. It is a self-regulating, self-sustaining entity, almost a “self-winding” mechanism that flows along “steady as she goes.” E’s order is pretty much rigidly frozen-congealed in place; its persons-agents are doing their jobs, acting and interacting according to their constitutionally legitimated roles using authorized quanta of power; its internal structures are consistently maintained; its idea is expressed and apprehended so as to provide effective motivation and overall superintendency-regulation; and its attunement to the external environment continues to hold up. What, then, would the point be of changing E’s direction-course-flow, that is, of making that direction different? There would seem to be no point. The answer to the question, Is
leadership present in E?, in a word, is no. Leadership in E is logically cancelled, uncalled for, technically wrong, even irrational and unethical, superfluous, ontologically out of place.

The implication of the above is the discovery that leadership is not relevant in a normal SSOA; accordingly its reality is not revealed-indicated by the normative social ontology. Conversely, this means that when leadership is relevant the SSOA’s normalcy must be disrupted in a basic way. More strongly, we might say that leadership cannot appear in E but can appear when E is disrupted in some way that threatens its normalcy-equilibrium. Leadership activity in E, almost “by definition,” interferes with E’s functioning, f(E), with, that is, the steady efficiency of the SSOA’s flow-course toward its good. An agent’s attempt to assert leadership in E, therefore, is at best a mistake, at worst a likely counterproductive, even destructive ego-adventure. This is not to say that there is no one “in charge” in E, but that this head-agent cannot be a leader but must be something else, perhaps a manager or overseer or administrator or facilitator (Kotter, 1990).

Another way to understand the discovery that leadership is not relevant in E is to recognize that leadership turns out to be extraordinary, both as agential activity and as a noticeable quality of the SSOA’s structure. This does not mean that leadership is necessarily rare, for ruptured SSOAs probably are frequent enough in which leadership ought to and actually does appear. What is meant is that leadership is a special, unusual, non-routine, deliberate reality whose appearance is precisely not generated /accounted for in the normal SSOA. This not surprisingly fits nicely with the goal of this essay to discipline the concept of leadership, to distinguish it so that its referential domain is quite
specific and certainly narrower than that of common parlance (Wolin, 2004; Voegelin, 1991). We see then that the concept of leadership, and thus the study of leadership, has been delimited in terms of a central problem, namely the disrupted normalcy of a SSOA. Leadership does not, cannot, and ought not to exist-appear in the normal SSOA, but emerges only when needed or called for in rather dire circumstances. The task of leadership is to do something to, influence, change the flow or direction or course of a dysfunctional SSOA so as to address the type of disrupted normalcy at hand and, presumably, to arrive at a “new normal” SSOA—either an improvement over or a transfiguration of the status quo. The crisis of normalcy implies that E, the status quo, is somehow no longer viable and therefore that it ought to be jettisoned and replaced. Indeed, if the status quo (its basic course-flow-direction towards some good-telos) were still viable, its problems would be a matter not for leadership (that is designed to change the basic flow-direction-course of the SSOA in terms of a new good-telos) but for management (that is designed to preserve-reinforce the status quo—incidentally, management can be quite “heroic” and thus seem like leadership in a common, vulgar way. But, technically, we can now see that with regard to what is being done to the SSOA itself, management and leadership are radically different). This more elegant, exclusive, and precise concept of leadership will allow us to see the true significance of leaderly agency and the (qualifying) effect of this agency on the SSOA (Kotter, 1990, Gardner, 1968; Bennis, 1989; Wolin, 2004).

The discovery that leadership is not relevant in the normal SSOA suggests that leadership’s ontological status is derivative or secondary. That is, since leadership does not, really cannot, appear in the normal SSOA but only in the disrupted SSOA, leadership
depends for its existence on the disrupted existential status of the SSOA; leadership exists-appears in some sense as an ontological Johnny-come-lately. The normal SSOA (and its management) thus is the ordinary, more fundamental and comprehensive category; leadership exists only insofar as it emerges as an extraordinary response to a complication of the SSOA. This does not undermine the objective reality of leadership nor compromise the rational-scientific effort to grasp its universal character. Rather it resolves our inquiry into these questions: How does leadership activity function in the disrupted SSOA in order to address the disruption? Where does this supernormal leadership activity “come from” and how is it introduced into the function of the SSOA? How and why does leadership activity end?

The Coming of Leadership

Leadership becomes relevant only when the normal SSOA is disrupted. Leadership, that is, becomes a real issue only in extraordinary circumstances when E’s status as E is challenged. Then, ostensibly, a call goes out for someone (a leader or leaders) to do something specific-peculiar to influence things in response to the crisis of normalcy. But what exactly constitutes a disruption of normalcy? And what is the nature of the called-for influence that addresses that disruption?

The Objective Circumstances of Disruption

The disruption of normalcy has three general objective forms [Note: My claim is that these are the main types of circumstances that cause the disruption of normalcy; this claim doesn’t exclude combinations of circumstances that can cause a SSOA to suffer more than one form of disruption. Nor does my claim deny that actual situations are very much more complex; all I want to do is suggest that these three forms, separately or in
combination, are the analytical rudiments of any disruption of normalcy.]: 1) the SSOA’s good-telos no longer is relevant, is obsolete (ex. A corporation’s main product is technologically superseded); 2) the SSOA is not realizing-fulfilling the truth of its idea (ex. a public high school systematically under-serves students with disabilities); 3) the SSOA somehow is rendered vulnerable to “morphing” into something else (ex. war weakens a monarchy opening up the possibility of a republic, a street gang’s losses make establishment politics attractive; an internal subgroup foments revolution).

The first of these forms implies that the SSOA’s dedication to producing a good ($g^N$) has been cancelled due to a lack of place for that good in the environment. Figure 5 indicates that the SSOA’s good no longer fits or is attuned to the logic of its environment; no one can use it anymore.

![Figure 5: Attunement curve for E’s product (g).](image)
The lack of environmental fit (attunement) regarding the SSOA’s main good eventually results in the inability of the normal SSOA to function \((f(E))\) as in figure 6. This inability is an *in principle* disruption of the SSOA’s normalcy because the irrelevance of \(g\) at \(t^1\) is absolute; that is, it isn’t that the same basic product can be superficially modified or that efficiency in its production can be increased---after all, the normal SSOA is by definition perfectly efficient---but that the good itself is meaningless and really ought not to be produced at all. What now? The problem here is categorically beyond the management of the status quo (=ordinary activity); it calls for special-peculiar-extraordinary activity that undertakes to change the SSOA so as to address the crisis of its normalcy.

The second form of the disruption of normalcy implies that the SSOA’s idea is not being properly represented existentially. That is, even if the full *expressive* representation of the idea, especially regarding the SSOA’s good-end, is acceptable, its concrete implementation is incommensurate to that expressive representation. Figure 7 depicts the activity of the normal SSOA as a production possibilities curve. The production of \(g\) at level \(N\) is taken to be (tacitly approved as) the “frontier” of the potential of the agency-structure complex prescribed by the SSOA’s idea. But somehow it is revealed (e.g.,

**Figure 6**: Function of the normal SSOA= \(f(E)\), maintaining \(g^N\) in any given time interval \(t^x-t^y\) through the unselfconscious participation of E’s agents.
someone asks a question that brings the objective circumstance to light) that the idea is not being fully implemented and that the “real” frontier is categorically beyond (a quantum away from) what has been the status quo. The problem, again, is fundamental; its solution cannot in principle be a matter of managing the status quo in some presumably more efficient way. The solution requires something extraordinary. The SSOA has gotten into a position of normally mis-achieving and has become self-deceived as to its truth. Agents of the SSOA have come to accept that what is actually a distortion is normal (ex. a high school practices a kind of apartheid, a version of “separate but equal,” in its treatment of students with disabilities and agents of the school tacitly approve of this as the appropriate way to realize the school’s idea; or a company has somehow got itself into a position of producing its good at a quality-level categorically below what it used to be in the past. In the first case, the SSOA has to “live up” to its original idea; in the second the SSOA has to restore itself to its idea).

Figure 7: Crisis of normalcy as a new possibilities frontier.
The third form of the disruption of normalcy concerns the comprehensive agency-structure-good-telos complex that the SSOA’s idea represents. The issue here is that the SSOA’s very *form of life* has become problematic; somehow the notion has come forth not only that things ought to be done differently but that the entire social reality, the ontological vehicle, that carries participants towards the telic horizon must be radically modified (ex: It has dawned on some agents/citizens of the USA that the realization of the idea of the USA can no longer continue if the institution of slavery remains. That the USA is a SSOA with a form of life involving slavery contradicts its original idea; accordingly that form of life must be changed lest the SSOA (the Union) literally be destroyed. Change here includes differentiating the meaning of agency itself (what it is to belong to the SSOA and the scope and legitimacy of inter-agent relationships) and the transformation of the structures of the SSOA to allow the new agency to bring forth the new status quo leaving behind forever the contradictions of the past. The profound, radical, “quantum” nature of this change clearly cannot be addressed through any sort of managerial tending of the status quo, but requires the peculiar and extraordinary influence of leadership to reach a categorically new social reality (see figure 8)).
The Subjectivity of Disruption

The normal SSOA, as we saw earlier in the discussion of social ontology, is characterized by the unselfconscious participation of agents. What are they unselfconscious about? It is the legitimacy and meaningfulness of their participation in the SSOA as formal members of it and consistent with the SSOA’s idea. This participation is that upon which the very existence of the normal SSOA depends; it comprises recurring, regular schemes of actions consistently and habitually performed, that is, performed such that agents’ consciousness-subjectivity, especially in the forms of articulated doubt, dissension, anxiety, questioning, but also as fastidiousness, not minding one’s own business, and over-thinking one’s role, doesn’t interfere with the efficient realization of the SSOA’s proper function f(E). This sort of consciousness-subjectivity is “invisible,” transparent, a tacit approval of f(E), offering no resistance in principle to the
enactment of the SSOA’s functioning with regard to its telos \( (g^N) \). No one in the normal SSOA opposes the current regime intentionally, though there are of course almost always “unconscious” resistances owing to agents’ lack of skill or infelicitous personality traits as well as to the irreducible effects of imperfect knowledge. Nevertheless, agents in E, more or less perfectly, are *motivationally attuned* to the vicissitudes of the SSOA acting appropriately within the structures orchestrated by the SSOA’s idea (see figure 6 above) (Lewin, 1997; Voegelin, 1991; Ranieri, 1995; Collin, 1997; Habermas).

Naturally, only if there is a “critical mass” of agents (in terms of numbers and/or possession of power in the SSOA) who are sufficiently troubled by objective threats to the status quo will there be a *perception and articulation* of a crisis of normalcy that calls for leadership. Generally, it won’t be enough that one agent asked an impertinent-rebellious-seditious question exposing the objective disruption. In a sense it will not matter what the “objective” circumstances are that threaten to disrupt the SSOA, as long as unselfconscious “subjective” attunement to the SSOA’s idea persists in most agents. The SSOA will go on existing as E and will simply, since unselfconscious agents are oblivious to the threat, decline and be destroyed unceremoniously, without a fight, without an opportunity to change via leadership. In addition to the existence of a bona fide objective threat to normalcy, then, leadership becomes relevant only if enough agents (again, either in terms of number or held-power) are both aware of the objective disruption of the SSOA and grasp the significance of the broached equilibrium, that is, are awakened from their unselfconscious slumber (tacit approval of the status quo) in order to conclude that change is needed and that this change implies peculiar-special action-influence not ordinarily (managerially) available. If not enough of the SSOA’s
agents knows or believes that there is an issue, and that the issue is radical, there will be no effective call or recognition of the need to do anything about it for the sake of the SSOA. If the unselfconscious tacit approval of the status quo isn’t undermined or brought to consciousness so as to prompt crucial questions and the subsequent call for leaderly activity, there will simply be no leadership. In fact, as we’ll see, agents’ attunement to the status quo, even if it becomes problematic (is raised to consciousness and evokes a call for leadership), is really quite tenacious and not easily eliminated, paradoxically becoming a source of resistance to the called-for leader’s efforts (Voegelin, 1991; Voegelin, 1952; Popper, 1962; Ranieri, 1995; Noble, 2000).

Now, let’s assume that a normal SSOA is indeed disrupted with regard to its normalcy and that some sufficient number of agents of the SSOA have become aware of it and, seeing the implications for the sake of the SSOA’s future existence (not as it is but in some different form), have become sufficiently self-conscious, uneasy, anxious about it such that their tacit approval/motivational attunement to the SSOA is significantly disturbed. What could happen? These now self-conscious agents might see the need for some peculiar-special action (“influence”) beyond ordinary management to change things. But what is this change about? Certainly the issue is change but not just change for the sake of change. Agents aware of the challenge to the viability of the status quo presumably desire change to do some “good,” to ameliorate the threatening circumstances, to address the disruption either to dissipate the source of it or to modify things so that there emerges a “new” status quo, a “new” SSOA that accommodates whatever it was that made the “old” status quo unviable. [In some ways, of course, the SSOA is the same entity through the changes it undergoes: It’s the same USA before and
after the Civil War. But in other ways the SSOA is radically altered by leadership: Things will never really be the same after the leaderly influence. But “it’s still us (the same persons)” after all.] This modification presupposes the transformation of the SSOA’s good(telos) as well as its basic order. When the SSOA is perceived as moving in a direction that either is no longer rightly related to its proper good-telos and/or suggests that another good-telos is more appropriate-desirable, a moral-motivational concern emerges to change the basic flow-direction-course of the SSOA and that this change represents a challenge to the normal business of the status quo. To effect this change will require some sort of extraordinary agency not normally available. To effect this change calls for leadership.

What is needed, then, is not something like a “refreshing” of the order of the status quo or a more efficient operation of E. These are just ordinary managerial tasks that do not require real, extraordinary influence to change the SSOA’s basic flow-direction-course towards a new goal-good. This requires leadership, which we now see is an essentially moral activity, to transcend and not preserve the status quo, to change things in a direction that ought to be over against what is.

Summary

Leadership is most generally an influencing, a serious categorical change in the basic course-flow-direction, of a SSOA. Leadership is extraordinary such that it is impertinent in the ordinary-normal situation. Leadership has no “right” to exist in E; its existence, if it does emerge, comes only later when the normalcy of the normal SSOA is disrupted. Leadership’s emergence, in addition to the objective circumstances of the disruption of normalcy, depends as well on the agents who have been awakened from their
unselfconscious slumber-complacency regarding their participation in the status quo. Only from such agents who grasp the radical moral significance of E’s disruption can come the call for a change in the SSOA’s fundamental course-movement-course-flow, the call, that it, for leadership. Also, only from such agency (more precisely, from the expression-protest of agents’ consciousness of the moral inadequacy of the status quo) can the moral mandate for a basic directional change be grounded. [But how to explain the empirical fact that it appears that someone takes on being a leader without any obvious call to do so? Doesn’t it happen that way sometime that a person sees the leadership issue and acts more or less alone? Yes, but this still technically-grammatically implies the call for leadership and that the call is perceived, and in any case must eventually be grounded in a threshold number of others before the activity can become legitimated and effective.] (Voegelin, 1991; Ranieri, 1995; Archer, 2000; Voegelin, 1952).

The Leader’s Work

Leaving aside the mystery of who should or can heed the call for leadership, suppose that the call for leadership is heeded, that someone takes the moral mandate for change to heart, that someone endeavors to take on the task of influencing the disrupted SSOA to effect change that will, one way or another, address (remediate, dissipate, fix) the disruption to transform the SSOA to a new normalcy. What ensues? If successful, leadership activity, the peculiar-extraordinary influence, will bring agents to the point of becoming motivationally attuned to a new SSOA, to a relatively peaceful-harmonious-unselfconscious-tacitly approving participation in it whereby the new f(E) is efficiently realized.
We must be certain here to stress that the “trouble” with the SSOA is trouble in principle, as a matter both of the inability of the SSOA to continue as it is and of the bankruptcy of “business as usual.” [Lincoln calls in Grant not to run the Army as usual but in an extraordinary way.] It isn’t as if the SSOA has merely declined in some way (e.g., its agents have lost interest in their roles such that f(E) isn’t optimally realized). In that situation the fix would be to “pep” agents up somehow to maintain the status quo, a strictly managerial task even if it may require a manager’s charisma and other laudable and perhaps rare skills/traits. No, the issue here is that the SSOA, even if optimized (even if agents are perfectly efficient within the order of the SSOA), is in principle unsatisfactory. The SSOA, then, has to change in a basic way or ways. Leadership is made to effect the changes that address trouble in principle (Lewin, 1997; Voegelin, 1952; Ranieri, 1995; Noble, 2000; Kotter, 1990).

Diagnosis

So, should someone take up the call to lead, she is presented straightaway with this question: Just what is the trouble? The trouble, of course, is the in principle disruption of the normalcy of the SSOA. But what does this mean? It isn’t that the SSOA has simply slowed down or is performing less than optimally. Rather it is that the SSOA is all wrong. This means that the purpose-goal-good of the SSOA has become disconnected from the life of the SSOA. The collective actions of agents no longer approach the “right” goal because another telos-good has been demanded, revealed, proposed, or imposed for which the extant SSOA is increasingly or suddenly unfit. [Note: it could be that the “new” telos-good is really the “same” or original telos-good as before except now properly differentiated so as to reveal the distortion-inadequacy of the status quo.
interpretation. For all intents and purposes, however, the properly differentiated idea is, relative to the agents of the status quo SSOA, a new idea.] How can this situation be assayed (examined by the would-be leader in order to determine its nature)?

Recall from the discussion of social ontology that it is the idea of the SSOA that posits a purpose-good-telos and, accordingly, articulates-dictates-superintends an agency-structure complex so that the SSOA functions to flow-course-move to realize that good normally (as E). It would seem, then, that when a SSOA is disrupted in principle as to its normalcy, that to address that disruption the leader must first (logically if not chronologically) reckon with the SSOA’s idea. A “critique” of this idea must occur.

This critique is an appraisal of the logical and practical integrity of the idea, an intelligent grasp of the idea’s expressive and existential (mis) representations. An intelligent grasp doesn’t imply any necessary format; it doesn’t have to be some sort of explicit, formal-formulaic, “intellectual,” verbal-conceptual, analytic-academic exercise. The critique may be rather implicit, informal, intuitive, “hands on,” and highly adaptive, but for all this no less intelligent. Anyway, regardless of the manner in which the critique is undertaken, the would-be leader must achieve an intelligent grasp of how the idea’s logical expression and existential concretion are impaired (Voegelin, 1991; Ranieri, 1995; Searle, 1995; Collin, 1997; Bernstein, 1976).

It could be that the logical-linguistic expression of the idea is insufficiently differentiated or that parts of the idea, even if expressed, have been ignored or unrealized for one reason or another (ex. it has been clearly expressed that students with disabilities should be served as well as other students but, as a matter of fact, they have not been so served). The idea might be right as far as it goes in expressing the SSOA’s mission (ex. a
school’s mission is to serve all students equally) and generally is motivating agents unproblematically (agents are unselfconsciously approving of how students with disabilities are treated in the status quo) to move the SSOA (emplaced in a definite environment) towards its telos for a long time. It may happen, however, that the environment changes (ex. new case law differentiates the meaning of equal treatment for students with disabilities) such that the SSOA’s production becomes (is exposed as) insufficient-wrong in principle. It isn’t that the SSOA needs to produce more but must produce differently (ex. the school needs to address the needs of students with disabilities in a qualitatively-categorically different way). The SSOA has become incoherent for its own good.

In this situation, the critique of the idea reveals that the SSOA, what had become normal to its agents, is actually malformed. All the implications of its idea have failed to be expressed-realized-acknowledged and therefore have not been integrated into the SSOA as a legitimate entity, as what it ought/was originally supposed to be. What has emerged, then, is a false whole (gestalt) that qualitatively, in principle, cannot be true to itself (as this truth becomes articulate in the critique of the SSOA’s idea). This false whole, in turn, falsifies the tacit approval of agents of the SSOA who unselfconsciously have taken it for granted. The critique of the idea therefore delivers a realization that is nothing short of a catastrophe for the status quo. [Note: Hopefully, it is apparent that the crisis of normalcy, the “catastrophe” for the status quo, does not imply an intrinsically undesirable or spectacular circumstance. It could be that agents’ thought about the crisis is: “about time it happened.” Or, on the other hand, agents of course may see the crisis as extremely threatening. The real issue is that the crisis is technically about the SSOA’s
putative normalcy; how the crisis appears depends on the SSOA---- A crisis of the normalcy of a research tradition (and, e.g., the ensuing “philosophical revolution”) will appear quite different than that of a nation (and e.g., the ensuing civil war), but technically the issues are the same, both requiring/calling for the extraordinary-peculiar influencing-activity of leadership. These crises are distinguished sharply from the many kinds of crises that befall SSOAs but do not concern their normalcy; facing the latter sorts of crises are the proper tasks not of leaders but of agents who tend to the preservation, expansion, and deepening of the status quo (=managers, stewards, custodians).] (Kotter, 1990; Lewin, 1997; Northouse, 2001).

Enacting the Critique

The critique of the idea can tell the leader (the one who intends to influence in a peculiar-extraordinary way the troubled SSOA) where in general the SSOA ought to be coursing-flowing-moving. That is, the critique provides the leader with an intentionality structure, a practical directionality, an intelligent point of departure to approach the SSOA’s in principle trouble. Again, although what the critique provides need not be an “academic,” explicitly intellectual-linguistic event, it, nevertheless, however so intuitive, commonsensical, emotional, and “hands-on” the leader may be, is a highly intelligent achievement. Thus the would-be leader begins to specify a new idea of the SSOA; this is something of a “vision” of the new normal (E), a projected status quo that is once again calibrated to its relevant environment and comprises an agency-structure order that functions efficiently to flow-course towards a proper (internally consistent) good-telos.

The diagnosis gleaned from the critique of the idea becomes a schematic or blueprint for the leader’s work. This work, of course, involves creating a new SSOA that is
commensurate to the demanded-required-imposed telos, a SSOA, that is, wherein agents’
activities are structured so as to produce-course-flow towards the new horizon. The
leader’s peculiar influence consists precisely in enacting the suggestions of the critique
of the idea (Wolin, 2004; Wisdom, 1987; Bernstein, 1983; Fairclough, 1992).

Enactment, however, is not simply a matter of action “forthwith” based on these
suggestions. There is, in the first place, the need to reckon with the actual circumstances
of the status quo, the fact of its establishment. This means that the existing SSOA, its
agents (in terms of their commitments, habits, motivation, personal investment,
adaptability, etc.), and its structure (its routines, institutions, policies/protocols) do not
just disappear; in fact they possess a strong inertia, a tendency to remain what they are
(=the “lastingness” of the normal SSOA that constitutes its identity). The enactment of
any solution to the disrupted normalcy of a SSOA, then, must take into account the actual
material conditions as much as the actual personal conditions of the status quo. Even the
most “reasonable” solution, if enacted without regard for either agential or structural
inertia (the fact that agents identify with the status quo and that the SSOA’s identity is
bound up with its lastingness), will necessarily fail. The achievement of a new status quo,
a new normal that involves a new lastingness-identity, must be preceded by a
“preparation” of the old status quo, a process that breaks-loosens the present lastingness-
identity connection. The status quo SSOA, that is, must become a leadership entity
(Voegelin, 1991; Ranieri, 1995; Searle, 1995).

The Leadership Entity

Consider once more the normal SSOA (see figure 4). There are constant clear lines,
stable straightforward roles, protocols, relationships, power distributions, and a tacit
legitimacy. Everyone, as a formal agent, is comfortable and assumes-believes that what is being done is right, appropriate, sanctioned, and normal. These agents “identify” with the status quo. Thus E, even as it is dynamic and active, flowing-coursing in time to produce its good, is a relatively rigid-frozen-congealed entity, an entity that retains its identity-integrity over time. The normal SSOA, that is, possesses lastingness that constitutes its very identity. Normally, then, this lastingness, this rigidity-frozenness, is an advantage, lending stability, endurance, and protection from (resistance to) even strong disruptive circumstances (including, as suggested, the circumstances that disrupt the SSOA’s normalcy). A SSOA that lacks this rigidity, this hardiness of order, is vulnerable to the smallest influences and disturbances and as such is unlikely to retain its identity and won’t last very long. But now with the need to address the disruption of the SSOA’s normalcy, its rigidity becomes a serious obstacle to the will of the leader who is called to create a new SSOA (Searle, 1995; Lewin, 1997; Voegelin, 1991).

The task at this point is to reckon with the rigidity of the status quo and actually to deconstruct it, even to destroy it. Why? Because the status quo’s agency-structure order is predicated on an idea that is fundamentally either misinterpreted or mis-enacted (existentially misrepresented) or has become inadequate to the new telos. This order, then, cannot stand; it must be disordered and then reordered; agency must be loosened from its current structuring and then restructured according to the vision of the new normal achieved by the critique of the present idea.

The deconstruction/destruction of the status quo amounts to what Lewin (1997) called “unfreezing” the social reality. Essentially, the status quo’s rigidity is a matter of forces (power quanta) distributed so as to constellate and maintain certain relatively fixed-
frozen arrangements of agency and structure. Agents, then, formally belonging to the SSOA, normally-habitually act not only with and by these forces (“empowered” by them), but by this action maintain the enforced arrangements. Thus the status quo is regularly, ongoingly, normally upheld and vindicated-validated-legitimated. Furthermore, agents in the normal SSOA are liable to be personally convinced of the (moral) rightness of their actions not only because of the lastingness, the predictable protective stability, of the social reality created by their repetitive, upholding, vindicating-validating participation, but also because of the self-reinforcing ethos-value-thought system of the group generated by that repetitive, validating action (=social habit). The SSOA normally is tacitly taken to be the way it is and ought to be; agents are understandably biased in favor of its maintenance and ever so much more if agents are dependent privately-personally, have “vested interests” (cf. financial, professional, egotistical, vocational) in the benefits of participating in the status quo. [It’s not only my job, but a substantial part of my whole life.] (Voegelin, 1991; Ranieri, 1995; Bourdieu, 1998; Polanyi, 1958; Simmel, 1971).

Now, as we saw, the normal SSOA (E), the status quo, comprises an agency-structure complex. Normally, then, this complex is rigid-frozen and agency possesses inertia, the tendency to maintain the structure of E, which inertia, when the would-be leader comes on the scene, must be perceived as resistance to change. Initially, therefore, agential and, correlatively, structural inertia must be reckoned with, destroyed, deconstructed, cancelled, countered. This reckoning amounts to unfreezing the SSOA, to loosening the grip that agential intentionality, motivation, bias, interest, and belief has, in the form of morally upholding-vindicating-validating social habits, on the SSOA. Unless this
unfreezing occurs, the status quo agency-structure complex remains intact leaving the installation of a new normalcy all but impossible (Lewin, 1997).

The leader, who we must suppose has the power, means, “permission”/authority, and will-choice to employ those means and power to exert radical-peculiar-extraordinary influence on the SSOA, can counter the intransigence of agents in a variety of ways. The leader, for example, may try to “stir up” agents emotionally and intellectually by articulating the vision-idea of the new SSOA and exhorting them as to the urgency, the moral necessity of realizing the new status quo while at the same time indicating how the current status quo is in the way of this realization. This is a form of discourse designed to reduce the strength-value of agents’ social habits (that vindicate the status quo) and to rid them of their bias in favor of the status quo. This amounts to a “catharsis” or a call to “repentance” concerning their intransigence. Agents are made to feel “guilty” (morally uneasy) about being closed to change for the sake of what must be done to transform the SSOA. Moreover, they are appealed to as rational, that is, as people who are susceptible to being “converted” by good logical arguments and/or “common sense,” and, based on this new understanding-consciousness, become willing to act accordingly. Agents also are respected both as egoists and altruists, as persons who are capable of realizing the need to participate in the proposed changes both for their own sakes and for the sake of fellow agents. Finally, the leader’s exhortation-discourse intends to impart courage to agents to move forward despite the uncertainties that realizing the new SSOA entail. All this is to make agents vulnerable-malleable-open regarding leaderly direction. The result is a certain “fluidity” of consciousness, a potency of mind and will that can become the basis for agents’ cooperation with the leader in thinking out (expressive representation)
and realizing (existential representation) the new SSOA, including accepting and implementing significant structural modifications that inevitably will affect agents’ formal identities (Voegelin, 1991; Ranieri, 1995; Searle, 1995; Collin, 1997; Fairclough, 1992; McCarthy, 1978).

Agents, however, despite the would-be leader’s best exhortatory efforts, may remain unwilling, resistant to being converted, and perhaps obstreperous, even if they know it’s wrong, even if they grasp intellectually that the changes proposed by the leader are quite necessary and are in their long-term interests. In this situation the leader must fail to deconstruct the rigidity of the status quo if all he has to employ are tools of moral-rational persuasion. And, if so, the process of the SSOA’s demise/stagnation will continue. But why would agents refuse the would-be leader’s moral-rational appeal?

It is proverbial that change can be hard to endure, that not only change but the prospect of change brings fear and anxiety. These feelings may be intense enough to overwhelm even the most rational agent: “My head knows it but my heart says stay put.” Or, “The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak.” Thus the leader’s exhortatory discourse may fail to impart the necessary courage (en-courage) for agents to work with the leader to change the status quo. Or, it could be that agents who enjoy relative personal advantage in the present SSOA somehow calculate that they should hold out against leaderly influence, that, despite the cogency of the argument for change, holding out, maintaining the status quo, is still more attractive perhaps only in the short term after which these agents might simply “cash in” and leave. These agents, then, lack moral concern-courage-perspective, the will to believe and to act, for the future of the SSOA; no matter how reasonable the leader’s discourse, he will not be allowed the authority-
permission to proceed and obedience to his recommendations will not be forthcoming. The would-be leader who faces this sort of agential resistance-intransigence-moral obtuseness as a last resort might add various incentives appealing to agents’ baser motives. These incentives may include immediate rewards (ex. financial bonuses) and the prospect for more compensation for those who “go along.” Perhaps after awhile, especially if the leaderly process goes well, agents who initially responded to such incentives might at last become “converted” to the cause for its own sake.

The most difficult form of resistance concerns agents who are impervious to the would-be leader’s moral-rational discourse because they are self-deceived or “hard of heart.” That is, if we assume that the leader’s diagnosis of the SSOA’s in principle trouble and its idea is correct, and if we assume that the would-be leader’s expressive representation (discourse) of this diagnosis, including what is wrong in light of what is right (in terms of the new idea and its good-telos), is lucid, there still may be agents who sincerely think that they “know better” and who in fact regard the would-be leader as a dangerous interloper, someone who ought to be opposed for the sake, ironically, of the SSOA. In this case, and with the general failure of leaderly discourse, other measures must finally be employed, measures that involve the use of force. [Gardner, 42] This may include removals (ex. firings), redefining roles (ex. reassignments), transfers, promotions, demotions, policy and protocol revisions, relocation, alterations of physical-economic conditions, drafts, rationing, and even imprisonment, censure, ostracizing, war etc. All this, despite how some individual agents may experience and are harmed by it, can be regarded, technically, as a kind of “benevolent dictatorship,” benevolent because done with the good in mind and because the use of force judiciously brings forth the

Now, let’s grant that the would-be leader (who at this point is on the verge of full-blown leadership) has been able, despite whatever resistance there might be, to bring some critical mass of agents to “repentance” and/or has used some force to modify various structures (changed roles, imposed policies, increased/decreased reinforcement schedules, enacted relocations and “emergency” reassignments, etc.). This leaves the SSOA (its agency-structure complex) fluid-supple-flexible hence vulnerable-amenable-open-subject to the leader’s activity, to being worked with on the potter’s wheel. The “heat” of the leader’s discourse (the critique of the idea, the moral-rational exhortation, the judicious use of force) has broken-loosened-unfrozen the relations between agents, has de-moralized participation in the status quo, has softened structure, and has repudiated the sovereignty of the idea and the legitimacy-authority of those who would perpetuate the status quo. What had been taken for granted as fixed and locked down is now unlocked and broken, subject to revision, reconfiguration, and transformation. Everything about E is at stake, its basic components are in flux, fluid, moveable, and only tentatively related as they had been. Thus E has become a leadership entity (LE), an extraordinary-peculiar-special SSOA that is the substrate of the new normal SSOA. The LE, that is, is the necessary condition, the transcendental ground, the potency of the implementation-realization of the new idea, of achieving a SSOA that is precisely created to move-flow-course toward a good-telos that the new idea recommends. The leadership entity, we might say, is the vehicle that provides the transitional link between the old SSOA and the new (Voegelin, 1991; Lewin, 1997; Popper, 1972; Polanyi, 1958).
Achieving the leadership entity naturally has dangers. In a sense, the leader’s discourse “entropizes” the SSOA, leaving it subject to disintegration. Ideally, then, the “heat” applied by leaderly action will be tempered and moderated so that, while the desired malleability of the agency-structure is attained, it is not so much as to cancel the SSOA altogether. The intention is to render relationships and structures “soft” so that they can be removed (if necessary), reconfirmed, reconfigured, augmented, differently emphasized, etc.. The danger, then, is that if in ushering in the leadership entity leaderly activity is too strong: the rhetoric is too inflammatory, inter-agent relations that might be useful in the leadership entity are cancelled wholesale, the use of force is too blunt, the changes too fast for agents to appropriate, etc. The result can be that agents become absolutely (not just relative to the status quo) demoralized; their unselfconsciousness regarding the status quo is so savaged-sabotaged that they are incapacitated or dispirited as persons-subjects to become newly motivated by the prospect of a new status quo. They may leave or shut down; they may even stage a rebellion. Thus the SSOA’s structure devolves into a chaos- unto-annihilation (maximum entropy-disintegration). Certainly, the fluidity of the leadership entity is posited over against the rigid order of the status quo, and so is indeed a kind of disorder-chaos. But properly, by intention, it should be a chaos- unto-order, a purposeful disordering for the sake of a new construction-integration guided or “attracted” by the new idea of the new normal SSOA. The leader therefore must take care to overlay the logic of the schematic-blueprint of the new idea onto the destructive-deconstructive effects of his discourse Fairclough, 1992; Lewin, 1997; Little, 1998; Morgan, 1986; Wisdom, 1987).
Another danger in the creation of the leadership entity lurks in the midst of the uncertainties that life in the fluidity of the leadership entity inescapably involves. Agents who initially were “gung ho” can become discouraged, fearful, and anxious as the LE travels. The leader as well can falter, loose momentum and lose the pathway. The LE, then, is deprived of the agency and leaderly commitment necessary for restructuring the new SSOA. The consequence of this likely will be reactionary, an attempt to regress to the old status quo. But this conservative retreat almost never resurrects the status quo: There’s no going back home once the disruption of normalcy takes hold. “Remember Lot’s wife.”

The New Normal and the End of Leadership

The leadership entity has emerged as the instrument par excellence of the leader. Without the leadership entity a solution to the in principle trouble of the SSOA is impossible. This solution, of course, actually represents the dissolution of the status quo. The leadership entity is the death knell of the status quo; out of this death process emerges a new form of life.

But the leadership entity is still an agency-structure complex that reflects the old social reality. The old reality is not utterly annihilated or effaced; after all, agents will not be able to function immediately without some frame of reference. The new normal SSOA, projected as a schematic-blueprint, is initially abstract, general, a set of logical spaces or potencies to be realized-filled. The old social reality, then, indeed serves as a frame of reference, but not for the sake of preserving the status quo but for the sake of transcending it. Agents in the leadership entity are poised over against the status quo; leaderly action and strategy are in dialectical opposition to the old SSOA with a view to
transforming it into a new synthesis of agency and structure to reach a categorically different SSOA. The old SSOA has been fashioned by the leader into a kind of ladder with which to ascend to a new form of life (Polanyi, 1958; Popper, 1972; Wittgenstein, 1953; Ranieri, 1995; Voegelin, 1991).

Now, if the leadership entity functions properly it is always already making itself obsolete. That is, the leadership entity’s purpose is not to persist but to allow for a new configuration of agency and structure, a new distribution and constellation of power, a new articulation of legitimacy and authority, a new installation of a moral system, etc.; all of this is enacted towards the concrete realization of the idea of the new normal SSOA. This new normal will, as with any normal SSOA, possess a lastingness, a relatively rigid-frozen order that is precisely uncharacteristic of the leadership entity. So, the leadership entity, the ladder, the vehicle, the leader’s proper forum, somehow should be self-consuming, self-transcending, and self-negating as its dialectic proceeds. This self-negation, however, is not unto annihilation but unto the realization of the potential (suggested in the schematic-blueprint) of the new idea (McCarthy, 1978; Habermas, 1973; Archer, 1995; Bernstein, 1983).

The leader’s work, then, once the leadership entity is at hand, is not only to initiate and construct changes (including possible additives to the old “mix”—new agents, roles, policies, resources. increased knowledge-expertise, different emphases and levels of moral pressure, etc.), but also to create the conditions wherein these changes become permanent. It can’t be that the fluidity of the leadership entity goes on indefinitely; sooner or later the features and character of the new normal must begin to appear, setting up the patterns of action and recurring schemes that serve to vindicate-validate-reinforce-
perpetuate-normalize a SSOA (= a stable circular causal process  (Lewin, 1997; Bourdieu, 1998).

The leader’s effort thus can only go so far; eventually agents must themselves decide that the new normal will and ought to come to pass. It will not be enough that agents have become motivationally attuned and structurally oriented to the new idea and, accordingly, for awhile in the flux and uncertainty and forced impositions of the leadership entity, act so as to go along with the leader’s intentions. Agents’ convictions must be linked to regular action, to preferred action; this link is established by decision. By agents’ decisiveness for the new normal, individually and especially in the presence of other agents (group setting), the new idea is consciously, deliberately, freely, personally appropriated as the proper way to think about belonging to and participating in the SSOA. [Otherwise, the new SSOA is only the product of the “strong man’s” will.] Thus, finally, the old idea and its vestiges are banished (though, to be sure, there almost always remain those who refuse to decide, who therefore represent a reactionary, ”conservative” resistance to the new SSOA) (Searle, 1995; Collin, 1997; Bernstein, 1976; McCarthy, 1978; Voegelin, 1991).

The leader’s work finally consists of tending to the neophyte SSOA, the new normal that in the early stages more often than not is extremely likely to fail. There may be various organizational complications, miscalculations, false starts, unforeseen contradictions in procedures, underestimated residual resistance, and just in general a “learning curve” for agents to appropriate the vicissitudes of the new form of life. Moreover, there is simply the fragility that accompanies any new life, a soft-boned vulnerability that for some time needs support and protection [that eventually can be
removed—cf. cement formations supported by wooden structure-bracing]. The time of the leadership entity has indeed passed, but the new SSOA is formally still a child needing time and opportunity to “set up.” Structures must implant and agents must get their “sea legs.” Eventually-ideally, of course, the new SSOA becomes merely the status quo, “as though it never even happened,” the normal, and accordingly moves forward making its own history as a being in time, implicitly-tacitly accepted as the world-cosmion that ought to be (Voegelin, 1952; Morgan, 1986; Wisdom, 1987; Cassirer, 1955).

Now, at last, the achievement of the new normal that is the success of the leadership entity implies, ironically-tragically perhaps, that the leader who has worked so hard is no longer needed. The new SSOA, once it has become a normal social reality, excludes leaderly action “by definition.” And so, along with the evanescence of the leadership entity, the success of which is at the cost of its self-negation in the process of realizing its function to transport a community of agents to the new SSOA, the leader too must retire (or be retired) from the scene. Not to do so, as has happened now and then, more or less notoriously, is to inhibit the subsequent emplacement-implementation-installation of the new SSOA. Inappropriately prolonged leaderly activity postpones agents’ decisiveness and arrival at unselfconscious participation (tacit approval-acceptance) of the new status quo and leaves structure problematic, tentative, fragile, unformed, unconfirmed, and susceptible to disintegration. Thus the leader must cease to act as a leader at the definite moment that the new normal finally coalesces, a moment obviating the authority that warrants and legitimizes leaderly action to influence the SSOA in a peculiar-extraordinary way.
Figure 9: The time of leadership between the emergence of a leader and the emergence of a new normal SSOA.
CHAPTER IV: SEMANTICS

Introduction

The task now is to apply the Grammar to actual socialities. [Note: From this point forward the term “sociality” will be used in place of SSOA.] The presentation of my theory thus far has been schematic and syntactical. The Grammar’s syntax refers to the formal agential-structural arrangements whereby the leadership entity comes into existence. These arrangements obtain, I submit, in every case of leadership; the syntax comprises the universal, transcendental, essential, fundamental arrangements and dynamics of agency and structure whereby and exclusively leadership is created-synthesized-emerges and finally recedes.

At this point, then, with the application of the Grammar, the intention is to provide semantical content, particular-actual contexts that simultaneously-dialectically fill-concretize the formal syntax and are formed by that syntax. Or, rather, the task now is to offer accounts of definite socialities that either enter into the universal-transcendental-syntactical arrangements or fail to meet-fulfill those conditions. Taken together these accounts of actual-particular socialities with reference to the universal Grammar of leadership constitute the full presentation of my theory. This is where the Grammar begins quite literally to mean something that can be entered into leadership study tout court. The reader, of course, after all is said, must ultimately decide about the usefulness of the Grammar as a unifying analytic tool for the study of leadership.

The US Sociality

Let’s take the United States (US) as the actual sociality of concern. Perhaps I should prove why the US is a sociality by showing how it fulfills the desiderata of the social
ontology. I could, that is, at the cost of many more words, show in detail that the US is indeed a social reality consisting of the elements that the social ontology mentions. But this will not be attempted; I’ll instead ask the reader to stipulate to the US being a veritable sociality, the US sociality. I shouldn’t think this to be a troubling request.

However, I shall want to pick out one component of the social ontology of the US sociality, namely its idea, to become the object of analysis. For, as we saw, it is the condition of the sociality’s idea, how it is or isn’t represented expressively and existentially, that defines whether or not leadership emerges. In what follows, therefore, after unpacking the US sociality’s idea somewhat, I’ll provide two scenarios based on actual events-circumstances that are essentially similar regarding their relationship to the representation of that idea. But, despite their essential similarity, these circumstances, besides occurring at different times (1828-32 and 1860-63), can be differentiated “grammatically” regarding the pertinence or impertinence of leadership. This grammatical differentiation, if it is convincing, is precisely the “proof” of the Grammar.

The Idea of the US Sociality

It’s fair to say that the US sociality’s logos, its idea, is expressively represented, even if not exhaustively unfolded with every philosophical nuance, by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The purpose of the US sociality, accordingly, is the faithful-accurate enactment-realization of its idea projected by these documents, the existential representation in institutions, procedures, laws, schemes of action, methods of enforcement, etc., of the logical, moral, economic, and political potencies of the idea to form an identifying normalcy of a definite social reality, namely the US sociality. This normalcy entails a lastingness, a relatively rigid-frozen-fixed orderedness, a characteristic
form of life (“American”), and social vicissitudes-habits embodied in the more or less unselfconscious tacit approval of persons-agents who formally belong to the social entity. This is not to claim that the expressive representation of the US sociality’s idea emerged full-blown and finally with the publication of the Declaration of Independence (1776) and the Constitution (1787) without need of continuing interpretation. In fact, the interpretation of the idea is bound up with trying faithfully to represent existentially the expressed idea (its logic) in increasingly complex circumstances of historical reality. There is, then, a logic-reality dialectic that is equivalent to the true history of the US sociality. The existential unfolding of the evolving understanding-interpretation of the idea is the US sociality’s (and every other sociality’s) history. This dialectic, that is, is the very meaning of that history.

The Declaration of Independence

The Declaration of Independence (Jordan, 2002) proclaims the US as a political entity, a definite sociality, with the power and right to exist among other socialities. The US sociality has a rightful-legitimate place in the wider ecology of other nations-comparable socialities; and is a viable social reality fit to exist in the contemporary political-economic environment. It is the right time, “in the course of human events,” to assume a place among “the Powers of the Earth.” Further, by way of legitimacy, the emergence of the US sociality is an entitlement bestowed by the “Laws of Nature” and “Nature’s God.” It is a sociality informed by absolute truths that describe how its agents-persons-citizens-formal members ought to be related and indeed must (if the US sociality lives up to its promise) be related and respected. To wit: “All men are created equal” and have “unalienable Rights” or “Ends” (goods—“Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness”).
These ends (telei) delimit the nature of the sociality’s structure, its operation, internal distribution of power, governing procedures, its trajectory-course-flow-movement-direction in time, its very history. This teleological argument for the legitimacy of the structure (government) is strongly put, so much so that “whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it.” This means that the sociality’s course-flow-movement-operation in time has legitimacy only as long as it is normal with respect to the ends-goods-telei grounded absolutely, self-evidently, in the Creator. The normal US sociality exists only insofar as it embodies and carries out its true historical meaning guided by certain supreme, unimpeachable moral truths that are central to its idea. It is, then, as will be discussed later, the historical unfolding of these moral truths, especially regarding slavery, that years later will trouble the pretension of the US sociality as to its normalcy.

But what does the Declaration of Independence say about the relationship between the several states and the Union? It would appear that Jefferson’s language about this is ambiguous, proclaiming on the one hand that the Declaration is “the unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America” and that these states comprise “one People.” But, on the other hand, he asserts that these states “of Right ought to be Free and Independent States” able “to do all Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.” These latter comments suggest that, though associated in some way sufficient to call them united and one, each state (representing its agents-persons) is significantly autonomous, self-determining, and sovereign. [Note: There might be some confusion regarding the agency of states and that of persons in the states. For our purposes, the two will be interchangeable. I’m looking at states and by extension the persons-citizens of
those states as formal members-agents of the US sociality according to membership
criteria contained in the US sociality’s idea. I realize that persons and states are obviously
quite different, but logically can be treated similarly as members of a sociality. States are
members of a nation like, ceteris paribus, gangsters are members of a gang.

I am not concluding that the author of the Declaration of Independence did not intend
to express the unity of the US sociality, but, as is well known, Thomas Jefferson was a
champion of states’ rights (cf. his position even in 1798-99 with the Kentucky and
Virginia resolutions) and a minimalist concept of federalism whereby each state would
determine almost all of its affairs internally. This still projected a kind of unity, but not
one that clearly defined the relationship of the parts (states) to the whole (Union) or
provided for the resolution of conflicts between the two sovereignties. This remained for
other expressions of the idea to do or fail to do.

Of course, the thirteen colonies after 1776, despite the lack of an articulate logos of
unity in the Declaration, were indeed united. But why? Surely it was a function of the
temporary common purpose of the Revolutionary War, of a common enemy (the British),
of the shared aura that came with military successes, and of the first blush of actual
independence. The states and agents of the US sociality, then, in the crucible of the
Revolution, despite even serious sectional (North-South) and interstate differences, were

As time passed, however, it became apparent that the Declaration of Independence, for
all its moral-philosophical eloquence, did not express the full essence of the US sociality,
especially regarding the relationship of states’ sovereignty and the prerogatives of the
central government. The Declaration offered no structural concepts, no blueprint,
describing-depicting a relationship between agents, states, and the federal power. Nor was there offered an account of the nature of the roles of agents, agencies, power distributions, institutional arrangements, enforcement protocols, etc. Significantly, then, even six years after the Declaration at the time of the Treaty of Paris (1783) that brought the War to a close, Americans, when abbreviating the name of the US sociality, always wrote: The united States, using “united” adjectively (in lower case), as what appeared to be almost a casual throwaway description, rather that as a substantive, ineliminable part of the name of the new social reality. This linguistic habit, consistent with the usage in the Declaration itself, revealed the lack of a clear idea of the unionizing structure of the US sociality. Further, as the urgencies associated with the War receded, the temporary basis for the states’ unity correspondingly evanesced; this left things susceptible to fragmentation such that any one of the several states might tend to go its own sovereign way and/or to enter into various factions (e.g., Northeast, Middle Atlantic, South) (Pole, 1972; Soifer & Hoffman; Garraty, 1994).

The Articles of Confederation

Many in the newly declared independent states realized that unless some sort of formal structure of unity was put forth, the US would be nothing more than a nominal social reality, certainly unworthy of being recognized as a world power. For some, this wasn’t much of a problem; states’ sovereignty by them was taken to be inevitable and preferable and in fact what the Revolution was all about. Proponents of this view believed that a loose unity was more “democratic” and consistent with the widely held, quintessentially American, distrust of power centralized in a remote authority (e.g., a monarchy, a President of a Republic?). Such was the attitudinal circumstance that
attended the drafting of the Articles of Confederation, a process that began as early as 1776 and was agreed to by Congress in 1777. But, due to fervently argued complications and oppositions by states’ rights supporters, the final version of the Articles was not ratified until 1781 and provided little more than a rhetorical unity, a wistful recipe for a benign, toothless central power that governed at the behest of the states and whose authority could be easily overridden by just one state’s objection. It was, then, not the Articles of Confederation but the Constitution that finally provided, although only after another decade of serious wrangling regarding ratification, the needed structural elements for a respectable-realistic union of conditionally sovereign states (and the agents-persons thereof) (Pole, 1972; Soifer & Hoffman, 1998; Garraty, 1994; Farber, 2003; Jordan, 2002).

The Constitution

Unionizing Structure

The Constitution posits an undeniably strong central government. Its first part (signed in 1787) consists of seven Articles describing the three branches of this central government, including the nature of agents, agencies, and the powers, functions, and duties of the branches. The Constitution also implies the balancing of the branches’ powers to prevent the emergence of an overly powerful branch or the central government’s total usurpation of the prerogatives of individual agents-persons (“the people”) and the states. The Constitution, that is, was intended as a practical instrument to achieve a more viable, operational, stable unity (“in Order to form a more perfect Union”) for the US sociality, while not completely canceling the sovereignties of the states and individual agents. The document offers a common, unifying framework of
standardized procedures, limits, and an orderly change (amendment) process within which agents can act individually and in association so as to achieve or tend towards (pursue) the achievement of various goods ("the general Welfare…the Blessings of Liberty" and, we assume, the "Life" and "Happiness" mentioned in the Declaration of Independence) for themselves and for the collectivities to which they belong. These empowered actions, repeated over and over ad infinitum, have the overall effect of consolidating the formation of the Union [cf. Adam Smith’s "invisible hand"] and the ongoing preservation-vindication of it. And, as agents more and more regularly achieve some modicum of happiness (the good) within the framework of the central government posited by the Constitution, their participation in the US sociality would become increasingly unselfconscious, tacitly approving, and normal [Note: this was only actually the case by 1815 (subsequent to the War of 1812): “Until 1815 nothing in the future of the American Union was regarded as settled” (Adams, 1967).] (Pole, 1972; Jordan, 2002; Garraty, 1994; Wolin, 2004).

An Articulated Federalism

The first part of the Constitution addresses explicitly the power relationship between the central government and the states. Article VI states that “this Constitution and the Laws of the United States [notice the substantive, capitalized, form of the term “united” in contrast to the adjectival, lower case, form in the Declaration] which shall be made in pursuance thereof… under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” Accordingly, the states (their judges, constitutions, laws, persons-agents) were subordinated in large part to the central government. [Moreover, in subsequent case law (viz., Marbury v. Madison in 1803; McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819; Gibbons v.}
Ogden in 1824), the priority-supremacy of the central government (the supremacy of laws passed by the Congress, the opinions of the Supreme Court, and the enforcement of the Executive) is driven home.] (Jordan, 2002; Garraty, 1994; Pole, 1972; Adams, 1967).

The Constitution’s articulation of a substantial Union initially met significant anti-federalist resistance. There were still those in the new social reality who were suspicious of centralizing power, even if they acknowledged the need for a unifying structure. This prompted no less illustrious persons as Hamilton, Jay, and Madison to produce a series of essays (The Federalist) promoting ratification of the Constitution which in fact was accomplished in 1791 with New Hampshire being the ninth state to approve of it. But this was only after some “political correctness” concerning slavery (to gain the support of southerners), the adoption of a set of Amendments guaranteeing the rights of individual persons-agents-formal members of the US sociality asserted over against the power wielded by the Union structure, and the addition of another Amendment (the tenth) delimiting federal sovereignty in deference to the sovereignties of the states and the people (Hamilton et al., 2003; Garraty, 1994; Pole, 1972; Farber, 2003; Jordan, 2002).

We the People

The first part (seven Articles) of the Constitution, even if predominantly concerned with the order of the Union, nevertheless adds to the Declaration’s moral-philosophical characterization of the status of persons-agents. Specifically, in the Preamble, the value-purpose-telos-good of the structure (“a more perfect Union”) is “to establish justice [and] insure domestic Tranquility” for the formal members of the US sociality, that is, to create normal-ordinary conditions of fairness and peace wherein agents (the people) are able to act to “secure the Blessings of Liberty” for themselves and “our posterity.” Agents of the
US sociality are thus empowered to act normally-habitually-tranquilly
(unselfconsciously, non-anxiously) to pursue happiness in regular recurrent ways (=social
habits) that effectively moves-courses-flows the US sociality in time reproducing-
validating-vindicating the empowering conditions for those persons-agents who come
later on. This is the meaning of the history of the US sociality, the significance of
participation in the social reality: not only to benefit the present generation (as
individuals and collectively) by participation but to perpetuate the social entity
indefinitely for the sake of others’ Life, Liberty, and Happiness. Hence, as long as these
Ends (goods-goals-telei) are sufficiently valued by most agents-persons, the lastingness-
identity of the US sociality as a definite social reality is assured.

Two Planks of the Idea

These are, then, the two aspects of the US sociality’s idea that shall concern us: 1) the
articulation of a (federalist) relationship between the relative powers-sovereignties of the
states (and their agents-persons) and the federal government, a relationship intended to
establish the preeminence and lastingness of the Union without canceling the integrity of
the several parts (E Pluribus Unum); 2) the assertion of the unassailable, absolute moral
status of every agent-person in the social reality, an assertion intended to enable everyone
to participate in the US sociality to produce the good individually and in the aggregate, as
well as to reproduce the conditions of this enabling-power (Liberty) indefinitely.

Andrew Jackson and the Nullification Crisis

Contradictions in the Idea

The first set of circumstances of the US sociality that I want to consider occupies the
years 1828-33, when Andrew Jackson was President. The Grammar (its conceptual-
theoretical apparatus) will be applied to determine if these circumstances of the sociality meet the criteria of a true disruption of normalcy, calling for leadership, and, accordingly, whether or not Andrew Jackson acting with regard to those circumstances was acting as a leader. Determining by the Grammar whether or not someone is a leader amounts to qualifying that person to be placed in an empirical domain for the empirical study of leadership. If Andrew Jackson is determined to be a leader, strictly identified by the Grammar’s metaphysical discipline, he then becomes a proper object of qualitative or quantitative empirical analysis (collectively what I’ve referred to as Contemporary Leadership Studies or CLS), to elaborate on his observable character, style, traits, behavior patterns, speech acts, testimonies, life-story, etc., that may be compared, contrasted, and aggregated with others who have also been identified (or ruled out) by the Grammar as leaders. Without the philosophical grounding of the Grammar, identification of circumstances calling for leadership (for the peculiar action-influence of a certain person that transforms a disrupted state of affairs into a leadership entity) is without direction and intelligibility, issuing in a kind of undisciplined guesswork based on a virtual infinity of notions about when leadership is called for and the 350+ “definitions” that currently bedevil CLS.

Anyway, in 1828, insofar as the US sociality was consistent with its idea (viz., the Constitution, its Amendments, and the Declaration of Independence), it was functioning normally \( f(E) \). This isn’t to say that things were perfect or without need for development and improvement. Certainly, no actual sociality can be so described; all fall short of their intended glory. Yet I shall assert that generally and for the most part the US sociality in 1828 was normal, that is, had a relatively rigid-frozen-congealed agency-
structure order that served to move-flow-course it towards its telic horizon (life, liberty,
happiness) for its members-agents individually and as a whole. Moreover, there were
well-established mechanisms for the enforcement and reinforcement of the status quo and
a set of procedures (laws) providing predictable ways to manage political, economic, and
social relations between agents and agencies so as to preserve and perpetuate the
sociality’s ordered identity in the flux of changing circumstances. This normalcy also
implied agents’-persons’ performance of regular schemes of actions and social habits that
vindicated-validated-legitimated the status quo because these schemes and habits actually
achieved and embodied the fundamental goods (life, liberty, happiness) upon which the
social entity is predicated. Most importantly for our analysis, as far as anyone at that
time was concerned, the US sociality’s normalcy in 1828 involved an operative concept
of federalism (defining the states-central government relation) as well as a general praxis
(body of accepted practices) consistent with the moral status (equal and with unalienable
rights) of every agent-person-member of the US sociality that its idea espouses.

Now, certainly it’s conceivable that for the period up to 1828 [the War of 1812
notwithstanding, a circumstance that should be treated “grammatically” on its own terms
to see if it is an instance of a fundamental disruption] the US sociality as a normal
sociality encountered no basic challenges, no real threats to disrupt its normalcy. Again,
this is not to say that a normal sociality cannot still develop (e.g., the Executive and
Judicial Branches clearly unfold their constitutional implications from 1791-1815), or
that no aspects of its social ontology will remain unexpressed-unused (e.g., the
enforcement structure in terms of the internal use of the military), or that the implications
of its moral philosophy might not be fully appreciated (e.g., the issue of women’s
suffrage was more or less neglected). But, it also can be that a normal sociality is only *apparently* normal, that is, there could be *latent contradictions* not worked out existentially so as to be perceived either as contradictions or for what they implied existentially. They may be objectively there, “technically” or logically, but subjectively unknown or for the most part ignored or even if known not prosecuted fully for their existential implications, and only later as the logic-reality dialectic (history) proceeds will they come to roost and in some sense force someone to address them on pain of the destruction of the sociality. And so, even if objectively there, latent contradictions do not trouble the conscious-subjective life of the sociality; no one (at least no one who “matters”) suffers because of them to the extent that the normalcy of the sociality is disrupted or perceived to be threatened to the point of provoking affirmative action (Pole, 1972; Soifer & Hoffman, 1998; Garraty, 1994).

Two of these latent contradictions shall concern us: First, there are numerous human beings (ex-Africans) enslaved in a social reality whose constitutive idea posits absolute moral truths about the status of every person: All men are created equal and have unalienable rights. As mentioned above, the ratification of the Constitution was not straightforward. Not only did its opponents demand a Bill of Rights before agreeing to it but southerners had to be appeased regarding slavery to secure their ratification. The slavery issue, in fact, caused perhaps the most divisive, union-threatening, debate in the Constitutional Convention (Pole, 1972). New York, Massachusetts, and even some representatives of Virginia tried to take advantage of the Convention to forbid slavery in the new Union. Georgia and South Carolina, however, and also several other states of the South where slavery had long been concentrated, adamantly resisted any attack on
slavery, an “institution” considered by southerners not evil but actually the best aspect of their economy and an asset of their “plantation” culture (Note: Although only one percent of the South’s population had plantations with 40 or more slaves, and there really wasn’t a typical southerner, it was with the wealth, prestige, and political dominance of the large plantation owners that the South became identified.) As it happened, then, Southern states in which most slaves existed and with whom the Southern economy was tightly and profitably bound, had serious misgivings about the proposed idea of the Union, that is, about the Constitution, and by implication, the Declaration of Independence as it embodied the moral philosophy of universal equality and human rights. The result, because the South would have refused otherwise to participate, was that the word “slave” never appears in the Constitution, and instead the euphemism “Person held to Service or Labor” was used (Article IV, 3). Further, slaves were regarded as three-fifths persons for the purposes of representation in Congress (Article I, 3) and had to be returned to their owners if they escaped and were caught in another state (Article IV, 3). These concessions gave the South relative advantage in the new Union, considering that its free-born population was rapidly increasing (that could be added to an already significant slave population for the purposes of Congressional representation) and its economy, based on the slave labor that was still legal, was improving (“Slave labor was the basis of almost every southern fortune” (Garraty, 1994)). Thus the Union was formed on the basis, in part, of a plain contradiction that was covered up (“repressed”) by sophistry and the overwhelming pragmatic desire to get the Union established. This contradiction, of course, was acknowledged and openly lamented by some persons-agents of the neophyte USSSOA (e.g., since 1774 in Philadelphia there was the Society for Promoting the
Abolition of Slavery, and in 1783 the Massachusetts supreme court ruled that the declaration of rights in the state’s constitution was a de facto abolition of slavery, but their voices would fail for quite some time to convict the moral sensibilities of most Americans who in some sense “forgot” the matter or, which is the same thing, relegated it to a latent unconscious status underneath the US sociality’s manifest form of life (Pole, 1972; Soifer & Hoffman, 1998).

Second, there were states, mainly in the South, that considered themselves independent and sovereign (at liberty to withdraw from the Union as the “Union was a question of expediency not obligation” (Adams, 1967)) even as, contradictorily, they were signatories to the Constitution intended to form a “more perfect” Union with superintendent power. This contradiction comported with the sentiments of Jefferson and Madison put forth in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798. In these Resolutions a doctrine of nullification was argued for in response to the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts. Each state “had an equal right to judge for itself” the constitutionality of a law of Congress. This presumptive prerogative, however, was never exercised and wasn’t adopted either as a theoretical option by the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures. Nevertheless, the sense of the contradiction was introduced into the American consciousness, an ideational tension that the Constitution, with all its unionizing structure, apparently did not preclude (Farber, 2003; Pole, 1972; Garraty, 1994).

This ideational tension, this contradiction, gained further articulation with South Carolinian John C. Calhoun’s essay of 1828 and Fort Hill address of 1831 that described an orderly process whereby states could reject (nullify) any federal law it found to be
unconstitutional. If a state legislature, that is, felt that a federal law was a violation of the state’s sovereignty special delegates could be elected to decide whether or not that law should be rejected or nullified within the state. [“Unconstitutional” = “not deemed in the state’s interests”] For Calhoun, then, the Union was nothing more than a compact, a loose confederacy, of states; and each state had the power of final judicial review, a power that the Constitution and subsequent Court decisions (cf. *Madison v. Marbury*) seemingly reserve to the Judicial Branch of the central government (Article VI, 2). This position, as it openly argues against the supremacy of the Union, plays logical havoc with the essential premises of the tripartite government articulated by the Constitution, seriously mitigating the importance of the laws of Congress, the opinions of the Supreme Court, and the enforcement of the Executive (Remini, 1966). As such the asseveration of the nullification doctrine is a direct and brazen assault on (contradiction of) the unionizing aspect of the US sociality’s idea (Pole, 1972; Garraty, 1994; Farber, 2003).

These two contradictions objectively obtained in the circumstances of 1828 but because the dialectic of logic-reality (history) had not yet revealed (interjected into consciousness) the contradictions in the fullness of what they were, there was not yet a serious existential rift, no manifest opposition that disrupted or threatened to disrupt the sociality’s normalcy. And so the contradictions remained latent. As we’ll see, however, history will create enough existential pressure regarding both contradictions to impinge on awareness, though, as I’ll explain, not in the 1828-33 period with the completeness required for leadership. However, irruptions will eventually occur in actual circumstances such that it will be plain to some agents (at least to some that “matter”) that the extant concept of federalism is inadequate to serve and preserve the US sociality and that
dealing with the moral scandal of slavery must finally trump economic expedience and whatever cultural “values” are involved. The logic-reality dialectic, that is, will manifest a serious *malformation* of the US sociality according to its idea (in terms of its unionizing structure and its morality) that can no longer be “forgotten” or otherwise dismissed from the consciousness (and conscience) of persons-agents who belong to the US sociality. This malformation and the awareness of it meet the criteria of a disruption of normalcy as discussed earlier. For now we’ll resume the analysis of the nullification crisis.

Nullification Challenge

Briefly, the facts are these: Andrew Jackson was elected President in 1828. In the same year, during Jackson’s election campaign, Congress passed a Tariff designed ostensibly to protect fledgling northern manufacturing from British imports. This Tariff, considered by some to have been a political tool used by Jackson’s supporters to gain northern votes for him in the 1828 election, understandably was welcomed by the North. But the South, with an economy predominately based on agriculture, especially cotton, regarded the Tariff of 1828 with contempt. Specifically, southerners were angered that while they had to buy manufactured goods (either from abroad or from the North) at the high prices of a closed market, their products were sold at the prices of an open market. For the same reasons, then, that the Tariff aided the North it hurt the South; accordingly the Tariff became known in the South as the Tariff of “Abominations” (Remini, 1966; Garraty, 1994; Skowronek, 1997; Soifer & Hoffman, 1998).

Jackson, whether or not he was privy to the political advantages that the Tariff gave him in his election, had some sympathy for southern concerns (mainly those of large plantation owners). This seemed reasonable since he was himself the owner of a
planted in Tennessee with up to 150 slaves. Moreover, the influential John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, who became Jackson’s Vice president, supported him to be President only because he fully expected Jackson, once President, to work to repeal the Tariff or at least to revise it to accommodate southern interests. And, in fact, Jackson tried to re-craft the Tariff to continue to protect the economy of the North (and the West) while significantly mitigating the negative effects on the South’s economy. The result was the Tariff of 1832. Jackson regarded this new Tariff as a fair “middle course” appropriate to everyone’s interests. Nevertheless, the Tariff of 1832 was summarily rejected by some radicals in South Carolina, considering it to be a betrayal (Skowronek, 1997; Remini, 1966).

The Nullies

The unappeased radicals in South Carolina were known as the Nullifiers or “Nullies,” chief of which was none other than John C. Calhoun who, as described above, had articulated a nullification doctrine in 1831 predicated on his rather parochial interpretation of federalism. It was, then, strongly influenced by the Nullies (who actually were a fringe minority that achieved general appeal through superior organization, resulting in the election of a governor sympathetic to Calhoun’s doctrine) and upon Calhoun’s maligned (mis?) interpretation of federalism promoting an absolute degree of states’ sovereignty, that South Carolina’s legislature passed an Ordinance of Nullification (November, 24, 1832) declaring the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832 null and void for South Carolina. Further, the South Carolina legislature warned the central government not to coerce the state in any way lest the state secede from the Union. [It should be noted that Calhoun himself did not advocate secession but did propose an eventual dissolution of
the Union through, ironically, the procedures of the very Constitution that was intended
to establish an indissoluble, “more perfect,” Union.] (Remini, 1966; Farber, 2003;
Skowronek, 1997).

It would seem, therefore, that South Carolina and other southern states as well
(especially Georgia) were ready to perceive themselves, despite being signatories to the
Constitution, ultimately as independent social entities, even as independent nations. Their
participation in the Union was only a matter of a state’s benefit in the current
circumstances; this participation could righteously-legally be rescinded as the state saw
fit when circumstances changed. We should note here that this southern self-perception
might have been all the more appealing to southerners due to a sense that not only did the
Tariff represent disrespect for the South’s economic well-being but it also implicitly
challenged the “civilizational” basis of that economic well-being, viz., slavery. Certainly,
from the beginning of the US sociality the North and the South developed culturally in
different ways according to their different economic forms of life, manufacturing in the
North, agrarian in the South. But the real-underlying economic-cultural difference
concerned the South’s heavy and always increasing entanglement with slave-labor to
ensure its economic growth and social structure. And this entanglement became all the
more profound as the efficiency of Eli Whitney’s cotton gin made cotton “king”
prompting southern plantation owners to devote more acreage to cotton the growth and
harvest of which required intense labor, that is, increased numbers of slaves (Pole, 1972;

Thus we see that both (latent) contradictions of the US sociality’s idea cited earlier are
in play in the nullification controversy and appear ready to push into consciousness
(becoming no longer latent and “forgotten”) to trouble the social reality. But will these contradictions really emerge into the US sociality’s consciousness? And will the ensuing trouble of the US sociality’s form of life be fundamental? Will the trouble be a disruption of the US sociality’s normalcy calling for leadership?

Andrew Jackson’s Prescient and Preemptive Tactics

Let’s look at things more closely. Andrew Jackson, even before the South Carolina legislature passed the Ordinance of Nullification, recognized the disruptive possibilities of the Nullies. He responded by putting the navy and army on alert in and around South Carolina and posted General Winfield Scott (who would gain fame later in the Mexican-American War) to Charleston. As Executive and commander-in-chief, Jackson “examined and prepared his military strength” hoping to deter South Carolina’s politicians from being radicalized by the Nullies. Jackson’s preemptive efforts, however, failed to prevent the passage of the Ordinance. He was certainly angered by this but did not reflexively exercise his military options; rather, he began to communicate openly, as if to signal and warn the Nullies, with Unionists in South Carolina assuring them that if things got out of hand the central-federal government would provide military means (actually in place just over the line in North Carolina) to help the Unionists deal with them. Jackson asserted, “Fear not, the Union will be preserved and treason and rebellion promptly put down, when and where it may show its monster head” (Remini, 1966; Skowronek, 1997; Garraty, 1994).

Jackson also established intelligence assets in South Carolina to keep him informed so that he could respond expeditiously to any emergency. Further, in his annual address to Congress he indicated that the Tariff of 1832 was not forever and would be reviewed and
changed if, “upon investigation,” the Tariff seemed an undue burden on any of the “branches of the national industry.” This appeared to be almost a conciliatory gesture designed to solicit South Carolinian’s patience and confidence that the federal government was sensitive to their (economic) concerns. In this address Jackson referred to the political-secessionist trouble in South Carolina, but did not mention the use of the military regarding it. He said that existing laws were sufficient to resolve the concerns. [Note: Very soon after this address Jackson asked Congress to give him explicit authority to enforce by any means, including military, the Tariff’s provisions in South Carolina: the Force Bill.] Finally, in a Proclamation directed particularly to the people of South Carolina (soon published nationally) Jackson averred that, “the laws of the United States must be executed. I have not discretionary power on the subject; my duty is emphatically pronounced in the Constitution. Those who told you that you might peaceably prevent their execution deceived you” (Remini, 1966).

The result of these tactics was the expression of strong support for Jackson’s position from around the nation. State legislatures, even those in the South, denounced the concept of nullification and expressed their loyalty to the Union. And nearly every member of Congress from all political parties and areas of the country voted to make the Force Bill the law of the land (Remini, 1966; Garraty, 1994).

South Carolina’s Reaction to Jackson’s Tactics and his Subsequent Response

Just a week or so after Jackson’s message to Congress, South Carolina’s legislature indicated a desire to work things out reasonably, that is, by using the existing protocols-rules of the USSSOA. In fact, the legislature had already set the implementation date of the Ordinance (passed November 1832) for February 1833; this seemed intended to allow
time for discussion-compromise-resolution with the federal government. Further, on the very day of Jackson’s Proclamation, the South Carolina legislature elected a governor who was much more moderate regarding nullification. The legislature also elected Calhoun to the Senate; he subsequently resigned as Vice President and began to search for a way to settle the controversy peaceably. Calhoun’s actual motive probably was to avoid any embarrassment to South Carolina from Jackson’s employment of the military to make the federal point. Nevertheless, Calhoun’s efforts clearly were in response to Jackson’s tactics.

Jackson naturally was pleased and welcomed South Carolina’s apparent capitulation. Accordingly, he kept a tight rein on the military and instructed General Scott to keep a low profile as arrangements were finalized. In addition Jackson quickly promoted the Compromise Tariff introduced by Henry Clay (the Great Compromiser) that initially offered the South significant immediate economic relief, although the final version provided real relief only after nine years. This Tariff easily passed in Congress with overwhelming support by southern representatives who wanted to get beyond the nullification controversy as soon as possible. On March 2, 1833 Jackson signed the Compromise Tariff. It should be mentioned here that, whatever Jackson might have thought about South Carolina’s turnabout, he still went ahead to sign the Force Bill the very same day he signed the Compromise Tariff. The South Carolina legislature for its part met on March 11 and repealed the Ordinance of Nullification, but, as a paradoxical face-saving gesture, also voted to nullify the Force Bill. For all intents and purposes, however, the nullification controversy was over (Garraty, 1994; Remini, 1966; Soifer & Hoffman, 1998; Farber, 2003).
Analysis

We are now in a position to consider the circumstances just described to see if they qualify as a structural disruption of the normalcy of the US sociality. We also can look at Jackson’s agency in these circumstances to determine if it is ordinary or not, that is, to see if it lies within the ordinary range of agency that the US sociality’s idea prescribes in the status quo or if it is some sort of creatively peculiar-extraordinary agency that could be construed as leaderly. As we’ll find out, the grammatical analysis of structure and agency reveals that the circumstances in question do not represent objectively a structural disruption of normalcy; thus there could not be any subjective-conscious realization of any such disruption. This means that in the nullification controversy there was no pretext-call for the emergence of a leader or for the creation of a leadership entity. Jackson’s agency could not be that of a leader; whatever he did was in the role of an able manager-conserver-presenter.

Structure

South Carolina’s Ordinance of Nullification was specific regarding the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832. It wasn’t intended as a doctrinal repudiation of the federal government’s authority to impose tariffs, but as a way to counteract a particular economic problem. The passage of the Ordinance, then, itself did not imply the will to secede, but was designed only to assert the state’s autonomy relative to the central government in certain economic matters. However, the legislature’s vow, under the Nullie’s radical influence, to secede should the central government not recognize the validity of the Ordinance, clearly exploited the fragility-contradictoriness of the federalist concept and exposed the US
sociality-threatening implications of a full implementation of the Ordinance. There were, then, two motives underlying the Ordinance, one economic and the other political. Which one was preeminent?

Of course, as we saw, Jackson’s responses to the passage of the Ordinance and the subsequent secessionist posturing were primarily directed to the political motive. The economic motive was acknowledged but did not account for Jackson’s passion. He was well aware of the economic impact of the Tariff of 1828 on South Carolina and in fact, in his mind at least, he had with the Tariff of 1832 done some work to lessen that impact and had shown a willingness (in the annual address to Congress) to make even more concessions. It would seem therefore that Jackson was actually sympathetic with the economic motive behind the Ordinance. But he would not tolerate any talk that threatened the Union; his discourse about the political motive behind the Ordinance was plain and ominous. Under the pressure of this discourse, then, South Carolina almost immediately began to back down from its nullification position, asking for discussion to reach resolution, electing a moderate governor, delaying full implementation of the Ordinance, and finally repealing the Ordinance. This capitulation did not solve South Carolina’s economic problems with the Tariffs, but actually marginalized those problems in the face of what had to be an unanticipated seriousness of Jackson’s response to the political-secessionist rhetoric.

It’s reasonable to believe that the vast majority of South Carolinians, even if they had a longstanding affection for the idea of being a sovereign sociality, and therefore logically were tolerant of the possibility of secession, were not in these circumstances truly-predominately motivated by the will to be politically sovereign, but rather by a fear
of economic (and by extension, civilizational) harm. If so, the secessionist rhetoric that prompted Jackson’s vigorous response was only evidence of the co-optation of South Carolina’s otherwise pedestrian economic anxiety by a radical fringe group, namely, the Nullies. Most South Carolinians might have seen the saber-rattling secessionist threat merely as a tool to get some economic advantage but were singularly naïve about the sensitivity and seriousness of the political implications of the use of such a tool. The same naivete could not be ascribed to the Nullies whose motivation was obviously and exclusively political, knowing full well what was at stake.

The President’s reaction to South Carolina’s Ordinance and the magnitude of national and Congressional support for his Union-preserving efforts against the politics of nullification, indicate the existence of a fragile federalism rooted in the contradiction of a state being able to assert its independence in the context of the Constitutional supremacy of the Union, a contradiction that the Nullies sought to exploit for their minority interests perhaps taking advantage of the majority’s naivete and their economic desperation. But we must conclude that with South Carolina’s speedy capitulation this contradiction remained unexpressed both as a logical dilemma of the US sociality’s idea and as a concrete problem. There was no actual existential rift but only the possibility of one. South Carolina never actually seceded nor, as we just explained, ever intended to do so. The nullification doctrine never captured the imagination of South Carolinians much less that of the nation as a whole (the tacit, unselfconscious approval of most persons-agents in the US sociality was not significantly challenged). This is not to say, however, that nullification as rooted in the federalist contradiction disappeared but only that it lapsed back into latency, ready to reemerge (as it does) later. In the end, however, the US
sociality's structural normalcy was not disrupted by any expressive or existential representation of the federalist contradiction in the circumstances of the nullification controversy; there was no in principle trouble that threatened the lastingness of the US sociality, its general form of life, distribution of power, etc. And, finally, we must observe that South Carolina’s capitulation left the latent moral contradiction (concerning slavery) pretty much intact. As South Carolina backed off from the political extremism regarding its rather dull economic concerns, scrutiny of the slave basis of its economic civilization was preempted. The nullification controversy, we must accept, never changed the US sociality’s agency-structure order and thus never disrupted the normalcy of the US sociality despite the continuing objective (though latent) presence of federalist and moral contradictions of its constitutive idea.

Agency

The foregoing analysis showed that the nullification controversy was not a disruption of normalcy such that the US sociality was objectively disabled and, subjectively, as far as anyone was concerned, was perceived to be incoherent for its proper good-telos. Again, this is not to say that in hindsight we cannot see the objective contradictory basis for a fundamental disruption of the US sociality’s normalcy, a disruption that later does in fact occur on just this basis of latent federalist and moral contradictions. It is only that a sociality can appear normal and, for all intents and purposes, be normal with respect to the present “fullness of time,” the point in the logic-reality dialectic of history from which agents participate in and tacitly approve of the social reality. This verisimilitude of normalcy means that as far as anyone is concerned or knows or is aware the sociality comprises an agency-structure orderedness that moves-courses-flows the sociality such
that it produces the good (Life, Liberty, Happiness) at a level somehow satisfactory to
most or enough agents-persons, especially those empowered-invested-willing to
undertake regular schemes of actions that vindicate-perpetuate-validate the status quo and
those who are endowed in the sociality with the ability-privilege to receive and enjoy the
characteristic good. So, since slaves didn’t count in this apparent normalcy, their non-
reception of the good isn’t figured into the efficiency of the sociality to produce the good
or with respect to how those who do benefit are negatively affected by the slaves’ non-
reception. The moral contradiction of slavery remains repressed-forgotten and doesn’t
suggest to anyone that the US sociality is both inefficient and malformed regarding the
production of its characteristic good. Also, as long as no actual secession occurs, the
federalist contradiction doesn’t interfere with the aggregate production of the good. As
long as the states remain in the Union the status quo appears proper and normal; no one is
concerned that the federalist contradiction may actually retard the full cooperation of the
states to become the strongest possible Union with regard to the production of its
characteristic good.

Admittedly, the nullification controversy brought the objective federalist contradiction
close to explicit consciousness (subjectivity). But before that happened, Jackson’s agency
casted South Carolina to back down unceremoniously, quickly returning to its original
position. Thus the federalist contradiction wasn’t fully discussed or recognized for what it
was, let alone resolved. And the slavery issue that embodied the moral contradiction
remained, as we said, in the realm of the forgotten-repressed. Let’s look, then, at
Jackson’s agency to assess its ordinariness.
First, Jackson deployed military forces, the navy and the army, not to attack-destroy South Carolina but to deter any radical political moves, in particular the passage and implementation of the Ordinance of Nullification. This deployment certainly was an ordinary prerogative of the President as Commander in Chief (Article II, 2, 1). It cannot be construed as anything really extraordinary-peculiar, at least not in the specialized sense of *deconstructing-transforming the status quo* into a vehicle for change or a leadership entity. Even if the use of the military by the President in this fashion was new (no President had used it like this before), and therefore in that sense was extraordinary or rare, it was simply the first unfolding of what was implicit in the ordinary powers of the Executive Branch afforded by the Constitution. The real question of interest is this: *Could* there be an ordinary use of the military if South Carolina had actually seceded? Any use of the military in this situation surely would involve destroying the agency-structure order responsible for the breached normalcy and later to support the formation of a new order. That would be seem to be a peculiar-extraordinary use of the military beyond what the US sociality’s idea seems to allow and would only be justifiable under a righteous call for leaderly agency. Indeed, what provisions are there in the US sociality’s idea, whether in the Constitution or Declaration of Independence, for making war on oneself, for risking and conducting civil war? In any event, how Jackson would have responded militarily to an actual secession, a circumstance that calls for leadership, is impossible to answer. As it was, his ordinary-normal use of the military turned out to be an excellent example of management that resulted in the preservation of the status quo not the transformation of it. The question of Jackson’s leadership with respect to his use of the
military, then, is moot. We can say that his restraint in its use was perfectly consistent with the discharge of his ordinary protector duties.

Jackson’s agency also consisted of a skillful employment of his ordinary-expected-constitutionally required annual address to Congress. This bully pulpit, along with that of the Proclamation, afforded Jackson the opportunity to apply various political pressures towards fulfilling his oath of office “to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States” (Article II, 1, 8). All this and whatever else he did on the side to converse with allies and enemies (e.g., quietly letting it be known that he could have a hundred thousand troops in South Carolina within two months) (Remini, 1966; Garraty, 1994) has to be construed as agency well within the normal-ordinary preservative-conservative-protective functions of the President that the idea of the US sociality articulates. Jackson did nothing, then, nor attempted to do anything, much to his credit, as an actual leader (which was technically impossible). True, he did push Executive prerogatives somewhat and his agency effectively cancelled a political threat that if carried out would have been a veritable disruption of the US sociality’s normality. But the political threat was not serious, as we saw, and collapsed rather easily under what must be seen as Jackson’s able management of the controversy using the extant-ordinary means at the disposal of the Executive Branch to carry out his constitutionally prescribed duties to preserve the Union and to direct the federal government to protect the states “against domestic violence” (Article IV, 4).

Summary

It is clear that while Jackson’s agency in the nullification controversy was laudable, it could not in principle be leaderly agency because the conditions for the possibility of
leadership were lacking. Perhaps Jackson knew this as his explicit and manifest intention was simply to preserve the status quo—the US sociality under the Constitution as it was presently interpreted-enacted. Accordingly, he did not attempt to destroy the existing agency-structure order with the military or any other means. He did not advance a critique of the US sociality’s idea with reference to its latent contradictions; thus did not propose a blueprint for the transformation-reconstruction of the sociality to achieve a new normal (that assimilated the resolution of the contradictions) oriented toward a new (or rehabilitated) telos-good. Rather, and quite admirably, his use of the military, rhetoric, and whatever political influence and federal power he had was balanced and moderate, commensurate to the circumstances of the nullification controversy. This controversy was indeed a crisis, but not a radical one calling for leadership. It was a crisis calling for masterful management (Kotter, 1990; Skowronek, 1997).

Before turning to our other example, let me comment on some technical results of the foregoing, namely that the grammatical analysis of a particular sociality has determined that it is not qualified by leadership and thus is ruled out as a possible object of empirical/CLS leadership research (quantitative or qualitative). There would be no point in studying the US sociality regarding the Nullification Controversy for the purpose of gaining knowledge of the nature of leadership. This isn’t to say that a person-agent like Andrew Jackson who excels in a management role would not be a good leader if the transcendental conditions for leadership obtained. It means only that there can be no person-agent who acts as a leader in an unqualified sociality. Nor are we implying here that a sociality that doesn’t meet criteria for a disruption of normalcy might not change to do so and thus fulfill the necessary and sufficient conditions that call for leadership. The
point is only that as a matter of fact the Grammar has shown that a sociality does not meet those conditions and so technically doesn't belong in the domain of leadership reality.

The results, then, of the Grammar precisely differentiate leadership from anything else, effectively providing a philosophical-metaphysical conceptual ground that rigorously delimits-defines the domain of CLS. This ground does not change CLS as such; it offers no comment on the integrity of any of the various empirical, hermeneutical, quantitative, and qualitative approaches employed by CLS researchers. The Grammar, since it is concerned with the real depth of leadership, leaves those (relatively) superficial approaches intact but legitimizes them insofar as it delivers to the CLS researcher a proper leadership object and saves CLS some time and definitional confusion by excluding objects that might seem like leadership but really aren’t.

Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War

We are now concerned to follow the progress of the American social reality into the year 1861 in terms especially of the federalist and moral contradictions-tensions in the US sociality’s idea. The analysis will attempt to reveal how the logic-reality dialectic of history leads to what has to be described as an untenable deformation of the US sociality under the pressure of circumstances wrought by these unresolved contradictions in America’s ideational-spiritual basis. This deformation evolved into an unbridgeable cultural-civilizational difference between the North and the South. In this circumstance, the US sociality’s lastingness, its essential orderedness and identity were increasingly incapacitated, cancelled. Everything about itself was at stake; its agents became more and more anxious and self-conscious and compromised in their abilities to function
efficiently-confidently for some general good-purpose. Concretely, the deformation was expressed in the secession of the South, an undeniable disruption of the US sociality’s normalcy, a situation that objectively cried out for leadership. As we know, it was upon Abraham Lincoln, certainly against his will, that this call was imposed (Sandburg, 1970; Farber, 2003; Lincoln, 1991; Skowronek, 1997). But did he respond as a leader? That is, did he act in the leadership-qualified sociality to influence things in the extraordinary-peculiar way that (grammatically) distinguishes a leader from any other actor? Before we answer these questions, however, let’s look at the emergence-formation of the US sociality in terms of the federalist and moral contradictions in its idea to see how the disruption of its normalcy is finally reached.

The Federalist Question

Although even before the US sociality’s formal (1776) beginning there were appreciable differences between the North and the South, by 1815 or so the US sociality was characterized by a sense of unity and “good feelings.” The social reality was sustained-validated by the tacitly approving participation of most of its agents-persons who, as it seemed, had finally come to identify themselves as Americans. The US sociality had achieved a more or less stable-fixed order, a normalcy that appeared in line with the unifying (federalist) aspect of its idea (Adams, 1967; Pole, 1972; Farber, 2003; Garraty, 1994).

Of course, there were significant difficulties with the federalist concept before 1815. In the first few years there was the problem, as we described, of establishing a workable unity, a way to achieve an indissoluble Union that balanced a substantive central power with states’ sovereignties and the rights of the people. A viable federalist concept, after
the false start of the Articles of Confederation, presumably was finally generated through the Constitution’s ratification process and elegantly argued for in *The Federalist* (Hamilton et al., 2003).

However, for all the arguments and signatures (of the states on the original 1791 document) the federalist concept was still not unambiguously interpreted. We have only to look at the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798, written by two illustrious Founding Fathers, that asserted a state’s right to judge for itself the constitutionality of any law and to cancel or nullify that law as it (its people) saw fit. These Resolutions never were applied and were quickly modified, forestalling the “federalist question” for awhile. But they exposed an unresolved tension, a contradiction in the US sociality’s idea concerning its unifying structure. This contradiction, then, insofar as it wasn’t really addressed, remained latent-repressed—“forgotten.” The logical possibility of a legally defensible secession (tantamount to a disruption of the US sociality’s normalcy especially in terms of its lastingness) was revealed for a moment even if no one yet recognized secession as existentially feasible. Certainly no one that “mattered” (no one truly influential person-agent or large group) seriously entertained secession as a real option though it remained objectively possible in the latent federalist contradiction (Pole, 1972; Farber, 2003; Soifer & Hoffman, 1998; Garraty, 1994).

There were other events relevant to the troubles with federalism prior to 1815. The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 was a vigorous, sometimes violent, defiance by western Pennsylvania farmers of the central government that even included a call for secession. George Washington decisively put down this defiance asserting in an apparently clear and unequivocal way the determination and legitimacy of the central government’s
power-authority to enforce-preserve the Union as the Constitution provides. But, as we just said, not four years later this legitimacy was openly questioned. And in 1804 Thomas Pickering of Massachusetts headed a secessionist movement of some states in the northeast. These states were upset over their loss of national influence; Pickering promoted the idea of a Northeastern confederacy. This effort failed with New York’s non-participation, but the federalist question, the federalist contradiction, again was plainly troubling the USSSOA. It was not yet seriously imposing itself on the burgeoning American social reality, but still somehow was present as a latent spiritual pathology that the circumstances of history will eventually allow to operate openly and forcefully, as in the Nullification Controversy of 1832 that we discussed earlier. The circumstances, however, that finally will devolve into the ultimate federalist crisis are bound up with the misfortunes associated with the moral contradiction in the US sociality’s idea, to which we now turn (Garraty, 1994; Farber, 2003; Jordan, 2002; Skowronek, 1997).

Slavery: the Moral Contradiction

The North-South sectional differences that will lead to a critical divisiveness in the US sociality are mostly a function of slavery. The North and the South can be less inflammatorily distinguished in terms of the relative effects of the Industrial Revolution; higher literacy rates, greater diversity, the rise of urban centers and seaports in the North and the decline of same in the South; the almost strictly entrepreneurial elitism of the North compared with the plantation aristocracy of the South, etc. But, after all, it is impossible that these prosaic economic-political-sociological differences really can be explained by anything else than the South’s profound, pervasive, and ever-increasing entanglement with slavery and the North’s early divestment in that “peculiar institution.”
For awhile, perhaps until about 1820, the moral contradiction between slavery and the assertion of universal human rights and equality in the Declaration of Independence was not troubling either for its (il)logic or moral repugnance. There were, of course, some people in the new social reality keenly aware of the problem; there were abolitionists and anti-slavery societies from the very beginning. But in general most agents-persons of the US sociality tolerated, even approved, and in any case were not very troubled by slavery. Accordingly, slavery persisted and became a fixture, a “normalcy” in the overall logic-dialectic of the US sociality, especially in the South after the Ordinance of 1787. To be sure, there were discussions, even high profile debates in Congress, of the slavery question. And the level of discourse was sometimes more than just wrangling about the property rights of slaveholders and whether or not to allow slavery in new territories. There also were some bona fide moral criticisms, averring that slavery was sinful and evil. But no one simply said that slavery was logically incompatible with the Declaration of Independence and the moral intent of the Constitution. We could possibly mention the case of William Garrison (1831), editor of *The Liberator*, who was so morally offended by slavery and the Constitution’s spineless allowance of it that he publicly burned a copy of the Constitution and advocated for the secession of the slave-less North from the Union, asserting that it was intolerable to be part of a nation that countenanced slavery even if it didn’t really endorse it. This was close to an explicit realization of the moral contradiction and how it can be combined with the federalist question to produce a radical crisis. But Garrison’s actions did not really amount to a sustained critical look at the US sociality’s idea, but rather represented a visceral reaction to slavery and a proposal not to *resolve* the contradictions so that the sociality can right itself and move
forward, but simply to *dissolve* the sociality and to form another social reality altogether. Garrison’s vehemence merely inspired southern apologists for slavery to defend it as biblically supported and, absurdly, in the best interests of the slaves (obviously regarded as racially inferior to whites) under the “care” of their masters. Garrison’s secessionist effort, of course, went nowhere, but did offer a glimpse into the ideational-spiritual mess (Garraty, 1994; Skowronek, 1997; Farber, 2003).

This, then, is the ideational-spiritual situation. On the one hand, the Declaration of Independence was clear about the equal dignity of each person (“all men”). Nothing is said that differentiates slaves, Negroes, women, or anyone else from “all men.” The existence of slavery, then, is plainly incoherent with the Declaration. Many knew this but were not influential in the circumstances. [Note: Of course, the status-treatment of other-than-caucasian races and women in the US sociality was similarly contradictory of the Declaration and the moral intent of the Constitution. But racial and gender issues were still only latent contradictions by 1861. How they work out in the emergence of the “new normalcy” of the US sociality after the Civil War is beyond the scope of this essay.]

On the other hand, the authors of the Constitution, without substantive moral deliberation, acknowledged slavery as a “given” but referred to it elliptically (“person held to service or labor”). The moral issue was thus skirted, effectively repressed, dissembled, covered-up, forgotten for an overriding pragmatic motive, namely, to convince the South to endorse the Union structured by the Constitution. So, even if the language of the Constitution acknowledged the reality of slavery, there was no straightforward affirmation or denial of it, no recommendation or condemnation. This is the tension in the US sociality’s idea, the incoherence, the moral double-speak, the moral
contradiction. Most of the Founders knew that slavery was wrong, incoherent with the spiritual principles of the new social reality. But they let it go on anyway (Farber, 2003; Pole, 1972; Skowronek, 1997).

Now, this problematic ideational situation played out existentially with no appreciable resistance or reaction except a series of political “solutions” to disputes over the extension of slavery in new states and territories. The earliest such solution was the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 (not really a response to a dispute but as a matter of organization), followed by the Missouri Compromise of 1820 (a response to the first real dispute), the Wilmot Proviso (1846), the Compromise of 1850, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854). Most of these measures involved some strained discussion of the moral status of slavery under the ever-increasing pressure of the moral contradiction. But none resulted in a definitive resolution of the contradiction. These political “solutions” were only ad hoc responses to try to assuage the proponents of the two sides of the contradiction (pro- and anti-slave). These ad hoc responses, these compromises, effectively perpetuated and deepened the civilizational-cultural-political-economic differences between North and South as well as literally divided the country in two. By 1854, then, the US sociality was not one but two forms of life, nearly independent of each other. Not reckoning with the moral contradiction of slavery had delivered the US sociality to an impasse, a literal self-contradiction. But the worst was yet to come.

Someone in 1850 or so could have realized that there was already a disruption of the US sociality’s normalcy. It would be enough to notice that the US sociality’s form of life was no longer unitary; existentially there were two social realities when normally there was supposed to be one. Naturally, there were some who recognized the increasing
division of the nation and who worried about it. And many people saw that opposing positions on slavery defined this division. Yet persons-agents of the US sociality were somehow or another “satisfied” with the rather crude compromises regarding slavery. Northern anti-slavery sentiments were indeed significant. But they were not yet crystallized in consciousness to the point of prompting a politically (existentially) credible expression of an intention to do anything about it such that the South would feel threatened, certainly not to the point of secession. So, the South’s entanglement with slavery simply continued. But with events like the publication of *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* (1852), violence in “bleeding Kansas” (1856), the Dred Scott decision (1857), and the hanging of prominent abolitionist John Brown following his raid of Harper’s Ferry (1859), northern anti-slavery sentiment became hardened and gained a wider public. This more focused-articulate position became represented politically in the emerging Republican Party. And, even though the Republican Party did not strictly embrace abolitionism, it became known in the South as the anti-slavery party. In fact, the first Republican presidential candidate, John C. Fremont, almost won the election in 1856 with exclusively northern support on an anti-slavery platform, a clear indication of the US sociality’s civilizational bifurcation in terms of the moral contradiction in its idea (Pole, 1972; Soifer & Hoffman, 1998; Garraty, 1994; Farber, 2003).

Democrat James Buchanan, with strong southern support, won the presidential election in 1856. For a variety of reasons, however, such as the economic downturn of 1857 that northern business interests blamed on Democratic policies, Republicans gained some advantage for the 1860 presidency. [Note: The South weathered this economic crisis much better than the North, giving the South confidence in its ability to exist.
independently on its cotton exports and illustrating in another way the North-South
division.] The Republican candidate was Abraham Lincoln, who had been ably if not
fairly characterized by Steven Douglas as an abolitionist, when Lincoln’s actual position
merely limited slavery to where it already existed. Nevertheless, for southerners deeply
disturbed by the Harpers Ferry incident, concluding from it that John Brown was the
harbinger of northern abolitionist attempts to incite slave rebellion, and by the increasing
vehemence of anti-slavery sentiment in the North as well as by the apparent strength of a
political party (Republican) that had put forth an ostensibly abolitionist presidential
candidate, the 1860 election was momentous. Southerners expressed an increasingly
well-founded concern that the logic-reality dialectic of the US sociality was leading to the
end of their form of life insofar as it was predicated on slavery. If Lincoln was elected,
therefore, the options for the South seemed limited to capitulation to the loss of that form
of life or leaving the Union (Farber, 2003; Sandburg, 1970).

Secession

One month after Lincoln’s election in November 1860 (but he was not inaugurated
until March 1861) seven southern states seceded. These states in February 1861 formed
the Confederacy (representing another sociality besides the US sociality) with Jefferson
Davis as its president and a draft of a new constitution (the idea of the Confederate States
sociality). Last minute compromises failed to stop the secession process; the efforts of
President Buchanan were singularly ineffective. In fact, Buchanan was in the thrall of the
federalist contradiction: He held both that secession was unconstitutional but that it was
also unconstitutional for the central-federal government to do anything about it. The
issues, therefore, were whether or not anything would or should be done about the
secessions and what justifications for action or inaction could be advanced. In any event, the secessions were patent culminations of the intersection of the federalist and moral contradictions that had been troubling the US sociality latently from the beginning. It was at this point in time that circumstances conspired to provoke southerners to exploit the ambiguities of the extant concept of the state-federal relationship as a tool to preserve their form of life that embodied one horn of the slavery dichotomy (Sandburg, 1970; Farber, 2003; Garraty, 1994).

Figure 10: The bifurcation produced by the secessions from the original US sociality into the CS sociality and ?.

Analysis

It seems almost too obvious to mention that the secession of the South amounted to a disruption of the US sociality’s normalcy. Everything that goes into a normal social reality was abridged-cancelled by the secessions. Most importantly, normalcy as having one superintendent idea governing the agency-structure order of the Union was exploded by the South’s adoption of its own idea, embodied in a constitution modeled on that of the US sociality but with various modifications to legitimize explicitly the southern form of life, including of course its slave basis. This meant that the US sociality no longer had
a common spiritual-creative center projecting a unifying purpose-good-telos. Its internal and external relationships were changed fundamentally. It ceased to exist as a self-regulating, self-organizing, self-sustaining social reality with a common set of rules/laws that prescribe and proscribe actions related to moving-flowing-coursing the sociality toward a proper good. And the anxious self-consciousness of persons-agents in the US sociality was rampant. No one, it appeared, was able to proceed with a tacit unselfconscious approval of the status quo any longer. This situation, then, represented circumstances that cried out for leadership. The US sociality’s very existence was at stake unless something was done to address this disruption of normalcy.

Now, a proponent of the seceding South might think that with the formation of the Confederacy the US sociality’s normalcy was moot. The Confederacy’s existence implied the non-existence of the US sociality. What was left of the old Union was something altogether different: The North by itself wasn’t and could not be the same US sociality (see figure above). There simply was no US sociality any more and therefore no normalcy that could be breached and thus no call for action to restore it. The South could justifiably implore, “Let us go in peace!”

But there were many Unionists in the South as well as the vast majority of Northerners who did not accept the legitimacy of the secession; they rejected the idea that the Union was really dissolved, that the South simply could walk away on the grounds that it claimed (viz., the constitutional legality of secession based on an absolutist interpretation of states’ rights-sovereignty and, as provided for in the Declaration of Independence, the inalienable right of free and independent states to abolish relations with a government that is destructive of the ends-good of the persons-agents of those
states and to form another government, that is, the right of revolution. So, did the US sociality founded in 1776 still exist after the South seceded? It is, after all, from the Grammar’s viewpoint, only if there is a breached normalcy of a sociality that leadership with respect to that sociality can be relevant, either to restore the normalcy (that, however, is never just a simple return to the status quo), or to establish a new normalcy that is a transfiguration of the old normalcy. But if the old normalcy simply doesn’t exist anymore because the sociality to which it applied has been destroyed, there is no pertinence of leadership regarding that old normalcy. If this is true, an agent of the North would have no grounds as a leader to employ force to cancel the secession of the South. Lincoln, then, technically would be ruled out as a leader and instead, given his actions towards the South, must be seen as nothing less than a tyrant.

*The Union Forever*

Many in the North, including President Buchanan, were at a loss in the face of the southern revolt. They could not think beyond the federalist and moral contradictions; nor could they refute the constitutional theories of Davis and Calhoun and others’ invocation of the right to revolt in the Declaration of Independence used to justify the secession. The South might as well be left to go its independent way. This was indeed Buchanan’s position, or lack of position, as he did nothing and even allowed federal property in the South to be taken over with the exception of three forts. Buchanan left office before his ineptness (or we should say, his singular inability to lead, to answer the call to influence the disrupted sociality in a peculiar-extraordinary way predicated on a critique of the US sociality’s idea in terms especially of the federalist and moral contradictions) could be
applied to deal with the South’s military aggression against one of these forts, Fort Sumter.

It should be no surprise, however, that in these extreme circumstances, already characterized as a disruption of normalcy, current-extant-ordinary protocols-responses-processes-thinking were ineffective in principle. A disruption of normalcy implies that the ordinary-normal has been compromised-denatured; that the sociality is fundamentally disabled. Responding effectively to this disruption with the resources that caused it in the first place must be self-defeating. An effective response must by definition transcend the terms of the disruption, must represent a peculiar-extraordinary influence that somehow is beyond but still engaged with the malaise. But, getting back to the South’s contention that the US sociality no longer existed, all this would be moot if it was “legal” for the South to secede and thus was entitled to be left alone. Did, ironically, the idea of the US sociality (the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence) provide for the South’s secession and thus cancel the possibility of legally acting to do anything about it? Did the US sociality’s idea, that is, provide for the US sociality’s self-destruction under certain conditions? Perhaps. But then anyone arguing that the South’s secession was illegal-unconstitutional would have to show that those conditions did not obtain.

Lincoln

The call for leadership in the circumstances of the South’s secession implies that the sociality in question had been violated fundamentally. But if the secession is an allowable action in that sociality, the result, even if paradoxical, cannot be legally opposed. This issue, therefore, had to be settled to validate the emergence of leaderly agency. If the secession was legal according to the US sociality’s idea, the South would have to be let
go; not to do so would not be leaderly but no better than what the English monarch did to try to hold on to the revolting American colonies. But who would make the case against secession?

Abraham Lincoln [who, we must recognize, had been involuntarily thrust into this position by circumstances: “Events have controlled me.”] used his first Inaugural Address to advance several arguments for the illegality of secession, at least in the circumstances at hand. These arguments in effect amounted to a critique of the US sociality’s idea with respect to the ambiguity-contradictoriness of the federalist concept. First, Lincoln refused even to conceive of the possibility of letting the South go; he would not countenance the present unilaterally enacted secession in any way. “We cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them.” Whatever else may happen, it was unthinkable that the South could simply walk away without further ado. The Constitution created a nation, a unifying structure that bound all the people into one people, an indissoluble Union that logically implied the impossibility of unilateral secession for those who, apparently in good faith, signed on. The Union was first and even “much older than the Constitution,” and “formed in fact” by the Articles of Confederation in 1774, reaffirmed in 1776 by the Declaration of Independence, and openly-explicitly ratified by the Constitution’s signatories. To secede unilaterally, therefore, was logically-morally-spiritually inconsistent with the US sociality’s idea and therefore had no constitutional legitimacy (Lincoln, 1991; Sandburg, 1970; Farber, 2003; Skowronek, 1997).

Second, Lincoln attempted to assuage southern concerns about slavery and about the federal government’s intentions. “There needs to be no bloodshed or violence; and there
shall be none, unless it be forced upon the national authority.” His hope plainly was that the seceded states might reconsider and return. To this end, he endorsed a constitutional amendment that would prevent the federal government from interfering with slavery where it already existed. And he eloquently appealed for reconciliation: “We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection.” The South, therefore, could not claim as grounds for secession any intransigence of the federal government regarding the status of slavery and thus its form of life. [Note: As it turned out, the non-interference amendment eventually failed, but not before the South had already denounced Lincoln’s conciliatory attempts.] (Farber, 2003; Lincoln, 1991).

Third, Lincoln repudiated the South’s claims of legitimacy regarding its secession based on Davis’ and Calhoun’s “compact” theories of the Union and the “revolutionary” appeal to the Declaration of Independence. Davis and Calhoun maintained the absolute right-sovereignty of states to govern their own affairs, to assert their sovereignty as they saw fit, even if it meant the disruption-dissolution of the Union. The Union, they held, was in fact only a tentative “compact” between fundamentally independent states that could be dissolved whenever the terms of the compact (expressed in the Constitution that allowed slavery) had been breached. The election of the “abolitionist” Lincoln, as well as the refusal of the North to return fugitive slaves, then, appeared to southerners to be such a breach. But Lincoln categorically rejected the compact theory, instead characterizing the signing of the Constitution as more like a binding contract that cannot be dissolved except with the consent of all parties, something that the South obviously did not seek. Further, Lincoln argued that the states, including southern states, “expressly plighted and
engaged that it [the Union] should be perpetual,” (italics mine) and not just a temporary arrangement. The South’s unilateral secession, then, was illegal-unconstitutional and contrary to the southern states’ avowed intentions upon joining the Union. Accordingly, the arguments of Davis and Calhoun must be seen as specious. Finally, Lincoln, with respect to the South’s attempt to invoke the Declaration of Independence as justification for revolution, admitted that, if “any clearly written constitutional right” of the South (a putative minority) had been abridged by the North (the putative majority), construing the secessions as acts of revolution might be justified. But no such right was in play in the circumstances. At most there was a disagreement about how to interpret constitutional language concerning slavery. But with regard to this the federal government and Lincoln himself were clearly open to working things out. In addition, Lincoln was even willing to take steps to enforce northern compliance with the Fugitive Slave Act. “Plainly,” therefore, “the central idea of [this] secession, is the essence of anarchy,” had no legal-moral justification, in terms of the US sociality’s idea, as an act of revolution, and thus could not be allowed or recognized. In effect the South’s actions could be characterized neither as secession nor revolution but only as an illegal rebellion. The US sociality still existed, then, despite the radical nature of the current trouble (Lincoln, 1991; Farber, 2003; Garraty, 1994; Skowronek, 1997).

The Call for Leadership

Lincoln’s deconstruction of the South’s secession amounted to a resolution of the federalist contradiction. Henceforth, the federal-states relationship was clarified at least regarding secession and sovereignty. The federal government had the only true sovereignty and the Constitution was supreme when it came to the priority and
preservation of the Union. In any event, what concerns us here is that the repudiation of the secession established the continuing existence of the US sociality despite the present confusion. There still existed, that is, a sociality whose normalcy had been disrupted, a situation that in principle could not be addressed by ordinary (managerial) agency. (We have already seen with Buchanan the impotence of ordinary-extant thinking in these radical circumstances.) The stage, therefore, is set for the propriety of the emergence of leaderly agency. But did a leader emerge?

Even at this point Lincoln could have let the South go. But he could not have done so without abdicating the destiny to lead that he seemed to impose on himself. Whether he liked it or not, Lincoln had by his Inaugural Address made his own bed. He had shown that there was a call, a crying need for leadership to counter an illegal and potentially catastrophic rebellion. He had decisively argued that the US sociality was an abiding social reality that met criteria for a disruption of normalcy and that therefore required extraordinary-peculiar (that is, leaderly) action to deal with it. Unlike Buchanan, Lincoln could see the way to resolve the federalist contradiction in the circumstances and thus put himself squarely in the middle of a fundamental crisis of the American social reality. Buchanan, to be generous, simply couldn’t parse the secessions in terms of the US sociality’s idea and so forfeited the arguments advanced by southern intellectuals like Calhoun that exploited the federalist contradiction. Under Buchanan one was unable to decide if the US sociality did or did not still exist after the secessions; thus preempted was even a question concerning the propriety of leadership. But under Lincoln the matter was clear: The circumstances called for leadership. But did they really?
We know that the South’s hostility towards Lincoln’s Inaugural Address (it was received as a “war message”) and the eventual firing on Fort Sumter pretty much made it impossible to avoid war. Yet, what if the South had responded favorably to Lincoln’s conciliatory tone? After all, Lincoln’s publicly stated priority regarding the secessions was to preserve the Union; the slavery issue to him was nearly irrelevant and certainly secondary regardless of what he thought about it privately. Lincoln was willing to allow slavery to continue where it already existed and supported a constitutional amendment restricting federal interference with it. Lincoln reiterated this sentiment as late as 1862 as war raged: “My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery” (Lincoln, 1991). In this scenario, then, as southern states rescinded secession and returned to the Union, the status quo would be restored, although with added clarity regarding the meaning of federalism. Technically-legally, of course, on Lincoln’s own analysis secession and revolution would still be possible if they were undertaken properly: By mutual consent of all parties in the former, and when there was a substantial violation of a written constitutional right in the latter.

But would a positive response to Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address from the South have cancelled Lincoln’s leaderly agency? The secessions, and even the formation of the Confederacy, would have not been much more than formalities, logical expressions-representations of disruption (something like South Carolina’s 1832 Ordinance of Nullification) without substantial concrete existential representation: Not a shot had been fired; nothing much had actually been done to push the logical disruption into graphic reality. Lincoln would then have become just a little more than what Andrew Jackson had been in the Nullification Controversy, viz., an able, perhaps extraordinary manager, but
definitely not a leader. The US sociality would continue to suffer from the moral
ccontradiction of slavery but would have benefited from a clarified federalist concept,
although it’s hard to tell what might have happened if slavery had eventually caused the
North and South to separate by mutual agreement—a possibility Lincoln himself
legitimates as constitutional. Anyway, at most Lincoln could not have emerged as a “full-
blown” leader, though we might consider that his responses to the secessions in the form
of a critique of the federalist concept, refutation of specious theories of the Union,
intransigence regarding the legitimacy of the present secessions, and characterization of
the situation as a disruption of an inviolably unified sociality, qualified his actions and
discourse as leaderly. But they would be leaderly only in anticipation of the technically-
grammatically real thing that can emerge only in the existentially represented disruption
of normalcy. If the South had responded favorably to Lincoln’s Inaugural overtures,
therefore, his actions (essentially all speech-acts) would not actually have been anything
out of the ordinary or beyond what was allowed by the US sociality’s idea. In a way,
Lincoln’s Inaugural discourse laid the groundwork both for his emergence as a leader (if
the South rejected that discourse) and for his avoiding the need for leadership (if the
South responded favorably to that discourse). From the Grammar’s perspective, then, had
the South responded favorably to his Inaugural Address, Lincoln-in-the-secessionist-
crisis-of -1861 would not be a proper object of leadership study, except perhaps as a case
of “what might have been.” As Lincoln himself put it: “If the people across the river had
behaved themselves, I could not have done what I have.” (Skowronek, 1997; Lincoln,
Technically the Real Thing

The grammatical analysis thus far has revealed that Lincoln cannot be a leader in the full sense if the sociality’s disruption is only logically-formally represented. This is so because the conditions for the possibility of leadership include the existential representation of a disruption of normalcy. Otherwise, there is no real context for leaderly agency.

But the South’s denunciation of Lincoln’s Inaugural Address as insolent, insincere, and more or less a declaration of war (a “war message”), culminating in the firing on Fort Sumter, pushed the disruption brazenly into existence. The call for leadership was no longer an anticipation, a logical possibility, but was technically in place. “The fatal step was taken.” In the face of the South’s hostility, Abraham Lincoln realized that the two economic and social systems, the two forms of life, North and South, both unfortunately supported by the same Constitution, could not do otherwise than fight to the death. The Union was truly a house divided and as such could not stand: It “will become all one thing, or all another.” Accordingly, he acted quickly and unilaterally (without Congressional approval as required constitutionally) to expand the army, impose a naval blockade, transfer Treasury funds to a private firm to pay for war preparations, suspend habeas corpus (resulting in the arrest of thousands of citizens without probable cause and trying civilians via military tribunals), close the mail to “disloyal” publications, and require army officers to renew their oaths of allegiance to the US sociality. All these actions were to one degree or another constitutionally suspect and in any case were unprecedented and transcended ordinarily allowed prerogatives of the Executive. Andrew Jackson, as bold as he was, never acted so boldly in the Nullification Controversy (nor
should he have, as we earlier observed). Thus, even if Lincoln did eventually secure Congressional approval for most of his actions, they must be seen as extraordinary-peculiar. But were they leaderly? Lincoln, after all, simply acted, considering what he did “partial, and temporary departures” that were necessary and legal one way or another even if not “exactly” constitutional. But what made these actions leaderly (Farber, 2003; Skowronek, 1997; Garraty, 1994; Soifer & Hoffman, 1998; Sandburg, 1970; Lincoln, 1991)?

To answer, we must inquire into what were Lincoln’s intentions in acting as he did. Obviously he wanted to save the Union that, now that the South had brought the disruption to existential representation, was at grave risk of real dissolution-destruction. But surely the Union emerging from any victory over the South could not be just the same Union that existed before? Simplistically, Lincoln of course desired that the North should prevail, that the US sociality should not perish, that the Constitution, the rule of law, should be defended and reaffirmed somehow over against this illegal rebellion. Lincoln, then, relying probably a lot on his role of Commander-in-Chief, considered himself to have broad authority to act in these conditions of actual war beyond the rule of law (what was strictly constitutional) precisely and paradoxically to preserve the social reality founded on that same rule of law. Accordingly, Lincoln acted unilaterally all through the war, not only in the early days; this “dictatorship,” as some called it, was actually an opportunistic, expeditious use of “the independent powers and prerogatives of his office…in terms largely unanticipated by preconceptions of political alternatives.” This, again, reaffirms Lincoln’s actions as extraordinary-peculiar. But still we must ask: Was his agency leaderly (Farber, 2003; Skowronek, 1997)?
The Grammar requires that, in order to be leaderly, agency, even if extraordinary, must be designed to influence the disrupted sociality so as to prepare it for a “new” normalcy. In this case, the new normalcy came into view with the revision of the sociality’s idea already critiqued by Lincoln regarding federalism. At stake was the Union itself, the overall agency-structure framework that provided opportunities (liberty) to formal members (the people) to pursue the proper goods-telei of the US sociality, namely, life and happiness. We assume, therefore, that Lincoln’s intended “vision” of the new normal US sociality that will be reconstructed out of the deconstruction resulting from the war included reformed state governments based on constitutions rewritten so as to preclude the possibility of unilateral secession, thereby affirming the supremacy of the Constitution and the indissolubility of the Union. [Note: This putatively “new” normalcy actually was, as Lincoln saw it, a reassertion of the “old” founding principles. More about this later.] Lincoln’s extraordinary war-faring actions, then, insofar as they were guided by this revision of the US sociality’s normalcy, have to be seen as leaderly in a strict grammatical sense.

*The Leadership Entity*

Eventually it had to dawn on Lincoln that the Confederacy would never be defeated unless it was absolutely annihilated or its form of life was decisively deconstructed (taken apart and debilitated but not utterly destroyed). But absolute annihilation would have cancelled Lincoln’s intention to preserve the US sociality at least insofar as “we are friends not enemies” and that the North and South, despite everything were still fundamentally one nation, one people and “will yet swell the chorus of the Union when again touched… by the better angels of our nature.” To annihilate the South, therefore,
would cancel Lincoln’s leaderly actions designed necessarily (grammatically) to forge a
new normalcy for the whole US sociality, North and South. So, the leaderly tactic had to
be a decisive deconstruction of the South’s form of life, a razing of enough, but not all, of
its civilizational infrastructure such that a “new” reconstructed Union could emerge
without the fatalities of the old, one of which, as we know, was the misguided notion of
absolute state sovereignty implying the “right” of unilateral secession; the other one
being slavery that at this point was not yet fully in play. Lincoln employed his war-
making agency, then, as a kind of battering ram, perhaps a bit extremely in some
instances (cf. Sherman’s “total war”), to break apart the South’s institutional-
civilizational framework so as to “prepare the ground” or establish a fluid workability
thereby creating a leadership entity, a substratum, for building a new framework
reflecting the revision of the US sociality’s idea. [Note: We must see that logically
everything about Lincoln’s critique of the federalist concept, including the refutations of
compact theories of the Union, states’ rights absolutism, and the legality of unilateral
secession, applied to the North as much as to the South. The implementation of the new
normalcy of the US sociality thus shouldn’t and really couldn’t single out the South. The
North also was subject to reformation and deconstruction in certain ways to provide for
the installation of the new normalcy of a more integrated Union that would overcome the
bifurcation of the past. The creation of the leadership entity, through Lincoln’s military
and executive agency, then, included the North and South as essential and “equal”
components. The agency-structure order of the whole US sociality was “softened” in the
heat of Lincoln’s leaderly agency. Lincoln, consistent with this equality, was desirous of
a quick, non-humiliating reconciliation with the South and a prompt beginning to a
gradual, respectful, and realistic reconstruction of the new agency-structure order, a task he projected to take at least 35 years! But he was opposed by many in the North (mainly the Radical Republicans) who wanted to punish the South severely, imposing onerous burdens on ex-rebels to prove themselves loyal, and forcing radical civilizational changes almost immediately. Lincoln rightly saw this as counterproductive and unnecessarily destructive and serving only to embitter the South and perpetuate sectional differences that ironically the War was intended to overcome.]

Now, as the war proceeded one year Lincoln realized that it would not be enough to apply military force to render the South (hence the US sociality) amenable to reconstruction. Without addressing the root cause, that is, of the South’s desire to secede, namely slavery, the moral contradiction would continue to promote the cultural-civilizational bifurcation of the US sociality that eventually would either reappear in another outright rebellion/civil war or lead to a mutually agreed upon separation of North and South. These alternatives were unacceptable to Lincoln; he was absolutely uninterested in prosecuting a war to deliver the American social reality back to the status quo that must now be seen as a malformed or deformed sociality. Rather, he desired a Union “forever worth saving” (Lincoln, 1991; Farber, 2003; Skowronek, 1997; Garraty, 1994; Sandburg, 1970).

A Union worth saving, Lincoln finally realized, is one without slavery, a sociality that in addition to being indissoluble and thus secure for maximizing the good-telos put forth by the Founders, would be characterized by maximum freedom-liberty (see figures 11 and 12 below). Lincoln’s (leaderly) critique of the US sociality’s idea moved to take on the moral contradiction in earnest, signaling the recognition that the South’s slave-based
economic-political-cultural integrity was a “monolithic, closed system of social and intellectual arrangements” that would not be eradicated without a direct assault on slavery itself. Without this assault the effort to reconstruct the US sociality into a new normalcy would ultimately founder. The resolution of the federalist contradiction was not enough; the moral contradiction had also to be resolved. In fact, Lincoln concluded that slavery anywhere in the US sociality was an affront to America’s original principles and that it was actually injurious to the very notion of freedom itself that the US sociality’s idea, especially the Declaration of Independence, espouses. “Our republican robe is soiled and trailed in the dust.” The next step in the deconstruction of the South, therefore, must be the emancipation of slaves, for “in giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free” (Lincoln, 1991; Farber, 2003; Skowronek, 1997).

Lincoln simply proclaimed this emancipation in plain and “illegal” opposition to the Constitution and the Supreme Court (cf. Dred Scott). He recognized of course the need eventually to formalize the emancipation as a revision of the US sociality’s idea (viz., the Thirteenth Amendment). But, in the circumstances of the South’s “monolithic system” and more generally “the dogmas of the dead past” that characterized the inertia of the status quo consciousness, he perceived himself to have a manifest warrant and transcendent moral obligation, to act forthwith, to do what was necessary to deal with the “stormy present” in a decisive, new, extraordinary way: “As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew.” Lincoln’s unilateral (“I do order and declare”) action thus represented, in terms of what was ordinarily prescribed, an unprecedented and outrageous (even to some northerners) cancellation of ostensibly constitutionally protected property rights, a blatant repudiation of the moral defensibility and civilizational-economic
acceptance of slavery in the US sociality, and a monumental imposition of Executive power without the mediation either of Congress or the Court or the People. (Of course, there were many in Congress, some Justices, and not a few of the People who supported Lincoln. The point here is that Lincoln acted regardless of the level of support.) The elliptical language in the Constitution, therefore, that allowed slavery to exist here and there in the US sociality was *by (leaderly) fiat* declared a contradiction of the true, absolute moral principles of the Republic expressed in the Declaration of Independence. The Constitution’s authors in effect were exposed as compromised by the “slavery conspiracy.” But now the time was at hand to restore the Union to what it ought to be. This restoration, then, Lincoln began to initiate by the discourse of his emancipation addresses: “It is not ‘can any of us imagine better’ but, ‘can we all do better?’” The whole nation, North and South, all the people are involved; “no personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us.” This amounted to a radical moral and political indictment of the status quo and the reinstallation of the moral hegemony of the Declaration of Independence and “the practices and policies which harmonize with it,” implying amendments to the Constitution to rid it of its moral ambiguities regarding slavery (and eventually race as well) thus making it consistent with the Declaration’s principles. The “new” (but really, the true “old”) social reality that would emerge on the basis of a rehabilitated, internally consistent idea would be one outfitted to last and forever to reproduce the conditions that maximize its proper good (see figures 11 and 12 below) (Farber, 2003; Skowronek, 1997; Lincoln, 1991).

The effect of the “heat” of Lincoln’s emancipation-discourse and political action was the further deconstruction of the agency-structure order of the status quo, a further
softening up of the agency-structure of the old regime to complete its transformation into a leadership entity that will be the stage-substratum for the construction of a new normalcy. “We must disenthrall ourselves [of the old order] and then we shall save our country.” And we now see that the “blueprint” of the new normal US sociality, the saved Union worth saving, included truly universal freedom and a more coherent-stable federal-states relationship. These are the two main results of the critique of the US sociality’s idea (regarding the federalist and moral contradictions) that Lincoln projected to guide the trajectory of the leadership entity created by his agency that, as it had been enacted for the sake of a new normalcy that not only overcomes the debilitating-deforming sins-contradictions of the past but rehabilitates the sociality regarding the purity of its original idea and the proper formation of its agency-structure order, can only be seen as the essence of leaderly.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 11**: Production of the good (life, happiness) by the North and South under the conditions of slavery.

**Figure 12**: Production of the good by North and South under the conditions of Emancipation or maximized freedom-liberty.
CHAPTER V: ANALYTICAL RESULTS

The Disciplining of the Concept of Leadership

The Grammar has revealed that there existed in 1861 a bona fide disruption of normalcy that called for leaderly agency. The analysis showed that employing ordinary-managerial protocols and thinking typical of the status quo were ineffective in principle. The trouble with the US sociality was fundamental based on ideational contradictions that fatally combined to emerge existentially in the worst case scenario for any nation: A civil war.

I do not claim that the foregoing grammatical analysis is complete. Left out, for example, is a full appreciation of the subjective side of the disruption, how a threshold number of agents-persons became sufficiently self-conscious-anxious-disenchanted with the status quo and how Lincoln’s discourse, political action, and use of force were able to “convict” these agents-persons about the need for and value of a new normalcy and got them to participate in the deconstruction-reconstruction process predicated on reaching that new normalcy. Also left out is a complete analysis of the dialectic of the leadership entity that shows how it eventuates in its own demise concurrent with the emergence of the new normal sociality. As it happened, Lincoln’s assassination prevented him from exploiting the leadership entity that his leaderly agency created. But the ensuing Reconstruction era could be profitably studied as a striking example of the mishandled potential of a leadership entity. Who knows what Lincoln would have done with it? Certainly he would have done his best to ensure that North-South reconciliation wasn’t rushed and that the dramatic increase of liberty in the US sociality wasn’t all but erased
by reactionary forces (present in the American social reality from earliest days) that stubbornly refused to recognize the dignity-equality of all men. Perhaps it’s arguable that the new normalcy that was Lincoln’s vision for the US sociality has not yet been realized, that the US sociality is still in the thrall of “the quiet dogmas of the past.”

Anyway, my intention was only to demonstrate generally the explanatory power of the Grammar, how it is able strictly to differentiate circumstances of a sociality that do qualify it for leadership from those that do not. Here, then, in the circumstances of 1861 the Grammar qualified the sociality for leadership but disqualified the sociality, on the same criteria, in the circumstances of 1832. It followed that in 1832 there could be no leader, whereas in 1861 there could. The technically strict possibility of a leader naturally does not imply that one will actually emerge or that some agent-person in the sociality won’t insist inappropriately-belligerently-tyrannically on acting “like” a leader. The technical-grammatical issue, however, is that the use of the term/application of the concept “leader” has been disciplined with respect to the strict qualification of the sociality for leadership. This discipline in fact is the main achievement, in my mind, of the Grammar. The concept of leadership can now be deployed to establish a proper domain of the empirical study of leadership (CLS); the term leadership refers unambiguously to some definite reality, namely a sociality qualified in specifiable ways within which some person-agent acts in specifiable ways. Moreover, the disciplining of the concept of leadership immediately distinguishes true leaders from false ones. With the Grammar we are able to go “behind” the appearances to judge them vis a vis a universal leadership object, rather than be at the mercy of the appearances, that leadership “seems” to be at hand without really knowing why. Accordingly, we saw that Andrew
Jackson was not, should not, and could not be a leader despite the appearances that “vulgarly,” in the common undisciplined parlance of CLS, as well as of most, perhaps all, books written about Jackson in the Nullification Controversy, would portray him as a leader. This result, this refutation of appearances as the standard, is counterintuitive to some but is precisely the virtue of a disciplined concept-theory useful for rational-scientific inquiry.

Discipline and Definition

The disciplining of the concept of leadership is not equivalent to the achievement of a definition of leadership. Definition has to do with the manifest-phenomenal dimension of leadership that is the proper object of CLS. The disciplining of the concept of leadership, then, is related to the attempt to define leadership as the transcendental foundation that guarantees that the phenomenal content considered by CLS is the right content, that is, gives the CLS researcher confidence that a strictly qualified agency-structure complex is at hand that may be defined e.g., in terms of leaders’ traits, styles, and relationships, or of things like the climate of the sociality in the process of being led, or how participants feel in the leadership entity. Is there a characteristic way that such participants feel? Are there actually common traits and styles of persons-agents who enact leaderly agency? Can we make a generalization about the climate of a sociality that has become a leadership entity? Is there a required-usual sort of leader-follower relationship? Etc. These questions all go toward defining the leadership phenomenon and are “matters of empirical fact” that CLS appropriately pursues employing one empirical theory or another. The grammatical disciplining of the leadership concept, however, provides the conceptual apparatus to determine if the conditions for the possibility of leadership are in fact instanced to make
sure that the superficial-appearing sociality has leadership depth or ontological “credentials” so as to legitimate-rationalize the empirical definitional project. The grammatical analyses of the Nullification Controversy and the Secessionist Crisis therefore did nothing to define leadership but did deliver to CLS Lincoln-in-the-secessionist-crisis-of-the-US sociality as a qualified item for scientific-empirical research. As such, this item can become part of a cache of data that in various ways might be aggregated and compared with other qualified leadership data in order to try to define leadership (find commonalities, characteristics, generalizations) more precisely.

In effect, the Grammar strictly discriminates between real and specious leadership. This means that it is possible that what has passed for leadership as the object of research may in fact not be leadership at all. I suspect this will turn out to be true in many cases. If so, the remaining research, purified of specious leadership, can yield fewer yet less ambiguous definitional results, that is, can yield fewer, but with higher epistemological potential, generalizations. The gross number of provisional definitions will certainly decrease. But most importantly those definitions will converge efficiently on the nature of leadership. Thus the overall project of knowledge that CLS represents, once disciplined grammatically, will be more efficient regarding the demonstration of the characteristic ways its proper object appears in a variety of contexts and with regard to a variety of variables. This is true regardless of the type of CLS research, quantitative or qualitative. The discipline of the Grammar affects the scope of this research, not its methodologies. (See figure 13).
True Leaders, the Absence of Leaders, Efficient Leaders

The Grammar showed that leadership is a secondary reality, that it is not a normal or basic component of a sociality. Perhaps better said, socialities are not normally qualified by leadership because the normal sociality functions and is managed in an ordinary way that precisely-strictly obviates the extraordinary-peculiar influence of leaderly agency. Normal socialities are properly managed not led. Leadership emerges, then, only when the normal conditions of the primary social reality are fundamentally abridged (such that ordinary managerial agency is in principle inept) and the call for extraordinary agency is heeded. And leadership disappears as soon as the work of leaderly agency is over and returns the sociality to its normal primacy (when again management is the only proper
agency). [By the way, this is an ontological analysis that grounds the otherwise excellent distinction between management and leadership that a CLS theorist like Kotter makes. The distinction is excellent, that is, but cannot be applied with discipline. When precisely is leadership needed? What is the ontological condition of the sociality that warrants the propriety of management? What is the real basis for asserting that “most U.S. corporations are overmanaged and underled” (Kotter in Wren, 1995)? The Grammar provides this ground and thereby can lend theoretical discipline-integrity-completeness-precision to Kotter’s empirical study.]

But leadership doesn’t necessarily emerge even in a sociality disrupted in its normalcy. What if no one, including Lincoln, had heeded the call-need for leadership in the ruptured circumstances of the US sociality in 1861? In that case, the grammatical analysis would have provided CLS with a non-instantiation of leadership, an opportunity to study a sociality’s decline in terms precisely of the lack of leaderly agency in circumstances that call for leadership. This via negativa could complement the positive study of instances when leaderly agency actually is operative in a qualified sociality. There is great potential in these negative, indirect, “shadow” studies to help us define leadership by noticing what characteristically happens in its absence when it is needed. But without the Grammar there is no precise way to notice this absence.

Or, what if someone had heeded the call for leadership and acted to create the leadership entity whereby the sociality was transfigured in terms of a new normalcy, etc., but did not “retire” as the vicissitudes of the new normal were established? What if the person-agent who was the leader continued to try to act leaderly? The Grammar, then, once again, can deliver to CLS a definite set of socialities wherein this sort of lingering
occurs. Isn’t there something to be gained by studying the structural effects of leaders (as well as the traits-styles of these persons-agents) who stay too long (and thus cancel their roles as leaders) in a sociality emerging from its status as a leadership entity? This is another form of the via negativa that could complement the positive empirical study of leaders who act when and where they’re supposed to act.

Again, what if someone heeded the call for leadership but failed to create the leadership entity? In this case, we shouldn’t think that there was not a leader but only that the leader was poor or inefficient as opposed to an apt-efficient leader like Lincoln who heeded the call for leadership and acted successfully to create the leadership entity. The Grammar, then, gives us tools-criteria to differentiate the relative efficiency of leaders. This is an ontological characteristic that concerns the universal process of leadership that may or may not be connected with any typical “defining” traits, styles, relationships, discursive habits, actions, etc., that actual leaders manifest in actual socialities. But then it’s up to CLS to look at various manifest-phenomenal characteristics of inefficient and efficient leaders in the context of the structure-agency order of qualified socialities to see if there are any such generalizations-definitions to be had-suggested. Once more the Grammar provides the ontological ground that determines-delimits-disciplines-focuses the space of empirical CLS research. This incidentally is exactly why the Grammar is to be carefully distinguished, however similar some of the language may be, from any CLS theory, such as the Transforming Leadership theory of Burns (1978) that stresses the interaction of leaders and followers by way of producing change, or the Transformational Leadership theory espoused by Bass that asserts one-way influence of leaders on followers to achieve change (1985). That is, the Grammar tells us what the necessary and
sufficient conditions for leadership are; it indicates that the deconstruction of the status quo must occur integrated with a reconstruction in terms of achieving a new normalcy. This deconstruction-reconstruction process is actually the dynamic agency-structure whole that I have called the leadership entity and concerns an in principle change-transformation of the social reality through the extraordinary-peculiar agency of a leader. This may “sound like” Transformational or Transforming Leadership, but the only thing in common is the idea of change-transformation. The Grammar does not prescribe how as a matter of empirical fact that change might occur in any general-defining way, but only that if leadership is really at hand there will be a certain sort of process (namely, the deconstruction-reconstruction change-transformation in the leadership entity via the extraordinary-peculiar agency of some leader-agent). Just how the leader’s extraordinary-peculiar agency achieves that transformation-change (in a grammatically qualified sociality) is a matter for CLS to investigate. Are leaders and other agents/followers manifestly-phenomenally-empirically-generally interactional (as Burns’ theory hypothesizes) in the leadership entity, or do leaders manifestly-phenomenally-empirically-generally exert one-way influence on other agents/followers (as Bass proposes) in the leadership entity? The Grammar will deliver qualified socialities for Transforming or Transformational (or any other CLS) theorists to study to make their respective cases. But the Grammar itself is logically a category-quantum “deeper” than any empirical theory (see figure 14).
Finally, there are persons-agents who somehow perceive the call for leadership but instead of undertaking leaderly agency exploit the situation for purposes inconsistent with any possible critique of the sociality’s idea (and thus with its good). Such persons may be positioned in the disrupted sociality as possible leaders but parlay that advantage into a private-personal agenda or some sort of ideological programme alien to the sociality’s form of life (e.g., the imposition of Communism on a predominantly Christian sociality like Czarist Russia). This perversion of leadership can result in a variety of “anti-leaderships” (tyranny and dictatorship) and in any case, even if somehow “everything turns out alright” is *destructive-annihilating in principle* of the sociality’s form of life and therefore cancels the possibility of creating the leadership entity. The Grammar, I believe, although only the grammatical analysis of an actual situation would prove it, cleanly differentiates this process of anti-leadership from that of true leadership and thereby provides CLS with yet another legitimate domain of inquiry that has potential to illuminate the nature of leadership by contrasting it to its antithesis-perversion.
Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Inquiry

Certainly much remains to be done to provide an adequate philosophical grounding for the empirical-scientific study of leadership. The exposition of the Grammar in this essay is only a prolegomena to serious theorizing about the ontological depth of leadership; it’s just a kind of radical hypothesis about what has to be at the bottom of leadership phenomena that exhibit such variety. This is deliberately over against “post-modern” anti-realist particularism that would be satisfied with whatever appears to be leadership (or with whatever some “intellectual” regime powers-through as leadership). Maybe there are other such hypotheses that could be articulated? I must acknowledge, then, that the Grammar is only “provisional.” It is to be adopted only tentatively, conditionally; it’s on “probation” until its conceptual power is fully vindicated or until something better comes along.

And I realize, too, that I’ve not done as much as I originally intended to demonstrate the explanatory potential of the Grammar. In addition to what I already mentioned as left out, I have not, for example, shown how the Grammar applies in a small scale sociality, such as a street gang, or other socialities that perhaps are not ordinarily seen as fulfilling ontological criteria of normal social reality, e.g., a philosophical school. But, though I have not done so here, there is no reason why these analyses can’t be undertaken later. My failings here mainly stem from the sheer complexity of any actual instance of universal leadership reality that I had underestimated as I began to explore. The statement of the Grammar’s “syntax” was a lot easier than the “semantical” analysis that entailed reckoning with the details of actual socialities.
Another dimension of the Grammar’s provisional status concerns the social ontology that I offered. I relied on the work of social theorists that were compatible with my own thought. But there are many ways to render the basics of social reality that could have extended significantly what I presented. For example, I could have, in addition to what I did put forth, more explicitly represented social reality as a kind of “space” shaped by relationships of power and status possessed by agents. Then the analysis of the transformation of a sociality into a leadership entity and finally into another status quo would have required a kind of “transformational geometry” in addition to the grammatical analysis of leaderly discourse-agency (Bourdieu, 1998). I am actually attracted to this geometric notion and probably will add it to the social ontology presented in this essay. But the point here is that my hypothesis about the ontological basis of socialities does not preclude revision and enhancement. Nevertheless, and this is important and not provisional, the centrality of the social ontology in the Grammar signals that leaders have no reality outside a sociality and that leadership is a matter of the whole agency-structure order of a sociality. There is no use in talking about leaders as though they could be persons-agents outside the context of an agency-structure ordered whole. And there is no use looking at social structure independent of the extraordinary-peculiar agency of some leader-agent in that same whole. The only way to see and therefore study leaders is in a sociality in the grip of a disruption of its normalcy; the only way to appreciate the structural effects of leadership is in the sociality that has become a leadership entity at the hands of a leader. Leadership is a complex social object requiring analysis commensurate to its complexity and wholeness. The development and improvement of social ontology, therefore, will only increase our knowledge of what a
normal sociality amounts to and therefore of what constitutes its disruption. The implications for the improvement of the analysis of leaderly agency are obvious.

Further, there is the matter of the *moral dimension* of leadership. What does the Grammar have to say about this? I mentioned earlier that leadership is an essentially moral activity. This meant merely that the extraordinary-peculiar influence of the leader necessarily involves the sociality’s *good*, what its idea prescribes as its normal-proper goal-purpose. Specifically, leadership involves the deconstruction of the status quo with a view to establishing a new normal, a new status quo sociality in terms of a new-revised-restored-rehabilitated good-goal-purpose. This clearly is a moral program, an effort to put into place what apparently *ought* to be “for the good” of the sociality. This program entails the reconstruction of an agency-structure ordered whole that includes rules, protocols, and reinforcements for *right* action respecting the production of the sociality’s new good-purpose. But what is the *range* of right action? Is *any* action that has “utility” for producing the good morally right? Or are there limitations on actions imposed by certain “principles” that prohibit some actions even with high utility? And just what is the nature of the social good? Are there limits to what *can be* the proper goal-purpose-telos of a sociality?

These questions must be answered on two levels. The first concerns the normal sociality: Are there boundaries on the sorts of purposes-goals-goods that a normal sociality could have? If there are boundaries, how are they established? Are there limits to participants’ actions (the sociality’s “moral system”) that might produce the sociality’s good? If so, what are the reasons for any limitations? The second level concerns leaderly agency: Is there any limit to what the leader-agent can do to create the leadership entity
as long as it represents the transportation of the sociality to its new normalcy? Does it make any real difference what the leader-agent does to bring forth the desired-good result?

Now, as it stands the Grammar does not address these questions on either level. The good and right are technically-grammatically just a function of the actual circumstances of a given sociality. And the leader’s agency is technically-grammatically just a matter of influencing the sociality in an extraordinary way (relative to the sociality’s ordinariness in terms of its idea). Nothing is necessarily implied about what can be the good and right. Of course, we can ask, for example, if the good and right actions of a major gang (assuming that it meets the criteria of a normal sociality) are really good and right. After all, don’t most of us think that a gang’s purpose-goal-telos is “bad” and that gangsters’ actions that promote the gang’s goal are obviously “wrong”? But the Grammar so far has no answer except to point out that as far as the gang goes (that is, insofar as it is a normal sociality that meets social ontological criteria) its agents’ habitual actions are right and its form of life is good. How can we say otherwise? On what grounds? Or, we can wonder whether Hitler’s presumed leaderly agency that attempted to transform the German social reality of the 1930s included actions that were absolutely morally repugnant (assuming, quite problematically, that the status quo German sociality was disrupted in its normalcy, called for leadership to influence the sociality to move-course-flow towards a new good, and that Hitler emerged as the leader-agent to effect this transformation by advancing a critique of the German sociality’s idea and by employing various discursive and forceful actions to create a leadership entity as the vehicle for the desired transformation). Surely those actions were absolutely wrong and surely the new normal good-goal projected by
the Nazis for the German sociality was astoundingly evil. But the Grammar merely is concerned to qualify the sociality as a leadership entity and has nothing to say about the sociality’s “real” moral status, except to indicate that as a normal sociality it has a presumed good-goal-purpose that certain “right” actions enable it to course-flow-move towards. The Grammar is simply not designed to analyze and criticize the good and the right.

Now, I’m not saying that a theory of leadership should ignore the good and the right. I mean only that the analysis of the good and the right belong to moral theory or ethics. The adjudication between what is really good and right from what is not (or from what only appears to be good and right but are really evil and wrong) is the job of some sort of universal-realist ethical theory. But, even if I myself hold such a theory (that includes a commitment to Christianity and a personalistic idea of human nature), and believe that both socialities and leaders should be judged by this ethics, I have no way at present to connect the notions of sociality and leadership with a universal-realist ethics or, for that matter, with any other ethical theory. [Note: It could be that a moral relativist will object at the outset to the question of what is “really” good and right because the question presupposes that there is a real-universal good-right that transcends social contexts. The relativist denies precisely this transcendent good-right and is quite satisfied with the good and right of a sociality and any leader who emerges in that sociality being relative to that sociality alone.] But, leaving the relativist argument aside that, if accepted, makes this discussion irrelevant, do we really want to assert that someone cannot be a leader unless his actions are right according to some overriding ethical standard? Or that there cannot be a normal sociality unless its good-goal-purpose and its internal moral (right action)
system is compatible with that standard? Do leaders have to be “good” people and “do the right thing”? And, let’s be serious, whose ethical theory do we use to separate bona fide leaders from those persons-agents who in every other respect act leaderly except that they don’t mesh with some ethical desiderata? And if we perpetrate this separation of the sheep from the goats, what do we call the goats?

Regardless of the above, I do believe that the Grammar should be complemented by an ethics, especially a universal-realist ethics that, for any sociality and for every one of its persons-agents and for any leader, limits actions to those that protect and enhance persons and provides critical guidance to formulate a form of life that respects the well-being of humanity. I’m just not now sure how to wed the Grammar with this universal-realist ethics.

Leadership, its complexity as a stratified social object, an agency-structure ordered whole, being noted, in the end is really about individual persons who somehow hear the call from a deeply troubled sociality and then deliberately and freely determine to involve themselves in the trouble and answer the call to transform the status quo even at great personal risk in many instances. It may be that leadership necessarily entails personal risk. But what is going on in the inner life of such persons that prompts and enables them to step out of themselves to lead? What is the real motive for a person to emerge from relative solitude to grapple with the fundamentals of social reality? What is the “internal conversation” of a would-be leader (Archer, 2003)? Is there a universal sort of cognitive-reflective-spiritual process whereby certain persons are constituted as leaders? And why is it that this person (e.g., Lincoln, Hitler?) and not some other in fact is positioned to lead at some particular moment in time? Isn’t it astounding that there exists any such
person at all? I think so. The lack of such a person is certainly the explanation for the
demise of innumerable socialities.

Of course, by its very nature, a person’s free choice is a mystery, not a problem or
puzzle to be solved but a reality that can be explored yet, after all, just has to be accepted
and respected, a foundational truth that we can’t get “behind” (Marcel, 1970). Another of
these truths is what has to be considered the destiny of some persons to lead and the
destiny of some socialities to decline for lack of a leader who can represent to herself the
trouble at hand, can see the way through, and freely determines to get involved to
undertake the risks of creating a leadership entity. Regardless of the mysterious quality of
these things, however, the Grammar’s significance is that we now have at least an
example of an approach to solid theoretical ground on which to conduct the study of
leadership with clarity and confidence and from which to reach towards something as
ethereal as the “foundational leadership mind.”

Finally, I’ll end this essay by remarking on what value the results of this inquiry might
have for leadership research. First, I believe that this essay raises the level of discourse
about leadership. It suggests that those who would study leadership and those who would
be leaders must become more disciplined about just what leadership is. It isn’t enough
simply to consider definitions generated by empirical research. One also needs to
appreciate the necessary-universal conditions for the possibility and appropriateness-
pertinence of leadership in the actual sociality at hand. This appreciation is an act of
philosophical reflection that should not be something dispensable or optional but an
integral aspect both of leadership inquiry and of leaderly agency. Students of leadership
and would-be leaders ought to take intellectual responsibility for their work; just how to
do this should, I believe, be part of the “basic training” in any serious approach to leadership. This essay, then, offers some ideas of what this basic training entails. Second, this essay suggests a way to differentiate the domain of socialities that are relevant for leadership study from those that are not. This, in my mind, is a crucial step in the development of leadership study as a scientific project. This may be a somewhat esoteric issue not of concern to casual students of leadership, but it is the sort of thing that must be considered by someone in order to legitimize and focus CLS as a bona fide field of empirical-scientific study. There may not be an immediate practical implication here, but that should not mean that the inquiry has no merit. Third, the Grammar (cf. the section on social ontology) increases sensitivity to the importance of the social reality in which leadership takes place. Especially important is the notion of the normalcy of a sociality and the struggles and challenges to that normalcy that set the stage for leaderly agency. It seems to me that an adequate understanding of the normalcy of one’s sociality and its relationship to the pertinence of leadership is of great practical and even moral value. That is, understanding the normalcy of one’s sociality and how that normalcy is or is not disrupted provides a framework for deciding whether or not leaderly agency ought to be enacted. The consequences of this decision are momentous for the sociality in question. Fourth, this essay, by differentiating the domain of leadership from other socialities, sets the stage for inquiries into other sorts of socialities that had seemed similar to leadership. For example, there is the “founding” of a sociality by “founders.” And there are “revolutions” undertaken by “revolutionaries.” What are the differences between these and leadership? With the disciplining of the concept of leadership, it may be possible to consider these other concepts more precisely. Finally, the value of a philosophical
reflection on the nature of leadership is that it opens up the field to other sorts of thinkers-inquirers and reveals leadership study as a truly inter-disciplinary field. Leadership surely should not and cannot be the exclusive province of CLS, but “belongs” to everyone who cares about the good of one’s form of life, its lastingness and overall integrity and the well-being of its participants. These things certainly are the concern of leadership theorists, but also of social theorists, political theorists, moral philosophers, persons “in charge” of schools, nations, gangs, etc., and anyone else who cares about the socialities in which he or she is a participant. This expanded regard for leadership is only respectful of its complexity and depth. Should not our collective thinking about leadership seek to become as complex and deep as its object?
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A: SCHEMATIC OF A GRAMMATICAL ANALYSIS

[The elements of the “syntax” of the Grammar will be italicized followed by how that syntactical element might be instantiated using a hypothetical example.]

Normal SSOA

Example: Private high school (not under the auspices of IDEA) operating efficiently in terms of its purpose-goal-good that its mission-idea articulates. This purpose includes graduating 100% of its students with a certain level of academic achievement. It also includes the “principle” that every student receives equal treatment. The idea of such a school, of course, would be much more complex, including policies and procedures, descriptions of roles-jobs, lines of authority, etc. For our purposes, however, we have emphasized only certain aspects of the idea.

Students with disabilities are enrolled in the school. The school had not originally accepted such students but decided for financial reasons to do so. In any event these students are instructed in classrooms in a part of the school separated from classrooms for other students. There are no special education teachers. These students are graduated based on criteria that differ significantly from and are very much less rigorous than those that apply to other students. The school’s administrators (none of whom have a special education background) consider that these arrangements are consistent with its idea as a form of “separate but equal.” The school’s agents (administrators, teachers, students, parents) participate with tacit approval of this status quo; regard the presence of students
with disabilities as a “necessary evil” (because of financial necessity) but in any case think that how they are treated at the school doesn’t contradict its idea.

*Disruption of Normalcy: Objective Circumstances*

Legislation is passed that puts the private school under the authority of IDEA. Auditors appear at the school and observe the “separate but equal” arrangements, the lack of special educators, and, through interviews with teachers, students, and administrators, the singular absence of appreciation and respect for what appropriate education for students with disabilities involves. The school is cited with violations of federal law (including equal rights under the law described in the 14th Amendment) and ordered to change arrangements for students with disabilities forthwith upon pain of being shut down. The school also is prohibited from dismissing its students with disabilities as a way to address these violations.

*Disruption of Normalcy: Subjective Circumstances*

Many administrators, teachers, parents, and students, think that IDEA is ludicrous and that the violations should be fought in court. The headmaster (whose job it is to manage the status quo), however, as well as several teachers, parents and students, perceive that the objective situation cannot be addressed this way, that the school’s very existence is imminently at stake and that the status quo is no longer viable. This is expressed to the school’s community forcefully with the effect of creating general anxiety about the school’s mission-idea (the logic of its expressive representation) and its present functioning (the adequacy of its existential representation). There is consensus that something has to be done to change the status quo. There is also the realization that what
has to be done cannot be a continuation of “business as usual” (that is, just managing the status quo is in principle not an option).

The Emergence of a Leader; the Creation of the Leadership Entity

The headmaster determines to involve himself to address the disruption of the school’s normalcy. In effect, he has answered the school’s need for a leader, for extraordinary-peculiar agency pertinently transcending his ordinary-managerial role. His first task is to undertake a critique of the school’s idea that includes the “principle” of equal treatment of students. How is the school’s idea to be reconciled logically with the terms of IDEA and the 14th Amendment? Once reconciled, what are the implications existentially? That is, what should the school look like, what policy issues are involved, what attitudinal changes are needed, etc.? The headmaster somehow (alone but also with the help of others in the school and an outside consultant who understands federal special education law) answers these questions and begins to apply the answers (the “blueprint for the new normalcy” of the school) to the school. He issues memoranda describing what has to happen; he abolishes the “separate but equal” interpretation of the school’s equality principle by fiat; he mandates the inclusion of students with disabilities; he adopts federal IDEA regulations as part of the school’s normal operational framework; he hires appropriate numbers of special education teachers; he disciplines teachers who resist the changes; he dismisses an administrator replacing him with a special education supervisor; he arranges for trainings regarding instruction of students with disabilities; he regularly exhorts and informs the school community about IDEA, etc. All of this leaderly agency (including discourse and some use of force) literally breaks (deconstructs) the agency-structure order of the school’s status quo in view of reconstructing-transforming it to
reflect the logical and existential implications of the revision of the school’s idea. In effect his agency has “heated up” the school making it into a leadership entity, a malleable “substrate” upon which a new normalcy (that addresses the circumstances of the disruption) can be formed.

The Formation of the New Normalcy

The headmaster initiates a regimen of reinforcements (positive and negative) for those who do or don’t cooperate with the installation of the revised idea, especially regarding training, observing inclusive practices, using inclusive language, and otherwise treating students with disabilities with the equality implied by IDEA and the 14th Amendment. The physical layout of the school is altered; policy revisions are formally written and adopted, special education procedures are integrated and regularized, the presence of students with disabilities becomes in some sense unremarkable, that is, normal. As time goes on, participants in the school community come to accept the new normal; less talk is heard about it; fewer questions are voiced; criticism and nay-saying all but disappears. And, finally, federal auditors clear the school of all violations and approve of its special education program.

The End of Leadership

The school’s adjustment is going well. The provisions, structural changes, roles and attitudes that follow from the revised idea have congealed. The school has emerged into a social reality in which the treatment of students with disabilities is normally commensurate with IDEA and federal law. Participants (parents, students, teachers, administrators) enact their roles in this new normalcy unselfconsciously, tacitly approving of the school’s form of life. The new normalcy of the school is now just the
status quo. The school as a social reality is secure in the regulatory environment. The headmaster dismantles the schedule of reinforcements that had been the “scaffolding” supporting the emerging “new” school. The headmaster resumes his duties as manager of the new status quo.