Beyond the Gaze: Post-Foucauldian Surveillance in Fictive Works

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BEYOND THE GAZE: POST-FOUCAULDIAN SURVEILLANCE IN FICTIVE WORKS

A Dissertation
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and Research
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

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December 2010
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ABSTRACT

Title: Beyond the Gaze: Post-Foucauldian Surveillance in Fictive Works

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This dissertation illustrates the evolution of surveillance theory as well as the social and political implications that have emerged as a result of continual developments in digital technology through the analysis of fiction and film.

Moving forward from the foundation of surveillance studies that Foucault established, this dissertation traces the Foucauldian concepts of panopticism, their application to literature and film, as well as the evolution of these theories in a modern context. In addition, the dissertation will define post-Foucauldian surveillance and offer projections as to how these developments will continue to evolve and affect society. Currently, there is a void in scholastic research concerning the application of post-Foucauldian theory in regards to contemporary digital technologies that permeate the physical and virtual spaces that we occupy. As a result, this dissertation will demonstrate the evolution of the post-Foucauldian model, one that is the most appropriate articulation of twentieth and twenty-first century literary representations.
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Ten years ago, nearly to the day when writing these acknowledgments, I packed up what little I had in U-haul truck and drove with my girlfriend over 1300 miles away from family and friends to begin my graduate education at the University of New Orleans (UNO) in late August 2000 – a journey that will conclude in December 2010 when I graduate with a Ph.D. in English.

First, I must thank Dr. Peter Schock and Fredrick Barton, the Graduate Coordinator of English and Dean of Liberal Arts, respectively, during my time at UNO.

It was Dr. Schock that initially saw the potential that I had and helped Dean Barton to see that as well, which led to my matriculation into UNO’s master of English program.

I was first introduced to the theoretical information used in the dissertation, regarding Foucault’s work with power and surveillance, during the second semester of the masters program in a rhetoric and composition theory course. When I first read “What is an Author?” by Foucault, which led to my reading of *Discipline and Punish*, the clichéd light switch “went on.” I distinctly remember sitting in our banana-yellow painted kitchen in New Orleans, early on a Saturday morning, reading and reciting complete sentences from *Discipline and Punish* to Katie. The ideas that I read out loud that morning were so engaging and compelling that they literally changed my life and directed the focus of my academic research.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“The eye you see isn’t an eye because you see it; it’s an eye because it sees you.”
- Antonio Machado

Statement of the Problem

Developments in modern technology continue to rapidly change the usage and politics of surveillance. As a result, ways of reading Michel Foucault’s theories on power and discipline disseminated via surveillance have been inevitably altered and will continue to evolve. Yet in spite of these developments, scholarship and theoretical application of post-Foucauldian theories to literature and film is lacking. This dissertation will examine theories of surveillance and advances in digital technology according to a post-Foucauldian paradigm, identifying the latter position in fictive texts. I will argue that this paradigm shift is indicative of a transformation not only in how we view the individual, but its altered state and lack of agency in digital form.

Overview

Michel Foucault’s work with surveillance has been seminal in many theoretical approaches to relations of power in social networks. The evolution of social structures formed the catalyst of Foucault’s study of power and discipline through the centuries. Focusing on the elements of panopticism and its utilization by social institutions to enforce power over individuals, Foucault examined the use of surveillance in the prison system, medicine and human sexuality in particular. The ultimate product of surveillance
and institutional control of society was not simply the disciplining of individuals since
the imposed social discipline produced what Foucault identified and labeled as “bio-
power,” which benefitted the state. Foucault claimed in *Discipline and Punish,* “[Social]
discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes
these same forces (in political terms of obedience)” (138). In other words, power and
discipline were imposed upon the masses by the state to not only enforce normative
behaviors but also to generate a utility in each person that the state could harness for its
benefit, such as the labor power of a work force or the mental capacities of intellectuals.
Therefore, bio-power became crucial to the modern nation-state, which depended upon
capitalism to prosper.

In addition, Foucault claimed that from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries
there was a shift in disciplinary modes within western societies, arguing that, “modern
forms of discipline [were] being rendered increasingly invisible” (*Discipline and Punish*).
In other words, punishment was no longer a public affair where citizens would gather in
the town square to witness and “take part in” the punishment of criminals as was
popular during the medieval and Early Modern periods. Instead, Foucault asserted that
since the end of the eighteenth century the publicized spectacle of torture had faded,
and punishment became less visible – a phenomenon he called the “privatization of
punishment.” Moreover, Foucault claims that these legal reforms sought “not to punish
less, but to punish better [. . .] to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social
body” (*Discipline and Punish* 82).

Therefore, Foucault indicated that power was now bound up in social institutions
that efficiently disciplined the masses via social discourse emanating from those
institutions, such as the clinic, school, church, workplace and penitentiary, which
emphasized the eternal possibility of being gazed upon. Foucault also stated that this power, “hidden though ever present,” coerced the masses and initiated social control, all the while conditioning individuals to internalize the ever-present disciplining “gaze.”

Ultimately, because power and surveillance of the institutions were coupled with one’s own self-policing, via the “internalization of the gaze,” order and the will of the state was maintained more efficiently than in the past.

However, Foucault’s theories only take into account the cultural and technological advances up to and including the 1970s, when the majority of his works were published. It has been left to more recent theorists to pick up where Foucault has left off and incorporate these ideas of panopticism and surveillance into a modern context. Thus, while it is important to recognize Foucault’s ideas on surveillance, discipline and relations of power in many fields, primarily literature and cultural studies, it is most critical to trace post-Foucauldian developments in contemporary texts.

Moreover, post-Foucauldian principles reflect the most recent changes in technology and, ultimately, illustrate how these facets of contemporary and future social networks are utilized in late twentieth and early twenty-first century culture.

For example, a number of contemporary literary works encapsulate what William Bogard claims is the “epochal shift from a disciplinary society to a society of control.” In addition, David Lyon claims that we are “plugging into circuits of our own panoptic surveillance that exist outside of the static Bentham model,” which Foucault used earlier as a metaphor to illustrate how power and surveillance function in society. Further, William Staples, Greg Elmers and others see this paradigm shift marked by the ubiquity of the decentralized gaze situated within cyberspace, the Internet and other digital media. According to the philosophies of Jean Baudrillard, it is in this state of simulacra
and, ultimately, hyperreality where individuals can be *constantly* surveyed. This condition pushes the established politics of surveillance, which Foucault had identified involving the mere “threat” of being seen, to the extreme. Furthermore, some theorists claim that within these virtual spaces, individuals and their identities can be usurped, fragmented, and reassembled at the whim of the cyber system or he who commands the system. In this way, agency and subjectivity are withdrawn from the individual and appropriated by the system.

**Significance of this Dissertation Study**

Moving forward within the foundation of surveillance studies that Foucault had established, this dissertation traces the Foucauldian concepts of panopticism, their application to literature and film, as well as the evolution of these theories in a modern context. In addition, the dissertation will define post-Foucauldian surveillance and offer projections as to how these evolutions will continue to evolve and affect society. At present, however, there is a void in scholastic research concerning the application of post-Foucauldian theory to the contemporary digital technologies that permeate the physical and virtual spaces that we occupy. As a result, this dissertation will demonstrate the evolution of the post-Foucauldian model, one that is the most appropriate articulation of twentieth and twenty-first century literary representations.

The traditional Foucauldian model with its concomitant modes of power and discipline is dependent upon the physically architectural arenas that are signifiers of a panoptic form of surveillance. In other words, Foucault’s model required a ‘transparency’ of those manipulated either through literally watching them or metaphorically observing them through socially constructed laws that prohibited any
individual privacy. Both practices resulted in the individual being forced to “internalize the gaze” and police one’s self within social networks. Therefore, the effectiveness and power of this disciplinary mechanism is bound up in both the social institutions and individual bodies. This is readily seen in works such as Sir Thomas More’s *Utopia*, Ayn Rand’s *Anthem* and Margaret Atwood’s *A Handmaid’s Tale* discussed in Chapter II.

In contrast, illustrated by the fictive works that represent the post-Foucauldian shift, the evocation of a virtual or simulation of physical reality – a hyperreality – allows for an even greater control, in fact a nearly complete control and manipulation of the individual according to some of the works. In essence, these developments compound the mere disciplinary actions illustrated via Foucault’s institutional spaces and processes. Contemporary literary texts, such as Walter Kim’s *The Unbinding*, P.D. James’s *The Children of Men*, or Spielberg’s film adaptation of “The Minority Report” by Philip K. Dick, reveal that power and control in the digital age are more discrete and ubiquitous within a virtual system that constantly surveys, catalogues, categorizes, assembles and disassembles information and individuals. Furthermore, the Foucauldian model with its emphasis on power and discipline rooted in social institutions has evolved, becoming decentralized and resituated within the virtual systems of the digital era.

In the end, the dissertation will prove that Foucault’s theories of surveillance, although removed from the original context, remain crucial to understanding the current hyperreal conditions of power and surveillance demonstrated in fictive works. At the same time though, some of the featured works identify prescient forecasts of further evolution and ubiquity of surveillance in human lives, thereby acknowledging that
current authors and theorists have forged new ground and have continued developing these philosophies beyond what Foucault could initially foresee.

Chapter Summaries

Chapter II

Deployments of the Gaze: Surveillance of Collective Bodies in Works of Fiction

Michel Foucault’s disciplinary model and its modes of power utilize physically architectural arenas necessary to produce a panoptic form of surveillance. In other words, the Foucauldian model produces a ‘transparency’ of those manipulated either by literally gazing upon or observing them through socially constructed laws that prohibit any individual privacy. Foucault’s theory on the coercive and punishing power of the gaze and the issue of transparency factors heavily into a number of literary works. The second chapter of the dissertation focuses on the application of Foucauldian surveillance in physical spaces as well as social mores and laws in Thomas More’s *Utopia*, Ayn Rand’s *Anthem* and Margaret Atwood’s *The Handmaid’s Tale*. Perhaps the most seminal literary text examined herein is More’s *Utopia* where the construction of Utopia’s city planning as well as its state and societal laws and mores utilize a number of Foucault’s principles of the distribution of power via social stratification and institutions. For instance, the island of Utopia itself appears to be an earlier form of what would become Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, which Foucault discusses as a machine for disciplining the masses in *Discipline and Punish*. More describes the island of Utopia as a crescent surrounded by water and also with a great bay. “In the middle of [the bay]
there is one single rock which appears above water […] and on top of it there is a tower in which a garrison is kept” (28). These features – the circular enclosed environs (bordered by the sea) and the central tower – are key elements in Bentham’s Panopticon, which Foucault uses as a metaphor for the functioning of power in society.

In this way, More has constructed his island of Utopia as an apparatus of surveillance. The crescent shaped island is similar to Bentham’s circular prison layout, allowing for an uninhibited view of the entire island from the central tower in the middle of the bay at the center of the encircling landscape. Furthermore, populating the tower with militaristic surveyors lends more insight into what the government of Utopia is hoping to achieve. Foucault states in *Discipline and Punish*, “Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behavior must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used” (205). Although this tower and its garrison within are claimed to protect the island from outside invasions, the entire layout of the island also conveniently allows for a close watch on the inhabitants of Utopia; this may be what those in power had in mind all along considering the social and legal structures of the island as well.

More’s text resonates with other utopic and dystopic fiction such as Ayn Rand’s *Anthem* and Margaret Atwood’s *A Handmaid’s Tale*. The use of public space by these fictional governments, as in *Utopia*, can be harnessed for and as spectacle to further control private space and individual bodies. This inversion of perspective, allowing those typically gazed upon to inflict their own individual gaze upon others, known as synopticism, yields an intense and unique power to discipline those who see as well as those being seen. In both texts, the ruling body permits public executions to allow for further control over its citizens. For instance, in *Anthem*, all are free to view the
punishment of criminals, witnessing the consequence if one breaks the moral and legal codes of the state.

Even more so, the use and torture of the body as public spectacle reinforces not only the punishment of deposing the state but also, and more importantly, the ultimate power of the ruling body over the body of the individual. The narrator describes one public spectacle, recalling the horrid punishment of citizens who have muttered “the Unspeakable Word, which no man may speak or hear [. . .] but when they speak it they are put to death” (49). Additionally, in *The Handmaid’s Tale*, the protagonist, Offred, describes her daily walks by the Wall, which on some days is “empty” and other days not. She details the bodies that hang upon the wall, claiming “they are meant to scare” (31). However, “when there’s someone hanging on it at least you know the worst. But vacant, it is also potential, like a storm approaching” (33).

It is this “potential” for punishment, which could be imposed upon anyone at any time, that produces an innate increase in surveillance via self-policing as individuals never know if they are being watched by the Guardians – the law enforcement of The Republic of Gilead. This internalized form of control, although quite subtle and self-induced, functions as yet another form of state terrorism. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault states that discipline, within the Panopticon, is manifested through sight and constant surveillance. Through this surveillance, the occupant(s) of the central tower can gather information from detainees. As a result, the continuous exchange of discourse generates and maintains the autonomic functioning of power (197). Therefore, within this “gaze,” power is enforced and order and control are ensured. Foucault describes this ability to punish via the gaze as “hidden” (105) and internalized by individuals who correct and police their own actions so as not to be seen as criminal
or chastised by others. In essence, according to Foucault, this is the “gentle way to punish” (104) through one’s own guilt, which for most individuals is enough to curb even the thought of committing unlawful acts – as seen in the three texts above.

In the end, each text emphasizes both the literal gazing upon subjects in physical spaces and the construction of shared mores and laws that produce transparent social spaces in order to further survey those subjects. In addition, the restrictions upon movement and regulations of sexuality and procreation in *Utopia*, *Anthem* and *The Handmaid’s Tale* are propagated by the ruling bodies in each text and work to further monitor citizens via cultural and legal manifestations of the literal gaze. It is the use of these representations of the states’ gaze, transforming the most private of objects, moments and acts into public manifestations exhibiting the state’s control, which most closely links these texts and hegemonies. The states’ restrictions on travel in the texts limit the spatial mobility of individuals permitting another form of scrutiny upon citizens by limiting or tracking the movement of bodies in state designated spaces. However, it is the state’s exposure of and participation in personal intimacies regarding sexuality that enforce the most power over individuals by removing agency over one’s body and manipulating personal agency in these autocracies. In the end, the state’s control over sexuality and procreation eliminates a great deal of control an individual may have over his body. By controlling the functions of the body, the individual is rendered transparent and, in Foucauldian terms, becomes a docile body.
Chapter III

Shift from a Disciplinary Society: Traces of the Digital Human in 1984

Similar aspects of surveillance and the panoptic gaze illustrated in Chapter II are also found in George Orwell’s 1984. However, surveillant capabilities are dramatically enhanced by the developing technology of the modern age. Although written six decades ago, Orwell’s 1984 uniquely demonstrates both traditional Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian characteristics. Orwell defines and highlights the dangers associated with the modes of surveillance at work. He also establishes Big Brother’s control and monitoring of public, private as well as institutional spaces and processes via various disciplinary and regulatory actions, which illustrate Foucault’s contentions about gazing spaces and resulting relations of power. However, and most importantly, Orwell himself is able to gaze beyond his present and anticipates how the conduits of power and surveillance will shift according to evolving technology in the following century. In other words, the novel’s bleak depiction of man subjugated via the interface with electronic systems indicates the formation of the rudimentary elements of digital hyperreality.

To begin, Orwell defines and highlights the dangers associated with the modes of surveillance at work in his futuristic setting of Oceania. Next, he establishes Big Brother’s control and monitoring of the public, private and institutional spaces and processes via various disciplinary actions, which illustrate Foucault’s contentions about gazing spaces and resulting relations of power. Most importantly, Orwell himself is able to gaze beyond the present and begin to predict how the conduits of power and surveillance will shift according to evolving channels of technology in the following century. Thus, this novel is not only concerned with what physical mechanisms of power
and surveillance are in place at the middle of the twentieth century but also how
developments in technology and a virtual space will compound the gaze and ensuing
control harnessed by those who wield it. This key facet of surveillance is the first
indicator of the paradigm shift embodied in 1984, highlighting a newly created viewing
space, which seeks out less the tangible form of bodies but the imprint produced by
those physical bodies in a digital field. In fact, a new representation of the body is
produced as a result, which can be captured, manipulated and measured much more
efficiently. Thereby, 1984 to some degree initiates the exploration of hyperreality.

*Foucauldian Surveillance in 1984*

However, despite Orwell’s novel assimilating to elements of hyperreality, it still
maintains facets of Foucauldian surveillance seen in the texts discussed in Chapter II,
which deal with the subjection and compartmentalization of *physical* bodies. For
example, in 1984 Winston and his colleagues spend their workday in cubicles at the
Ministry of Truth, individualized and physically separated from others by partitions –
organized as “a collection of separated individualities” (*Discipline and Punish* 201). In
fact, under these circumstances, any contact with others, be it physical or not, is rare
and extremely risky but always treated with suspicion. It is through contact with others
that the threat of exchanging illicit information and ideas, considered hazardous to the
state, could be attempted. This danger to the totalitarian rule of Big Brother is conveyed
through Winston and O’Brien’s momentary eye contact during a Two Minute Hate:

> It was as though their two minds had opened and the thoughts were
flowing from one into the other through their eyes. “I am with you,” O’Brien
seemed to be saying to him. “I know precisely what you are feeling. I know all about your contempt, your hatred, your disgust. But don’t worry. I am on your side!” And then the flash of intelligence was gone [. . .]. (17)

The transitory connection between these two men, although seemingly undetected, is already a danger to the state. Consequently, the solitary “docile body” is forcibly inhibited in its contact with others. As Foucault states, “[the ‘docile body’] is a subject of information, never a subject in communication” (Discipline and Punish 200). This reticent state is exactly what the Party instills within each of its employees corralled in their cubicles and through constant subjection to the Party’s gazing. The telescreens also have the same effect on society, transforming each individual into a separate body to be gazed upon. The telescreens in Winston’s home, in the homes of every Party citizen and appearing virtually everywhere, also serve to compartmentalize and individualize each body gazed upon. Now individualized, the image of each body is presumably transmitted and appears upon its own unique monitor, allowing the Party to openly gaze upon the collection of individualized images. This visibility of the collective arrangement of “docile bodies” distinctly echoes Foucault’s description of the Panopticon’s design and the efficient autonomic functioning of power through this apparatus.

This use of visual spectacle is also exploited in 1984 to propagate discipline of the masses. Public executions, a practice done away with in most parts of the world, are revived and become a very popular occurrence in Oceania. Public hangings of war criminals from Eurasia, an occasional enemy of Oceania, frequently take place in the Park as a means of political propaganda. Winston recalls that, “This happened about once a month, and was a popular spectacle. Children always clamored to be taken to
see it,” scampering around chanting, “Want to see the hanging! Want to see the hanging!” (23). The transparency of punishment, allowing members of society to witness and even embrace the executions, also functions as a means of control via the gaze. Paralleling the open detestation of Goldstein during the Two Minute Hates, discussed in further detail below, it is the normalizing gaze of the collective population that subjects each individual of the community to the power of the state. The executed traitors and criminals serve as an example to society of what punishment one can expect if found in disagreement or opposition to the Party. Furthermore, the criminal becomes subjected to the gaze and identification of the populace as well as the dissemination of physical punishment. Foucault claims in *Discipline and Punish* that:

The public execution, however hasty and everyday, belongs to a whole series of great rituals in which power is eclipsed and restored [. . .]; it deploys before all eyes an invincible force. Its aim is not so much to reestablish a balance as to bring into play, as its extreme point, the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength. The ceremony of punishment, then, is an exercise of ‘terror’ [. . .] to make everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign. (48-49)

By replacing the term “sovereign” with Big Brother, it is obvious here how Orwell crafts this facet of the Party’s administration in permitting public executions to allow for further control over the citizens of Oceania. All are free to view the punishment of criminals, witnessing the consequence if one breaks the moral and legal codes of the Party. Even more so, the use and torture of the body as public spectacle reinforces not
only the punishment of deposing the state but also, and more importantly, the ultimate power of the ruling body over the body of the individual.

Post-Foucauldian Surveillance in 1984

As described from the outset of the novel, the layout and landscapes of London and Oceania need not be constructed or altered to maximize the transparency of its inhabitants as in More’s *Utopia*. Instead, the presence of countless telescreens delivering and receiving visual and aural information serves as the primary conduit for the dissemination of power in society, emanating from Big Brother and the Party. For instance, every street corner, alleyway, and domicile is equipped with telescreens and, as a result, the potential for monitoring all actions and utterances. In fact, as the narrator recounts:

Any sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up [by the telescreens]; moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. You had to live – did live, from habit that became instinct – in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and except in darkness, every movement scrutinized. (3)

From the third page of the novel, Orwell overtly points out the ubiquitous gaze that the inhabitants of London are subjected to via the telescreens. In this way, in *1984* as well as *Utopia*, all dark corners – even the private spaces of one’s home – are made public,
illuminated and observed by the ruling party. But, what is more significant is that unlike *Utopia, Anthem, and A Handmaid’s Tale*, Winston has been reduced to an “informational flow,” as coined by William Staples, within the Party’s surveillance system by way of the telescreens. Ultimately, his behaviors are recorded and analyzed by the various institutional systems, i.e. the Ministry of Love, and processed accordingly. In essence, the Party is continually gathering information, storing and processing it about every member of Oceania. According to David Lyons, these surveillant conditions evoke “digital personae,” a quality of hyperreality wherein the system reduces individuals to digital manifestations of their physical selves.

It is the information produced by the body that emerges as important specifically when gazing upon the Party members. This key facet of digital surveillance is the first indicator of the paradigm shift embodied in *1984*, highlighting a newly created viewing space, which seeks out less the tangible form of bodies, but more the imprint produced by those physical bodies in a digital field. In fact, a new representation of the body is produced as a result and can be captured, manipulated and measured much more efficiently.

Ultimately, *1984* features the traditional forms of physical surveillance as well as the burgeoning form of digital monitoring. As a result, and what is central to the dissertation, Orwell illustrates the transition from the Foucauldian to the post-Foucauldian paradigm in Oceania.
Chapter IV
Fractured Subjectivities: Emergence of the Society of Control

Orwell’s *1984* pushed the limits of surveillance regarding the Foucauldian-Benthamite model of power and discipline by moving beyond the state physically watching individuals to the processing and recording of information continuously produced by the hyperreal representations of “digital humans” within virtual spaces. This presence of a post-Foucauldian paradigm within *1984* is significant because more modern theorists perceive the updating of Foucault’s position as having only been possible because of more contemporary instances of technological advances. For instance, William Bogard claims that he has picked up where Foucault has “left off,” updating the latter’s ideas of panopticism in a modern context. Fashioning a newly ‘updated’ theory of surveillance and the functioning of power and discipline, which considers advances in technology, Bogard states that we are “experiencing an epochal shift from a disciplinary society to a society of ‘control.’”

The first area that Bogard addresses concerns Foucault’s claim that power is bound up in specific spaces, i.e. social institutions and the bodies of individuals. In fact, Foucault saw power and discipline function between these two poles. Bogard states that Foucault views discipline as “reducing multiplicities into binary oppositions,” such as self/other, sane/mad, or pious/pagan. Therefore, the individual engaged in self-policing herself is juxtaposed to the desires of the institutions, thereby demonstrating the polarities and restrictions of power between those two poles.

However, Bogard claims that because of technological advances, power and discipline have become decentralized and freed from these confines and binary
paradigms. As a result, the channels of global capitalism, which issue the spread of these technologies, have become more inclusive and efficient. David Lyons states that these new information channels and technological devices, such as cell phones, ATM machines, credit card purchases, CCTV, satellite imaging and so forth have made surveillance more ubiquitous. In fact, Lyons claims that we are “plugging into circuits of our own panoptic surveillance, which exists outside of the Bentham model.” Furthermore, Lyons sees this continual flow of information produced by society via these channels as a “Super Panopticon,” continuously monitoring and potentially recording our behaviors. In this way, Bogard claims that discipline has now entered the more deadly plane of cyberspace that can be “mutated into simulation and exists in a state of hyperreality.” In this state, both simulation and surveillance exist symbiotically.

Bogard also argues that while Foucault saw discipline imposed via “massification and individuation,” advances in technology have rendered this form of discipline as antiquated. Rather than create a binary opposition to enhance control, Bogard claims, drawing from Baudrillard, that in this state of hyperreality, which is created by the cyber arena of modern technology, all individuals and society as a whole are reduced to discarnate “packets of information” that are continually disassembled, reassembled, coded, recoded and processed dependent upon what criteria the system or user desires. In essence, we are subjected to a great hyperreal “spreadsheet” that organizes and reorganizes individuals according to innumerable possibilities and criteria, a process that Greg Elmer refers to as the “Panoptic Sort.” The resulting creation and recreation of numerous identities, or “fractal subjectivity” as Bogard defines it, in cyberspace can continually be manipulated and mutated readily. These disparate identities, called “digital personae” by Lyons, are separated and disembodied from their
original physical subjectivities. In such instances, the individual has no agency over or ability to assert one’s self into these identities or hyperreal space without access to the system. Bogard refers to this process as the “disarticulation of the self.” It is this ability to reduce, separate, and recode, with complete manipulation of the individual that separates the Society of Control from the disciplinary society.

With this ability to process and track information, both Staples and Bogard claim that there is a move from imposing a specific form of punishment on a particular individual for a particular crime to a general, more evasive surveillance of all. In this way, authorities are using this processed information and “digital personae” to predict and even prevent crimes. Bogard even states that with these technologies and limitless access to vast information about individuals authorities are profiling deviants and future suspects more and more, claiming that “the police don’t have to wait for a crime, they can stage it.”

This “staging” of events, upon which evidence or guilt is derived from cyber-real surveillance is exactly what Philip K. Dick predicted in “The Minority Report” (1956). The protagonist John Anderton of the PreCrime unit claims that “punishment and fines” for post-crime offences are anachronistic. Instead, prisons are now full of would-be criminals. Future guilt is to be determined by the PreCogs who can “see” into the future and predict deviant behavior. Verified by the “Theory of Multiple Futures,” it is statistically impossible for the three PreCogs to duplicate false crime premonitions. As a result, guilt is determined by factors that lay outside the range of the accused’s actions. Like the PreCogs, the profiling of would-be criminals in this new system of surveillance and simulation is a reality, and both systems remove agency from the individual and places it in the hands of the system. Anderton even states, “If we slip up, someone
dies.” Placed in the hands of a corrupt government or used with malicious intent, individuals could be condemned based solely on the actual or fabricated predictions of the system.

Last, Bogard claims that the new system no longer targets the bodies of individuals, those “messy, unpredictable things.” Instead, he states that with the use of developing technology there is a move to survey and gather information about and produced by bodies. Here, Bogard again reinforces the switch from a discipline society to a Society of Control in that the individual can be continually broken down and processed in the hyperreality or the cyber world where this information is logged. This is a significant departure from the Foucauldian model, which relied upon the “docile body,” individualized, reformed, remarked and constantly under the threat of being seen.

In fact, Bogard declares the end of the individual in this hyperreal state and suggests a replacement, termed the “dividual.” With all of the information collected from credit card purchases, ATM statements, online shopping and personal WebPages, the multiplicity of identities can be endless. Ultimately, Lyons agrees with Bogard and sees a complete fragmentation of the individual as well. In accord, the increasingly large amounts of information, both intimate and general, produced by and about ourselves daily, which Staples refers to as “The Pornography of the Self,” have become easily accessible to others via the cyber channels. In the end, Bogard sees a total control of humanity occurring as power and discipline fuse seamlessly and dissolve into what he calls the “pure operationality” of the system that ultimately cannot be resisted.
Chapter V
Conclusions and Questions

Sir Thomas More forecast futuristic usages of surveillant techniques in physically architectural spaces centuries prior to the paradigm shift that occurred in the 1700s. Also, George Orwell predicted the rise of ubiquitous digital interfaces, which would dictate to and gather information from its users. Next, Philip K. Dick, writing "The Minority Report," discernibly detailed future developments in digital technologies utilizing hyperreal surveillant techniques that will be used to disseminate power over citizens to the point that control over one’s agency may shift from the individual to the operating system. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, based on the emergent theories and contemporary prescient works analyzed in this dissertation, that surveillant technologies contributing to the shift towards what William Bogard termed the Society of Control would continue developing. However, continued analysis of this cultural shift and application to fictive works is imperative, necessitating further research, which has been limited at this time, by literary and theoretical scholars.

Ultimately, one of the critical efforts of this dissertation is the definition and application of post-Foucauldian elements of surveillance. Qualities that had characterized the Panopticon and Foucauldian surveillance, e.g. docile bodies, unobstructed visibility, self-discipline, and a gaze dependent upon physically architectural spaces, are giving way to an new evolution of surveillance, which changes the politics of how and where the gaze is disseminated and in what ways subjects react to being observed.
Elements of Post-Foucauldian Surveillance

**Control.** Control is displacing disciplinary action as the mechanism achieving social order. Rather than coerce citizens to self-monitor themselves by instilling an internalized fear of institutional power, the gaze seeks to punish bodies or souls of deviants less. Instead, the gathering and processing of information produced by and about all citizens is emphasized. In turn, in the new paradigm, this information is used to limit choices, create easily manipulated digital personae and dictate consumer desire. In fact, the corporeal bodies seemingly become insignificant in this shift to a hyperreal mode of surveillance. In their place, surrogate digital personae are more visible and substitute for corporeal bodies. This displacement potentially renders the Foucauldian docile body as antiquated. In the end, state control over individuals in hyperreal spaces becomes nearly absolute via the refined digital systems of the twenty-first century.

**Synopticism.** Tim Matheison’s theory of synopticism addresses the evolution of the gaze, which is one facet of the paradigm shift. In addition, he cites mass media as the catalyst for the condition that he describes as the “many watching the few” (*Profiling Machines* 30). Panopticism was characterized by Foucault’s metaphor of a single or few guards in the central tower monitoring the many prisoners; Synopticism simply reorders the line of sight. Synoptic viewing entails the social majority monitoring a comparatively small number of individuals. For example, John Fiske posits that a crowded football stadium represents a synopticon, a “reverse panopticon” (*Profiling Machines* 31). Matheison states that in the twenty-first century “social control is exerted by media messages [from television, radio, the internet, etc.] that discipline our consciousness via synoptic viewing” (*Profiling Machines* 30). In turn, the information seen or experienced
by the viewer becomes internalized. Baudrillard echoes this, stating, “television alienates us, informs us, manipulates us” (Simulacra and Simulation 30). In other words, we rely on information from media outlets to regulate and inform us, making us conform. It is what the masses are seeing that dictates behavior today more so than the threat of being seen as in the past. This coupled with limited consumer choices produces a control over individuals.

However, synopticism, although having the potential to render the Foucauldian model obsolete, has yet to completely do so. No doubt, modes of surveillance are shifting away from Foucault’s confined bodies and punished souls towards more absolute conditions of control as illustrated in the following chapters. But, currently, synoptic and panoptic forms of the gaze are working concurrently. The former is most noticeable in society as the masses watch celebrities and desire goods via mediated images on primarily television and the Internet. All the while the government agencies and corporations continually gather, sort and process infinite amounts of information disseminated by citizens in consumer societies.

In the twenty-first century, we are experiencing the duality of hyperreal control and panoptic coercion that Orwell predicted in 1984. For instance, we look to “telescreens” for information, entertainment, assistance, even approval. It is reasonable, then, to claim that we will continue moving towards a system and culture that demands more transparency and information from its citizens, as seen in The Children of Men and “The Minority Report,” propagating an atmosphere of control rather than discipline.

The new mobility of the static Foucauldian gaze is one of the most defining elements of post-Foucauldian surveillance. The Panopticon depends upon a central tower or gazing spot and inert subjects, physically isolated and eternally illuminated.
Each is a pole in a dialectic relationship, i.e. gazer and subject. Modern technologies have decentralized the gaze from this static model. Surveillance is even more capillary in that not only are deviants subject to the state’s gaze, depending upon internalization of that gaze to self-police themselves, but nearly all in society are also subjected to surveillant assemblages that they willingly carry. Cell phones, GPS systems, PDAs, etc, have “mobilized” the gaze. The gaze is no longer covert and unassuming. It is completely visible, desired and freely engaged by citizens.

*Exiled Bodies and Disembodiment*. Representations of the body are the focus of post-Foucauldian surveillance, not the physical bodies critical to panoptic surveillance. Data flows come to embody the digital personae, which represent the individual in cyberspace. Rather than create a social dichotomy between the masses and individual to enhance control, as seen in the texts in Chapter II, individuals are reduced to discarnate “packets of information” that are continually disassembled, reassembled, coded, recoded and processed dependent on what criteria the system or authorized users desire in cyberspace. The resulting creation and recreation of numerous identities in cyberspace, or “fractal subjectivity” as Bogard defines it, can continually be manipulated and mutated readily by those privy to the system. These disparate identities, called “digital personae” by Lyon, are ultimately separated, and disembodied from their original physical subjectivities.

In cyberspace, the physical body lags behind its simulation, never fulfilling the future intent of the body as illustrated in “The Minority Report”. Precrime eliminates the physical body’s commission of a future crime that has been committed by its simulacrum. Ultimately, hyperreality dictates the actions and outcomes occurring in physical reality. In fact, the simulacra of bodies nullify the agency of physical bodies in
physical spaces. The hyperreality has always already occurred by the time corporeal bodies can enact or experience the events in physical reality. Most importantly, Foucault’s concept of the docile body is nullified in the new paradigm. The body need no longer be rendered “docile,” because it has been removed of its agency via the new system of control. Instead, the individual is now resituated from a physical space into a cyber hyperreality, where those in control of the system can encode, recode, process and catalog it without interference or influence from the analog subject. The gaze no longer evokes discipline in self-policing individuals. Instead, the gaze watches to gather information about, construct and control the data doubles of individuals. Bodies, therefore are discarded or exiled as seen in *Children of Men, Senseless, and Minority Report*. 
CHAPTER II
DEPLOYMENTS OF THE GAZE
SURVEILLANCE OF COLLECTIVE BODIES IN WORKS OF FICTION

“I am positive that the great war was fought, not for democracy and justice, but for no other reason than that a cop, or immigration officer, may have the legal right to ask you to show him your sailor’s card or what have you. Before the war nobody asked you for a passport.”

- B. Traven

Michel Foucault’s disciplinary model and its modes of power are manifest within the physically architectural arenas necessary to produce a panoptic form of surveillance. In other words, the Foucauldian model produces a ‘transparency’ of those manipulated, either by literally gazing upon or observing subjects through socially constructed laws that prohibit any individual privacy. As Foucault states in *Discipline and Punish*, “[Power] had to be like a faceless gaze that transformed the whole social body into a field of perception” (214). These practices resulted in forcing the individual to “internalize the gaze” and police one’s self within social networks. Therefore, the effectiveness and power of this disciplinary mechanism is bound up in the social institutions and individual bodies. This coercive apparatus is readily seen in works such as Sir Thomas More’s *Utopia* (1516), Nathaniel Hawthorne’s *The Scarlet Letter* (1850), Ayn Rand’s *Anthem* (1938) and Margaret Atwood’s *The Handmaid’s Tale* (1986) where physical landscapes and designed social customs, combined with one’s own self-
policing, provide for various degrees of surveillance that all serve to discipline collective bodies. The disparate historical periods of these representative texts best demonstrate various discourse systems that utilize visibility and transparency to wield power over and discipline subjects. Furthermore, limitations in and a deficiency of modern technological advancements in these narratives, as seen precisely in *The Handmaid’s Tale* despite its more contemporary publication, maintain a truly Foucauldian deployment of surveillance in the novels. Each text emphasizes both the literal gazing upon subjects in physical spaces and the construction of shared mores and laws that produce transparent social spaces in order to further survey those subjects.

The establishment of surveillance systems in the physical reality of social spaces depicted in these novels enables the autonomic functioning of power as disseminated via the institutions and the state, which transforms that reality into a field of vision as Foucault stated, rendering all visible within that space. Within that area of visibility the gaze can exact discipline, produce labor, reform, or quell transgressions.

**Visibility and the Disciplinary Mechanism of Spatial Architecture**

**State Deployment of the Gaze**

The issue of visibility, considering Foucault’s theory on the coercive and punishing powers of the gaze, plays heavily into the construction of Utopia’s city planning. Jennifer Burwell states, “This panopticon, like More’s and later utopias, represents an architectural, hence spatial, solution to the problem of discipline whereby violence is replaced by unceasing observation as the prevailing disciplinary mode”
(Notes on Nowhere 57). Furthermore, in his preface to The Panopticon (1791), Jeremy Bentham extols the virtues of his surveillance machine:

Morals reformed – health preserved – industry invigorated instruction
diffused – public burthens (sic) lightened – Economy seated, as it were,
upon a rock – the gordian knot of the Poor-Laws are not cut, but untied –
all by a simple idea in Architecture!” (29).

The island of Utopia appears to be an earlier form of what would become Bentham’s Panopticon. Janett Semple states that “The similarities between it [More’s Utopia] and the Panopticon are so striking that it is difficult to believe that Bentham was not deeply influenced by More’s work” (Bentham’s Prison 301). Nevertheless, as Semple asserts, “Bentham was defensive about the utopian elements of the panopticon and himself rejected the comparison with More on the fundamental point of viability” (Bentham’s Prison 305). It seems clear, however, that regardless of Bentham’s purported intentions or the degree of Utopia’s influence upon the Panopticon’s design, there are unmistakable parallels between the work of More and Bentham in terms of social engineering and disciplinary tactics. Jennifer Burwell echoes this claim, stating, “Although Foucault identifies this new disciplinary model [utilizing Bentham’s panoptic scheme as the central metaphor] with the beginning of the eighteenth century, already in More’s Utopia there exists a space architecturally designed to produce an economy of visibility that guarantees the virtue of the utopian citizens through the presences of the surveillant gaze” (Notes on Nowhere 57).

For instance, Foucault describes Bentham’s machine for disciplining or rehabilitating those who are considered “abnormal” (Discipline and Punish 199) according to social mores and institutional regulations as:
an architectural figure [. . .] based: at the periphery, an annular building; at the center a tower. The peripheric building is divided into cells [. . .]. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy [. . .]. The panoptic mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately. (200)

In Utopia, those scrutinized by the gaze are “constantly” visible, ensuring that all follow the social codes under the continual surveillance of those in the “central tower.”

Ironically, or perhaps strategically, More constructs Utopia as:

not unlike a crescent [. . .] between its horns the sea comes in [. . .] and spreads itself as a great bay [. . .]. In the middle of [the bay] there is one single rock which appears above water [. . .] and on top of it there is a tower in which a garrison is kept. (28)

These features, the circular enclosed environs bordered by the sea and the central tower, are key elements in Bentham’s Panopticon, which Foucault uses as a metaphor for the functioning of power in society.

In this way, if we apply a Foucauldian reading, More has constructed Utopia as an apparatus of surveillance. As a result, Bentham’s circular prison layout is anticipated by the crescent shaped island, allowing for an uninhibited view of the entire island from the central tower in the middle of the bay at the center of the encircling landscape.

Furthermore, populating the tower with militaristic surveyors lends more insight into what the government of Utopia is hoping to achieve. Foucault states in *Discipline and Punish* that, “Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behavior must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used”
Although this tower and its garrison within are claimed to protect the island from outside invasions, the entire architectural layout of the island also conveniently allows for a close watch on the “commoners” (56) of Utopia.

Like the enclosed, spherical design of the island of Utopia, the Republic of Gilead, in Margaret Atwood’s *The Handmaid’s Tale*, is encircled by a tall “Wall” that is heavily policed. Offred (“of Fred”), the protagonist, states:

> Now the gates [of the Wall] have sentries and there are ugly new floodlights mounted on metal posts above it, and barbed wire along the bottom and broken glass set in concrete along the top. No one goes through those gates willingly. The precautions are for those trying to get out, though to make it even as far as the Wall, from the inside, past the electronic alarm system, would be next to impossible (31).

Functioning much like the island of Utopia, encircled by water, it is nearly impossible to leave the Republic of Gilead. The state has configured an architecture of confinement that allows for the surveillance of its citizens by restricting not only the access in and out of the republic’s boundaries but also limiting access to those inside the encircling Wall. Offred reveals these restrictions, claiming:

> I don’t go [. . .] on the subway, although there is a station right there. We’re *not allowed* on, there are Guardians now, there’s no *official* reason for us to go down those steps, ride on the trains under the river, in to the main city. Why would we want to go from here to there? We would be up to no good and they would know it. (31)

Although Utopia’s containment of its citizens appears much more benign, the deep waters and political enemies of the Utopians beyond the island provide the same strong
deterrents that the barbed wire reinforced Wall and armed guards in the Republic of Gilead achieve. Both function to intimidate citizens from attempting to leave or proceed where they are not authorized to enter or exit.

But even more limiting is the space where the women are initially sequestered in the newly formed nation of the Republic of Gilead, which provides a sustained, intimate gazing space through which the women are monitored. Atwood’s female narrator states:

We slept in what had once been a gymnasium. A balcony ran around the room, for spectators. [. . .] We tried to sleep, in the army cots that had been set up in rows, with spaces between so we could not talk. [. . .] The lights were turned down but not out. Aunt Sara and Aunt Elizabeth patrolled, they had electric cattle prods slung on thongs from there leather belts [. . .]. We weren’t allowed out, except for our walks, twice daily, two by two around the football field, which was enclosed now by a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire. (3-4)

These lines are the first paragraphs of the novel, which immediately construct an atmosphere of confinement and constant surveillance by agents of the state. Atwood begins the novel within the panoptic construct of the gymnasium that used to house sporting events, ideal for arranging spectators around the periphery to easily see the performers in the center of the building. Replacing the athletes with incarcerated women, it is just as easy to view those in the center of the building. This space is used much like a prison designed according to Bentham’s panoptic scheme.

The prisoners, in this case the women of the Republic of Gilead who have been rounded up and held for reasons unaware to readers at the start of the text, are
confined to the center of the court. Offred describes her surroundings: “The floor was of varnished wood, with stripes and circles painted on it, for the games formerly played there; the hoops for the basketball nets were still in place, though the nets were gone” (3). Utilized in the same way as when athletes took the court, the women are kept in the middle of the space to be viewed from any other perspective in the building. Like all sports arenas and stadiums, one of the most crucial elements that goes into the planning and construction of those edifices is the ability to see the playing field from any and all places within. This space was no exception in that the balcony that ran around the room “for the spectators” still served that purpose by allowing the gaze of one of the “Aunts,” who patrolled the female inmates like prison guards, to keep an uninhibited view of those below on the wooden floor. In this way, Atwood immediately sets the tone of the novel by using a modified version of Bentham’s Panopticon to enact power and control over the women held within the gymnasium, applying Foucauldian concepts in the use of that space and the oppressive power of the gaze to illustrate the docile bodies within.

Reinforcing the docility of the female bodies, Offred and other select women are forced to wear a specific color and style of clothing at all times. Offred describes these visual demarcations as “Everything except the wings around my face is red: the color of blood, which defines us” (8). The women’s clothing signifies the duties of each woman. As a result, the women are meant to be seen and identified visually by their dress, which signifies their role in the community and other details about their use value. What is more, around her face she is required to wear “white wings,” which Offred claims “are to keep us from seeing (8),” serving to distort the wearer’s vision. Similar to Foucault’s theories on panopticism, she is limited in knowing who may be looking at her or even if
she is being gazed upon: “Given our wings, our blinders, it’s hard to look up, hard to get the full view, of the sky, of anything” (30). According to Foucault, it is the “invisibility” of or at least the distorted view in seeing “the guard in the tower,” caused by the wings on her face that restrict her ability to see who may be watching her, that is “a guarantee of order” (Discipline and Punish 200). Furthermore, the Republic of Gilead is an emergent society that, perhaps, does not yet trust the women to monitor themselves despite the ubiquitous male gaze – hence the use of the blinding white wings that the Handmaids are required to wear. Despite the great honor associated with the position in the Republic, Offred and the other Handmaids are the most physically restricted citizens in the new state. This, along with the re-forming of what was contemporary American culture into the new social order of the Republic of Gilead, may have forced the state to apply such individualized restrictions upon the Handmaid’s since the women are still in the process of being acclimatized to the expectations forced upon them. This acclimatization is similar to prisoners subjected to the Panopticon for reform whose sight is also restricted, allowing them to see only the central tower. In other words, the Handmaids and prisoners are limited in what they can see, permitting the state to control sight lines. This mechanism ensures that subjects see only what they are ‘meant’ or permitted to see until the state can be assured that no artificial constraints on what can be or is seen are necessary. In both situations, the Handmaids and prisoners are in the process of being conditioned to accept the will of the state and monitor themselves.

Furthermore, the construction of Offred’s position and use in society directly reflects Foucault’s claims about docile bodies in that a docile body is “seen, but does not see; [it] is always the object of information, but never a subject of communication”
In her bright red dress, she is quite visible, even in large crowds, easily identified by the deep red color of her garments. As one of the Aunts says to Offred, “To be seen – to be seen – is to be penetrated” (28). It is this “penetration” of the body via the gaze that wields the power over the subject, which “induces in [the subject] a state of consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (Discipline and Punish 201). The subject of the gaze is caught up in the power play of which she is the bearer. Offred has all of the responsibility of the constraints of power bound up in her red habit and the white wings on her face. She must assume all restrictions, liabilities and duties associated with her image.

In addition to the sumptuary laws regarding dress, the Handmaids are also branded with a tattoo, permanently marking and determining the body. This allows for constant visibility of her and her duty as Handmaid even if or when Offred’s body is stripped of its identifying garments. Offred describes the tattoo as “four digits and an eye, a passport in reverse. It’s supposed to guarantee that I will never be able to fade, finally, into another landscape” (65). This description illustrates the very power of surveillance. She is visually identified quite easily as a Handmaid, marked and defined with the associated meaning upon her body via the power of the gaze. This constant visibility limits her movement, like “a passport in reverse,” determining her freedoms and restrictions within the space of the republic where she is surveyed.

The ever-watchful “eyes” of God and the state are forever emblazoned upon her skin, a constant reminder of the potential of being seen. All of this demarcation upon her body ensures that, as Offred states, she can never “fade … into another landscape.” Symbolically, the gaze of the state and God is eternally upon her body. Furthermore,
the power of the gaze affords no space to hide or escape from her present condition in the Republic of Gilead so long as the red habit, white wings, and distinctive tattoo mark her body. As a result, for others in the community, there is danger and allure in seeing those marked as such, enforcing the discipline applied to those individuals who are to be subjects of others’ gazes, disseminating power over those in view. Offred states, “I can feel their bright black eyes on us [. . .] the women especially, but the men too: we are secret, forbidden, we excite them” (29).

Another mechanism off surveillance is The Guardians – the law enforcement of The Republic of Gilead – who monitor the community to ensure that no moral or social codes are broken or that certain spaces are only accessed by those with the proper authority. They “aren’t real soldiers. They are used for routine policing and other menial functions” (20). On the other hand, the Eyes – another internal group of surveyors – are most feared because they are always present, yet indistinguishable from any other citizen in the Republic of Gilead. At times, they appear in “a black-painted van, with the winged Eye in white on the side. The windows of the vans are dark-tinted, and the men in the front seats wear dark glasses: a double obscurity. The vans are surely more silent than other cars” (22).

Many Eyes are often “incognito” (20), posing as ordinary citizens, laborers, and confidants. This threat, the potential of the Eyes doubling as friends or colleagues, only serves to compound the efficiency of control by way of surveillance. Citizens are forced to always question if others are secretly monitoring their actions and if friends are doubling as Eyes. In this way, the gaze has been internalized, as Foucault claims, coercing individuals to police their own actions in fear of not knowing if they may be in the company of the Eyes. This context becomes “power reduced to its ideal form"
(Discipline and Punish 205); the perfect exercise of power is induced by reducing the number who exercise it by increasing the number of those upon whom it is exercised. All that is needed, then, to harness this power is the simple threat of being seen by the Eyes. The state's creation of this threat, whether it is idle or in fact true has no bearing on the dissemination and execution of power in this scenario. Instead, internalizing the potential of this threat is enough to create fear in the masses and coerce individuals to bear the weight of this power upon themselves, ensuring by no other means, only their own guilt, that order and laws of the state are followed. Again, in Foucauldian terms, the individual in this construct “becomes the prisoner of his own subjection.” Furthermore, the Eyes, like those in the central tower of the Panopticon, see all, but are not seen. Their presence is felt, but their definitive form or identities are obscured, either by the tinted windows and dark glasses or by their covert placement within the social order.

Furthermore, it is the docile body produced via the disciplining gaze and the resulting conditions that allow for the utilization of bio-power by the ruling Commanders. According to Foucault, bio-power is achieved when discipline increases the force of the body in economic terms of utility and production, while diminishing the forces of the body in political terms of disobedience (Discipline and Punish 208). In other words, individuals become more useful to those in power as those individuals become more obedient, which is relative to a lack of disciplinary problems regarding state regulations.
Consequently, the women of the Republic of Gilead are obedient to the men, primarily the Commanders, whom they serve. According to Naomi Wolfe, cultural stereotypes maintain that women are viewed by men as either a “body” lacking any appreciable intellect or as a “mind” without a desirable body. Possessing both would afford those women too much power (The Beauty Myth 59). In The Handmaid’s Tale, the state has reformed this dominant view, constructing a new social consciousness that permits women to be considered for their physical body by emphasizing their ability to reproduce in a time of declining fertility as well as prohibiting women from reading or becoming educated outside of the ideologies of the republic. However, there is no power for the women in their appearance because clothing restrictions are enforced or in their sexuality, which is also suppressed and regulated by the state. According to John Berger, “To be born a woman has been to be born, within an allotted and confined space, into the keeping of men” (Ways of Seeing 46). To be kept and governed by men, which is obvious in The Handmaid’s Tale, is to also be subjected to a masculine gaze as well as that of the state.

Prior to the establishment of the Republic of Gilead, Offred recalls a time when the masculine gaze also dominated the landscape, but it was not as dominating then as it is currently in the republic. She questions herself as an object of that gaze both in the past and in the current state system:

Did I really wear bathing suits, at the beach? I did, without thought, among men, without caring that my legs, my arms, my thighs and back were on display, could be seen. Shameful, immodest. I avoid looking down at my
body, not so much because it’s shameful or immodest but because I don’t want to see it. I don’t want to look at something that determines me so completely. (63)

Many theorists argue that institutional gazes or any gazes for that matter, emanating from a hegemonic entity, are inherently masculine. In the novel, Offred comes to understand or at least recognize this condition. The ubiquity of this engendered gaze had dictated the reality of individuals long before the construction of the new republic. This lends credence to Foucault’s claims that “in order to be exercised, this power had to be given the instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible, as long as it could itself remain invisible” (Discipline and Punish 214). Offred corroborates the “invisibility” of the source of power in the passage above, which is not realized until the shift in social consciousness and structure is enacted through the reforms of the Republic of Gilead. Only then, removed from the former governing order and her accepted reality, can she understand what had manipulated her (and now has nearly complete power over her). Prior to the republic, the masculine gaze determined the transparency of the female body by dictating clothing styles for appropriate occasions. She recalls the skimpy bathing suits that afforded minimal cover for their bodies, inviting the desiring gazes of men at the beach. However, in the Republic of Gilead, the function of women has changed as well as how Offred and the Handmaids are to be presented in certain situations. Now they are completely concealed by the red habits and white wings. Their bodies are not revealed in public as in the swimsuits of the past. Instead, their bodies are laid bare and manipulated by the Commanders. Furthermore, as stated above, the quote from one woman to Offred, “To be seen – to be seen – is to be penetrated” (28), conveys the female perspective of the
penetrative masculine gaze upon the female body. In either situation, it is the masculine
gaze that determined the appearance and transparency of the women. This example
reveals the coercive nature of the internalized gaze of the state, where bodies police
themselves, summed up in the statement, “‘The Republic of Gilead,’ said Aunt Lydia,
‘knows no bounds. Gilead is within you’” (23).

Considering the latter scenario, Atwood identifies characteristics of that
commanding gaze that infiltrates and scrutinizes those in the Republic of Gilead in the
scene where Offred describes her trip to the washroom in the gymnasium where the
future Handmaids are conditioned and held:

This washroom used to be for boys. The mirrors have been replaced here
too by oblongs of dull gray metal [. . .]. I marvel at the nakedness of men’s
lives: the shower’s right in the open, the body exposed for inspection and
comparison, the public display of privates. What is it for? What purpose of
reassurance does it serve? The flashing of a badge, look, everyone, all is
in order, I belong here. Why don’t women have to prove to one another
that they are women? Some form of unbuttoning, some split-crotch
routine, just as casual. A doglike sniffing. (73)

This passage alludes to Atwood’s identification of the male gaze and its qualities in the
Republic of Gilead as it plays out as microcosm in the boy’s lavatory. There seems to
be a need for a complete and questionable transparency of the body laid bare by the
masculine gaze, as Offred identifies here. In this way, the masculine gaze seeks out to
scrutinize the body, examining for abnormalities or deformities, utilizing the binary
conditions that Foucault claims the institutions apply to individuals in society. Applying
the dialectic conditions of male/female, sane/mad, normal/abnormal and so forth, the
masculine gaze generates a systemic evaluation of bodies. In this examination those who do not meet certain standards are removed from the social order to be reformed or reeducated and reemerge as docile bodies in society, which is exactly what the Reeducation Center and the emphasis on religion achieve in the Republic of Gilead. Susan Bordo, in *Unbearable Weight*, supports this idea and argues that the body is inscribed upon with the rules and hierarchies of society and, paraphrasing Foucault, is the “direct locus of social control” (165). Furthermore, Bordo contends that female bodies become docile by “habituated regulation” (166), which is exactly what is taking place in the Reeducation Center and through the Aunt’s training of the women. In addition, the removal of mirrors eliminates the possibility for women to view themselves. Only the institutional and masculine gaze can evaluate the women’s bodies. If women were permitted to see their entire selves using mirrors, some may form their own opinions about how they look and assert their own gaze upon themselves.

It is the male gaze and conditions thereof that define the women of the Republic of Gilead and, in turn, constructs their reality. According to John Berger in *Ways of Seeing* (1977), the single “gazing eye” is the center of the visible world (16). In this way, the masculine gaze functions much like Foucault’s guard in the central tower of the Panopticon, seeing all and, through that visibility, disseminates power and discipline to all within that potential field of vision. In *A Handmaid’s Tale*, the masculine gaze of the Commanders as well as that of God, traditionally portrayed as masculine (God, the “Father”) in Christianity, oversees all. In accord, Berger continues by stating that, “It is seeing that establishes our place in the surrounding world” (7). As a result, we see the ability of marked bodies to change the meaning of those individuals who are denoted as such. For instance, it is the sight and recognition of the scarlet letter by members of the
community that applies punishment upon and disdain for Hester Prynne, revealing her transgressions against Church and community values. The same is true for the prisoners in *Utopia*, whose cut earlobes and gold and silver adornments signify their misdemeanors, and the blood red habits of the Handmaids that identify the women as the republic’s breeders. In this way, sight establishes the social hierarchies in the state, not only designating particular social strata but also ensuring that particular “place,” as Berger claims, for each individual in that determined order. For Offred and the Handmaids, their place is to serve the Commanders and the state by sacrificing their bodies for the good of the republic. Again, echoing Foucault, it is the ability to see and be seen that wields power over the masses and coerces actions in regards to specific social mores and state laws dependent on the setting. In the end, sight distinguishes individuals and produces identities, hierarchical order, and assigns and upholds social values.

Berger continues to explain the dichotomy of how men and women are viewed in order to be defined in social spaces and reaffirms the dominance of the masculine gaze:

Men *act* and women *appear*. Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at. This determines not only most relations between men and women but also the relation of women to themselves. The surveyor of women in herself is *male*: the surveyed *female*. Thus she turns herself into an object – and most particularly an object of vision: a sight. (47)

This internalized gaze, which Foucault argues allows for a more efficient way to discipline individuals, promotes yet another degree of transparency and surveillance in the Republic of Gilead where individuals, in this case the oppressed women, also
perceive themselves from the masculine perspective. In accord, the women portray themselves or perform as the masculine gaze dictates, fulfilling the expectations of their role as the “object of sight.” For example, Offred is readily cognizant of her appearance as well as the reactions that are produced by onlookers, ensuring that her appearance maintains the codes enforced in the state. Offred describes an encounter with two young Guardians:

As we walk away, I know they are watching, these two men who aren’t yet permitted to touch women. They touch with their eyes instead and I move my hips a little, felling the full red skirt sway around me. [. . .] I enjoy the power; power of a dog bone, passive but there. I hope they get hard at the sight of us and have to rub themselves against the painted barriers, surreptitiously. They will suffer, later, at night in their regimented beds. The have no outlets now except them selves [. . .]. There are no more magazines, no more films, no more substitutes; only me and my shadow walking away from the two men [. . .]. (22)

The fact that the Handmaids’ bodies are forbidden and hidden under the red habits, accessible by only their designated Commanders compounds the desire for these women among all other men in the republic. There are elements of danger and mystery surrounding the Handmaids because they are off limits for the purposes of interaction let alone in seeing their flesh as they are covered from head to toe except the small space in the wings from which the women can scarcely see out. Not to mention the fact that all forms and expressions of sexuality have be outlawed and eradicated from society. As a result, it is the masculine gaze that is the only conduit through which the
common men of the republic can express and experience sexuality or desire of a woman for, as Offred states above, “They have no outlets now except themselves.”

Although Offred does allude to a small amount of power that she and the Handmaids seem to possess and can wield in regards to their physical bodies and appearance stemming from their prohibited bodies and sexuality, this minute power serves to only magnify the restrictions put on the women since that is what makes them desirable. In other words, this power, produced by the oppressive limitations and dress, compound the control over the Handmaids because they relish this small ability to seemingly usurp the social hierarchy, attempting to reverse the power play by seducing the men who gaze upon them, thereby fulfilling male desire. As Offred realizes, there is power in being desired. As a result, the women could be more willing to accept the restrictions placed upon them by the state, thinking that they have some agency within the totalitarian regime. However, that power is illusory. It only serves to attract the masculine gaze that much more, inviting further scrutiny of the female body, therefore compounding the docility of the women and the discipline associated with it. Although there may be some authority generated by being desired, the men who desire the women revert the hierarchy by wanting to control and possess that which they desire sexually.

Laura Mulvey claims that, “The determining male gaze projects its fantasy onto the female figure, which is styled accordingly” (Narrative Cinema and Visual Pleasure 19). In this way, it is still the masculine gaze that produces and commands power over the women, “determining” her appearance, regardless of whether Offred and the Handmaids think they are experiencing a semblance of agency in their actions and control over the men of the republic. In the end, it is the image of her and the meaning
embodied by that image that is determined by the masculine gaze. In support of this, Mulvey also points out the concept of “Scopophilia,” which Freud associates with “taking others as objects,” subjecting them to a “controlling and curious gaze” that is typically associated with sexual overtones. This is exactly what the men of the Republic of Gilead enact when gazing upon the Handmaids. Ultimately, it is the controlling masculine gaze that dominates the visual landscape of the republic, regardless of what power Offred’s limited sexuality seems to afford. In the end, it is that male gaze that produces and, in this case, reestablishes the gender hierarchy and patriarchal totalitarian state.

The Public Spectacle

In addition to the deployment of state and masculine gazes, the construction of a public space, to be utilized by these fictional governments as a theater of punishment within the broader confines of the physical state, can be harnessed to further control private space and individual bodies by incorporating the use of public spectacle. This inversion of perspective, allowing those typically gazed upon to inflict their own individual gaze upon others, wields an intense and unique power to discipline those who see as well as those being seen. In The Handmaid’s Tale, as well as Ayn Rand’s Anthem, the ruling bodies permit public executions to allow for further control over its citizens. For instance, in Anthem, all are free to view the punishment of criminals, witnessing the consequence if one breaks the moral and legal codes of the state. Even more so, the use and torture of the body as public spectacle reinforces not only the punishment of deposing the state but also, and more importantly, the ultimate power of
the ruling body over the body of the individual (*Discipline and Punish* 49). Equality 7-2521 describes one public spectacle, recalling the horrid punishment of citizens who have muttered:

[. . .] the Unspeakable Word, which no man may speak or hear… but when they speak it they are put to death. [. . .] We have seen one of such men burned alive in the square of the City. And it was a sight which has stayed with us throughout the years, and it haunts us, and follows us, and it give us no rest. We were a child then, ten years old. And we stood in the great square with all the children and all the men of the City, sent to behold the burning. They brought the Transgressor out into the square and they led him to the pyre. They had torn out the tongue of the Transgressor, so that they could speak no longer. [. . .] all the faces on that square . . . shrieked and screamed and spat curses (49-50).

In this scenario, witnesses to the punishment not only come to understand the circumstances and consequences of the crime but also experience, with their own eyes, these conditions. This act of seeing the punishment not only guarantees proof that punishment has been administered among the many witnesses, but most importantly, those in attendance must be made to be afraid, conditioned by the experience to understand the consequences of deviant actions and see the state’s power restored via the execution.

Additionally, in *The Handmaid’s Tale*, the protagonist, Offred, describes her daily walks by the Wall, which on some days is “empty” and other days not. She details the bodies that hang upon the wall, claiming, “they are meant to scare” (31). However,
“when there’s someone hanging on it at least you know the worst. But vacant, it is also potential, like a storm approaching” (33).

It is this “potential” for punishment, which could be imposed upon anyone at any time that produces an innate increase in surveillance via self-policing because individuals never know if they are being watched by the Guardians or the Eyes in The Republic of Gilead. This internalized form of control, although quite subtle and self-induced, functions as yet another form of surveillance. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault states that discourse within the Panopticon is manifested through sight and constant surveillance. Through this surveillance, the occupant(s) of the central tower can gather information from detainees. The continuous exchange of discourse generates and maintains the autonomic functioning of power (197). Therefore, within this “gaze,” power is enforced and order and control are ensured. Foucault describes this ability to punish via the gaze as “hidden” (105) and internalized by individuals who correct and police their own actions so as not to be seen as criminal or chastised by others. In essence, this is the “gentle way to punish” (104) through one’s own guilt, which for most individuals is enough to curb even the thought of committing unlawful acts, as seen in the texts above.

Furthermore, this synergistic gazing, produced by the public spectacle of punishment as well as the adaptation of Bentham’s panoptic model, is also illustrated in the physical environment surrounding the scaffold and Hester’s disciplining in the 1640s Puritan settlement featured in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter. Hawthorne’s own description of the use and purpose of the scaffold in the novel sounds much like Foucault’s own words describing the construction and utility of the Panopticon. Hawthorne writes:
In fact, this scaffold constituted a portion of a penal machine, which now, for two or three generations past, has been merely historical and traditionary (sic) among us, but was held to be as effectual as an agent in the promotion of good citizenship, as ever was the guillotine among the terrorists of France. It was, in short, the platform of the pillory; and above it rose the framework of that instrument of discipline, so fashioned as to confine the human head in its tight grasp, and thus hold it up to the public gaze. There can be no outrage, methinks, against our common nature, – whatever the delinquencies of the individual – no outrage more flagrant that to forbid the culprit to hide his face for shame as it was the essence of this punishment to do. (59)

Hawthorne recognized the application of the power to punish in the public's “gaze” upon the guilty party as well as the physical punishments of pain and death. What is more, though, is that Hester enters a metaphorical form of the pillory – a violent mechanism that locks around the neck of the accused, disabling the subject from moving or covering the face or head so as to produce an uninhibited view of the individual. Although Hester is not physically constrained, she is transformed into a figure of vulnerable display for the crowd. Hester is, in a sense, forbidden to hide her face ‘for shame’ once the crowd has acknowledged her sin and the signifier of that sin in the scarlet letter upon her breast. Those subjected to the actual pillory cannot disassociate themselves from their crime by hiding their faces. In this way, the public perceives the criminal by identifying his face. Therefore, his face assumes the symbolic image of by which the criminal is recognized and labeled; the characteristics of one’s face represent
the ‘self’ and the existence of the subject to those in observance. It is this representation that the crowd identifies with and gazes upon, punishing with their surveillance of the criminal.

In the case of Hester, she cannot hide the image that distinguishes her as a criminal; unlike those punished in the actual pillory, the object of the observers’ gazes is not her face, but the scarlet letter on her chest. In fact, it is the letter that will remain the object of the many gazes of the townspeople, not the body of Hester. Instead, the signified meaning of that letter applies new meaning to Hester’s body. Once seen by observers, they then associate the meaning of the letter with Hester. Therefore, the individual being punished cannot hide. Hester is always visible to society despite her alienation from the people in town. Through the discourse of the gaze, those who are singled out for punishment, branded by recognizable signs, receive their penalty through the surveillance of others, noticing and acknowledging by sight the mark that has made its wearer the marginalized body, the outcast.

This is also the case for criminals in *Utopia* where the body is used to signify transgressive behavior and to carry out the resulting punishment. Take for example the punishment of the thieves in Book I. The individuality of the criminal is removed and replaced with a spectacular form of propaganda. The criminal is outfitted in a specific color and style of dress, the hair is cropped and the earlobe is cut. In other cases, “whosoever for any offence be infamed, by their ears hang rings of gold, upon their fingers they wears rings of gold, and about their necks chains of gold, and [. . .] their heads be tied about with gold” (70). This display of the manipulated and mutilated body serves as a warning to others as well as a form of punishment for the criminal who is readily identifiable. Although a precious metal, the Utopians abhor gold and other items
considered as forms of wealth in reality. In fact, More states that gold and silver make great chains and fetters “wherein they tie their bondsmen (71). As a result, gold adornments on the body function as the scarlet letter for Hester Prynne, marking the criminal for all to see and identify.

Hester is subjected to what Dorothy Ko describes as the “Penetrative Mode.” Ko claims that this technique generates a gazing space focused on female suffering, which emphasizes creating a public spectacle out of a typically private event” (*Discipline and the Other Body* 227). In *The Scarlet Letter* scaffold scene, where Hester is sentenced, Hawthorne describes the criminal as “under the heavy weight of a thousand unrelenting eyes, all fastened on her, and concentrated on her bosom” where the scarlet letter was pinned (60). Louis Althusser’s ideas on Ideological State Apparatuses support this claim, stating that, “Ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects” (*Norton Anthology* 1504). Hester is no longer a member of the society; instead, she is reduced to a “subject” of others’ gazes, recognized only as a sinner, and has become the “subject” or locus of the applied punishment.

Hawthorne clearly recognized the application of the power to punish in the public’s “gaze” upon the guilty party. But more importantly, in *The Scarlet Letter*, it is not only the subject that is being punished, both manipulated and controlled by the “gaze” and its application of power, but also the entirety of the community in the audience who come under the scrutinizing “gaze” of others within the crowd, as well. Elizabeth Hoffman states that:

While the Puritan leaders have appropriated Hester’s physical person as an object through which they communicate the legal code, their bodies and those of the spectators are also subject to the gazes of others. Only
the symbol on her breast, the penal semiotic, differentiates Hester from the remainder of the community. In presenting this historical moment in which two types of punitive power have begun operating...the author examines the one, a subtle, ambiguous power, for its means of obtaining the conformity of the individual, and the other, a definite, public punishment [...]. (18)

Hoffman reveals the duality of power functioning in this gazing space. She clarifies that through the discourse of the “gaze,” those who are singled out for punishment and branded by recognizable signs receive their penalty through the surveillance of others who notice and acknowledge by sight the mark that has made its wearer the scrutinized subject, the outcast. Second, Hoffman reiterates another function of this power, as stated by Foucault. When the masses witness the ostracism of Hester, individuals begin to assume that the crowd may be attempting to find blemishes on their own moralities; each member of the crowd realizes that they are also the object of many other “gazes” within the assembly, gathering information and searching for other irreverent acts or law breakers. In this way, the second, and perhaps greatest force of surveillance is the ability to impose conformity. The paranoia has now spread and not wanting to be as humiliated as Hester is, the townsfolk are kept in control and become subordinate to the laws of the church, society and state, ensuring order as Foucault has promised.

According to Foucault, discipline functions one-way via the recoding of differences and reduces multiplicities to simple sets of binary oppositions: self/other, sane/mad, pious/irreverent, healthy/sick, lawful/criminal, etc. This is the way Hester is viewed by the town’s people and how her punishment is applied. As Foucault claimed,
the stocks and gallows disappear, and the punishment of the criminal becomes privatized and internalized. The infliction of pain upon the body becomes secondary to the psychological “correction” or rehabilitation of the wrongdoer. Foucault saw this new mode of control pioneered in prisons but also recognized its application to cultures by way of social institutions. Ultimately, in this move not to punish less, but to punish more effectively, the act of punishment is pushed more deeply into the social body. In fact, for Hester, she and the entire settlement take part in her punishment. The townspeople, seeing the scarlet letter on Hester’s breast, reinforce her wrongdoing by emphasizing the contrast between themselves and her. A social binary is established between the lawful and unlawful, the devoted and the adulterer. It is the polarity created by the signifier on her breast, via the discourse of the gaze, which maintains Hester’s punishment.

What is interesting to note, considering what Foucault claimed in regards to shifting modes of punishment, is that discourse systems become the vehicle of the law between men, families and generations, producing a “culture of discipline” beginning in the latter eighteenth century rather than one of public spectacle involving executions that were popular until approximately this time period. However, in the scaffold scene of *The Scarlet Letter*, set in the mid 1600s, Hester’s punishment is not met by death or physical torture despite the pillory and scaffold being a locus for those corporeal acts in the settlement. Instead, she is forced to be continually gazed upon by others, similar to the prior texts discussed above that emphasized the self-punishment of the individual via the gaze rather than the physical torture of the body by the state. The latter, however, was utilized to quite lesser degrees. In its place, the potential of Hester being seen, which translates into a potential of being punished, echoes Bentham’s design of
the Panopticon as well as illustrates Foucault’s use of the prison as a metaphor for how power functions in society. It is the gaze of her peers or the potential of entering the gaze of her peers that applies the punishment to Hester. However, it is her internalization of that public gaze that results in Hester’s internalization of the punishment. Her mind and soul as Foucault claims are the loci of punishment, “subjected to a field of visibility” of which Hester is aware. She must assume the responsibility for the constraints of power that are placed upon her, bearing the weight of that punishment. In the end, Hester becomes the prisoner of her own subjection after internalizing the authoritative gaze.

**Social and Legal Manifestations of the Gaze and the Production of a ‘Transparent Society’**

The literal gazing of hegemonic powers upon subjects in space, featured in these texts, is accompanied by specifically designed legal and social structures that produce further vantage points through which to survey individuals. Thereby, the states’ surveillance capabilities are multiplied by constructing laws and customs that greatly reduce or restrict any given instance of privacy by rendering the actions of individuals as public displays. For example, by designing laws that prohibit the possession of private property and which necessitate placing locks on individual homes as in *Utopia*, or requiring special permits for Handmaids to access specific locations and recording of their purchases in *The Handmaid’s Tale*, autocracies are able to magnify their authoritative powers upon their citizenry by producing socially constructed monitoring systems via these laws and customs, allowing a closer scrutiny of individuals. Furthermore, these sanctioned limitations upon the populi provide the state’s knowledge
not only of where each citizen is permitted to be at any given time as well as where they have been and when, but also define the potential movements and actions of individuals whether or not the state is literally watching citizens. Ultimately, societies are rendered ‘transparent’ by imposing surveillance systems that blend the literal monitoring of citizens with implemented social customs and laws that restrict or record certain movements, privacies, access and actions. Gary Marx defines a transparent society as a “porous” state, where:

Information leakage is rampant. Barriers and boundaries – distance, darkness, time, walls, windows, and even skin, which have been fundamental to our conceptions of privacy, liberty and individuality – give way. Actions, as well as feelings, thoughts, pasts, and even futures, are increasingly visible. The line between public and private is weakened; observations seem constant; more and more information goes on a permanent record [. . .]. Transparency of human behavior [is implemented] for the purposes of total control. (Transparent Society 296-7)

In other words, a transparent society embodies more than literally watching individuals, but involves restricting, manipulating and even tracking the movements and behaviors of those individuals. In essence, nearly all facets of daily life are rendered ‘visible’ in transparent societies by disseminating both literal and socially constructed surveillance. These social and legal extensions of the literal gaze are best exemplified by discourse about sexuality, reproduction and restrictions on movement in these representative texts.
In *Utopia*, aligned with the visibility afforded by the panoptic design of the island, there is an element of transparency constructed in the culture. By scrutinizing citizens and limiting their mobility, Utopian hierarchical structures of power are maintained. This chain of command is anchored by a King, followed by “princes,” who function as the chief magistrate of each Utopian city (50,55). Next, every city has Tranibores who each oversee a collective of ten Syphogrants, each in charge of 30 families or farms (55). It is apparent that the government of Utopia is a structured and stratified apparatus regulating national, regional and local environs. In this way, the state has a telescoping reach into the lives of its citizens, creating a number of additional ‘vantage points’ of surveillance within the social fabric of Utopia.

Furthermore, in his description of the island, the narrator Hythloday blatantly states that the social expectations and work regime do not allow for “any occasion of vice or wickedness, no lurking corners, no places of wicked councils or unlawful assemblies. But that they be in the present sight and under the eyes of every man” (68). The emphasis on work, which is conveyed to the inhabitants as a communal ideal where all residents labor and perform their share of responsibilities so that everyone can reap the benefits, serves also to prevent any deviance from social norms. As a result, work is considered virtuous and healthy. While working “under the eyes of every man” (68), no unwarranted and undesirable behavior can be undertaken without notice, which deters any transgressions. Under this mode of surveillance, in the words of Foucault, “there are no disorders, no theft, no coalitions” (*Discipline and Punish* 201) that can take place.

The initial system of surveillance, created by the physical design of the island via the crescent shape and central tower, is compounded here by the design of the labor
force that contributes to the transparency of Utopian culture. Not only does the military garrison keep watch over the entire island, but also each island inhabitant functions as an additional conduit for the government’s controlling gaze. As a result of the communal system of labor, each worker must perform his own share of work to ensure that the civilization prevails. If one laborer falters or does not meet his quota, the entire society is affected. In this way, each laborer is concerned not only with his production but the production of others. All laborers are connected in this way and influence the livelihood of others. Consequently, each worker is coerced to scrutinize the labor of others, expecting to see equal production from all. In the end, each laborer assumes the function of a gazer in the tower, examining all others in their work. The initial gaze of the garrison is internalized by the citizens and as a result compounded, magnified throughout and by those who are being watched. Now those initially being watched are also watching, creating another layer or degree of surveillance, ensuring that the standards and expectations of the society and ruling power are met.

Moving beyond labor codes in *Utopia*, the socially required transparency of the island grows increasingly more extreme. Homes are not permitted to have locks, and all have free access to enter any domicile as they please. Perhaps what is most striking is “there is nothing within the houses that is private or any man’s own” (54). Embracing an extreme practice of early Communism, nothing can be privately owned. Instead, all things can be utilized by members of the state. For instance, food is amassed in large storehouses where the head of the households can freely enter, take what is needed without payment or record, and return home to sustain the family (63-64). On the surface this system may appear idyllic, but it does become disturbing to think that the food supply is housed and controlled by the state. In this way, the body is controlled not
only by the gaze of the state but also regulated in its access to and consumption of food.

Additionally, one’s own privacy is also nonexistent. Besides the free access into anyone’s home, Utopian society dissuades any instance of personal privacy. Offering the illusion of freewill, the state relies upon the internalization of these mores to keep individuals part of the collective. More writes:

For though no man be prohibited to dine at home, yet no man doth it willingly because it is counted a point of small honesty. And also it were a folly to take the pain to dress a bad dinner at home, when they may be welcome to good and fine fare so nigh and at the hall. (65)

In this way, individuals appear free to enjoy the privacy of their own homes for dinner, but the expectation of the collective is that all will enjoy the fellowship together in the hall. In this case, after continually being gazed upon in daily pursuits by others, not being seen at dinner has been internalized as unacceptable or not virtuous, characteristics strongly emphasized by this society. This internalization of the expectations and mores of a society, Foucault claims, “assures the autonomic functioning of power” (201). Now internalized, each individual is monitoring herself, perpetuating that “autonomic” dissemination of the state’s power and discipline. In this way, each individual has become a “docile body” as Foucault posits, reformed, marked, and manipulated (Discipline and Punish 135).

Consequently, the populace can only be viewed as a singular collective, not a grouping of many individuals. Foucault claims that this is one of the key functions of surveillance, in that the gaze disseminates the power to eliminate “individualities” (Discipline and Punish 221). This is an extreme discipline in Utopia, taking many forms.
First, is the emphasis on labor. Each is assigned an occupation dependent upon his skills: working in the fields, preparing dinners, etc. Next, is the positioning of bodies. All are expected to eat together in the hall, but even more, each member has his assigned seat within an assigned area. Take for example the elders and the younger members in which each body is used to mark or designate a section of the table. In this way, the body is reduced to a signifier of age, station, or occupation to be seen by all others. Furthermore, the use of the hospitals to sequester and contain the sick, reportedly so that illness cannot spread to the healthy population, also yields a form of transparency. The inclusion of all those who are ill in one of the hospitals affords complete observation – no one is free to go unseen while recuperating at home or anywhere else outside of the clinic. Although the hospitals are concealed from the cities of Utopia, those inside are bound to a ‘public’ space, unable to find a private retreat outside of the gaze of physicians situated within the clinic. The physicians play a similar role as the military garrison policing the island, in that the clinicians also occupy a “central tower” in this panoptic scheme. Rather than induce and regulate the external bodies of the masses, the physicians focus on the regulation of the internal body by determining the health of the body in regards to disease. This practice is an even deeper penetrative visibility of individual bodies that the state institutions are afforded in this disciplinary society. In all, within these institutional spaces, the body functions as subject of the collective gaze of the community, which helps to establish and maintain proper order as determined by the state, exercising surveillant power in a number of positions and forms on the island of Utopia.

The body’s movements in space are another concern of the Utopian state, which also seeks to regulate travel within and outside of its borders. According to law,
Utopians are free to “visit either their friends dwelling in another city, or to see the place itself” (67-68) if the proper license can be obtained. However, “No man goeth out alone, but a company is sent forth together with their prince’s letters, which do testify that they have licence (sic) to go that journey” (68). So, although the laws allow for and endorse the “free” travel of citizens, the state has the final word in not only who may go but also determine the duration of the trip. In this way, all are accompanied by escorts, sanctioned by the state, who chaperone travelers on their journeys. This is an efficient way to monitor the acts and motives of those traveling, eliminating any escapes, spying or the potential exchanging of information with other nations or even between cities of Utopia. In this way, perhaps what is most important to the state is prohibiting or quelling any coalitions between Utopians that could threaten the state. Because individuals cannot travel alone, potential coups devised between the alliances of Utopian cities are nearly impossible when combined with the transparency of labor, leisure, and home spaces. Furthermore, the state can also mandate the duration of the travel, if in fact travel is ever granted, and “prescribeth also the day of their return” (68).

Ultimately, it is the decision of the state whether or not to initially grant the “licence” or passport. Therefore, the Utopians are presented with only the facade of free movement and travel opportunity by the government. As Steven Greenblatt noticed, regarding the regulated travel of the Utopians, they “begin with almost unlimited license and end with almost total restriction” (Three Early Modern Utopias, xxiii). The consequences of not following the protocol listed above also act to quell nearly all resistance of or dissent regarding these mandates:

If any man, of his own head and without leave, walk out of his precinct and bounds, taken without the prince’s letters he is brought again for a fugitive
or a runaway with great shame and rebuke, and is sharply punished. If he be taken in that fault again, he is punished with bondage. (68)

In a community where all are purportedly equal and the expectations of shared livelihood and property are tantamount, creating a social consciousness based upon conformity, the dissident is not only easily identified but castigated by the entire community as seen again in this example.

Echoing Greenblatt’s claim, the state does not stop here in its regulation of movement. In order to restrict all movement outside of a subject’s designated community, the state issues one last condition for Utopian travel, stating, “But into what part of the country soever he cometh he hath not meat given him until he have wrought out his forenoon’s task or dispatched so much work as there is wont to be wrought before supper” (68). In other words, the final criterion for permissible travel is that one must finish his daily labor prior to embarking if he wishes to receive his daily food rations. This condition makes travel utterly impossible as it, first, leaves little or no time for a journey after one’s duties are completed for the day and, two, prohibits any food consumption allotted to the traveler if he misses a day’s labor, which again would make even a short journey unbearable.

According to Jean Elizabeth Howard, in her text *The Stage and Social Struggle in Early Modern England*, the great anxieties expressed about idleness in More’s *Utopia* respond to some “real changes in social and economic relations in sixteenth-century England” (26). In fact, Howard claims that a number of scholars have shown that during the early part of the 1500s:

fewer and fewer people had fixed manorial ties. Consequently, the wage-labor pool grew, creating a class of landless persons alien from the feudal
world of obligation and fixed residence, but with no clear stake in the emerging bourgeois world of discipline [. . .]. Often wandering the roads in pursuit of seasonal work, these vagrants and “masterless men” were the target of a series of state measures designed to regulate their movements and behaviors. A 1531 statute ordered that vagrants were to be carted and whipped until bloody; in 1572 they were directed to be flogged and have holes bored into their ears. [. . . And ultimately,] an elaborate system of licenses and passports was developed [in the mid to later 1500s] to control the movements of the poor. (26)

It seems that More was reflecting upon the economic and political conditions as well as the social concerns of early sixteenth century England in regards to the treatment of movement within Utopia and the resulting punishment of deviants. Moreover, what More implements in his fictitious Utopia is an earlier form of what Elizabethan England would come to mandate by strictly sanctioning passports and licenses. Maintaining control over individuals and their movement is crucial in both Utopia and Early Modern England, predominantly those who are outside the bonds of a “master” via the breakdown of the manorial system. It is this idleness and lack of a master that allotted too much personal freedom, which could also produce criminals and dissidents – both enemies of any state. According to A.L. Beier:

Vagabondage first received detailed analysis in More’s Utopia, which identified unemployment and crime as related problems…. More showed great insight in raising the question why thieves [and crime in general], despite capital punishment, still abounded. He came up with the answer that no punishment “is sufficient to restrain from acts of robbery those who
have no other means of getting a livelihood.” The fundamental causes of crime, he argued, were economic – unemployment, and poverty. 

(Masterless Men 149)

In other words, the cause of most crime, according to More, was the idleness of individuals not invested in labor that, in turn, contributed to vagrancy. As a result, the solution to these issues, in both Utopia and England, was the regulated freedom of movement by way of the issuance of passports, which the state could restrict or deny at will.

Beier also claims, “In 1515 [the year prior to Utopia’s publication] York officials ordered those unable to labor to wear tokens upon their shoulders” (Masterless Men 154), distinguishing individuals who are displaced from the labor system and may, as a result, commit vagrancy and beg for food. In fact, in late Tutor England:

Badging was another procedure that governments devised to check vagabondage. It involved wearing a badge, or ‘token’, to indicate one’s status as a convict or authorized beggar. The purposes were penal and administrative, that is, to punish convicted vagabonds by holding them up to ridicule and to limit the numbers and movements of beggars. (Beier 154)

These procedures, no doubt, had influenced some of More’s literary reformation of the political and social shortcomings that he observed in sixteenth century England as well as the social surveillance mechanisms captured in Utopia.

What may seem so benign – destitute men roaming unimpeded between national and local boundaries – is actually quite detrimental to the state. In fact, the vagrant usurps some of the state’s power by not only denying but also appropriating the state’s
jurisdiction in terms of locality. If permitted to wander, the vagrant is not relegated to any particular place and, therefore, he cannot be defined as belonging to a particular area or allegiance, which disrupts the surveillance of that individual by the state. The transparency of movement in tracking the vagrant is rendered opaque; there are no clearly drawn lines of demarcation restricting or permitting his occupancy of physical spaces. Instead, he has a greater degree of mobility than those ‘fixed’ to particular places via labor, economics, familial ties, etc. Therefore, regardless of how or to what degree of visibility the vagrant is exposed to, there are no clear markers in which to define his crimes regarding movement. Instead, he is defined by his mobility. In sum, physical mobility, as well as hierarchical, whether social, economic, or political, is dangerous for the state because there are opportunities afforded for others to rise to power as a result. For these reasons, the issuance of passports becomes crucial because these documents can clearly mark the body and immediately display where it is permitted and not permitted to be, thereby enabling clearly identifiable deviant behavior.

The last way that the Utopian state monitors its citizens is by regulating one of the most intimate facets of the body and individual: sex and reproduction. Again eradicating all privacy from the community and its citizens, sex and reproduction are strictly managed by the state, removing all intimacy and pleasure, reducing sex to either a regulated mode of production or severe misdemeanor depending on the context. Foucault contends in The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, that “sex is placed by power in a binary system: licit and illicit, permitted and forbidden” (83). This distinction is enforced in Utopian society: the permissible, yet regulated, use of sex for reproduction and the forbidden use of sex for pleasure. Restrictions on sex are extreme, and the
number and frequency of children are dictated and measured. Furthermore, both genders must be of appointed age before they can marry.

Unlike the phallocentric state in *The Handmaid’s Tale*, which disseminates its power via the masculine gaze upon female bodies, if it is found in *Utopia* that if either spouse had “previously offended,” he or she is sharply punished (90). In this way, in keeping with the seemingly ‘egalitarian’ environment of Utopia, men do not have more rights than women or domestic power over their wives. For example, women have just as much right in choosing to marry or divorce, “For if either of them [wife or husband] find themselves for any such cause grieved, they may […] change and take another [spouse]” (91). Furthermore, men and women are tried equally when it comes to punishing deviance so that any person breaking “wedlock be punished with most grievous bondage” (91). It seems as though transgressive behaviors involving sex carry the heaviest of crimes. It is interesting to note here that the most intimate and typically discrete acts, hidden from view, carry the most severe punishments. Here again, we see the emphasis on transparency and the great threat to the state by hidden, unseen affairs. However, this process implemented provides the state with not only the knowledge of who individuals have selected for spouses but instills the cultural norm of presenting one’s bare body in public. In this way, again, the body is unable to hide its self or be used to hide or enact illicit things. Instead, the cultural norm insists that one’s body be on display at the request of other citizens or the state. This, too, produces a cultural gazing space regarding the body that renders it naked and transparent in consideration of the social mores of Utopia.

Oddly enough, each party interested in marriage is permitted to gaze upon the nude body of the other, analyzing it for “deformity” (91). Presumably, one could gaze
upon a number of potential “bodies” until finding one suitable for marriage. Again, just as a man is free to gaze upon a possible wife, “likewise a sage and discreet man exhibiteth the wooer naked to the women” (90). In this way, a female perspective – deploying a feminine gaze focused on male bodies – is also asserted within the viewing space produced by Utopian customs.

Indeed, nothing is left for the private experience of the individual in Utopia. In fact, no one is permitted to possess private property whether it be tangible or not. Even experiences and the bodies of others are shared. In this sharing, all things are visible and nothing can be hidden. In essence, Foucault’s ideas on the relations of knowledge and power hold true – when all happenings are visible great power is afforded to those who maintain the gaze. Order and discipline are produced; even the individuals contribute to this order by internalizing the mores of the state and self-policing their own actions.

More’s text resonates with other utopic/dystopic fiction such as Ayn Rand’s Anthem and Margaret Atwood’s A Handmaid’s Tale in the use of surveillance to not only establish a hierarchy but most importantly to maintain power over individuals by regulating sexuality and movement via the cultural manifestation of the state’s gaze, yielding multiple degrees of transparency. In Anthem, Rand constructs a futuristic state that has moved to eradicate any individuality and produce widespread conformity that promotes and easily identifies any party not prescribing to the sanctioned rules or behaviors of the state. These measures transform the social arena into a transparent field of vision, affording the state further visibility to identify transgressors. The novel begins:
It is a sin to write this. It is a sin to think words no others think and to put them down upon a paper no others are to see. It is as if we were speaking alone to no ears but our own. And we know well that there is no transgression blacker than to do or think alone [. . .]. The laws say that none among men may be alone, even and at any time, for this is the great transgression and the root of all evil. (17)

As illustrated here, the state insists on ensuring the transparency of society, even in its ability to scrutinize the thoughts and writings of all citizens, which are not permitted in private spaces. In essence, the disciplinary mechanism functions to dismantle, via constant visibility, the ability of the subject(s) to think, plot, or act outside of what the state and its governing institutions dictate as acceptable.

Instead, like More’s Utopia, the collective society in *Anthem* is the main emphasis of the state and its citizens. The narrator recounts the ideology of the state in *Anthem*:

> We strive to like all our brother men, for all men must be alike. Over the portals of the Palace of the World Council, there are words cut in the marble, which we repeat to ourselves whenever we are tempted:

> “*We are one in all and all in one.*
> *There are no men but only the great WE, One, indivisible and forever.*”

Again, the collective is stressed, prohibiting the emergence of an individual being or idea from the masses. This cultural expectation dictates “none among men may be alone,” works to create a transparent society and renders privacy as not only illicit but nearly unattainable, where every citizen is always in the presence of at least one other. As a result, the government in *Anthem* has generated another form of surveillance via
socially constructed norms where all actions and thoughts must be directed towards the collective state, allowing for no individual thought or action that could threaten the state.

By implementing the mantra above, it is the habituated conditioning of the individuals that assist in maintaining these goals. As Foucault stated, “pedagogical and spiritual transformation of individuals [is] brought about by continuous exercise and penitentiary techniques...” (*Discipline and Punish* 121). As a result, this repetition continued to indoctrinate the masses with the disciplining power of the state, compounding the surveillance capabilities since citizens were now internalizing this imposed ideology that individual needs are sinful and harm the collective. Furthermore, only one ideology can legally exist – any ideology that the state chooses to implement. It is the World Council and other institutions of the state, “which can be implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools and prisons” (*Discipline and Punish* 205), that propagate and enforce these principles.

The narrator and others in *Anthem* are subjected to institutional powers that Foucault mentions. As seen above, the World Council governs and protects the state from invasion. Next is “the Home of the Useless, where the Old Ones live” (28). At age forty, men and women are deemed “useless” and “worn out” (28) and, therefore, are removed from the greater society to spend their last days sequestered in the Home where it’s a “miracle” to reach the age of forty-five. But at an early age, they are sent to the Home of the Students that serves to educate the children and young adults, providing schooling that promotes the will of the state, “The teachers were…appointed by the Councils and the Councils are the voice of all justice for they are the voice of all men” (22). By way of these institutional programs, individuals are reduced to and reformed as docile bodies, complicit to the demands of the state.
In addition to conditioning individuals to the state’s demands and societal ideals, physical movement is also restricted for citizens in *Anthem* via social tradition. Unlike *Utopia* where individuals are seemingly ‘permitted’ to travel the island at their leisure, restricted by regulations on the duration of journeys, physical boundaries and fear are utilized in *Anthem* to directly impede unsupervised movement, escape from the state or access to other spaces beyond designated City boundaries. Similar to *Utopia*, however, there are a number of Cities that make up the state in *Anthem*. But, the narrative of the latter focuses on one particular City.

In *Anthem*, the boundary mentioned at length was “the edge of the City, near the City Theatre” (30) where Equality 7-2521 and other street sweepers were working:

> We were gathering the papers and the rags which the wind had blown from the Theatre [. . .]. We came together to the great ravine behind the Theatre. It is empty save for the trees and weeds. Beyond the ravine there is a plain, and beyond the plain there lies the Uncharted Forest (30).

This vast and treacherous ravine coupled with the plain, which any individual could easily be observed crossing if she could traverse the first obstacle, are formidable enough boundaries to contain citizens. Not as precarious as *Utopia*’s circular island, surrounded by the sea, the Uncharted Forest is yet another ostensibly impassible physical boundary used to inhibit travel or escape from outside the city. However, the social anxieties produced by the cultural mythos or folklore surrounding the woods is even more of a deterrent. Equality 7-2521 states:

> We do not wish to look upon the Uncharted Forest. We do not wish to think of it. But ever do our eyes return to that black patch of sky. Men never enter the Uncharted Forest, for there is no power to explore it and
no path to lead among its ancient trees [. . .]. It is whispered that once or twice in a hundred years, one among the men of the City escape alone and run to the Uncharted Forest, without call or reason. These men do not return. They perish from hunger and from the claws of the wild beasts which roam the Forest. But our Council says that [the men escaping] is only legend. We have heard that there are many Uncharted Forests over the land, among the Cities. (48)

Movement beyond the City’s boundaries appears physically improbable (journeying into and past the ravine and Uncharted Forest) due to the difficulty and “no path” in which to navigate the woods. In addition, according to Equality 7-2521, it is also unthinkable to escape as well. Based upon the legends surrounding supposed escape attempts, fear is generated about what lies beyond the City’s protection, which acts as the initial deterrent even before one may consider the physical challenges involved in departing the City. In fact, there is no mention about the threat of crossing the ravine, only the anxieties of what the forest holds. These legends of the unknown lying beyond the City, such as the “wild beasts” and the aptly named “Uncharted” Forest, spread through society and work to further contain citizens within these boundaries by evoking emotional fear and compounding the physical limitations of movement across the ravine into the Uncharted Forest.

In this case, the folklore propagates the consequences of fleeing into the Uncharted Forest and functions as an additional feature of surveillance in this text. In fact, the folklore describing those few who purportedly attempted to escape the City and, as a result, met tragic ends introduces a social norm into the culture. This social norm dictates the impossibility of escape that is disseminated throughout *Anthem* and
frightens the population from actually discovering what lies beyond the accepted boundaries. In other words, these beliefs function as propaganda, promoting the safety of individuals within the boundaries of the benevolent City compared to what awaits outside of the state’s borders. The social norm produced via the folklore works in correlation with the legal measures to monitor and restrict movement. In this way, the myth of the Uncharted Forest shapes the social consciousness of the society, immediately removing any thought or consideration of escape for most citizens and limiting their movement to within the boundaries of the City.

As stated in the selection above, it appears that formidable woods surround the entirety of the state, not only this particular City, as reflected by the last statement, “We have heard that there are many Uncharted Forests over the land, among the Cities.” In this way, movement outside of one’s particular City is ostensibly impossible due to the mental, emotional and physical challenges produced by the topographical boundaries surrounding the state. Although regulations of individual movements and applied restrictions upon mobility are less developed in *Anthem* than in *Utopia*, the state in *Anthem* can still maximize control of its citizens by limiting movement to and within one’s designated City, which promotes further transparency and surveillance of individuals because no movements outside of monitored areas are permitted nor successful. Therefore, the state’s laws as well as the social mores and cultural folklore, restricting individuals from exploring outside of permitted areas, serve to enhance the degree of surveillance within the City in *Anthem*.

In *The Handmaid’s Tale*, similar to the process of Utopian citizens requesting travel, the Handmaid’s are distributed passes, which are routinely checked, enabling mobility throughout the Republic. The passes permit each Handmaid access to specific
areas and buildings, such as All Flesh for groceries and her assigned Commander’s
domicile – two of the few places they are permitted. Offred comments upon the process
of regulating mobility in the Republic as her and another Handmaid are confronted at a
checkpoint:

The two young Guardians salute us, raising three fingers to the rims of
their berets [. . .]. We produce our passes, from the zippered pockets in
our wide sleeves, and they are inspected and stamped. One man goes
into the right-hand pillbox, to punch our numbers into the Compuchek.

(21)

There are two facets of surveillance involved with the state sanctioned mobility of
Handmaid’s in the Republic of Gilead. The first, as pointed out above, is similar to what
is implemented in *Utopia*. For example both the Handmaids and Utopians must acquire
passes or passports, respectively, to travel. Where the state assigned travel
companions to ensure the validity of the passport and inhibit deviation from the stated
destination in *Utopia*, a computerized authentication is put in place via various
checkpoints manned by the Guardians in the Republic of Gilead. In this way, by
scanning and stamping the Handmaid’s pass, each movement she makes can be
registered, verified and recorded. The gaze of the Republic is thereby magnified by the
system of passes and Compuchek in that not only is a particular movement checked to
determine if permissible, but there is also a record generated telling where each
Handmaid travels to and every time she reaches a checkpoint or encounters a Guardian
patrolling the Republic on foot.

Second, besides brief walks permitted, Offred and the Handmaids travel only to
All Flesh for groceries or back to their Commander’s homes to procreate and sleep.
After shopping at All Flesh, Offred “hands over [her] tokens, and one Guardian enters the numbers on them into the Compubite while the other [Guardian] gives [her the] purchases” (26). Similar to the Compuchek recording and validating the movements of Handmaids throughout the Republic, the Compubite records the purchases and amounts spent by the Handmaids on food and supplies for their Commander’s home. By entering the amounts spent into the Compubite another system of surveillance is implemented into the culture of the Republic. These records accurately monitor not only the movements but the money spent and goods acquired by subjects of the state as well, allowing the state to survey the Handmaids even when not literally gazing upon them. Again, these are crucial surveillant measures that not only track Handmaids but also prohibit stealing or hoarding of money or goods by Handmaids. Both of which are crucial in preventing attempts to escape from the Republic. Furthermore, a lack of resources, both financial and goods in kind, help to maintain the Handmaids’ dependence upon their Commanders by providing for the women’s basic needs.

What is more, in *Anthem*, the most effective use of the gaze for social control, which follows the example of More’s society, is that sex is equally and strictly regulated by the state, decreeing a specific time of year, titled the Time of Mating, allotted for propagation of the nation. Rand writes, “This is the time each spring when all the men older than twenty and all the women older than eighteen are sent for one night to the City Palace of Mating. And each of the men has one of the women assigned to them by the Council of Eugenics” (41). Bodies and their reproductive functions are obviously possessions of the state, which delineates the specific time and partner sanctioned for procreation. Aptly named, the Council of Eugenics works to skillfully engineer the production of new citizens, beginning with the selection and pairing of mates. This
breeding of its citizens is the first measure to ensure the desired outcomes in future offspring. Again, as seen in *Utopia*, sexuality and reproduction are transformed from very private acts to quite public, governmental operations, illustrating the state’s control over the individual body as well as the reach and forms of the penetrative gaze that monitors all aspects of life in these totalitarian regimes.

Moreover, “Children are born each winter, but women never see their children and children never know their parents” (41). After attempting to genetically engineer offspring to some degree by matching parents, the state further produces compliant individuals through social engineering. The removal of newborns from their parents produces two effects. One, it allows for the unimpeded indoctrination of the state’s ideologies. Rather than place responsibility on the parents or social mechanisms to directly “educate” children as to the social and political expectations of the state, the state can directly program those expectations into the children as seen fit. In this way, by immediate removal from the parents, the child is not introduced to other influences or ulterior motives except those disseminated by the state. Furthermore, the parents are impeded from developing devotion towards the child, which could interfere with the prior conditioning of the state that has constructed society as a single, collective body. In other words, raising one’s child may distract from allegiance to the state and produce a loyalty solely to the child. In the end, these calculated measures are taken so that each body must serve only the state. In addition, this conditioning is an extension of the literal gaze in that programming citizens with acceptable ideas and limitations produces desired results for the state, allowing the latter to “see” what its citizens are thinking and how they are acting because subjects have been trained to think and act in specific ways predetermined by the state.
Next, the compliance of each body is compounded by other mechanisms set in place by the state. As Foucault claims in *Discipline and Punish*:

> The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individualities. However, from the point of view of the [state], it is replaced by a multiplicity that can be numbered and supervised. (201)

In *Anthem*, the state takes this process that Foucault illustrates and advances it one step further. Where the social institutions seek to indoctrinate, police and manage the collective, other methods implemented by the state serve to eradicate individuality by homogenizing the collective “multiplicity” produced via the systemic surveillance that much further.

Subsequently, the significance of maintaining a discrepancy of visibility, e.g. who can and cannot “see” or have access to particular facets of the society, is most crucial to the discipline of the state in all texts discussed in this chapter. These restrictions are not as prevalent in *Utopia*, in that all citizens excluding criminals, had access to nearly everything minus the tower in the center of the island that housed the garrison or the hospitals. But for the general population of Utopia, free citizens primarily had access to the property and resources of everyone else, which aided in the production of a nearly transparent society. However, this is not the case in Atwood’s *The Handmaid’s Tale*, where a massive imbalance in the use and condition of transparency is exercised.

Atwood’s dystopic novel is set in a newly reformed totalitarian and theocratic state – the Republic of Gilead. This new regime emphasizes traditional mores and religious values from which its rulers claim the United States had deviated. As a result,
an emphasis on patriarchal rule is of primary concern. However, the proclaimed motive of the reformed society is the protection of women through the eradication of those mediums listed above that portrayed women in negative ways. Furthermore, stringent regulations on sexuality and forced reproduction have been implemented. The Republic claims it has eliminated rape and sexual violence from the society by not allowing men to freely express their carnal desires and imposing rigid control over women.

As a result, the Republic of Gilead has succeeded in stripping women of their rights and forcing each into various subservient roles to ‘benefit’ the state. No longer allowed access to education, permitted to read, or have control of their own bodies, women are utilized for various attributes specific to their gender – all, allegedly, for their protection. Although the state claims its motives for creating a despotic society based around a phallocentric agenda are based on living in an age of declining rates as a result of pollution and chemical spills, it is hinted that the cause of its restrictive measures towards women was due to women pursuing selfish goals and achievements rather than, according to traditional expectations, producing children and raising a family. The condemning eyes of God as well as the ubiquitous masculine gaze of the state are utilized to oversee and regulate social behaviors within the Republic of Gilead.

As mentioned earlier, it is Offred’s duty in this newly revamped social order to maintain the future of the Republic of Gilead. Against her will, she has been selected, groomed and is used for her reproductive powers. One of numerous “Handmaids,” Offred is assigned to one of the many Commanders, a group of men that rule the republic, to provide heirs to those in power. In this way, identical to the viewing of marriage partners in *Utopia* and state designated times and mates for procreation in *Anthem*, the very intimate and private act of sexual intercourse is turned into a
somewhat public event in *The Handmaid’s Tale*. Although not held outside as a public spectacle, the infertile wives of the Commanders as well as a number of attendants are present while the sexual acts take place. In fact, each Handmaid is forced to lie on the bed, between the legs of the Commander’s wife, while the Commander “is doing his duty” (95). During intercourse Offred raises her arms and the Commander’s wife holds her hands, while supporting Offred’s head on her stomach: “This is supposed to signify that we are one flesh, one being. What it really means is that she is in control, of the process and thus of the product. If any” (94). Ultimately, the Commanders dictate the social mores of sexuality, sequestering and controlling the Handmaids for their reproductive usage. In this way, a further gazing space is produced via the created social expectations regarding sexuality by these agents of the state, transforming the traditionally private space of the individual body into a more public event, thereby ensuring another form of surveillance through which the state can observe subjects.

In essence, the Handmaid’s body is made transparent, laid bare for all in attendance to gaze upon. Because the society is designed around the maintenance of childbirth, women’s bodies have become the property of the state by way of political subjugation. As Offred claims, a woman’s body has been commodified as a “natural resource” (65), producing heirs for the Commanders and propagating the future of the state. As a result, she is reduced to her abilities of reproduction, seen as nothing but a womb – “think of yourselves as seeds” (18) the Aunts would convince the Handmaids. The individual is removed through this process of visibility and a subject to be scrutinized remains in her place. Accordingly, the body is possessed by those who see it and by the state that reforms the individual body of Offred as well as the other
Handmaids into one of many “containers,” so that, as Offred states, “It’s only the insides of our bodies that’s important” (96).

Offred again refers to the reformation of her body into an object that is important only because of its use value in bearing children via the transparency afforded by the controlling gaze of the state, saying:

I used to think of my body as an instrument of pleasure, or a means of transportation, or an implement for the accomplishment of my will [. . .].

Now the flesh arranges itself differently. I’m a cloud, congealed around a central object, the shape of a pear, which is hard and more real than I am and glows red within its translucent wrapping. (73-74)

The creation of the docile body is apparent here. The internalized power of the state has reshaped the body and image of the subject, not only for those gazing upon it but also in the eyes of the subject herself. She is reduced to a function, dehumanized and replaced by the image of a reproductive machine. This transformation is precisely what the ideal docile body seeks to exhibit. Rather than stand out, recognized by the individuating features of a singular and unique body or personality, the docile body is removed of its eccentricities and normalized, inscribed with the methods and intentionality of the type of labor impressed upon it. As a result, the docile body, engaged in the act of production, issues in another facet of discipline that Foucault had identified as “bio-power.” And like all forms of production, sex and reproduction is to be managed – surveyed, analyzed and efficiently executed according to the terms of industry – in capitalist nations. This included the consideration of how citizens made use of sex and the associated taboos and regulations of sexual conduct. Foucault claims that this exhibition of:
bio-power was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism: [bio-power] would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes. (The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 140-141)

This description and application is exactly how female bodies are utilized in Gilead. The female body and reproductive powers represent the productive mechanisms of the state in terms of industry. Commanders utilize the procreative powers of the Handmaid to maintain the paternal rule of the Republic of Gilead, via the constructed gender hierarchy.

In The Handmaid’s Tale, this process seeks to not only control the body of the individual upon which the gaze and power is directed but is magnified to manage the production of other bodies resulting from childbirth as well. The reach of the patriarchal state’s power is extended in this circumstance to include those new bodies born into the system, again rendering transparent previously accepted private issues and events now made visible by way of the penetrative gaze. Offred recalls a time prior to the establishment of the Republic of Gilead when she had freedoms, an occupation, a family, and a free will: “Luke and I used to walk together, sometimes, along these streets. We used to talk about buying a house like one of these [. . .]. We could have a garden, swings for the children” (23). However, those born into this system as products of the Commanders’ and the Handmaids who continue propagating the phallocentric society, will not have the luxury of knowing another way of life. Instead, they will be indoctrinated with the laws and mores of the republic – a place where infants will be
educated and normalized to these patriarchal and autocratic practices by way of these surveillant discourses.

The most important resource and mode of production in the Republic of Gilead are the Handmaids’ docile bodies and their reproductive function. Offred is first rendered docile by the social mores of the Republic, which then easily allows for her insertion into the mechanism of production of which she comes to embody. It is the process of harnessing bio-power from docile bodies that “guarantee relations of domination and effects of hegemony” (*History of Sexuality, Vol. 1* 141). In the Republic of Gilead, the state asserts the principles of capitalism to reap the bio-power of the Handmaids and preserve the future of the state and its power. For example, the Commanders represent the capitalists, functioning much like Marx and Engel’s model from *The Communist Manifesto*, which defines history as a struggle between socio-economic classes of the exploited and the exploiters. The Commanders are easily equated with the Bourgeoisie class, owning the means of production as well as commanding the workforce. In *The Handmaid’s Tale* it is the Commanders who dictate the social mores of sexuality and own the conditions of production, sequestering and controlling the Handmaids for only their reproductive usage. As a result, the Handmaids function as the exploited Proletariat “wage laborers” expected to ‘sell’ their reproductive abilities – their labor-power – to not only maintain their own lives but that of the state. The women have become acknowledged by nothing but their reproductive abilities, as Offred reflects above, “I’m a cloud, congealed around a central object” of her womb. To reiterate, she has been commodified, acknowledged for only her use value to the republic. In other words, the Proletariat masses are forced to labor under the hegemonic Bourgeoisie power in order to survive, entering a relationship of which the former is
dominated by the latter’s implemented system of labor, brought about by and also contributing further to the transparency of the social spectrum.

The processes of creating docile bodies to harness their labor production and exploit the bio-power of the masses are also prevalent in *Anthem*. The state must begin by converting its citizens into docile bodies in order to reform the masses into a compliant labor force. This first happens by leveling what was once a society of individuals during a time before the “Great Rebirth” (19) where a great inequality between citizens thrived permitting ambition, apathy, greed, poverty and affluence to separate people from one another. These disparities among individuals were caused by personal desire and accomplishment that all stemmed from free will of the individual. However, following the Great Rebirth, all now focus on only the will of the state, which demands from each citizen that “The will of our brothers be done” (26), eliminating – in fact, outlawing – personal motives, desires or accomplishments.

By aiding the reformation of citizens into docile bodies, the state has begun (re)namining individuals as a way to label and catalogue facets of society. Noting the development of these techniques in history, Foucault states:

> [. . .] we saw the emergence of techniques of power that were essentially centered on the body, on the individual body. They included all devices that were used to ensure the spatial distribution of individual bodies (their separation, their alignment, their serialization, and their surveillance) and the organization around those individuals, of a whole field of visibility.

*(Society Must Be Defended 242)*

Named Equality 7-2521, “as is written on the iron bracelet which all men wear on their left wrists” (18), the protagonist has no creative or unique “name” to differentiate him
from others, to identify a personality within. Instead, he is assigned and labeled as a specific ‘group’ and serial number, confirming and revealing details about his history to the state. Others have “names” like Union 5-3992 and International 4-8818. Determined by their state given titles, Equality 7-2521 is just one in a series of others who combine to represent the state. In this way, even the names of individuals in *Anthem* provide information and serve as another form of surveillance for the state, rendering the masses even more transparent by eliminating individualities.

Next, the function of the Council of Vocations also serves to suppress the citizens and render them docile to the will of the state, again magnifying the transparency afforded by determining the work of each person and further limiting free will which, in turn, reduces the amount of activity that potentially could remain hidden from the state. Enforced by the penalties associated with the Transgression of Preference, the Council of Vocations evaluated and determined the occupation of citizens in *Anthem*. Having one’s own desire for a particular vocation or showing displeasure in the Council’s selection resulted in incarceration since one’s personal preference was illicit. The teachers also enforced this process stating: “Dare not choose in your minds the word that you would like to do when you leave the Home of the Students. You shall do that which the Council of Vocations shall prescribe to you.” (22)

Equality 7-2521 had secretly wished to “be sent to the Home of Scholars” (23) where great modern inventions were produced. If he attended the Home of Scholars he “could ask questions [. . .]. They do not forbid questions” (24) as the teachers do. In this way, another degree of transparency is produced by creating a system of education where knowledge and truth are disseminated by the institutions and the state rather than arranging a system of discovery for students. As a result, reality is constructed and
fixed, never able to be challenged or questioned. Instead, that which is construed as real and truth are constantly visible. Thus, all that moves to challenge or is subversive to that truth is also readily visible and can immediately be removed, punishing the transgressor(s) as the Transgression of Preference and other ordinances serve to do. Rather than going to the Home of the Scholars, which he had secretly wished for, the Council of Vocations assigned Equality 7-2521 to the Home of the Street Sweepers.

However, what appears most effective in eradicating the individual from a social system is the usurpation of language by the autocratic state in both *Anthem* and *The Handmaid’s Tale*. The control and manipulation of language induces docile bodies by producing another layer of transparency within social and cultural spaces. For example, the restriction of language translates into the inhibition of ideas and “free” thinking, as one can only construct ideas and express one’s self with the linguistic tools made available. Furthermore, variances in a specific language – speaking, writing and spelling – also serve to define individuals and affiliations with others regarding geographic, socioeconomic and ethnic boundaries. In *Anthem*, in particular, this control of language by the state has a profound effect in producing docile bodies that cannot recognize individual desires because of limitations on rhetoric that the state has imposed.

In *Anthem*, the protagonist cannot express the identity of himself or any individual for that matter but can only refer back to the entire collective society with the pronoun in the third person plural: “We.” For instance, Equality 7-2521 describes his personal evaluation by the Council of Vocations in determining his occupation: “So we waited our turn in the great hall and then we heard the Council of Vocations call our name: “Equality 7-2521.” We walked to the dais, and our legs did not tremble, and we looked up at the Council.” (25) This is a prime example of how the state has removed any
terminology that conveys or represents the first person singular or a first person singular experience. Instead, each citizen is left to utilize the plural form of the first person. This does convey the thoughts and experiences of the first person, but what is uttered can never be personalized or unique to a particular individual in the state. As equality 7-2521 states:

There is some word, one single word, which is not in the language of men, but which had been. And this is the Unspeakable Word, which no men may speak nor hear. But sometimes, and it is rare, sometimes, somewhere, one among men find that word. They find it upon scraps of old manuscripts or cut into the fragments of ancient stones. But when they speak it they are put to death. There is no crime punished by death in this world, save this one crime of speaking the Unspeakable Word. (49)

The importance of the state’s eradication of the individual and, in turn, its focus on the collective is illustrated here in the dire consequences that result from even the utterance of an individual thought or the representative pronoun used in communicating that thought. Later, Equality 7-2521 describes the execution of one citizen who had muttered “the Unspeakable Word, which no man may speak or hear [. . .] but when they speak it they are put to death” (49). This emphasis on the “We,” the collective, is what drives the social consciousness and state in Anthem. Furthermore, by removing the rhetoric from the social lexicon that represents individuals, the state has achieved a significant mechanism for producing docile bodies. Ultimately, if the concept of an “individual” is removed from the established language, no personal agendas, ideas or ambitions can be expressed, maintaining the collective reality and its transparency.
The Handmaid’s Tale also illustrates a state’s utilization of rhetoric to institute further surveillance upon citizens. Offred and the Handmaids have been stripped of their original names and re-labeled after the social reforms had occurred in establishing the Republic of Gilead. As a result, this procedure has affected the women in two ways. First, they are rendered as docile bodies, as discussed above, renamed and given new identities as human breeders or “Handmaids” for their designated Commanders. Also, each woman now must bear her “owner’s” brand manifested in her new name. No longer an individual of freewill, yet claiming to remember her “real” name but never revealing it, she is now called and recognized as “Offred” (“of Fred”). As a result, she is a possession of Fred, her delegated Commander. The same is true for her friends Ofglen and Ofwarren. In this way, the manipulation of language, when renaming the women in The Handmaid’s Tale, acts as a rhetorical mode of rendering individuals “docile,” subservient to the new application of language and the resulting oppressive meaning.

What is more, the Commanders use the theocratic authority and corresponding written doctrine of the state to further enforce the transparency and discipline within the Republic of Gilead via this extension of the gaze produced by the human limitations inscribed in the text. The men in power use passages from the Bible to justify the role of women in the new social order. Offred expresses frustration in this imbalance of power afforded by the biblical writings, “He has something we don’t have, he has the word” (88). It is “the word” that has enslaved her and the Handmaids, reducing the women to an antiquated system of power, as compared to the standards that the Republic of Gilead sought to reform, in which they are subordinate to men. The Commanders read to the Handmaids:
Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth [. . .]. Give me children, or else I die. Am I in God’s stead, who hath withheld from the fruit of the womb? Behold my maid Bilhah. She shall bear upon my knees, that I may also have children by her. (88)

Asserting all of the alleged authority passed down to man by God, the Commanders apply the teachings of the Bible scriptures to the culture and political framework of the new republic helping to ensure the gender hierarchy and establish social and sexual mores.

Offred is cognizant of the motives behind the reading of the scriptures and understands the use of repetition to condition the women into believing and acting accordingly. She recalls the tape that plays everyday at lunch when the women are sequestered together under the watchful eyes of the Aunts, so that “not even an Aunt would be guilty of the sin of reading. The voice was a man’s.” It read:

Blessed be the poor in spirit, for there’s is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are the merciful. Blessed by the meek. Blessed are the silent. “I knew they made that up, I knew it was wrong, and they left things out, too, but there was no way of checking.” (89)

Here, Offred reveals the manipulation of an authoritative text in order to control the population and coerce the women to behave accordingly. Using the Bible adds to the Commanders’ authority by invoking a higher power – the highest authority for a theocracy, in fact – to validate their social reforms and the Handmaid’s duties in particular. In this way, it can be construed that the Commanders’ did not dictate how society should operate, but rather it is God’s supreme rule that has been enacted in the Republic of Gilead, commanding the management of sexuality and childbirth. In this
way, the manifestation of the literal gaze delineates power over the women by dictating their socially accepted roles in the regime and designates what is and is not appropriate behavior. Therefore, the women are judged in juxtaposition to the state’s religious needs and mores ascribed to women who are immediately seen as conforming to or defying the laws of the Republic. As a result, the monitoring produced by the laws and mores found in the Bible in *The Handmaid’s Tale* work to identify those subversive acts and deviants within society.

It is only through reducing procreation to conditions of industry and production, rendered by the degrees of surveillance in the state, which allows the patriarchy of the Republic of Gilead to not only harness this resource but also dominate this all-important power. The eternal gaze of the state, manifested in many ways illustrated above, all seek to invert the “natural” gender hierarchy, removing the female from her place of power and replacing her with the male and his resulting gaze. Biologically, it is the woman who commands the greatest power—the ability to contribute an egg and not only carry but directly contribute to the development and, ultimately, the birth of a new human being. The creative powers of God, He who all should serve in the Republic of Gilead, are embodied in microcosm within the eggs and creative potential of a woman. Offred hints at the acknowledgement of this power, stating “I think that this is what God must look like: an egg” (110). If this is the case, then she and the other Handmaids embody God through their ability to produce and carry fertilized eggs. This is what makes Offred and the other Handmaids so vital to the state because the men in charge can only oversee the discipline and production of citizens, harnessing this power but never be capable of it themselves. Therefore, rendering the women docile by controlling
the means of production and regulating sexuality and reproduction is vital to the motives and propagation of the patriarchy.

Here again, the restrictions upon movement and regulations of sexuality and procreation in *Utopia*, *Anthem* and *The Handmaid’s Tale* are propagated by the ruling bodies in each text and work to further monitor citizens via cultural and legal manifestations of the literal gaze. It is the use of these representations of the states’ gaze, which transforms the most private of objects, moments and acts into public manifestations, exhibiting the state’s control, which most closely links these texts and hegemonies. The states’ variations in restrictions on travel and movement in the texts limit the spatial mobility of individuals and allows for another form of scrutiny upon citizens by limiting or tracking the movement of bodies in state designated spaces. However, it is the state’s exposure of and participation in personal intimacies regarding sexuality that enforce the most power over individuals by removing agency over one’s body and manipulating personal agency in these autocracies. In the end, the state’s control over sexuality and procreation eliminates a great deal of control an individual may have over their body. By controlling the functions of the body, the individual is rendered transparent and, in Foucauldian terms, becomes a docile body.
CHAPTER III
SHIFT FROM A DISCIPLINARY SOCIETY
TRACES OF THE DIGITAL HUMAN IN 1984

“In the past man has been first; in the future the system must be first.”

--Fredrick Winslow Taylor
The Principles of Scientific Management, 1911

Foucault established that power was disseminated by individuals or institutions in power via the literal gazing upon subjects in physical spaces. For example, in The Scarlet Letter, while Hester Pryne’s punishment is dependent upon the Church branding her with the scarlet letter, more importantly, she is visibly marked in the settlement by being continually under the scrutiny of her peers via the Church’s authority. Furthermore, social manifestations of surveillance, utilizing the construction of shared mores and laws, produce further vantage points through which individuals can be monitored. Utopia illustrates this form of surveillance by issuing passports along with dictating stringent rules on individual movement within and outside of each borough in the state to monitor and restrict movement. Deployment of these manifestations of the literal gaze renders society all the more transparent.

These surveillant powers became dramatically enhanced by the developing technology of the modern age. What emerged was a new intangible space, created by electronic technology, through which to view subjects. In this way, physical bodies begin to disappear, as David Lyon states, and are replaced by the hyperreal representations of bodies. Furthermore, the physical body begins to degenerate from the visual
landscapes as the digital body materializes to take its place. For example, whereas the Bentham model of Panopticism sought to manipulate bodies and render them docile via the disciplinary gaze of institutions, in Orwell's *1984* the electronic gaze of the telescreens manipulated bodies by rendering them as seemingly purposeless objects, only considering the *representations* of those bodies as vital. Although this virtual representation of the body and resulting information produced by bodies will impact and magnify the use of surveillance in the twenty-first century, this is a paradigm shift regarding surveillance and the conditions of its deployment that was already anticipated by *1984*, written during the late 1940s.

Orwell’s *1984* uniquely demonstrates both traditional Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian characteristics. The Foucauldian elements are clear. Orwell defines and highlights the dangers associated with the modes of surveillance at work. He establishes Big Brother’s control and monitoring of the public, private and institutional spaces and processes via various disciplinary and regulatory actions that illustrate Foucault’s assertions about gazing spaces and resulting relations of power. However, and most importantly, Orwell is able to presciently gaze beyond his present to reveal how the conduits of power and surveillance will shift according to evolving technology in the following century. In other words, the novel’s bleak depiction of man subjugated via the interface with electronic systems indicates the formation of the rudimentary elements of digital hyperreality.

**Traditional Foucauldian Elements of Surveillance in *1984***

From the outset of the novel, the Party has constructed the layout of the city of London and Oceania to maximize the visibility of its inhabitants within material spaces.
similar to those illustrated in More’s *Utopia*. First, the Ministry of Truth is centralized in relation to the design of the city that “towered vast and white above the grimy landscape” (3). Minitrue, as it was called in Newspeak, could even be seen from Winston’s flat over a kilometer away, leering in the distance. This description resembles the central tower of Bentham’s Panoptic prison surrounded at its periphery with the many occupied cells. The tall building encompassed by many individuals in their flats produces the same effects as the prison schema that Foucault identified. However, in this instance, there is no presence of a directly disseminated institutional gaze emphasizing the visibility of the subjects below. The high reaching structure does, nonetheless, broadcast a coercive discourse meant to be seen and understood by those subjected to this mechanism. “Startlingly different from any other object in sight, [. . .] soaring up three hundred meters in the air” (4) the Ministry of Truth displays the three slogans of the Party on its walls:

WAR IS PEACE
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY
IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH (4)

Despite living over a kilometer away, Winston is still able to read the inscription on the Minitrue edifice. This display of the Party’s slogans does not function like the penetrative gaze of the guard in the central tower of the Panoptic prison but produces some of the same results in that the building transmits the power of the state upon its citizens. In addition, like Bentham’s model, this mechanism also constructs the relations of power so that the subjects also must bear the weight of the discipline enforced upon them as Foucault stated. Gazing up at the skyline the state’s expectations and mores are clearly labeled. Like the central tower of the Panopticon, Minitrue is always visible, easily seen
towering above the city, “watching” over London, and continually impressing its ideologies, which are ever-present upon its walls, on all citizens that the Party wishes to discipline. What is more:

Scattered about London there were just three other buildings of similar appearance and size. So completely did they dwarf the surrounding architecture that from the roof of Victory Mansion [Winston’s apartment building] you could see all four of them simultaneously. They were the homes of the four Ministries between which the entire apparatus of government was divided. The Ministry of Truth, which concerned itself with news, entertainment, education and the fine arts; the Ministry of Peace, which concerned itself with war; the Ministry of Love, which maintained law and order; and the Ministry of Plenty, which was responsible for economic affairs. (4)

Orwell has constructed a modified Panopticon in designing the cityscape of new London after the Party’s rise to power. Foucault claimed that the Panopticon is a metaphor for how power functions in society, primarily its dissemination over the masses by the social institutions. Applying that thinking, it is obvious here that Oceania overtly emphasizes the use and importance of these social institutions in governing the nation. Towering high above the landscape, the buildings of Minitrue, Minipax, Miniluv, and Miniplenty, as abbreviated in Newspeak (4), stand as the four pillars of the ruling body and its directives, producing and enforcing a normalizing milieu from these four points. In short, the might of the Party is manifest in the institutional architecture that towers over the Oceania environs.
More importantly, in theoretical terms, by using the four tallest and bright white buildings to house the branches of the state, Orwell has magnified Big Brother’s power fourfold in multiplying the number of “central towers” or conduits of power in this arena. Not only is one tower visible in this situation, which is all that is needed to maintain order according to Foucault’s disciplinary model, but four are simultaneously visible, at least from Winston’s perspective from his flat. Similarly, in the Panoptic design, Bentham:

laid down the principal that power should be visible and unverifiable.

Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know where he is being looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so. (Discipline and Punish 201)

Assumingly, at any point in the city and at any moment in time, traveling in any cardinal direction, one could be subjected to seeing at least one of the Party’s institutional structures and the propaganda etched into the walls.

This modification of the Panopticon would then produce a greater disciplinary mechanism emanating throughout the social body. As in the prison model from Discipline and Punish, rather than one presumed guard in the tower, at least three others now potentially can gaze upon the masses from three additional vantage points. As Foucault stated, “Visibility is a trap (DP 200),” but in this situation with four viewing points within this space, one’s visibility becomes the ultimate trap as the probability of being seen is also magnified by increasing the number of towers.

It is of little importance, actually, if there truly is a guard occupying the tower and watching the masses. Simply the potential of being seen is the greatest threat. And this
threat of visibility is what causes the individual to assume “responsibility for the constraints of power [. . .] upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which [. . .] he becomes the principle of his own subjection” (202). Like the example above, in 1984 it is not necessary for Big Brother to exist for order to be kept. Instead, what is crucial is that the “tower,” itself, simply exists and is constantly visible, not the occupant(s) within, radiating the power of the state upon those individuals caught within the confines of the viewing space. In other words, who wields the power is insignificant in this model, but it is the potential and presence of that power that is key and must remain eternally present. This is the case in 1984, where the four buildings that house the operating institutions ruling Oceania are constantly visible to those who the institutions rule over. This maintains order and represents the visual proof that the institutions exist and are exhibited by the towering structures, housing the potential to punish those transgressors that dare to step outside the bounds of the law. As a result, all facets of the state can be imposed concurrently upon citizens of Oceania, compounding the power of the state over its subjects.

Another scheme that produces transparency concerning the design of physical spaces is the creation of localized boundaries by the Party. One specific restriction is that Party members, who includes Winston, are forbidden to access areas designated for the occupation of the “proles” (the Proletariat and lower working class citizens), which consisted of “eighty-five percent of the population of Oceania” (69). This law serves to restrict certain movement and works to contain the deviant citizens in much the same way that Foucault claims contemporary punishment has evolved in the western world.
Other societal laws and expectations were also paramount in Oceania. As seen in *Anthem*, there were certain dangers to formulating and communicating unique ideas, especially those that disputed or even questioned those of the state. The same holds true for Winston and others in *1984*. Despite the threat of the Thought Police or the ubiquitous telescreens, Winston purchases a book with blank pages that he intends to use as a diary to record his own thoughts and ideas that “if detected [he] was reasonably certain that [he] would be punished by death, or at least by twenty-five years in a forced-labor camp” (6). The diary’s blank pages, with the potential of filling it with new, subversive or different ideas and questions, represented a formidable danger to the rule of the Inner Party and Big Brother. Ironically similar to the potential of being seen by the state via the social surveillance mechanisms in place, this ‘potential,’ only now in the hands of citizens and their self-expression, could threaten to invert the power structure by presenting competing or deposing ideologies in opposition to the state. As a result, the state had instituted the use of speakwrite machines to record one’s thoughts whenever necessary to “write” anything down. As Winston states, “Apart from very short notes, it was usual to dictate everything into the speakwrite, which was of course impossible for this present purpose” (7). It is safe to assume that the reason it was “impossible” to utilize the speakwrite in this situation was due to the fact that Big Brother has access to the information dictated to the machine. Similar to the Compubites in *The Handmaid’s Tale*, the Party has access to any information that individuals would deem important enough to record on the speakwrite, functioning as yet another layer of surveillance and transparency at work in the social fabric of Oceania. Winston’s use of the diary was to privately record his thoughts, concealed
from the Party, which he utilizes to express his true and seditious attitude toward the state, repeatedly writing:

DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER
DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER
DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER
DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER
DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER
DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER (18)

However, Winston acknowledged that even if the diary was never found, the Party could still discover his treasonous opinions. In fact, whether he continued on with the journal or not the:

Thought Police would get him just the same [. . .] even if he had never set pen to paper. Thoughtcrime they called it. Thoughtcrime was not a thing that could be concealed forever. You might dodge successfully for a while, even for years, but sooner or later they were bound to get you. (19)

The act of committing thoughtcrime and being taken away by the Thought Police seemed to be the most frightening consequence to Winston. The Thought Police utilize the various surveillance systems to scrutinize the social body of Oceania and function much like the metaphorical gaze of the Panopticon, creating a situation where individuals are always seen, but never seeing (Discipline and Punish 201). The Thought Police function much like the Eyes in A Handmaid’s Tale in that one never knows who may be a secret member of the state.

Routine surveillance of Oceania is also enacted by the state. Patrol Police helicopters “snooped into people’s windows” (2). Again, Foucault asserted that creating transparency in a particular space induced “a state of conscious and permanent visibility
that assures the autonomic functioning of power” (Discipline and Punish 201). These measures create the potential of being seen by the Party and produce a fear in citizens. As afforded by the Panopticon, this potential of visibility is enough to minimize deviant behavior simply by creating the possibility of being seen: “Visibility is a trap” (Discipline and Punish 200). And the Patrol Police serve to trap citizens by way of surveillance.

Furthermore, in 1984, Winston and his colleagues spend their workday in cubicles at the Ministry of Truth, physically separated from others by partitions, which mirrors Foucault’s definition of individuals “inserted into a fixed space” (201) regarding the example above. This arrangement is analogous to Bentham’s Panopticon layout where the “building is divided into cells” (Discipline and Punish 200). In each of those “cells” the occupants, in this case Winston and other employees at the Ministry of Truth, are “small captive shadows in the cells [. . .]. They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible (200). As a result, the design of the space transforms an amorphous crowd of workers into “a collection of separated individualities” (201).

Under these circumstances, any contact with others, be it physical or not, is rare and extremely risky, but always treated with suspicion. It is through contact with others that the threat of exchanging illicit information and ideas, considered hazardous to the state, could be attempted. This danger to the totalitarian rule of Big Brother is conveyed through Winston’s and O’Brien’s momentary eye contact during a Two Minute Hate:

It was as though their two minds had opened and the thoughts were flowing from one into the other through their eyes. “I am with you,” O’Brien seemed to be saying to him. “I know precisely what you are felling. I know
all about your contempt, your hatred, your disgust. But don’t worry. I am on your side!” And then the flash of intelligence was gone [. . .]. (17)

The transitory connection between these two men, although seemingly undetected, is already a danger to the state. Consequently, the solitary “docile body” is forcibly inhibited in its contact with others. As Foucault states, “[the ‘docile body’] is a subject of information, never a subject in communication” (Discipline and Punish 200). This reticent state is exactly what the Party instills within each of its employees corralled in their cubicles and through constant subjection to the Party’s gazing. Without it an established cohesive unit can form out of the isolated individuals who trust in and converse with each other, growing more threatening to the Party than the latent contact of O’Brien and Winston above. For these reasons, it is imperative that the state preserve the established hierarchy and maintain order by eradicating the ability of individuals to form collectives and to remain in “a sequestered and observed solitude” to be “numbered and supervised” (201) accordingly by the Party.

But what is more, as touched upon above, the very thought of subversive activity is rendered transparent by the Thought Police who can reportedly read the very ideas of one’s mind. Even prior to acting out against the state, one can be incarcerated for merely conjuring such thoughts. This extreme form of surveillance allows for no free spaces of one’s own, even in the intangible recesses of the mind. No secret spaces can exist in Oceania according to Big Brother. This also includes those intimate “spaces” between two individuals.

Like the potential threat produced in the fleeting yet ostensible alliance between O’Brien and Winston during the Two Minute Hate, carnal and emotional connections must also be closely controlled by the state. Similar to measures taken by the
hegemonies in *Anthem, The Scarlet Letter* and *The Handmaid’s Tale* sexuality and intimacy are strictly disciplined in Oceania, moving towards the eradication of the sexual libido all together from Party members:

The aim of the Party was not merely to prevent men and women from forming loyalties which it might not be able to control. Its real, undeclared purpose was to remove all pleasure from the sexual act. Not love so much as eroticism was the enemy, inside marriage and outside it. All marriages between Party members had to be approved by a committee [. . . and] permission was always refused if the couple concerned gave the impression of being physically attracted to one another. The only recognized purpose of marriage was to beget children for the service of the Party. Sexual intercourse was looked on as a slightly disgusting minor operation, like having an enema. [. . .] it was rubbed into every Party member from childhood onwards. [. . .] the Party was trying to kill the sex instinct. (65-66)

This systemic repression and move to destroy the human sexual impulse seeks to reduce human reproduction to a form of production from which the state can benefit, removing all humanizing, enjoyable and intimate aspects once associated with the process. This is crucial to maintain the individualization of bodies because sexual intimacy and associated feelings are very humanizing elements that can work to create and solidify relationships and loyalties, not to mention the ability to produce empathy towards others, which can empower individuals. Furthermore, as the narrator states, “Desire was thoughtcrime” (68) because “desire” is a subjective term, indicating individuality and personal preference, which can interfere with one’s priorities of serving
the desires of the state. In turn, all of these resulting consequences threaten the power of the Party and can dilute the loyalty one may have to the state if part of other relationships or allegiances. As a result, the state seeks to quell any competing loyalties or emotional ties to ensure that “there will be no love except the love of Big Brother” (276).

The first way to achieve the death of the “sex instinct” was the edict declaring pleasurable sex and sex for ‘non-procreative’ reasons unlawful. Newspeak terms dictated licit and illicit forms of sex by establishing the conditions of “sexcrime” and “goodsex.” The former “covered all misdeeds whatever. It covered fornication, adultery, homosexuality, and other perversion, and in addition, normal intercourse practiced for its own sake,” where the latter could “be simply summed up as chastity” (305). Here the transparency of language, which translates to the transparency of thought, is rendered in Oceania. By creating and controlling the language used to express one’s ideas and emotions, the Party is immediately privy to all information that can be formulated and enunciated within its political boundaries.

Next, the state has inaugurated social programs through Minilove, which citizens of the Party can readily participate in to help ensure that the commands of the state are followed. The Junior Anti-Sex League drills the values of chastity and sexual normalcy into children from a very young age. Appropriating the institutional gaze of Minilove, each member works to spread the disciplining discourse of the state throughout the spatial confines of Oceania’s social fabric. In accord, Foucault claimed that institutional power was capillary because the gaze allowed the power of the state to seep into the very dark corners of the community. Here, the League acts as an additional conduit of power by members of the League scrutinizing their fellow citizens’ sexuality. In this way,
certain individuals of Oceania are not only subjected to the laws of the state regarding sexual practices, but also actively participate in the surveillance and enforcement of those Party edicts. These members of the Junior Anti-Sex League are not only idealized docile bodies – who have internalized the institutional gaze and now self-police themselves – but also work to police others in the same matters. Again, the panoptic gaze of the state has been magnified by the implication of Junior Anti-Sex League members who multiply the visibility of the state within the spatial geography of Oceania.

Third, similar to the scaffold scene in *The Scarlet Letter*, the use of visual spectacle is also exploited in *1984* to propagate discipline of the masses. Public executions, a practice done away with in most parts of the world, are revived and become a very popular occurrence in Oceania. Public hangings of war criminals from Eurasia, an occasional enemy of Oceania, frequently take place in the Park as a means of political propaganda. Winston recalls that, “This happened about once a month, and was a popular spectacle. Children always clamored to be taken to see it,” scampering around chanting, “Want to see the hanging! Want to see the hanging!” (23). The transparency of punishment, allowing members of society to witness and even embrace the executions, also function as a means of control via the gaze. Paralleling the open detestation of Goldstein during the Two Minute Hates, discussed in further detail below, it is the normalizing gaze of the collective population that subjects each individual of the community to the power of the state. The executed traitors and criminals serve as an example to society of what punishment one can expect if found in disagreement or opposition to the Party. Furthermore, the criminal becomes subjected to the gaze and identification of the populace as well as the dissemination of physical punishment. Foucault claims in *Discipline and Punish* that:
The public execution, however hasty and everyday, belongs to a whole series of great rituals in which power is eclipsed and restored [. . .]; it deploys before all eyes an invincible force. Its aim is not so much to reestablish a balance as to bring into play, as its extreme point, the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength. The ceremony of punishment, then, is an exercise of ‘terror’ [. . .] to make everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign. (48-49)

By replacing the term “sovereign” with Big Brother, it is obvious here how Orwell crafts this facet of the Party’s administration in permitting public executions to allow for further control over the citizens of Oceania. All are free to view the punishment of criminals, witnessing the consequence if one breaks the moral and legal codes of the Party. Even more so, the use and torture of the body as public spectacle reinforces not only the punishment of deposing the state but also, and more importantly, the ultimate power of the ruling body over the body of the individual.

Fourth, any sexual frustration as a result of strictly disciplined, practically nonexistent, sexual outlets must be dissolved or relieved so as not to manifest itself in angry outbreaks against society or the Party at large. This pent up energy is channeled into and dispelled by participation in the physical incantations of the Two Minute Hates, public executions and Hate Week. Through these events the Party is successfully removing and replacing the sexual instinct with a newly conditioned response to Big Brother and Goldstein, which produces a gamut of emotions and physical reactions: “There were hisses here and here and there among the audience” and “uncontrollable
exclamation of rage were breaking out from half of the people in the room” (11, 13). In fact, the narrator describes the citizen’s reactions to the parading of Eurasian criminals through the streets as “the great orgasm was at its climax and the general hatred of Eurasia had boiled up into such a delirium” (180). Through the Party members’ love for Big Brother and hate for Goldstein and Eurasia, the state can dissipate sexual urges and frustrations, while replacing that energy with anger to be channeled for the benefit of the state. In other words, citizens not only reduce their sexual frustration but also fall deeper under the spell of Big Brother’s power by way of the propaganda accompanying these events.

The narrator explains the state’s power and measures taken to quell sexual urges, coloring the expression of sexuality and its enjoyment as evil, especially for women:

Chastity was deeply engrained in them as Party loyalty. By careful early conditioning, by games and cold water, by the rubbing that was dinned in the them at school, and in the Spies and the Youth League, by lectures, parades, songs, slogans and martial music, the natural feeling had been driven out of them. (68)

The perfect example of the conditioning by the procedures above are readily seen with the interactions Winston has with his former wife, Katherine:

As soon as he touched her she seemed to wince and stiffen. To embrace her was like embracing a jointed wooden image. [. . .] Even when she was clasping him against her he had the feeling that she was simultaneously pushing him away with all her strength. She would lie there with shut eyes, neither resisting nor co-operating, but submitting. [. . .] She had two
names for it. One was “making a baby,” and the other was “our duty to the
Party.” (67)

As seen here, the Party is driving out sexual pleasure, leaving in its place a scarcely
tolerable “duty” to the state through reproduction. Sex is reduced to another form of
labor, as seen in A Handmaid’s Tale, to be performed for the state. In the end, sexuality
has been rendered transparent by enforcing the only legal way of committing and
motives for pursuing the act. What had been a private matter is turned into a very public
event and governed accordingly.

Except for the proles, who are permitted to interact freely, Winston and other
followers of the Party are frequently isolated from others in the regulated spaces of
Oceania. In fact, besides his brief connection with O’Brian, Winston has very little if any
intimate connection with other individuals at the beginning of the novel. Except for the
mandatory time each night at the Community Center and the gatherings of Hate Week
or the Two Minute Hates, he is either alone in his flat or sequestered in solitude,
diligently working at Minitrue – the idealized docile body, produced by the surveillant
power of the state. These times of isolation allow for the intense observance of
individuals by Big Brother, focusing in on each of the solitary figures. However, the
Party is acutely aware of individuals spending too much time alone, which could lead to
facets of one’s individuality to develop and produce opposing desires in relation to the
state. In reaction to this possibility the Party instituted and enforces the crime of ownlife
to quell the emergence of eccentricities, making it illegal to assert one’s individuality and
subjectivity. The disciplinary actions of the Party “increase the forces of the body (in
economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of
obedience),” (Discipline and Punish 138) as discussed in Chapter II. In addition, Big
Brother even takes measures to regulate the balance between one’s solitude and social interactions.

In accordance, Winston, like a well-disciplined docile body, has internalized the institutional gazes of the state. It is obvious that he bears the weight of this power as seen throughout the novel. He is consumed at times by the potential of being seen by the Party and that they are lurking around every corner to catch him in the act of betraying Big Brother. For example, from the outset of the novel the narrator acknowledges Winston’s disenchantment with the state’s ever-present gaze and its ubiquitous forms: “There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. You had to live [. . .] in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, [. . .] every movement scrutinized” (3). What results from that understanding of being under constant scrutiny is a ceaseless fear of being gazed upon, caught in the act of some transgression. When Winston began writing “DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER” in his private diary the narrator states that Winston:

> could not help feeling a twinge of panic. [. . .] For a moment he was seized by a kind of hysteria. He began writing in a hurried untidy scrawl:

> theyll shoot me I dont care theyll (sic) shoot me in the back of the neck I don’t care down with big brother [. . .]

The next moment he started violently. The was a knocking at the door [. . .]. His heart was thumping like a drum (18-19).

Yet another example also involves his covert attempts at keeping the journal.

He opened the diary. It was important to write something down. [. . .] He tried to think of O’Brien, for whom, or to whom, the diary was written, but instead he began thinking of the things that would happen to him after the
Thought Police took him away. It would not matter if they killed you at once. To be killed was what you expected. [. . .] the groveling on the floor and screaming for mercy, the crack of broken bones, the smashed teeth and bloody clots of hair. [. . .] Nobody ever escaped detection, and nobody ever failed to confess. When once you had succumbed to thoughtcrime it was certain that by a given date you would be dead. (103)

These examples show a conditioned state of fear produced by the internalized power of the state’s gaze. Despite his attempted resistance in the journal, Winston’s subconscious has still accepted the power of the state. At the outset of his transgressions, he begins to imagine the punishment that he would receive. As a result, Winston has been successfully trained to emotionally react according to the will of the state. He has internalized the values of Big Brother and feels the guilt and panic when betraying or even considering the thought of betraying those values. In short, the process and punishment has become autonomic. As Foucault claimed, punishment will “present itself to the mind as soon as one thinks of committing a crime” (104) within the Panoptic scheme, which is exactly the case here with Winston, especially in the latter example.

Winston’s situation in 1984 embodies a specific technology of power, utilizing the dissemination of the gaze and accompanying surveillances systems, which are disciplinary and focus primarily on the body, producing “individualizing effects, and manipulates the body as a source of forces that have to be rendered both useful and docile” as Foucault claims (Society Must Be Defended 249). Winston has been “trained” by these institutional mechanisms to be a productive worker at Minitrue as well as a compliant citizen of Oceania. However, there is a second form or “technology” of power
possible that Foucault identifies outside of the well-known institutional model, which also depends on various levels of transparency to operate. Both forms are “obviously technologies of the body” (249), and therefore, require some degree of compliance through the creation of docile bodies produced by the state’s gaze. However, as seen in 1984, not all inhabitants of Oceania are subjected to institutional control of the four Ministries like Winston and other Party members.

In fact, a large number of the inhabitants live outside of social spaces inscribed with institutional gazes and discipline, contributing to the complex social and political hierarchy of Oceania. These are the proles. Instead of projecting the institutional gazes upon them, the state seeks to not discipline the vast community of proles, but regulate them. Foucault describes this second technology of power as:

> centered not upon the body but upon life: a technology which brings together the mass effects characteristic of a population [. . .] which aims to establish a sort of homeostasis, not to train individuals but by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers. [. . .] A technology in which bodies are replaced by general biological processes. (Society Must Be Defended 249)

This emphasis upon examining and controlling the biological processes that characterize the masses is exactly how the Party approaches the regulation of the proles. In other words, it is not the scrutiny of the individual body, caught up binary oppositions in relation to the norms of society: sane/mad; pious/heretic; innocent/guilty that is the emphasis of this secondary technology, but the processes of the social body as a whole. This is achieved, in part, by regulating two primary functions of the body: food and sex. Rather than isolate each body in order to catalogue and discipline
individuals, this second model insists upon the massification of individuals – a concentration on the collective body and its functions. Foucault states that these two forms of power “do not exist on the same level. This means of course that they are not mutually exclusive and can be articulated with each other” (Society Must Be Defended 250). In fact, both configurations of control exist simultaneously in 1984.

The Party claims that they had “liberated the proles from bondage. Before the Revolution they had been hideously oppressed by the capitalists” (71), and the Party delivered them from the torture and misery of laboring for the wealthy business owners. “But simultaneously, true to the principles of doublethink, the Party taught that the proles were natural inferiors who must be kept in subjection, like animals [. . .]” (71).

Due to the size of the laboring class – Orwell states that the proles accounted for “perhaps eighty-five percent of the population of Oceania” (208) – and the dismissal of it as a threat to the state, the Party chooses to regulate the large working class rather than enforce the same detailed scrutiny and discipline upon the proles as the class of Party members of which Winston is a part of. The Party views the proles as subhuman and their only value to the state is through their production of base labor: “So long as they continued to work and breed, their other activities were without importance” (71). In fact, one Party slogan stated: “Proles and animals are free” (73). Equating the working class with beasts dehumanizes the proles and serves to underscore the lack of respect and concern the Party has for them.

As a result, the Party largely ignores the proles, who are left to their own devices; “They were beneath suspicion” (73). In other words, the Party did not believe that it had to invest as much in the overseeing of the proles as it did the minute remainder of the population. The Party taught that they were “natural inferiors who must be kept in
subjection, like animals, by the application of a few simple rules” (71). In fact, very few telescreens are present in the prole areas.

Consequently, the Party need not waste the time and resources to govern the majority of the Oceanian population. Instead:

To keep [the proles] in control was not difficult. A few agents of the Thought Police moved always among them, spreading false rumors and marking down and eliminating the few individuals who were judged as capable of becoming dangerous; but no attempt was made to indoctrinate them with the ideology of the Party. [. . .] All that was required of them was a primitive patriotism which could be appealed to whenever it was necessary to make them accept longer working hours or shorter rations. And even when they became discontented as the sometimes did, their discontent led nowhere, because being without general ideas, they could only focus in on petty specific grievances. The larger evils invariable escaped their notice. (72)

Denying the proles any education or leisure time, by demanding a rigorous work schedule, and forcing the proles to focus on daily survival due to food rationing as a result of continual war with Eurasia, the Party has little to fear from the proles and need not waste energy attempting to discipline the bodies of each individual. Instead, this massification allows for a regulation of the social body via biological processes. In the end, the social body is rendered docile, not as initially illustrated by Foucault in its discipline, but in its emphasis on biological necessities such as nourishment and procreation. These become the primary activities of the proles, rendering their lives transparent to the state, which regulates these aspects.
To preserve its authority, the Party instituted a number of regulations upon the proles. First, the Ministry of Plenty creates and implements economic depressions. As a result, the rationing of food is one of the most detrimental and coercive forces that regulates the proles. When not working to produce goods that benefit the Party and feed the war effort, the proles are forced to safeguard, search or steal food daily to maintain their meager existences. This condition, in return, eliminates any leisure time in which they could pursue an education, share ideas with others or plot a revolt. Furthermore, the limited food rations maintains the weakened physical state of the proles, nullifying any coup attempts. The only fight that the proles can muster is revealed by Winston when he hears what he thinks is the beginning of a rebellion, but come to realize that it is only a squabble over sauce pans, which again illuminates the main concerns of the proles in maintaining the basic elements of survival, in this case that of food.

Next, the rampant poverty, crime and other shortages further preoccupy the proles. To compound the debilitation of the proles, the Party set up a cash lottery. Obviously corrupt, the lottery only serves to provide a false hope for the proles in deliverance from poverty, all the while squandering what, if any, meager savings a prole may have. In fact, the lottery is the only social event that the proles seem interested in. Again, this maintains the preoccupation of the proles in regards to daily survival, unable to unify because each is consumed with maintaining his own existence.

Third, sexuality and procreation are regulated among the proles by the Party vehemently *supporting* these acts and their frequency. Unlike the Party’s strict disciplining of its members’ bodies through various forms of sexual repression, even attempting to eradicate the “sex drive” and the creation of the Anti-Sex League, the
proles are encouraged to engage in sex frequently. For example, prostitutes are
tolerated in the prole sections of London. Also, the Pornosec committee was created as
“the subsection of the Fiction Department which turned out cheap pornography for
distribution among the proles (130), [. . .] which no Party member, other than those who
worked on it, was permitted to look at” (43). In this way, distributing pornography is an
attempt to heighten sexual urges among the proles to maintain the propagation of the
working class, which in turn maintains the labor and production needed to sustain the
Party’s rule and command of the social and political hierarchy. In short, the proles are
bred and “farmed” just as the animals they are likened to in the Party’s slogan
mentioned above.

Fourth, the widespread distribution and usage of alcohol in pubs or at home by
the proles works to maximize their despondence and minimize their abilities to unify,
quelling any rational thoughts of rebellion. The perfect example of this is when Winston
visits a prole pub and attempts to interact with an older man who was alive prior to the
Revolution. When Winston tries to probe into the past, interrogating the man on what
things were like in London before the Party, our protagonist is left sorely disappointed.
The old man can only respond in a drunken reverie of disparate objects and events from
the past, rambling about “top’ ats” and lost bicycle pumps (92). In the end, the alcohol
also works with the passing of time to muddle the memories of those old enough in
years to reminisce about the time prior to the Party’s appropriation of power, but only
ineffectual recollections are recounted. Not even a rebellious thought or disapproving
smirk is produced in recalling the past in the context of the present situation. At most,
the inebriated proles can only engage in drunken brawls.
These regulations implement the “proletarianization” of individuals in Oceania and “force the people to accept their status as proletarians and the conditions of the exploitation of the proletariat” (Power/Knowledge 14). By accepting these conditions, the social body of proles is rendered docile by the regulations set upon them, allowing for no threats “from internal dangers” (Society Must Be Defended 249) as mentioned above. Most importantly, a single factor not only holds this system together and supports the surveillance methods that produce and preserve the power of the state’s authority. Maintaining the war with Eurasia preserves the current system of power that the Party exerts over the proles. They must toil endless hours per day to drive the war machine of Oceania. Spurred on by various political and military propaganda broadcast daily, touting the glorious victories over Eurasia and the random bombings that occur in London, the proles who represent the majority of the population must dedicate their lives to producing materials that the state needs to continually defend itself from enemies. But what is more, as written by Emmanuel Goldstein in his text The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism, Winston discovers that:

None of the three superstates [Eurasia, Oceania and Eastasia] could be definitely conquered even by the other two in combination. They are too evenly matched, and their natural defenses are too formidable. [. . .] There is no longer, in a material sense, anything to fight about. [. . .] In any case, each of the three superstates is so vast that it can obtain almost all of the materials that it needs within its own boundaries. In so far as the war has a direct economic purpose, it is a war for labor power. [. . .] It is for possession of these thickly populated regions, and of the northern ice cap,
that the three powers are constantly struggling. [. . .] Above all they [highly populated regions] contain a bottomless reserve of cheap labor. (186-8)

It appears from this passage that the proles have been laboring in vain, and if Goldstein is correct, the war efforts serve not to protect the superstate of Oceania from its enemies but to maintain the function of the society, primarily the rule of the Inner Party and Big Brother. War has become not a battle of natural resources, wealth, territory or ideological differences between states, but the maintenance of social structures within the state.

Goldstein claims, “The primary aim of modern warfare in accordance with the principles of doublethink is to use up the products of the machine without raising the general standard of living” (188). In this way, the continual wars aim to use up the surplus goods produced by the proles so that they can never benefit from the goods that they produce – only the Inner Party benefits in maintaining its hegemony and increasing its wealth. On the other hand, the general standard of living remains minimal in this current system. Only that which is rationed for the proles is available to them and barely sustains their survival let alone improving the quality of life. Goldstein also claims, “In principle, the war effort is always so planned as to eat up any surplus that might exist after meeting the bare needs of the population” (191). In accord, an increase of goods and resulting wealth acquired by the proles would only destroy the hierarchical structure. Furthermore, any acquired wealth, increased standard of living or leisure afforded to the general public resulting from the overproduction and distribution of those goods, could result in political and social rebellion:

For if leisure and security were enjoyed by all alike, the great mass of human beings who are normally stupefied by poverty would become
literate and learn to think for themselves, and when once they had done this, the would sooner or later realize that the privileged minority had no function, and they would sweep it away. (208)

Indeed, if Goldstein is correct, offering an accurate analysis of the Party’s motives and depicting a true version of Oceania’s history unlike those rewritten at Minitrue, the Inner Party serves not to protect its citizens, liberating them from the Capitalists as they claimed, but instead cast them into bondage to serve only the greed of the “privileged minority” who reap all benefits from the toil of not only the proles but the Outer Party members, like Winston, as well. These sentiments ring true with Goldstein’s claim that “In the long run, a hierarchical society was only possible on a basis of poverty and ignorance” (190). In essence, the proles are subjected to a poverty of body and mind, while the Outer party members were not only subjected to but participated in their own ignorance by reconstructing and distorting reality, while tossing truths down memory holes to be forever erased. In fact, it is the ignorance of how this system runs, which Goldstein refers to as the “ultimate secret,” which is the ultimate burden to bear in this society that emphasizes modes of industry and social stratification.

To reiterate, some very simple regulations have been implicated along with the constant threat of war to maintain the depravity and complicity of the proles. As a result, no one rises up in opposition; the proles are physically and mentally rendered complicit – the idealized docile body. Their primary activities are rendered transparent and obvious to those in the Party. Proles work and procreate. Therefore, they pose no immediate threat to the state. As a result, resources can instead be focused on developing surveillance systems to discipline the Outer Party who do have varying degrees of education and leisure. The establishment of these surveillance systems in
material social spaces allows for the autonomic functioning of power as disseminated via the institutions and the state, which transforms that reality into a field of vision as Foucault stated, rendering all visible within that space. In accord, the Party and Big Brother focus their gazes upon the physical bodies and their processes within Oceania to discipline and regulate those subjected individuals.

**Deployment of the Electronic Gaze in Physical Spaces and the Anticipation of the Digital Human**

Whereas the emphasis on the body and its functions is crucial in dealing with the proles and their regulation, it is not the processes and movements of the proletariat body that are key in the process of state surveillance, but the information produced by the body that emerges as important specifically when gazing upon the Party members. This key facet of surveillance is the first indicator of the paradigm shift embodied in *1984*, highlighting a newly created viewing space, which seeks out less the tangible form of bodies, but the imprint produced by those physical bodies in a digital field. In fact, a new representation of the body is produced as a result, which can be captured, manipulated and measured much more efficiently. As illustrated earlier in this chapter, it is the information produced by bodies that Big Brother focuses in on and seeks to capture. For instance, detecting and quashing Thought Crime, subversive ideas and expressions of individuality are of the utmost importance to the Inner Party. What becomes apparent is a move from *punishing* criminals to *predicting* would-be criminals, as detected from information produced by bodies, which is only one usage of the telescreens in Oceania. In sum, *1984* not only predicts but also exudes a number of the
conditions that the modern form of electronic surveillance in the twenty-first century will embody.

Despite the numerous systems of surveillance and mechanisms of control, the presence of countless telescreens, delivering and receiving visual and aural information, serves as the primary conduit for the dissemination of power in Oceania, which emanate from Big Brother and the Party. Because the majority of the population, made up of the proles, are rendered innocuous through regulations of bodily processes, the focus of the Party’s discipline must be placed upon its own members who are more knowledgeable and possess, albeit minimal, social and leisurely freedoms – conditions that could foment a rebellion against the current social and political regime. Consequently, every street corner, alleyway, and domicile is equipped with telescreens and, as a result, possesses the potential for monitoring all actions and utterances. In fact, as the narrator recounts:

Any sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up [by the telescreens]; moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. You had to live – did live, from habit that became instinct – in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and except in darkness, every movement scrutinized. (3)

From the third page of the novel, Orwell overtly points out the ubiquitous gaze that the inhabitants of London are subjected to via the telescreens. In this way, in 1984 as well as Utopia, all dark corners even the private spaces of one’s home are made public,
illuminated and observed by the ruling party. But what is more significant is that, unlike *Utopia, Anthem, and A Handmaid’s Tale*, Winston has been reduced to an “informational flow,” as coined by William Staples, within the Party’s surveillance system by way of the telescreens. In support of this, Winston thinks about “the telescreen with its never-sleeping ear. They could spy upon you night and day [. . .]. They could lay bare in the utmost detail every that you had done or said of thought. . .” (166-7). In this way, Winston alludes to not only the ever-present gaze of the state but its abilities to gather knowledge about individuals, listening with its “never-sleeping ear” to not only impose power upon but exact information from individuals.

In accordance with this state, Winston claims that, “There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often or on what system [. . .]. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time” (3). As a result, in 1984, not only do Big Brother’s institutions disseminate their controlling gaze upon the members of the Outer Party, which manipulates their actions, influencing each individual to “punish himself” by internalizing the metaphorical gaze of the state, but Big Brother himself is taking an active role in the surveying and disciplining of each subject by way of electronic surveillance. Where Foucault claimed that power was disseminated via various discourse systems that aimed to punish not the body but the soul of the individual, use of the telescreens to both watch and disseminate information to those subjected to it magnifies the use of surveillant power to both instill in the individual a sense of responsibility for self-punishment as well as gather information produced by the body. In short, the appearance of the state’s gaze via the telescreens not only ensures that bodies know they are being watched, which assures the “autonomic functioning of power” (*DP 206*) as Foucault claimed, but also to
gather information about and produced by those bodies being seen. This is the new potential of punishment afforded by the electronic technology of the telescreens that Winston refers to above. Here, there is a strong possibility that individuals are constantly under surveillance, which is a new development from the original panoptic model where it was the prospect of being seen that created the power dynamic and ensured order. In 1984, there exists a new power that has emerged with the development of the electronic gaze – the ability to see all at all times.

Despite the lack of telescreens in the prole areas, which were unnecessary because of the conditioned society they lived in, members of the Outer Party did have more opportunity and ability to participate in deviant acts because of their increased leisure time and intelligence as compared to the proles. In fact, Winston states, “Until [the proles] become conscious they will never rebel, and until after they have rebelled they cannot become conscious” (70). This statement identifies the crucial difference between the proles and the Outer party as well as the discrepancy in how Big Brother attempted to discipline each social group. Moreover, the Party harnesses the ability of the telescreens to deploy a constant gaze among the Outer Party members. In this way, the potential for discipline by and subordination to the state is multiplied, compounding an individual’s own self-policing. Furthermore, the threat of the Thought Police is also maximized in conjunction with the ubiquitous gaze of the telescreen by allowing the synergism of these two mechanisms to efficiently monitor both one’s deviant thoughts and actions, all the while disseminating pro-Party propaganda via the monitors. In the end, the electronic representation of bodies as viewed through the telescreens represent a replacement of the need to see the actual physical bodies. As a result, Big
Brother has fashioned the most effective technologically advanced surveillance system possible.

The state’s use of the telescreen represents a significant paradigm shift from the Foucauldian model of surveillance. According to the panoptic model, a single guard is required to maintain order as his presence, or even the potential of his presence, is enough to keep subjects in line. Again, it is the potential of being seen that curbs illicit activities. However, with one guard and numerous subjects, it is possible for some individuals to perform illicit acts, as it would be impossible for one guard to watch a number of subjects at the same time. For this reason, it is crucial that individuals actively internalize the gaze and power of the institutions, as Foucault claimed. This is the key to the panoptic model of surveillance and power: the individual must assimilate to the subjugation of the gaze and police themselves for this disciplinary apparatus to be successful. As seen above and in Chapter II, within its literary contexts, the majority of bodies readily assume their castigation and internalize the will of the state. However, as pointed out by William Bogard, “bodies are messy, unpredictable things” (“Welcome to the Society of Control” 70), and the panoptic model is not foolproof. Because this system is dependent on the individual, some may choose to resist as seen with some proles who need to be removed or “vaporized” (Orwell 19) from society. Consider, too, Winston’s plight in secretly living among the proles, visiting a prostitute, having a lustful affair with Julia, and his attempted coup with O’Brien. So while panoptic surveillance is extremely effective in controlling the majority of its subjects, its dependence upon self-policing does allow for some degree of resistance and illicit behavior.

On the other hand, in Oceania, each subject is assigned his own ‘electronic guards’ in the form of the telescreens. Similar to Bentham’s model, the telescreens
behave as virtual guard towers, and the subject is not privy to the visibility of the guard who may be watching. However, utilizing the telescreens, it is conceivable that each individual may be monitored at all times and even recorded for further scrutiny at a later time with the technological developments afforded by the telescreens. Evidence of this is apparent after Winston is awoken by a beeping sound from the telescreen in his bedroom indicating that it is time for the “physical jerks,” a communal exercise regimen to maintain the physical manipulation over and health of citizens:

‘Smith!’ screamed the shrewish voice from the telescreens. ‘6079 Smith W! Yes, you! Bend lower please! You can do better than that. You’re not trying. Lower, please! That’s better comrade. Remember our boys on the Malabar front! And the sailors in the Floating Fortresses! Just think what they have to put up with. Now try again. That’s better, comrade, that’s much better,’ she added encouragingly as Winston with a violent lunge, succeeded in touching his toes. (36-37)

Here, it is obvious that Winston is being monitored by the woman leading the exercises projected on the telescreen. It is safe to assume, then, that all telescreens are conduits of a constant gaze that is always examining what is in that field of vision. This ability issues in a dramatic shift considering surveillance and the resulting power by moving from the potential to the infinite promise of being gazed upon. In essence, the chance of being watched when subjected to the panoptic schema has been adapted and compounded to the condition of being watched all the time when subjected to this electronic surveillance system.

This ability of the state to survey individuals who are privy to the fact that they are always seen yields an even greater power of the Party over its subjects. The
telescreens compound these effects on society, transforming the individual as a separate body to be gazed upon, emphasizing a scrutiny of each individual. The telescreens in Winston’s home and in the homes of every Party citizen, appearing virtually everywhere, also serve to compartmentalize and individualize each body gazed upon. Once individualized, the image of each body is presumably transmitted to and appears upon its own unique monitor, allowing Big Brother to openly gaze upon the collection of individualized images. Furthermore, this visibility of the collective arrangement of “docile bodies” distinctly echoes Foucault’s description of the Panopticon’s design and the efficient autonomic functioning of power through this apparatus just like the construction of the cityscape and governmental buildings towering overhead in London.

As a result, the presence of the telescreens allow for the omission of a single, fixed “central tower” seen as imperative to Foucault’s mechanism of surveillance. Instead, the widespread telescreens work to further decentralize power in regards to its very source and produce an even more sinister and unimpeded landscape of absolute visibility. What this creates in Oceania is the presence of Bentham’s disciplinary model of surveillance as well as a newer technology of punishment produced by visibility – Foucault’s spatial panopticism is seen in transition as it moves towards digitized surveillance. As Foucault claimed, the gaze within the panoptic scheme freed the constraints of power, decentralizing it in regards to the subjects that it reached by promoting the subjects to bear the weight of disciplinary power. But, even more so, the use of the electronic telescreens afforded a more capillary conduit for power to penetrate all physical spaces in Oceania dependent only upon where they are placed, not the physical architecture of the city as is so important in More’s *Utopia* as well.
Unlike the Panopticon, “where individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised” (Discipline and Punish 164), despite limited access to sections of the city, Oceanians are not held in “fixed place[s]” as defined by Foucault and readily move throughout the territory where they are authorized. In this case, helicopter reconnaissance of the Patrol Police work to provide a more mobile form of visibility. More importantly, the electronic telescreens fashioned throughout London decentralize the single pole from where the gaze and its power is traditionally disseminated in Bentham’s model. In other words, there was not one or a few locations where perspectives to gaze were afforded. Instead, the ability to view the landscape stemmed from numerous locations, all providing multiple fields of vision simultaneously. All spaces can now be illuminated from countless angles. As a result, all permissible spaces that Party members can occupy are at once being watched rather than only a few or simply conjuring the mere potential of visibility by one mode of surveillance above, as seen in the works in Chapter II.

All in all, the institutions of Oceania are still watching individuals, just not through physical means when using electronic assisted surveillance. As addressed earlier in this chapter, institutions are not gazing from the tower directly upon individuals below. Instead, the gaze occupies a viewing field of electronic spaces. What is seen is the electronic representations of bodies, not the actual bodies themselves. As a result, a disconnect occurs between the guard in the tower or gazer and the prisoner or subject of the gaze. No longer is a direct connection maintained between these poles by way of a visual discourse. Instead, this connection is interrupted and rerouted via an electronic interface, which then connects the disseminating gaze with its target. Consequently, what is seen is also interrupted, rerouted and processed through the same electronic
interface through which is passed from gazer to subject. Therefore, what is seen is no longer the physical bodies of individuals caught in the sight of the looker, but a mechanical representation of those bodies as recorded, transferred and displayed upon the telescreens. The physical body has become transformed into a electronic representation of itself, a hyperreal two-dimensional “body” existing no longer in the physical spatial context, but in a cyber space upon the telescreens.

In this way, physical bodies begin to disappear, as David Lyon states, and are replaced by the hyperreal representations of bodies as seen above. The physical body begins to degenerate from the visual landscapes, as the electronic body materializes to take its place according to these developments in technological surveillance. For example, where the Bentham model of Panopticism sought to manipulate bodies and render them docile via the disciplinary gaze of institutions, the electronic gaze of the telescreens further manipulate bodies by rendering them as seemingly purposeless objects, only considering the representations of those bodies as vital. It is this visual representation of the body and resulting information produced by bodies that are the main foci of these circuits of surveillance.

Moreover, the significance of bodies is shown in two competing models in 1984 that further reveal the shift in discipline from physical to electronic surveillance. First is the regulation of the proles. As discussed above, the emphasis on the physical body and its needs are key to the subjugation of the proles. In fact, individuals are reduced to bodily functions, forced by the rationing of the Party to merely survive and drive the war machine. In effect, their physical labor serves to only maintain their misery and the entire socio-political structure of Oceania. Their bodies are disposable and promoting procreation continuously supplies the labor force. In essence, proles are defined by
how their bodies function and what they produce. So, in using individuals for physical labor, who pose little to no threat to the state because of their meager existence and lack of education, emphasis on each body is critical. The proles must focus on sustaining their bodies due to lack of food and rampant crime. However, in disciplining those utilized by the state for more intellectual pursuits, such as Winston’s job in the Ministry of Truth fabricating and distorting history, information becomes more critical to one’s disciplining in regards to the will of the state.

Unlike the proles, if one is permitted and has the ability to “think” and produce thoughts, the discipline must act accordingly. As ideas are generated in the mind so must the discipline of those individuals also seek to be internalized in the mind. This is what Foucault claims that subjection to the panoptic gaze affords. However, the telescreens compound this power over the individual bodies that the Party has deemed necessary to survey by constantly gazing upon their intended targets. In the novel, and mentioned above, there are numerous examples of Winston’s paranoia, fearing that the Party has discovered his illicit actions. In this way, he has internalized the Party’s gaze and polices himself as Foucault has promised. But, most importantly, elements of the paradigm shift from physical to digital spaces begin to reveal themselves. It is evident that the state’s gaze is utilized to impose discipline and power over individuals, but the gaze also produces the hyperreal space that recreates individuals within that virtual reality of the electronic telescreens. In other words, what had been the emphasis of inscribing appropriate behaviors upon the body is now accompanied by a rudimentary form of the digital personae of each individual. Whereas Foucault had observed a paradigm shift from the public spectacle of overt torture and punishment to a time of “privatized punishment,” featuring surveillance and discourse systems to induce
personal policing and rehabilitation, another shift in discipline is emerging here, that utilizes the current disciplinary mechanism of physically gazing upon tangible bodies as well as assimilating the burgeoning advanced technological power that promotes a society of surveillance. In essence, 1984 revisits previous modes of power and blends technological advances in discipline to not only apply each form but also weigh these mechanisms and their effectiveness in the various applications in Oceania.

As a result of this hybrid mechanism, Winston’s body is gazed upon as well as converted into an “informational flow” via interface with the telescreens. His body, therefore, is not predominantly of relevance. Instead, the information produced by his body is vital considering the use of the telescreens. With both the spatial panoptic modes and the electronic informational modes in use, 1984, represents the literary crossroads of applied surveillant power. The looming edifices of the institutions with the Party slogans in constant view as well as random patrols and other physical usage of surveillance represent Foucault’s model of the dissemination of power via the institutional gaze of the state upon its subjects. All the while, the inclusion of telescreens not only compound the gaze of the state upon individuals, but they also serve to capture the images, sounds and other information produced by individual bodies for processing, which humanity has become accustomed to in the twenty-first century. These qualities mark the shift from what Foucault identified as a “disciplinary society” to what David Lyon, William Bogard and others label a “surveillance society.” In 1984, the physical bodies of Party members begin to lose importance when considering the telescreens, which capture informatics concerning and produced by the body rather than emphasizing the body itself. In accord, the body takes on a newly created identity, that of electronic representation. Winston’s behaviors are recorded and analyzed by the
various institutional systems, i.e. the Ministry of Love, and processed accordingly. In
essence, the Party is continually gathering information from electronic fields produced
by the telescreens that capture and convert physical objects into electronic
representations.

According to William Staples, there is a cultural shift that has taken place in
which the specific punishment of the individual deviant is being replaced by the
generalized surveillance of all citizens (Everyday Surveillance 7). What happens in this
shift is the blurring between the actual deviant or committer of a crime and the “likely” or
“possible” offender. Staples considers the individual body as the locus of many
surveillance and disciplinary techniques, as Foucault would assert. But, it appears as if
social control is becoming more concerned with the prediction and prevention of
deviance rather than responding to the violation after it occurs and then disciplining the
criminal.

Foucault claimed that modern modes of discipline aimed to render punishment
increasingly invisible. Consequently, Foucault considered the episteme prior to the
Industrial Revolution, as defined by the move from public torture and punishment to a
“new technology” of power where surveillance and institutional normalization
disseminated discipline and resulted in the self-policing of bodies. What Staples, along
with William Bogard, David Lyon and others observe is the continued evolution of
discipline, citing the technological development of surveillant capabilities for increased
control of the masses. Building upon Foucault’s claims, which only take into account the
latter end of the twentieth century, it appears that we are in the midst of another
paradigm shift considering the use of surveillance to instill disciplinary action upon
individuals. Only now the physical plane of reality is not the only or even predominant
gazing space where individuals are under surveillance.

Ultimately, what begins to surface in *1984* is the generation of a new plane of
reality, one constructed by and conducted through the electronic space produced and
embodied within the telescreens. Orwell’s *1984* anticipates the creation, manipulation
and surveillant capabilities of a hyperreality via the use of the telescreens, which
produces yet another space from which to gaze upon individuals.

Jean Baudrillard described this “hyperreal” space as a state at which the
representation or copy of an object precedes or has precedent over the original reality
of that object. This is how the human body is manipulated and reconfigured via the
advancing technologies afforded by the electronic capabilities of the telescreens. In
essence, the telescreens allow for a copy or representation of individual bodies,
captured and conveyed via the monitors to exist in a duality of both physical and
electronic spaces simultaneously. The two dimensional image, portrayed and captured
on the telescreens, functions as a simulation of the original object according to
Baudrillard. When the simulation of the original object “engenders the real,” and is taken
as the true form of that object, it is considered simulacra, no longer a simple simulation
of a thing. For those of the Inner Party and Big Brother monitoring Winston and other
citizens via the telescreens, what they are viewing is the simulation of bodies depicted
in a electronic manifestation. However, because those original bodies are not seen, only
the simulation is perceived. Therefore, the representation is taken as real or the true
form. Similar to Plato’s “Analogy of the Cave,” what is truly a fabricated image
representing the original, lacking the original referent or signifier, is considered to be
real and therefore defined as simulacra. In this state at which the copy replaces the real
or original, there is no longer imitation, duplication, or parody as Baudrillard claims. In 1984, the telescreens become “simulators” of reality, producing and reproducing what is real in the processes stated above. On the most basic level, the individual body is manipulated in appearance when captured and projected via electronic means. For example, the portrayal of human images on electronic screens not only determines the appearance of the bodies, but confines each to electronic spaces according to the dimensions of the screen and network.

It appears that Orwell foresaw this shift and the usage of electronic technology for surveillance. First, the shift from responding to crimes committed by punishing the condemned criminal to the generalized surveillance of the masses to predict and prevent deviance is evident in the instillation of the Thought Police in Oceania. The singular purpose of the Thought Police was to detect and render useless anyone with deviant thoughts in order to quell any potential for deviance, let alone a riotous act. In this way, Big Brother sought to eradicate any rebellious actions before they could be carried out. Considering Winston’s diary writings, the Narrator states:

> Whether he wrote DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER, or whether he refrained from writing it, made no difference. Whether he went on with the diary, or whether he did not go on with it, made no difference. The Thought Police would get him just the same. He had committed – would still have committed, even if he had never set pen to paper – the essential crime that contained all others in itself. (19)

As thought typically precedes action in this context, anyone with the slightest disagreement with the state’s rule or wishes could be detected and dealt with prior to any potential coup attempt. Big Brother seeks to predict who would commit crimes
against the state by focusing on the thoughts of individuals. Even without tangible proof, one could be arrested, which was a very mysterious event, sinister enough to keep many obedient.

It was always at night – the arrests invariably happened at night. The sudden jerk out to sleep, the rough hand shaking your shoulder, the lights glaring in your eyes, the ring of hard faces round the bed. In the vast majority of cases there was no trial, no report of the arrest. People simply disappeared. Your name was removed from the registers, every record of ever thing you had ever done was wiped out, your one-time existence was denied and then forgotten. (19)

Much like the erasures of the past that Winston participated in for Minitrue, one’s identity and existence was forever deleted if found guilty of Thought Crime. In this way, the simple thought of deviance was not only rendered null, but the mind and body that produced that radical thought was also expunged. This process was the most extreme form of discipline. In this new historical shift that Staples describes, in 1984, the body is not punished as public spectacle or disciplined and reformed. Instead, after predicting the potential of deviant behavior, the body is dissolved entirely, in form and memory. It now has never existed. This was the fate of Winston’s mother and sister.

This extreme apparatus of discipline can be quite dangerous for the people of Oceania. With no trial or tangible evidence of the crime, claiming only Thought Crime, the state could abuse this power and mistakenly or falsely accuse anyone that it wanted to eradicate. Here is the hidden danger and effectiveness of the telescreens that prompts the paradigm shift: seeing all bodies of the Party, scrutinizing body language, every facial expression and thought, Big Brother could focus on the information
produced by those bodies to predict potential criminals and not only remove them and their influence from society but erase them entirely. Again, bodies are rendered disposable and literally begin to “disappear” as Lyon stated, but what emerges is the importance of what information the body produces, rather than the tangible bodies themselves, to the state in regards to more effective discipline of its subjects.

According to William Bogard, new technologies, particularly in reference to electronic surveillance, do not monitor bodies. Instead, they operate via a “process of disassembling and reassembling” (“Welcome to the Society of Control” 72) analyzed data produced by those bodies. In other words, subjects are broken down into a series of “discrete informational flows” (Bogard 72) that are stabilized and captured according to classificatory criteria determined by and used to serve the institutional agendas. This gathered and processed information, “which constitutes our virtual/informational profiles that circulate in various computers” (The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility 4) and computer networks, Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty call our “data doubles” (4); David Lyon refers to the same as “digital personae” (Surveillance as Social Sorting 277). These processes echo Big Brother’s attempts to scrutinize and analyze the body language, thoughts and facial expressions of individuals monitored by the telescreens. Oceanians are reduced to these qualities and expressions, which are treated as quantifiable data by the state, and only one’s digital personae exist within the hyperreality of the telescreens interface. It is this process that defines the Outer Party’s fate in the regime. Orwell anticipates a new subject – the digital human – to be subjugated and manipulated by Big Brother via the budding technology embodied via the telescreens, which paralleled the availability of television in every home. In the decades to come, it is this new form of the individual and a more complex hyperreality
that allows for the continuing development of technology as a means of further surveying and disciplining subjects. This process moves beyond the watching of individuals and the presence of digital humans to the processing and recording of information continuously produced by the hyperreal representations of subjects – the “data doubles” and “digital personae” – within this infinite virtual space.
CHAPTER IV
FRACTURED SUBJECTIVITIES
EMERGENCE OF THE SOCIETY OF CONTROL

“Nothing can become real until it is subjected to some form of surveillance.”
- Thomas Levin

When Orwell demonstrated how the human subject was manifested, observed and disciplined according to virtual as well as literal modes in 1984, he was anticipating the emergence, theoretically and textually, of a post-Foucauldian emphasis on state applied power structures in future societies. In fact, as Foucault’s theories only take into account the cultural and technological advances up to and including the 1970s, when the majority of his works were published, theorists such as William Bogard can claim that they have continued where Foucault “left off,” updating and furthering the latter’s ideas of surveillance in a modern context. In addition to Bogard, a number of modern theorists, such as David Lyon, William Staples, Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty, attempt to trace post-Foucauldian developments in contemporary contexts because they reflect more recent advancements in technology and surveillance, ultimately illustrating how these facets of contemporary and future social networks are utilized in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Consequently, Bogard has stated that we have been “experiencing an epochal shift from a disciplinary society [of which Foucault was a proponent] to a society of ‘control’” (New Politics of Surveillance 28), which is due primarily to an increase of surveillance systems in daily life. In spite of
these developments, there has currently been a lack of scholarship in these areas as well as in the application of these updated and post-Foucauldian theories to literary and media works.

Therefore, Chapter IV illustrates not only the application but the significance of viewing these works through a post-Foucauldian lens. This innovative perspective furthers not only the development of surveillance studies but presents evidence of a new paradigm shift regarding electronic monitoring, which further magnifies power and moves to not discipline but control subjects. In fact, the physical bodies of individuals become less important in this shift to a digital, hyperreal mode of surveillance. Instead, surrogate digital personae are rendered more visible and begin to take the place of corporeal bodies, potentially rendering the Foucauldian docile body antiquated. Ultimately, control of the state over individuals in hyperreal spaces becomes nearly absolute via the refined digital systems of the twenty-first century as portrayed in the fictive works below.

**The Decentralized Gaze**

The first area of Foucauldian theory regarding power and the gaze, which has evolved in a contemporary context, concerns Foucault’s claims that power is bound up in specific spaces, e.g. social institutions and the bodies of individuals. Discipline was thereby a function of the panoptic discourse disseminated from the institutions upon individual bodies. William Bogard states that “Bentham’s Panopticon was designed as a closed system” attached to and dependent upon “a host of assemblages” like the institutional mechanisms that provided the resources for surveillance capabilities.
(Theorizing Surveillance 109). However, because of advances in digital technology and the reliance upon data collecting and processing at the end of the twentieth and start of the twenty-first centuries, power and discipline have become decentralized and freed from their prior confines, binary paradigms and the traditional Benthamite ‘assemblages.’ More specifically, surveillant power has become decentralized, freed from this “closed system” (110) that Foucault had used to illustrate as a metaphor for how power functioned in society. Christian Parenti asserts that in the twenty-first century:

Computers transform meaningless data into the ore from which are refined the precious informational alloys of the soft cage. Instead of observational towers, checkpoints, and the low-flying black helicopters of dystopian fantasy the emerging surveillance society is characterized by innocuous passwords, swipe cards [. . .] and workplace IDs. We are not “being watched” so much as we are voluntarily “checking in” with authorities. *(The Soft Cage 79)*

The channels of global capitalism, from which the spread of these technologies issue forth, have become more inclusive and efficient. David Lyon states that these new information channels and technological devices – freely purchased, carried and accessed by consumers – such as the internet, cell phones, ATM machines, credit card purchases, CCTV, satellite imaging and so forth have made surveillance even more ubiquitous. In fact, Lyon claims that we are actively “plugging into circuits of our own panoptic surveillance, which exist outside of the Bentham model” *(The Electronic Eye 69).* Furthermore, in the twenty-first century, more and more information and records about individuals are computerized, such as Social Security numbers, school and
hospital records and credit profiles. Thus, Lyon sees this continual flow of information produced by society via these channels generating a “Super Panopticon,” allowing for the continuous monitoring and recording of our behaviors. Lyon claims that this Super Panopticon does two things:

It imposes a norm [exercising the Foucauldian dissemination of power], disciplining its subjects to participate by filling out forms, giving social security numbers, using credit cards. But it also helps to constitute complementary selves for those subjects, the sum, as it were of their transactions. New individuals are created who bear the same names but who are digitally shorn of their human ambiguities and whose personalities are built artificially from matched data. Artificial they may be, but these computer “selves” have a part to play in determining the life-chances of their human namesakes. Thus are subjects constituted and deviants defined within the Super Panopticon. (“An Electric Panopticon?” 665)

Moreover, Bogard asserts that discipline has now entered the more deadly plane of cyberspace that can be “mutated into simulation and exists in a state of hyperreality” (The Simulation of Surveillance 17). Lyon echoes this claim asserting that contemporary surveillance deals with both physical and virtual spaces, as we currently inhabit both as physical bodies and digital personae respectively (Surveillance as Social Sorting 43). In this dual state, both simulation and surveillance exist symbiotically, constructing a dual reality that allows for not only increased surveillance but also a greater manipulation of individuals. However, there seems to be a continued shift towards the emphasis of hyperreal surveillance. Whereas the Foucauldian model served to convince individuals via the gaze to self-police one’s actions through one’s own agency, this new “Super
Panopticon,” as Lyon claims, is born into “a hyperreal plane,” (Surveillance Society 50) deploys a greater power over those within the system than Foucault could have anticipated. In addition to being coerced to internalize the institutional gaze as Foucault identified, individuals are now, ironically, voluntarily ‘checking in’ with surveillance systems via various digital interfaces mentioned above. Mark Stephen Meadows claims, “A strange migration is occurring…” in how individuals represent and conduct themselves in this way (I, Avatar 7).

Surprisingly, surveillance has become so ubiquitous in daily life, as seen in protective measures and the availability of commercial technologies in the twenty-first century, that not only have consumer populations become generally desensitized to the fear of being observed, but we now willingly desire to be monitored and gladly broadcast information about ourselves. In the text, Welcome to the Machine, Derrick Jensen and George Draffan claim that “the central purpose” of state implemented security and legal surveillant measures “is to normalize surveillance in the lives” of citizens (38). They state that “the fingerprinting [of] children in lunch lines, forcing children to wear RFID tags, and putting video cameras in schools” (38) indoctrinates citizens at a very young age to not only acknowledge but accept this condition as ordinary. In the twenty-first century, surveillance of individuals occurs even prior to birth via ultrasounds and physiological tests on the fetus and mother. This is followed up with baby monitors for parents to “check in” on newborns via audio and video devices as well as countless home video and photographs the baby is subject to. As a result, even prior to the moment of birth, those brought up in consumer societies are subjected to the pervasive surveillant gazes of the state and others, which have produced a society that no longer fears the gaze, but sees its deployment as a facet of normalcy in daily life.
Next, David Lyon asserts that it is this consumerism and not the traditional social institutions that Foucault identified that is the driving economic and cultural force of western societies. In return, consumerism heavily dictates social norms (*Electronic Eye* 61). Consumers are disciplined to some degree, however, in that they respond to the latest trends and fashions, desiring and purchasing new and “improved” goods, dependent on the changing market. In fact, the ubiquity of digital surveillance is made possible in large amount by consumer activity. Greg Elmer states that “dataveillance,” the “systematic use of personal data systems in the monitoring” of one or more persons’ “consumer interactions, exchanges, credit card purchase and ATM withdraws” (*Profiling Machines* 36) gathers, recommends and even determines our likes and dislikes regarding the consumption of goods. As a result, consumers are actually offered less options, limited by previous choices and buying trends, which discard less popular items and variety. Therefore, citizens are further influenced nearly to the point of corporations controlling individual choices. In fact, Elmer claims that what consumers ultimately desire and purchase is merely an illusion of free will and personal choice. Control over personal decisions, in this regard, also appears to have become even more decentralized via the dissemination of the digital gaze and developing technology.

Interestingly, over the past decade, commercial products equipped with surveillant capabilities have saturated the market and consumer demand for these items has responded accordingly. Actually, the majority of American consumers own many personal goods that contribute to their own dataveillance, e.g. personal computers, E-Z Pass, cell phones, PDAs, video cameras, GPS systems, etc. Due to the flood of technological devices that most individuals possess, the state and corporations no longer need to rely solely upon traditional Foucauldian methods to impose its will. The
Foucauldian gaze – the vehicle of coercive power that once radiated exclusively from the social institutions, which indoctrinated the masses to self-discipline – is being replaced by commercial technologies that have decentralized the gaze via the consumers’ desire to purchase and possess these items. In addition, Foucault’s idea of the confined, disciplined body bends under the magnitude of consumerism. The latter produces more seemingly mobile bodies, with the illusions of free choice, controlled by indoctrinated desires and monitored by portable surveillant products. In this way, the primary institution coercing behavior in the twenty-first century is Capitalism, disseminating the discourse of consumerism. In the end, the fear and uncertainty of being seen, which Foucault’s Panopticon relies upon, is giving way to a new social consciousness. In fact, whether inherent or influenced by advertising and the state, there is a general social and personal need to be watched that has emerged in the twenty-first century.

For example, Walter Kirn’s fictive work *The Unbinding* (2006) features a system of widespread surveillance deployed by a number of mechanisms that, as Lyon projects above, citizens not only willingly “plug into,” but also happily pay for. In the novel, protagonist Kent Selkirk works as an operator for the AidSat agency, a corporation similar to OnStar™ yet more omniscient and invasive in the lives of its customers. In fact, consumers can hire AidSat to track their actions, provide advice and “life coaching” as well as monitor their vital signs. The novel begins:

> They call at all hours with a thousand problems, and our satellites fix their locations to the square foot while our operators try to help them or put them in touch with specialists who can. They call because they’ve fallen and can’t stand up, because they’re alone and choking on their food,
because they’ve been abandoned by their mates, because they smell gas, because their babies won’t nurse, because they’ve forgotten how many pills they’ve swallowed, and sometimes because they’re afraid that we’re not here and crave that reassurance [. . .]. (3)

This example validates Lyon’s and Parenti’s claims above that many individuals now willingly insert themselves into the gaze. In fact, it seems that contemporary society has evolved into a culture that no longer appears to fear or resist being seen, but in some ways demands it. As seen here, AidSat advertises its surveillance capabilities as a safety feature, a benefit rather than a detriment.

Because digital technology has advanced to the point that individuals can communicate with others despite distance or access information from around the globe, surveillance has evolved with those technological advances. For instance, GPS systems, cell phones, the internet, and other digital remote communication devices have allowed surveillance to expand beyond the “closed system” of the Foucauldian – Benthamite model, which relies upon architecturally designed physical spaces or definitive boundaries to produce power and deploy the gaze. In contrast, these contemporary surveillance systems are even more capillary, no longer dependent upon the fixed physical spaces where a gazer and subjects must be statically arranged. Instead, the surveillant mechanism, the “gaze” itself, is sought after, purchased and voluntarily carried by the subject, embodied by the cell phone, laptop, GPS, etc., marketed and distributed via consumerism. As a result, there is no longer a fixed, static discourse of the gaze between the individual and the hegemonic power. Instead, “power continues to flow freely via these technological conduits,” claims Lyon (“An Electric Panopticon”).
Moreover, these devices not only monitor, but have the capability to record the location of an individual physically or in cyberspace. For example, cellular phones use towers to triangulate positioning, which also mark the location of the cellular phone and therefore the location of the user. Online, servers as well as websites and the user’s very computer records searches made as well as the virtual “places” or sites visited. Consequently, “The surveillance-based economy persuades individuals that they count when all it wants is to count them [. . .]. The spectacle returns decisive, once more parading the body before audiences” (Hier and Greenberg 8). In this way, by marketing these technologies to consumers, i.e. cellphones, GPS systems, etc., individuals are able to engage in the latest consumer trends, but also engage in more powerful channels of their own surveillance. In the end, these technologically advanced mechanisms, i.e. cellular phones, the internet, GPS, etc., eliminate the need for constant human supervision of individuals because those who had previously avoided being seen are now willingly “checking in” and unintentionally marking locations, identifying purchases, noting nearly every move or act with a date and time stamp, etc., via these personal digital interfaces. This evolution in the politics of surveillance reveals the continued development of technological monitoring and of the digital human. Where Orwell’s 1984 introduced the widespread deployment of the digital interface in the mid twentieth century, technological advancements over the following six decades have produced portable interfaces that individuals not only carry with them but willingly pay to do so – a huge departure from the Foucauldian paradigm where subjects feared being monitored.

As members of a global society, we are continuously engaging these various devices daily, plugging into these systems of surveillance, for work, personal
information and entertainment. Therefore, not only do we willingly assert ourselves into the gaze of these modified telescreens, but a dependence upon these digital systems also begins to emerge. Safety, convenience, communication, and efficiency are all supposed benefits of engaging in the latest developments and trends of digital technology. In fact, in *The Unbinding*, Selkirk admits to a woman he has been secretly monitoring for personal reasons that being watched is such a part of daily life that the younger generations have internalized this condition:

They’ve grown up believing in the orbiting eye, the sub dermal microchip, the circling drone, and they’re no more afraid of them then they are of moonlight. Perhaps that’s because they are *born on stage* [. . .], and the first thing they see is the snout of Daddy’s Handycam [video camera]. Their first steps, their first words, their first Little League at-bats are all directed towards the lens. In time, they have nothing inside them that hasn’t been outside. No depths. No interiors. They have no use for them, even when they find themselves in crisis. Convinced that nothing can escape the probe. [. . .] I know this because I’m the one who’s watching [all of] you. (140)

These statements by Selkirk illustrate the claims of Lyon who states that former clearly defined spaces of public and private are continually blurring due to the increase of these intrusive technologies. Furthermore, those who are privy to these technologies have the ability to monitor individuals almost constantly. William Staples claims in *Everyday Surveillance* that a “subtle coercion” (36) is practiced in society associated with consumerism that further contributes to the paradigm shift towards a society of control. Staples contends that developing technologies, which are made available to
consumers, create an integration of individuals within a culture, rather than a segregation of one or some individuals from others, the latter being a dichotomy crucial to the Foucauldian theory of discipline. Staples claims that television, the internet and other forms of media have huge affects upon populations regarding individuals making informed decisions (34). This integration, influenced via popular media, work to coerce individuals to behave according to the desires and mores disseminated.

What is more, advances in digital technology have not only allowed for more ubiquitous surveillance in societies, as witnessed in Orwell's 1984, but the decentralized, capillary spread of surveillance via these electronic interfaces also allows for individuals to not only be seen but also to participate in gazing upon others. For example, just as the internet, computers, and cell phones produce a limitless arena through which individuals submit themselves to the surveillance system, these subjects can also use these devices to gaze upon others.

In Eric Nicholas' film Alone with Her (2006), the protagonist uses this advancement in technology to continually survey young women. Doug, a very socially awkward young man, stalks an attractive young woman, named Amy. The entire narrative of the film is shot and presented using the CCTV and miniature surveillance cameras that Doug has purchased. In this way, the audience is privy to the exact perspective of the gazer, Doug, and the details of Amy’s life that he captures on video. Because he is too shy and insecure to approach Amy in person, he follows her home and, while she is out later that evening, he enters and installs a number of hidden surveillance cameras in her apartment, filming her bathroom, bedroom, and living rooms simultaneously. He is then able to monitor her via his computer at his own home. In this way, the newer technologies have blurred the notion of public and private spaces, as
Lyon stated, by allowing Doug the ability to view Amy’s most intimate moments alone and in the traditionally “private” space of her home. These digital surveillance cameras enable Doug to watch her sleep, masturbate, shower, eat, dress, etc. As a result, he acts accordingly while watching her in the monitor. He is, as the title of the film states, “alone” with her – individualized in his home, as she is in hers, yet still able to “be” with her in a virtual sense, as supplied by the video cameras and monitor. When Amy lies down to sleep, he too lays his head down on his desk next to her image on the computer screen. When she is masturbating, he too does the same and imagines making love to her. Here, the private and the public spaces have not only blurred, but have seemingly intertwined from Doug’s perspective.

According to Susan Sontag, Doug “possesses” Amy via the gazing space of the camera, which offers him “possession of a space of which the gazer himself is insecure” (Regarding the Pain of Others) of in reality. Indeed, Doug can bypass his physical emotions of fear and shyness by “interacting” with and “possessing” her simulated image on the monitor via the surveillance cameras. In essence, he comes to love not Amy, but the simulation of her, presented in this virtual space that he interfaces with on the computer screen. It is the simulation, or simulacra in Baudrillard’s terms of Amy, not her physical body that is considered real. Furthermore, possessing her in this hyperreality, he can manipulate her digital image as he chooses by blowing up the image, cropping, pausing, or recording it. This technology of surveillance gives Doug more power over her in the hyperreal space than he ever could in physical reality.

Moreover, this virtual environment of digital communication and surveillance is what the protagonist, Kent Selkirk, uses in The Unbinding to monitor and eventually assume the lives of others in the hyperreality produced by this virtual world. Selkirk
admits tracking clients even after they terminate their calls to AidSat and has “even made a habit of this practice” (5). According to Selkirk, he is able to:

Pinpoint the safest neighborhoods for children, the highest concentrations of single black millionaires, and the most likely spots to contract a tick-borne illness [with AidSat’s trademarked multiaxis maps]. Location is destiny [. . .]. (6)

In this way, average individuals who have been subjects of the gaze, such as Selkirk and Doug from *Alone with Her*, wield the power of surveillance over those individuals whom they choose to gaze upon via the new digital technologies. Unlike *1984*, *Anthem*, and *Utopia* where only ruling institutions had this power, these contemporary works reveal how a change in the spread and control of the gaze has changed the nature of surveillance. In this sense, the modern works reveal a shift in the nature of surveillance by illustrating the individual assuming some increased ability to participate in the gaze by engaging in the magnified surveillance of others in society.

In this way, the everyman can even direct his own amplified gaze, however the limits of the democratized gaze, in the hands of the everyman, ends here. This gaze remains superficial, it is only a slightly magnified version of the everyman’s gazing with the naked eye. The technology of the camera does afford a more intimate view of Amy in *Alone with Her*; however, Doug’s gaze through the camera lens in not nearly as powerful or invasive as the state’s. Mark Winokur claims, “Anyone can install Net Nanny, AdAware, Norton Firewall, or other ‘user-friendly’ applications. Everyone has a little power, though power is shared unequally oppressively (sic)” (“The Ambiguous Panopticon”). The general ability for the everyman to survey others has been amplified via modern technological advances, which, considering the number of consumer goods
that can be used for surveillant purposes, accounts for a seemingly democratization of the gaze. However, the surveillant capabilities available to the everyman are minuscule in comparison to what the state possesses.

As the majority of individuals in capitalistic nations are equipped with these surveillant technologies via consumer purchasing, the condition of being monitored appears much less of a threat than it did for Foucault. A second reason is that according to the film Look (2007), shot entirely by CCTV and surveillance cameras located in a shopping mall, ATM machine and gas station, “the average American is captured approximately 200 times” by surveillance cameras. This staggering statistic does not take into account, however, the times an individual is captured on personal surveillance devices like camera phones or video recorders or via data-collection most frequently taking place via the Internet. In fact, this increase of surveillance, in the hands of the masses, only works to mask the institutional and corporational surveillance that not only maintains great power but the ability to see completely into the lives of its citizens and patrons. For example, Doug directs the gaze towards Amy, who unknowingly is spied upon for Doug’s sexual and personal pleasure. He creates and attaches memory to her image, her virtual body via the cameras, experiencing what he never can physically attain. But, on the other hand, Selkirk and Aid Sat are privy to an invasive system of surveillance that not only visually monitors and records individuals’ activities like Doug or the everyman, but can track heartbeats, blood types, detailed movements, or locate any specific data or individual dependent upon the criteria searched for with this cutting edge technology. In this way, it appears that technology and commercialism have allowed for an even greater spread of surveillance, beyond what Foucault could foresee in the early 1980s.
To reiterate, not only does the state make efforts to track individuals via passports, taxes, fingerprinting, various licenses, traffic cameras, etc in modern cultures, but in a capitalistic society, corporations are also tracking individual purchases, market trends, and locations. Furthermore, individuals use personal surveillance mechanisms such as cell phones/cameras, video cameras like Doug in *Alone with Her*, GPS systems, and baby monitors to name just a few. In this way, any one individual in the twenty-first century can be subject to countless gazes and surveillance systems originating from not only the state, but from literally any other individual. Ultimately, the ubiquity of surveillance is multiplied exponentially by the masses obtaining, carrying and deploying the gaze. However, the advancements in digital technology and developments of the virtual world pose an even greater threat of surveillance that is much more covert.

**Digital Personae and “The Panoptic Sort”**

Second, Foucault considered a primary function of discipline as the “[reduction] of multiplicities into binary oppositions,” (Bogard) such as self/other, sane/mad, or pious/irreverent. This duality is played out in the dichotomies of male/female in *The Handmaid’s Tale* and pious/irreverent in *The Scarlet Letter* as illustrated in Chapter II. Forced into this duality, according to Foucault, the individual engages in self-policing herself which, juxtaposed to the desires imposed on her by the institutions in power, demonstrates the polarities and coercive power exhibited by this apparatus. Therefore, where Foucault saw discipline imposed via “massification and individuation,” advances in technology appear to be rendering this *duality* and form of discipline as antiquated.
Gilles Deleuze posits, from the perspective of semiotics or “sign systems” rather than territories, that disciplinary societies have “two poles: signatures that stand for individuals, and numbers recorded in registers that stand for the places of individuals in a mass” (The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility 62). However, in this new paradigm, “the duality collapses in favor of a single system capable of finely modulated adjustments” (Ericson and Haggerty 62). “Signatures and numbers are replaced with passwords, which determine whether or not you have access to information. Passwords in turn are codes, and codes are the new language of control in digital systems” (Deleuze 62).

Therefore, rather than create a social dichotomy between the masses and individual to enhance control, as seen in the texts in Chapter II, Bogard claims that in this state of hyperreality, which is created by modern technology, individuals are reduced to discarnate “packets of information” that are continually disassembled, reassembled, coded, recoded and processed dependent on what criteria the system or authorized users desire. In essence, we are subjected to a great hyperreal “spreadsheet” that organizes and reorganizes individuals according to innumerable possibilities and criteria, a process that Greg Elmer refers to as the “Panoptic Sort.” The resulting creation and recreation of numerous identities in cyberspace, or “fractal subjectivity” as Bogard defines it, can continually be manipulated and mutated readily by those privy to the system. These disparate identities, called “digital personae” by Lyon, are ultimately separated, and disembodied from their original physical subjectivities. As Lyon stated above:

New individuals are created who bear the same names but who are digitally shorn of their human ambiguities and whose personalities are built
artificially from matched data. Artificial they may be, but these computer “selves” have a part to play in determining the life-chances of their human namesakes. (665)

The individual experiences, to some degree, a loss of agency over one’s self regarding these identities in hyperreal spaces without access to the system. Bogard refers to this process as the “disarticulation of the self.” This lack of agency or “disarticulation” of individuals in cyber or hyperreal spaces is further examined by John Palfrey and Urs Gasser in *Born Digital: Understanding the First Generation of Digital Natives* (2008). Palfrey and Gasser describes that what emerges from the situation of online identities, or digital personae as Lyon has dubbed it, is the “problem about an individual’s control over one’s identity in a digital age” (44). Furthermore, the countless bits of information collected about every individual on a daily basis disseminated into virtual systems online produce what Palfrey and Gasser call “digital dossiers” (39). These digital dossiers continue to grow in size and informatics quite rapidly. But what is most worrisome to Palfrey and Gasser is that:

> Individuals are losing control of this information because the data-collection practices of corporations, among others [advertisers, financial records, bills etc.], are changing at a rate that is faster than the rate of change for society’s methods of protecting that data. In other words, the market for information about individuals is developing more quickly than the social norms that govern how people protect data about themselves. [. . .] But these many, daily individual acts result in a rich, deep dataset associated with an individual that can be aggregated and searched. This process, start to finish, is only lightly regulated. (39,50)
Stona Fitch’s novel *Senseless* (2002) captures these metaphorical disassemblings, disarticulations and mutating superimpositions of cyber space upon a particular individual, illustrating the degradation and reduction of the body into disparate identities and informational flows quite literally. An American, Eliot Gast, is an affluent international businessman who moves to Brussels and is abducted. The apartment that he is held captive in is nearly empty, all windows are painted white, and the single entrance and exit is locked from the outside. The once public figure, who claimed, “I spent much of my career at parties, dinners, receptions [. . .]. I was not tucked away in an ivory tower. I was out in the world” (4) was now invisible to the world, hidden inside the opaque walls of his abductors’ prison. His abductors, however, have an interesting plan as to how to exploit their victim for their benefit. It resembles many political kidnappings, where the assailants often use abduction as a form of protest, broadcasting their cause or as a method of earning large sums of money in *exchange* for the victim. However, the methods in achieving these goals in this case were quite unique. Eliot Gast’s abductors continually broadcast his containment while putting “forth evidence to the world and asked them (*sic*) to judge [him]” (54) for his white-collar crimes of economic exploitation of third world nations. After “gathering thousands of votes and money [from the Internet subscriptions of Gast’s ‘trial’],” (56) the terrorists delivered the viewers’ verdict and carried out Gast’s punishment of torture over the Internet.

When Gast attempts escape the first few days of his abduction he notices that his kidnappers are electronically monitoring him. Gast explains, “I’m held hostage in public, visible but hidden” (54). He tries to break one of the painted windows, but his hand recoils from the enforced glass. Afterwards, Gast states, “When I rose, I saw
dozens of black cables had snaked out of the ducts and now waited, extended and watching for me to continue” (21). His containment and behavior were being constantly streamed around the world on the Internet. Similar to individuals who set up their own websites or post via social networking sites like Facebook, MySpace, or Match.com, Gast is broadcast continually, exposing personal details, like his intimate suffering, to anyone browsing the site.

As the cameras record, the abductors torture Gast by slowly yet methodically dismantling his body. The abductors claim that Gast is “a man of senses – so [they are] eliminating them. To change a man you must take what is important to him” (58). One of the abductors states, in reference to the millions watching live or downloading their digital spectacle via the Internet, that they have produced “Torture, on demand.” First, the abductors press a hot iron on Gast’s tongue to remove his sense of taste. He is left to suffer for a number of days, visible in cyberspace to online viewers. Then the second torture begins: a cheese grater is run over his hands and fingers to destroy Gast’s sense of touch. Again, he is left to suffer while “millions watch” (66) until the abductors puncture Gast’s eardrums with ice picks. Last, “one eye is scooped out of his head with a coffee spoon” (122). The remaining eye, assumingly, is left so Gast can see his transformation.

During his torture, as his physical body is literally being dismantled and disappearing, Gast is also transforming into a stream of data, entering the cyberspace of the Internet, telecast upon the computer screens of those choosing to watch this particular stream. His eroding corporal body is reconstructed and replaced by the pixilated simulation, echoing Amy’s videoed body in Alone with Her, which is then taken as real, hyperrealized via the dissemination of the original’s representation via the web.
Gast, as Bogard asserts, is experiencing the “disarticulation of the self” in that, against his will, Gast is not only physically tortured and dismantled, but even more so he is captured by the lenses of the video cameras and disseminated into the virtual system of the web. What is more, considering Gast, the individual has no control over his digital body; control belongs to those who have created the program and possess authorization to access the system. In the virtual system, “he” can be processed, coded and recoded, searched for according to various criteria of the particular matrix. For example, just as search engines like Google and Yahoo have an array of search criteria under which to browse information in cyberspace, the same is true in Senseless. In the novel, viewers could search under Gast’s name if his captors logged it in, or under “torture,” or any other moniker applied to the website set up for Gast’s transmission. What was his original, corporal body has been reduced to one of many endless bits of data in cyberspace, subjected to endless searches, orderings, disassembling and reassembling within the Panoptic Sort. Furthermore, the information produced and captured about Gast, i.e. his torture and pain, add to his individualized digital dossier that Palfrey and Gasser illustrate above.

True to their assessment, it is the terrorists in Senseless that have gained control of and dictate Gast’s own identity in the hyperreality of cyberspace, allowing them to manipulate (quite literally) and broadcast their recreation of Gast’s identity online. This broad distribution of Gast’s incarceration via the Internet is exactly what the abductors had in mind. Bent on protesting the creation of the European Union and punishing those who influenced this conglomeration, these terrorists acknowledge the power of the Internet and hyper-reality in disseminating their message. In fact, one abductor tells Gast that, “We don’t even have a bomb, we have something better. We have you” (23).
It is this power to reduce, separate, and recode, with complete manipulation of the individual via virtual spaces that separates the Society of Control from the disciplinary society and ushers in the paradigm shift. Gast’s body is physically dismantled while his digital personae or virtual body is accumulating with each digital frame that records his capture and torture. A “new” digital body is continuing to form online. With this enhanced ability to process and track information about specific bodies, both Staples and Bogard claim that there is a move from imposing a specific form of punishment on a particular individual for a particular crime to a general, more evasive surveillance of all. In this way, authorities around the globe are using this processed information, digital dossiers and “digital personae” to prevent and even predict crimes. Bogard further states that with these technologies and limitless access to vast information about individuals, authorities are profiling deviants and future suspects more and more, making the bold claim that “the police don’t have to wait for a crime, they can stage it” (*The Simulation of Surveillance* 126).

This “staging” of events, upon which evidence or guilt is derived by way of hyperreal surveillance, is exactly what Philip K. Dick predicted in his futuristic work “The Minority Report” (1956), which was also adapted to film as *Minority Report* (2002). As a result, guilt is determined by factors that lay outside of the accused’s actions. Like the precogs, the profiling of would-be criminals in this new system of surveillance and simulation is a reality. Dick’s work furthers the use of digital technology as a means of surveillance that Orwell had established a decade earlier. The unique surveillance mechanism that Dick predicts in his short story’s futuristic setting of New York City serves as the precursor to methods actually used in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to not only “see” or identify certain individuals but to expand upon and magnify
the surveillant capabilities of the system. As a result, the film version *Minority Report*, released at the beginning of the twenty-first century, is a contemporary retelling of Dick’s future predictions from the 1950s. Furthermore, “The Minority Report” draws on one key element of Orwell’s Oceania, which also served as the foundation of Thoughtcrime in *1984*, to form the single disciplinary system of his futuristic police state. Dick constructed a system of justice that does not pursue and convict delinquents who have committed crimes. Instead, “The Minority Report” features a judiciary that emphasizes the *prediction* and incarceration of ‘potential’ criminals using an advanced, technologically dependent surveillance mechanism situated in a plane of reality that only specialized machines can detect and process. This reality, which humans are not conscious of, becomes the governing force of discipline in this futuristic setting of New York City.

This revolutionary penal mechanism, known as the prophylactic Precrime system operates via the “pre-detection of criminals through the ingenious use of mutant precogs, capable of previewing future events and transferring orally that data to analytical machinery” (84). That data is then reviewed by members of the police force to determine who, as indicated by the clairvoyance of the precogs and translated by computer programs, will commit crimes in the near future. As a result, Anderton claims that there has only been one murder in the past five years (74) and that they have “successfully abolished the *post-crime* punitive system of jails and fines” (72). Much like Thoughtcrime in Oceania this mechanism is dependent upon not only a hyperreal system of surveillance but also the purported “intent” of a potential criminal. Moreover, “writing at the cusp of the development of computing machines, Orwell could not have envisioned the marriage of computers and optics” (Haggerty and Ericson), which we
see in the latter twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. However, furthering Orwell’s limited vision of the future, Dick is able to predict this hybrid technology and display it in the Precrime system decades earlier than its actual inception.

However, what is scrutinized in “The Minority Report” are not the movements or actions of the individual’s physical body in a present, shared reality, but the simulation of a body and its actions as experienced only by the precogs within the Precrime mechanism. In essence, as detected by this system, the physical body lags behind its simulation, never fulfilling the future intent of the body as witnessed by the precogs. Precrime eliminates the physical body’s commission of a future crime that has been committed by its simulacrum. Ultimately, hyperreality dictates the actions and outcomes occurring in physical reality. In fact, the simulacra of bodies nullify the agency of physical bodies in physical spaces. The hyperreality has always already occurred by the time corporeal bodies can enact or experience the events in physical reality. Baudrillard refers to this condition where the simulation precedes and comes to engender the original object as “the precession of simulacra” (*Simulacra and Simulation* 1).

Furthermore, this situation is similar to the effects of consumerism illustrated above, where consumer demand of products may appear to be based on personal, free choices but is actually dictated by advertising and previous buying trends.

This situation echoes what Bogard has identified as the conditions of individuals interfacing with virtual systems of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Bogard claims that inside these systems:

‘You’ don’t control yourself but are only a mobile node in a highly dispersed control environment. In this scenario, the whole polarity of
Subject and Object, observer and observed collapses [. . .]. Violation, arrest, sentencing, everything is over, mapped out, before it’s begun. (99)

Instrumental in the original creation of the Precrime system, Bogard refers to the adaptation of surveillance from physical architecture to the gazing space of virtual realities as a “simulation of surveillance.” He considers this technologically enabled magnification of visibility as simulating surveillance “in the sense that they precede and redouble a means of observation” (96). Applying “The Minority Report” to this theory, the clairvoyance of the precogs is, in Bogard’s terms, a “kind of surveillance in advance of surveillance, a ‘technology before the fact’” (96). In other words, viewing an alternative or virtual reality, the precogs are able to “see” a crime committed prior to any witness observing the crime as it is actually committed. Verified by the “Theory of Multiple Futures,” it is statistically impossible for the three precogs to duplicate false crime premonitions.

But what is more, is that this foreknowledge of the crime promotes a more focused state of surveillance, in that once the initial phase of ‘foreseeing’ the crime is activated and the precriminal is identified, authorities can then concentrate their observation upon the specified precriminal. In a sense, the physical viewing space that Foucault politicized is secondary to, even displaced by, the “virtual viewing” space in this particular context and furthers the case of a paradigm shift. The virtual gazing upon the precriminal, prior to carrying out a deviant act, precedes the traditional Foucauldian gazing upon the physical body of the deviant during or after committing the crime. In a sense, this virtual surveillance replaces the need for Foucauldian surveillance and the production of docile bodies.
The practical usage of criminal profiling in contemporary police operations illustrates these techniques that Dick predicted decades earlier. For example, a composite of qualities are assembled in order to construct a demographic that ultimately identifies the perpetrator dependent upon the circumstances of the crime. Moreover, the criminal already exists as such prior to the crime he commits in this system. He is constructed and defined by the operating system long before he can engage in his deviance. In other words, “a profile, as the name suggests, is a kind of prior ordering, in this case a model or figure that organizes multiple sources of information to scan for matching or exceptional cases” (Bogard 97). These profiles emerge as the “data doubles” representing the individual within the virtual system. Therefore, the profiles are representations of the individuals that are used to identify future deviants and detain them. By breaking down the body via abstraction from its territorial setting, it is then reassembled in different settings, e.g. virtual and cyber realities like those created by the Precrime and 1984’s Thoughtcrime systems, through a series of data flows. “The result is a decorporealized body, a ‘data double’ of pure virtuality,” which is then scrutinized and processed (Haggerty and Ericson 105).

What separates “The Minority Report” from Senseless is that the latter features the physical body of Gast existing prior to the creation of his data double or virtual image. His corporeal body is disfigured and becomes more flawed as more data about him is streamed. In this way, we witness the beginning processes of the body’s degradation in favor of his audience’s and general masses’ desire for the digital representation of the body. In the end, those viewing care only for what the digital screen disseminates in the form of Gast’s virtual representation, not his corporeal body.
On the other hand, in “The Minority Report,” considering Dick’s virtual profiling, the individual body exists only after the virtual creation via the precogs and Precrime hyperreality. The individual is created from the system of virtual data, conjured by the precogs’ prescient and surveillant abilities and fills up the virtual predictive space – the ‘body’ is the embodiment of the data. Unlike in Senseless where the human captors required Gast’s corporeal body to be recorded in order to produce a virtual body, broadcast for the world to see, the Precrime system creates and dictates the data doubles of future criminals without the physical bodies or actions of those actual individuals existing before hand. For instance, the precogs could predict a crime so far into the future that the criminal may not have been born yet. Again, the virtual data of the crime has been generated first in this digital reality, waiting for the individual body to ascribe to the crime in physical reality. Here, is where the power and control of those in charge of the virtual systems can become absolute. The physical human is irrelevant in the creation of a data double or virtual being. However, once materialized in this hyperreal space, that data double is at the whim of the system. He is held accountable for what the system determines he is accountable for as played out, predicted or fabricated in the digital hyperreality.

Another medium in which this “foreseeing” is accomplished is via biometrics – an increasingly popular form of “technology before the fact” used commonly to verify or authenticate identities typically for security measures. As its name implies, biometrics is a series of mechanisms for measuring the body. The most common forms of biometric measurements are fingerprinting, iris and retinal scans as seen in the film Minority Report (2002), as well as facial and thermal imaging, and urinalysis (Surveillance Studies Reader 378). Sean Hier and Josh Greenberg state that an important moment in
the history of surveillance, which deployed the use of a digital biometrics system occurred in the post-9/11 environment of Tampa, Florida. Days prior to the 2001 Super Bowl, police strategically placed numerous surveillance cameras, equipped with the new software program FaceIt™, in key locations to scan the faces of thousands of ticket holders around and entering the venue. As a result, “the program identified 19 wanted suspects by matching biometric readings of spectators’ facial images with previously stored facial images of convicted felons” via this virtual system, which influenced the police force to install a 36-camera system equipped with the FaceIt™ program in the city’s “nightlife district” (*Surveillance Studies Reader* 191).

Five decades earlier, Dick illustrates an analogous virtual system of biometrics utilized for its surveillant capabilities in “The Minority Report.” When Anderton is on the run, after he is accused of Precrime by the same punitive system he created, a man claiming to be named Fleming and a member of “a protective society” that functions as a “sort of police force that watches the police” (83), gave Anderton a number of false passports and identification cards to elude capture. Similar to the usage of passports in pre-Elizabethan England featured in *Utopia*, movement is restricted in Dick’s futuristic New York City and regulated by passports. However, the information on these identification cards and passports can be easily altered. But, the biometric readings of Anderton’s body cannot be as easily altered, if at all. The narrator states, “Obviously, the cards had been made out with him in mind, for all the measurements [listed on the identification cards] fitted [his description]. After a time he wondered about the fingerprints and the brain-wave patterns. They couldn’t possibly stand comparison” (84). In this way, biometric surveillance emerges as a more accurate and efficient mode of surveying targets when incorporating electronic means that expedite the process.
The deployment of biometrics, in this case facial imaging, compounds the power of the institutional gaze upon citizens, especially in heavily populated areas like the Super Bowl setting. Not only is the accuracy of the gaze magnified in its ability to accurately know and match facial features with identified targets, but more so, the system has less if not a complete disuse of an active human guard in the gazing tower. Instead, the guard is machinated, which transcends the limitations of a human gazer: the mechanical system never grows tired and is nearly infallible in its ability to identify individuals. With the development of technology and its use in surveillance, information about subjects can be collected more efficiently as well as stored and sorted at alarming rates of size and speed.

The film adaptation, *Minority Report* (2002), emphasizes the same techniques and disciplinary measures of Precrime as the original short story, yet provides a contemporary context illustrating the issues of the twenty-first century concerning the pervasiveness of surveillance in society. Set in 2054, *Minority Report*, directed by Steven Spielberg, provides a modern envisioning of the transparency in daily life to come based on Dick’s predictions. In fact, the entire narrative of the film appears to be based on the conditions of seeing and being seen to various degrees. All scenes in the film and spaces in the futuristic city are well lit, with no dark corners. What is most ubiquitous in the film is the use of countless biometric retinal scans, referred to as “eye-dents,” playing on the term ‘identification.’ Towards the beginning of the film, all entering the Department of Precrime are subjected to a number of eye-dents as they attempt to enter the building, which identify individuals and information about each as well as grant access or record information about each. What is more, when Anderton enters the Metro station train with hundred of other travelers, the film’s audience is made aware of
how many thousands of retinal scans each individual is subjected to in this short amount of time. Spielberg conveys the continual monitoring of individuals by showing countless shutter flashes of the eye-dents as the commuters pass into the station, through the hallways and enter and exit each train. The ubiquity of the eye-dents in the Metro station presumably reveals that each and every public walk way or entrance to every building, contains some form of biometric monitor.

Furthermore, what is most interesting is the scene where Anderton walks past advertisements when entering the Metro station, and the eye-dents on the billboards not only identify him but directly address him, personalizing the advertisement by greeting him by name and describing the product and why, specifically, he needs or should purchase it. This example illustrates the accuracy of the eye scans and singles out each individual, always illustrating that the system is watching them in particular, measuring desires and tracking movements – one is always seen under continual digital and hyperreal surveillance. In fact, adding to the condition of constant surveillance, the office of the Department of Precrime where a large part of the film is set is completely opaque in its architecture: all walls are made of a translucent material, with many open spaces within the structure so that individuals can easily see and be seen by others despite the size of the edifice.

In these respects, the film mirrors what Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson have identified as an “emerging ‘surveillant assemblage’” (“The Surveillance Assemblage” 607) at the start of the twenty-first century, which operates by converting physical bodies into virtual ‘data doubles’ to be targeted and scrutinized. Furthermore, this “visualizing device . . . brings into the visual register a host of heretofore opaque flows of auditory, scent, chemical, visual, ultraviolet and informational stimuli.” The
majority of this visualization targets the body, and “exists beyond our normal range of perception” (Haggerty and Ericson 613). In this way, the surveillant assemblage relies entirely upon machines to make and record observations that humans are incapable of detecting, which is analogous to the rudimentary elements of the Precrime system where computing machines are necessary to perceive and decipher the incoherent babblings and visions of the precogs. The emergence of this new system, whose beginnings are represented in Orwell and furthered through Dick’s fiction, and elucidated in the scholarship of Haggerty and Ericson, “can be contrasted with the early forms of disciplinary panopticism analyzed by Foucault” (SSR 109). In fact, the latter utilizes complete human observation, i.e. the guard in the tower and individual self-policing. The former, however, are dependent upon not only computers, but the mechanical production of virtual realities.

There are moments in Dick’s story when the individual, scrutinized and analyzed by the system, resembles those individuals in the Foucauldian-Benthamite model. Louis Althusser refers to the process of “interpellation,” which is the ability and procedure of social mechanisms thorough which ideology constitutes human beings as subjects. Furthermore, “the constitution of subjects concerns the ways in which individuals come to define themselves and to make sense of the their own subjectivity through social positions such as ‘taxpayer,’ ‘middle class,’ and ‘criminal’” (380). For Althusser, it was the ideological state apparatuses – many of which Foucault later names as the governing institutions that disseminate power via the discourse of the gaze – that “hailed” or defined individuals in a way that situated them in certain social positions. This process of interpellation also occurs within the hyperreality that the precogs experience in “The Minority Report.” For instance, individuals in Dick’s futuristic New
York City are common citizens until they are ‘hailed’ as criminals by the Precrime system.

However, what differentiates the determining gaze as Foucault or Althusser would identify from what is occurring in Dick’s work is the process of “hailing” the subject. For Dick, the gaze is still determining as Althusser would suggest, but instead of depending on the individual to internalize and participate in the construction of identity and the applied discipline in the former paradigm, “The Minority Report” and the film adaptation illustrate a surveillance mechanism that removes the agency of a subject and dictates, without the subject’s approval or participation, the fate of the individual. Here, again, is the difference between Foucault’s concept of surveillance inducing discipline and Bogard’s idea of the gaze’s evolution to one of control. In other words, and what is most compelling in this example, is that personal agency is removed from the individual and placed entirely in the hands of the state, which determines not only one’s innocence but future actions as predicted by the precogs. Anderton states, “We’re solely responsible. If we slip up, someone dies” (74). Again, the accountability of the one committing a crime, or killing in this case, has been removed from the individual and handed over to the institution in this system. This immediate effect of Anderton’s Precrime mechanism is a direct departure from what Foucault had identified as the paradigm shift in punishment occurring in the mid 1700s, which focused on the self-policing of individuals via the internalized gaze and power of the state rather than publicized physical punishment. In “The Minority Report,” this society is one not of individualized self-control via self-monitoring, but of absolute state control, in that all actions of citizens are always already predetermined via this penal mechanism. In other words, Precrime appears to be even more effective than the Foucauldian-Benthamite
model of discipline via the Panopticon since the former has removed an even greater chance of deviance (99.8%), which Anderton claims allowed the state to do away with the post-crime system of jails. Moreover, there is no opportunity or need for prisoner reform because the criminal is immediately removed from society and either exiled to another planet or sequestered in a holding cell until after the supposed crime is to be committed, thus preventing the deviant act. In the end, resources need not be spent on rehabilitating or reintroducing the criminal to society when any forthcoming crimes can be handled in the same way – readily detected by the precogs, and the ‘precriminal’ is again taken into custody and detained.

In this way, the precriminal body in Dick’s short story and Spielberg’s film adaptation is no longer disciplined, but does revert back to being punished in some sense of the term. The punishment does not make an example of the individual as a consequence of deviant behavior or to instill guilt and self-surveillance as in the works featured in Chapter II, but imposes a state of *invisibility*. As a result, the body’s punishment is not truly punishment in the Foucauldian definition, which refers to the condition of complete *visibility* of the deviant. In contrast, regarding Dick’s work and the new paradigm, the body is dismantled, removed from its physical embodiment and discarded from reality – exiled and invisible. In a society subjected to complete transparency, the appropriate punishment would be its inverse, invisibility.

The same occurs in *Senseless*. Gast’s body is isolated in the opaque apartment, exiled from its once worldly past. However, it is his data double that continues to define him, broadcast online. His physical body is rendered invisible, only his digital self remains visible, which viewers see all over the world. What was crucial to Foucault’s analysis was the presence of the physical body, captured in the panoptic gaze, which
was a product of the Benthemite model. Gast’s physical body has been exiled, hidden away in what could be any random room, in any location, in any part of the world. In fact, the physical conditions: the architecture and the corporeal body that is so crucial to the Foucauldian paradigm and surveillance are nearly obsolete in this example.

Although a multitude of viewers gaze upon Gast’s torture, this situation is much different from the public spectacle of punishment. Mentioned earlier in this chapter, advances in technology have allowed for the general population to participate in forms of surveillance. In Senseless, viewers pay to influence the verdict of and watch Gast atone for his crimes. As such, the numerous viewers and the democratization of the gaze via consumerism have generated an evolution of the gaze, creating an inverse of perspective. The panoptic gaze has given way to synoptic viewing. Paying to see Gast’s torture means that the audiences are not participating in upholding the laws of the king or moral codes, which would be exemplified in public executions of the past, but are simply paying for the entertainment value of what they gaze upon.

What is ironic, considering this departure from the visible Foucauldian body, is the containment of precriminals in the film adaptation of Minority Report. Practically glossed over in Dick’s original work, the layout of The Department of Containment in the film where precriminals are incarcerated, appears to be a former Panopticon prison updated with digital holding cells. The Sentinel, as it is called by Anderton, is situated in a high central tower oversees the prisoners much like Bentham’s guard. Furthermore, in the film, there are even vertical blinds on the tower windows that Foucault claimed were important to hide the source of the gaze – the presence of the tower guard. Also, in Minority Report, the prisoners are physically immobilized on individual pedestals
surrounding the tower, but connected to a digital interface. In essence, their bodies are contained and removed from society so as not to commit their future crime.

On the other hand, their minds are still active and “busy, busy” as the Sentinel claims. Furthermore, electrodes on the bodies transmit the precriminals’ ‘thoughts’ for the Sentinel’s viewing upon a series of monitors. In this evolution of the panoptic model, criminals are not reformed or even subjected to the institutional gaze. Instead, future deviants are simply exiled, removed from society and physical reality only to be transferred to a hyperreality controlled and invoked by mechanical means by way of the electrodes and further surveyed through the Sentinel’s monitor. In this way, criminal bodies are disappearing from this futuristic New York City, as Lyon claimed, stolen from society and forced to experience a hyperreal state as their minds remain “busy, busy” while their bodies are contained and exiled from the general population. This modified punishment and detainment dictated by the Precrime system no longer depends upon the docile state of citizens, who police themselves, to maintain order. Instead, they are subjected to a hyperreal surveillance that completely controls and manages them, plucking would-be deviants from society. Again, the criminal is defined by his exilic body, removed from the public gaze. To reiterate, this is a major departure from a public who had once participated in, and demanded, the public punishment and viewing of the tortured body up to the eighteenth century as Foucault had defined, let alone a departure from the constant visibility of the physical body, which defined the Foucauldian – Benthamite model of surveillance.

This complex and developed system of surveillance, which allows for specific individuals to “see” deviant actions before they happen, offers an even greater power of control over the population. What is more, this system of surveillance in “The Minority
Report” and the film adaptation further breaks from the Foucauldian model, which emphasized the “privatization of punishment” that occurred within the individual as imposed via the discourses disseminated by the state institutions. For Precrime does not fall under the definition of punishment as one becoming “increasingly invisible”. Instead, Precrime renders the future actions of individuals completely visible, manifested through the precogs and computer system. As a result, there is no need for the institutional settings or discourses to manipulate society. In fact, the potential of being gazed upon, which is so critical in the Panoptic schema, is so magnified by Precrime that the latter nearly eliminates the potential of being seen and virtually guarantees it.

Ultimately, this legal and penal structure is even more dangerous and oppressive than Orwell’s Big Brother because control and agency finally disappear into, as Bogard states, the “pure operationality” of the system against where resistance becomes nearly impossible. The authority of the state renders all visible at all times in the virtual system. However, those who will commit a crime are immediately rendered physically invisible upon arrest. In this way, control is dictated solely by the state, which determines the extent of one’s existence, measured by the degree of visibility of the individual. Ultimately, the physical body’s disappearance removes the agency of the individual since only his data double exists in the virtual system to represent himself, which can be easily manipulated and completely controlled by those privy to the working of the system. In this sense, an individual being rendered invisible upon arrest equates to that person having no control.

The emergence of the telescreen and its potentials, as Orwell introduced decades ago, have developed into various media that utilize the virtual system to
survey, gather and distribute information about and to individuals, maintaining and expanding the virtual plane and its importance in human existence. In fact, Martin Irvin claims, “Culture [is] adapting to simulation, visual media [are] becoming undifferentiated equivalent forms, [and] simulation and real-time media [are] substituting for the real” (“The Postmodern”). These conditions of Postmodernity that feature the decentering, disparate and disconnectedness of the hyperreal in relation to the unmediated experiences of the body are magnified by the developments of technology, i.e. primarily digital systems. In fact, this fragmentation of experience, where the body is increasingly disconnected from the actual event, promotes Baudrillard’s claim that simulacra can be more powerful than “the real.” For example, in the film Minority Report, detective work no longer involves the “hands on” activity of physically tracking clues and following leads. Instead, crime prevention takes place in the hyperreal space of the computer-simulated visions of the precogs. Anderton works to detect and “solve” crimes before they happen by behaving more like a symphonic conductor than a police officer. Interfacing with the digital technologies that allow him to access the prescient visions of the precogs, Anderton manipulates the computer screens and the projected images upon the monitors looking for clues of future crimes to occur. Referred to as “scrubbing the image,” Anderton quickly yet gracefully combs through the holographic images of the hyperreal to uncover the events of the yet unfolded physical reality. In essence, the simulacra of the precogs vision is more important than “the real” as Baudrillard explains above because the hyperreal vision can prevent “the real” event of murder from occurring. But, most importantly, the *hyperreal* depiction of the individual has precedence over the innocence or culpability of “the real,” corporeal person.
Opposed to the disciplinary society that Foucault identified where the individual bears the accountability and weight of power in disciplining himself, Bogard’s Society of Control emphasizes the simulated body or digital personae that is subject to reordering and control by the virtual system and its user(s). In essence, the subject is coerced in the former context, but controlled in the latter context.

The “Pornography of the Self”

Mark Winokur claims in “The Ambiguous Panopticon: Foucault and the Codes of Cyberspace” (2003) that for Foucault “attention to the body of the prisoner [in the Panopticon] is total: it implies an interest in and effect on all these movements of the individual” (5). However, according to Bogard, the new system of social control no longer targets the bodies of individuals, those “messy, unpredictable things.” Instead, with the use of developing technology there is a move to survey and gather information about and produced by bodies. This condition reinforces the paradigm shift, switching from a discipline society to a Society of Control, in that the individual can be continually broken down into data flows and processed in the hyperreality of the cyber world where the information is logged. In the final transformation, from corporeal to virtual, the hyperreal data double usurps the physical individual. This is a significant departure from the Foucauldian model, which relied upon the “docile body,” individualized, reformed, marked and under the constant fear of being physically seen. As a consequence, Bogart states:

We must, then, develop a new critical discourse of social control, one that accounts for the operation of a system that depends less and less on the
normalization of practices within the confines of a place—the factory, the
office, the hospital, the school, the market—and which now operates
universally via a complex temporal process that brings into play modeling,
gaming, forecasting, testing, all ways of electronically mediated feeling
and perceiving. Increasingly, virtual realities, artificial intelligence, expert
systems sever us from older forms of control and project that control—
refashioned, smoothed, and streamlined—onto the plane of simulation.

(77)

In fact, in this hyperreal simulation, Bogard declares the deterioration and
complete dissolution of the individual as we know it and suggests a replacement, the
“dividual.” Coined by Gilles Deleuze, the "dividual" is a physically embodied human
subject that is endlessly divisible and reducible to data representations via the modern
technologies of control, like computer-based systems (Williams). With all of the
information collected from credit card purchases, biometrics, security cameras, ATM
statements, online shopping and personal WebPages, what Palfrey and Gasser refer to
as an individual’s “digital dossier” above, the multiplicity of identities for one person in
cyberspace can be endless. Ultimately, Lyon agrees with Bogard as well as Palfrey and
Gasser and sees a complete fragmentation of the individual in this virtual space via
information sharing and processing. In accord, the increasingly large amounts of
information, both intimate and general, produced by and about ourselves daily, which
Staples refers to as “The Pornography of the Self,” have become easily accessible to
others via the cyber channels. In the end, more compelling than Palfrey and Gasser’s
initial observation, Bogard sees a total control of humanity occurring as power and
discipline fuse seamlessly and dissolve into what he calls the “pure operationality” of the system that ultimately cannot be resisted. Bogard asserts:

The gaze is no longer invisibly on the scene; it is the scene. It no longer merely watches, it is not exterior, calculating and detached. It is perhaps not really a “gaze” at all, but a kind of “informed touch,” since the whole environment is transparent and hyperperceptual. (76)

As a result, Foucault’s concept of the docile body is nullified in the new paradigm. The body need no longer be rendered “docile,” because it has been removed of its agency via the new system of control. Instead, the individual is now resituated from a physical space into a cyber hyperreality, where those in control of the system can encode, recode, process and catalog it without interference or influence from the analog subject. The gaze no longer evokes discipline in self-policing individuals. Instead, the gaze watches to gather information about, construct and control the data doubles of individuals. Furthermore, Scott Bukatman, in *Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Postmodern Science Fiction*, claims that:

Subject dislocation is enacted by a movement through an excruciatingly technological, decentering spatiality. The site of origin of the subject passes first outside the body and then inside the terminal. [. . .] Such a deconstruction does not point to an *annihilation* of subjectivity, but rather to the limits of the existing paradigms. The subject is deconstructed through operations of technology. The subject is *broken down* in the zones of cyber spatial simulation, there to await its reconstruction amidst these fields of data. (180)
This “disembodiment” of one’s subjectivity from the physical body can be exemplified by examining P.D James’s novel *The Children of Men* (1992). The narrative is situated 20 years in the future when England is very strict about regulating the population’s movements in and out of city, state and national boarders.

In Alfonso Cuaron’s film adaptation, *Children of Men* (2006), nearly every building or city street in London are restricted or have limited access, forcing all individuals to be subjected to a variety of biometric scans, ID cards, mandatory curfews and other forms of electronic surveillance in order to gain access to particular locations. These conditions are prescient imaginings based upon the continual installation of actual surveillant mechanisms in current western societies as well as the resulting anxieties of terrorist threats and xenophobia. In the film, the year is 2027 and England remains the only semi-stable government on the planet. Other nation states that were once prominent, including the US, have crumbled due to terrorism, failed economies, anarchy and political strife. In addition to this situation, humanity is facing a very widespread threat – no children have been born for nearly two decades anywhere on the globe. In fact, the youngest person on earth had just been murdered at the age of 18. Many citizens are unable to cope with the impending end of humanity. As a result, the government has stepped in to help its depressed people by offering and advertising for the “Quietus.” A clever play on words – “quiet us” – the Quietus is a simple, yet painless government sanctioned method of suicide. The kits are delivered to each home for use when the individuals are ready to “let go.”

In London, to preserve the fragile social structures, legal residents are restricted to various degrees of limited access, while foreign refugees that flood into England are continually rounded up, exiled to refugee camps and detained until their systematic
genocide. These processes may appear to be a traditional Foucauldian application of legal manifestations of the panoptic gaze (introduced in Chapter II). However, the physical regulations and restrictions on the bodies of citizens are utilized as an advanced form of social sorting: identifying, gathering and sequestering “illegals” for their removal. The retinal scans, identification cards, and other biometrics search for those not “approved” by the system. When discovered, those who do not meet the predetermined criteria are not disciplined or rendered docile as in Foucault’s disciplinary society. Instead, marked individuals are removed from society, exiled and exterminated – rendered “invisible” as they are discarded from reality by the system.

The film overly concerns itself with this concept of “disembodiment” in that the narrative emphasizes a new state system that is focused more about gathering and sorting information produced by bodies via digital metrics than the actual bodies themselves, which are rapidly becoming extinct due to the failed birthrate, suicide and genocide. Interestingly enough, Lyon’s claim that “bodies are disappearing” from reality is literally portrayed in Children of Men. Individuals remain in the virtual systems purely by way of their data doubles. The disappearance of physical bodies in connection with the loss in the ability to procreate illustrate Bogard’s concept that the dissolution of individual power “hinges on the disembodiment of sexuality and the decasualization of the body, i.e., a double movement that drags both sex and the body into simulation, constructing both as virtual realities, not just shriveled objects (i.e., physically real, representable objects)” (164). In this way, bodies and that which defines the body with intrinsic power to procreate are ultimately eradicated by way of hyperreal surveillance, which assumes and mutates sexual and physical bodies in these simulated spaces. Presumably, based on Bogard’s claim that “sexuality is overexposed via
hypersurveillance” (165), in the film *Children of Men*, the ubiquity of digital surveillance had already focused part of the gaze upon sexuality and the sexual body in this futuristic society. This ever-increasing overexposure and analysis of the body and its most intimate, yet most powerful aspect – procreation – renders individual bodies transparent, “a surface seen through, but also the body as disappearing surface/screen” (Bogard 165).

Therefore, the ubiquitous systems of surveillance that the state has implemented to monitor and regulate the populous has directly contributed to the disappearance of its members as well as the failure of producing further generations, all the while leading to increased surveillance and analysis of failures to conceive. Bogard explains that:

> In a state of general obscenity, the flesh – subject to decay and obsolescence – vanishes beneath the apparatus that watches it, only to be resurrected as simulacrum. This is the virtual body. […] And this is precisely what happens to sex and sexuality, too. Lost in the consuming brilliance of a gaze that continues to test, record, and replay its smallest movements. (165)

As a result, digital hyperreality is the key element featured in *Children of Men*, usurping the physical world as a means of existence and communication now governed by the technological advances that determine and monitor the environs, taking place within the cyber space of the electronic surveillance databases. In fact, in the novel “the children born in the year 1995 are called Omegas” (*The Children of Men* 10) because this is the last year that children had been born. As a result, the Omegas mark the transition of humanity’s shift from a physical to hyperreal embodiment. The description of the Omegas portrays them as very inhuman in appearance or personality and yet they
personify the potentials of the new hyperreal embodiment. In fact, the Omegas are, as the title of the novel reflects, the last children of men. The male Omegas are described as:

Strong, individualistic, intelligent and handsome as young gods. Many are also cruel, arrogant and violent, and this has been found to be true of Omegas all over the world. [. . .] The female Omegas have a different beauty, classical, remote, listless, without animation or energy. Like their male counterparts, they seem incapable of human sympathy. Men and women, the Omegas are a race apart, indulged, propitiated, feared, regarded with half-superstitious awe. Perhaps we have made our Omegas what they are by our own folly, a regime which combines perpetual surveillance with total indulgence [. . .] . (10-11)

Omegas are like demi-gods, part human and part superhuman, part real and part hyperreal. They embody the traits of their human and hyperreal origins, products of man and digital surveillance, both of which have shaped the Omegas’ characteristics and personalities. Their “lack of human sympathy” reveal inhuman traits and why they are considered “a race apart.” Omegas represent the threshold of the paradigm shift where humanity transforms from Foucauldian “docile bodies” to Bogard’s “dividuals” in the hyperreality of the virtual systems, appropriated and entered by way of the omnipresent digital surveillance mechanisms covering the landscape.

In this prescient future, the Foucauldian docile body appears antiquated because employing one’s biopower is dependent upon the fear of surveillance instilling discipline, which increases the force of the body in economic terms of utility while diminishing the forces of the body in political terms of disobedience. People become more useful as
they become more obedient. Simply put, this condition relies on the self-policing of individuals. However, according to Bogard, in a Society of Control, agency is removed from the individual and is assumed by and embodied in the virtual system. In this way, there is no longer a question of obedience, which was so crucial to the Foucauldian-Benthamite model. All actions are anticipated, standardized and programmed, efficiently organized and occurring in the hyperreal matrices of cyberspace.
“Man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge; he will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form.”

- Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*

**Conclusions**

Foucault’s work predominantly emphasized power relations in societies: individuals with power juxtaposed with those subjected to that power. In particular, Foucault highlighted how the power/knowledge synergy created social polarities, dictating appropriate behaviors for citizens. Furthermore, Foucault examined the nature of power and its applications across two epochal shifts. The first paradigm featured the rule of a sovereign over his subjects, emphasizing physical torture and execution. The second, which Foucault called “a new technology” of power represented a situation in which “modern [nineteenth and twentieth century] modes of punishment aim[ed] to render punishment increasingly invisible.” This occurred as coercive power was interiorized by individuals who engaged in self-disciplining, which in turn was viewed as a product of state surveillance. Since this shift, issues of power and surveillance have continued to evolve and become more efficient and universal in the twenty-first century.
This particular study, in tracing the foundation and evolution of surveillance in regards to technological developments, relating to Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian theory, has not enough space to comprehensively pursue all facets, including future developments, of surveillance mechanisms. In fact, there is much more to be explored and further advancements in forthcoming technology. On the other hand, it is reasonable to postulate, based on the prescient texts analyzed in this dissertation, that the shift towards a society of control will continue developing. After all, the texts discussed thus far have anticipated future innovations. To reiterate, as illustrated in Chapter II, Sir Thomas More forecast futuristic usages of surveillant techniques in physically architectural spaces centuries prior to the paradigm shift that occurred in the 1700s, which Foucault identified as the move from a society of public spectacle to one of punishment and discipline. In addition, George Orwell predicted in the late 1940s the rise of ubiquitous digital interfaces, i.e. “telescreens,” which would come to not only mediate discourses of power between the state and citizens, but also saturate consumer-buying trends in the form of computers, PDAs and cell phones that have defined the early twenty-first century.

Further, Philip K. Dick, writing “The Minority Report” in the 1950s, also presciently detailed futuristic developments in digital technologies utilizing hyperreal surveillant techniques that will be used to disseminate power over citizens to the point that control over one’s agency may shift from the individual to the operating system. Moreover, physical bodies may eventually disappear in total as P.D. James illustrates in The Children of Men and Cuaron shows in his film adaptation Children of Men. Foucault, although restricted by the technological limitations at the time of his death, also posited the possibility of the coming paradigm shift in The Order of Things (1966).
Foucault claimed, “Man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge; he will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form” (xxv). And now that has come to pass. That “new form” representing “Man” has emerged as the data double and the digital personae in the developing plane of knowledge produced by and mediated in virtual spaces of hyperreality. Analyzing this cultural shift and its application to and effect upon fictive works, therefore, is crucial and needs further attention from literary and theoretical scholars.

In the end, one of the critical efforts of this dissertation is the definition and application of post-Foucauldian elements of surveillance to fictive works. Qualities that had characterized the Panopticon and Foucauldian surveillance, e.g. docile bodies, unobstructed visibility, self-discipline, and a gaze dependent upon physically architectural spaces, has given way to an evolution of surveillance that changes the politics of how and where the gaze is disseminated and in what ways subjects react to being observed. Below I have outline the criteria of the new paradigm. The first involves the shifting motive of surveillance. Rather than discipline bodies, absolute control over individuals is the ultimate aim of post-Foucauldian surveillance. Next, via television and the Internet, Synoptic gazing of the masses is used concomitantly with Panoptic monitoring to increase the transparency of society. In addition, the dissemination of the gaze is altered and freed from the static Benthamite model. Last, the physical, docile body is disregarded and replaced with an emphasis on digital personae in cyberspace.
Control

Control is moving to displace disciplinary action as the catalyst for social order. Rather than coerce citizens to self-monitor themselves by instilling an internalized fear of institutional gazes, the gaze seeks to punish bodies or souls of deviants less, while emphasizing the gathering and processing of information about all citizens. In turn, in the new paradigm, this information is used to limit choices, create easily manipulated digital personae and dictate consumer desire. In fact, the corporeal bodies become insignificant in this shift to a digital, hyperreal mode of surveillance. Instead, surrogate digital personae are more visible and begin to take the place of corporeal bodies, potentially rendering the Foucauldian docile body antiquated. Ultimately, control of the state over individuals in hyperreal spaces becomes nearly absolute via the refined digital systems of the twenty-first century.

According to William Staples, “we have begun to see an historical shift from a specific punishment of the individual deviant to a more generalized surveillance of all citizens” (Everyday Surveillance 7). In other words, there has been a move from using the gaze to impose discipline, as Foucault claimed, to extract information. In this way, there is a blurring in differentiating the actual deviant from the ‘likely’ or ‘possible’ offender. The new paradigm of social control, rather than social discipline, becomes more about predicting and preventing deviance rather than responding to violations after they occur, i.e. controlling the actions of citizens.

In essence, police profiling and Precrime in Dick’s “The Minority Report” both claim a priori knowledge of potential deviants before crimes are committed. This process has some overlap with the efforts of Minitrue in 1984. Where Minitrue works to
alter and erase the past by rewriting history or the lives of individuals, Precrime seeks to achieve the same results in the future by predicting and eliminating deviant acts. Seeing into the future would likely be the ultimate condition of surveillance because having prescient knowledge of any and all actions would make it nearly impossible for individuals to conceal anything. Just as Goldstein purportedly claimed in 1984, “He who controls the past controls the future,” Precrime seeks to manipulate the future in order to control the present. What is more, Dick’s short story was written only eight years after 1984, revealing the same prescience of a hyperreal reality to come as Orwell had.

Anderton, the protagonist in “The Minority Report,” claims that Precrime has “cut down on felonies by ninety-nine and decimal point eight percent. We seldom get actual murder or treason. After all, the culprit knows we'll confine him in the detention camp a week before he gets a chance to commit the crime” (74). Police Commissioner Anderton continues, “. . . we get them first, before they can commit an act of violence. So the commission of the crime itself is absolute metaphysics” (72). Similar to Big Brother when dealing with Thoughtcrime, Anderton’s police force considers only the “metaphysical” reality produced by the precogs in determining one’s guilt. The actual committing of the crime – the tangible act – is of no matter since the reality of the precogs usurps the perceived physical reality of human experience and therefore the act in the present. Instead, what is crucial are the events of the future, which exist not in a physical space, but on a hyperreal plane, relayed to Precrime agents from the precogs via specialized “analytical machinery” (84) who then issue warrants for the arrests of “would-be criminals” (72). In this way, what Foucault and Bentham emphasized in the physical architecture of the Panopticon and the resulting visibility of physical spaces is supplanted in these contexts by the continuing development of
hyperreal surveillance. Ultimately, Dick, drawing from Orwell, continues to further the technology used in the surveillance mechanism in his narrative and, as a result, predicts the new paradigm shift in the method of discipline to be used in the future.

The research and application of post-Foucauldian theory in this dissertation illustrates not only the development of surveillance in the twenty-first century but proves that although both burgeoning hyper-real and established physical surveillance modes are currently being used in concert, there is the growing potential of a move towards what Bogard defined as the “Society of Control,” exemplified by the fictive works in Chapter IV. Due primarily to increasing developments in digital technologies, the disseminated gaze has become more mobile and discursive, freed from its previous limitations. As a result, surveillance has been able to evolve, becoming even more capillary and only continues to expand as the majority of human communications, commerce, employment and leisure are increasingly mediated via digital technologies that access virtual spaces.

In the same way that contemporary surveillance technologies have been increasingly used to not only detect, but predict and direct future actions of bodies, this new paradigm seems to emphasize the same regarding the consumption of consumer goods. In fact, dictating consumption is one element of the Society of Control. As seen in Chapter IV, David Lyon states:

The surveillance-based economy persuades individuals that they count when all it wants is to count them. The gaze is no longer a threat of mass homogeneity but a promise of mass individuation; the person is no longer just one of the crowd, but the individuation is commodified. This is [...] the ‘panopticommodity’, in which people market themselves. Self-disclosure apparently equates with
freedom and authenticity. But you individuate only by submitting to mass
surveillance. So in this case too, in so far as we believe that our customized
products express our individuality and our creativity, we are diagnosed by the
panopticcommodity. [. . .] The spectacle returns decisive, once more parading the
body before audiences” (“The Search for Surveillance Theories” from Theorizing
Surveillance, ed. David Lyon, pg 8).

Consequently, the general social consciousness of the twenty-first century,
especially displayed by the younger generations, no longer seems concerned with being
marked out or seen as Foucault’s Panopticon dictated. Instead, they want to be seen
and stand out. As Lyon claims above, freedom and self-expression is equated with “self
disclosure,” a willing submission to the gaze. The best examples of this are social
networking sites like Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, religious confession sites like
DailyHug.com and eHarmony to name a few. On these sites, individuals post intimate
information about themselves and others, in text and pictures. At times the information
has been so revealing that some have been fired from employment, not admitted to
colleges, bullied, and has even led to suicide. The spectacle indeed has “returned
decisive…parading the body before audiences,” as Lyon stated above, especially in
cyberspace.

However, Lyon’s labeling of the “panopticcommodity” is a misnomer or, at the very
least, misleading. “Panopticcommodity” refers to the commodification of the masses for a
select few to see, which implies a select few gazing upon the masses that are
unwillingly subjected to the gaze of others. Instead, I offer the more appropriate term
“synopticcommodity” for this social phenomenon. The situation is best described as
many individuals willingly placing themselves into the gaze of the masses as well as
those of the state. Those with Facebook pages or Twitter sites share information about themselves and others for all to see. Furthermore, it is the gaze of all watching that specific individual that commodifies that person in this hyperreal gazing space, engendering and determining various values of that particular body based upon individual assessment of the information presented online. As Guy DeBord postulates in *Society of the Spectacle* (1967), “commodities are all there is to see” (48) in social spaces. The developments of digital media are transforming the modes of power from a state of *panoptic*ism to one of *synoptic*ism. In other words, control is still dependent upon surveillance and the discourse of the gaze; however, it is the traditional Foucauldian gazer and subjects that have been reordered.

**Synopticism**

According to post-Foucauldian theory, the Foucauldian-Benthamite model is becoming outmoded. Being seen is no longer a great fear for the general public. As Foucault claimed, being seen continues to individuate bodies. However, being seen and, as a result, singled out is now a common desire in modern society. Furthermore, Synopticism is taking over as the means to not only influence citizens but to produce greater transparency of society.

Tim Matheison’s theory of Synopticism addresses this shift in perspective that cites mass media as the catalyst for “many watching the few” (*Profiling Machines* 30). Where Panopticism was characterized by Foucault’s metaphor of a single or few guards in the tower monitoring the many prisoners, Synopticism reorders the line of sight. Synoptic viewing entails the majority monitoring a comparatively small number of
individuals. For example, John Fiske posits that a football stadium represents a Synopticon, a “reverse panopticon” (*Profiling Machines* 31). Moreover, Matheison states that in the twenty-first century “social control is exerted by media messages [from television, radio, the internet, etc.] that discipline our consciousness via synoptic viewing” (*Profiling Machines* 30). In turn, the viewer comes to internalize the information seen or experienced. Baudrillard echoes this, stating, “television alienates us, informs us, manipulates us” (*Simulacra and Simulation* 30). In other words, we rely on information from media outlets to inform and regulate us, coercing us to conform. It is what the masses *are seeing* that dictates behavior today more so than the threat of *being seen* as in the past. This, coupled with limited consumer choices, produces a control over individuals.

Drawing from Baudrillard, this is the condition of the hyperreal. What we desire and the decisions we “make” are actually predetermined and fabricated, similar to the mechanism of Precrime, and disseminated by television, the Internet, and so forth. This mechanism is a departure from the Foucauldian model in that control, not discipline, is enforced. Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter IV, the limited variance of consumer goods offered to the public limit desire, i.e. consumers can only desire what is advertised to them. Considering these conditions of the hyperreal, it is no longer imperative to utilize the gaze to coerce subjects to submit to the “the model” of discipline determined by social institutions that Foucault illustrated. Instead, Baudrillard claims in “The End of the Panopticon” that currently “[we] are the model” (89). In the Society of Control individuals are forced to assimilate through Synopticism and the limitation of choice. In other words, in hyper-reality, we have been made into “the model” that the antiquated disciplinary gaze could only coerce us to emulate.
Ultimately, we have entered a reality of simulacra, which simultaneously rely upon hyperreal spaces. Elements of culture – sexuality, religion, education, consumerism, economics, and so forth – have been converted into simulation and dictated by the hyperreal. As such, Synoptic gazing is utilized to control our desires and convey the reality of the new paradigm. In other words, the Society of Control generates a demand and desire first through media and marketing, and then it creates products or behaviors to meet that desire. Again, echoing the foretelling "Minority Report", the hyperreal desire or need precedes the actual products or action marketed to fulfill that need. In this circumstance as well, the physical product lags behind its simulacrum just as the physical bodies of potential criminals lags behind their simulacra in the Precrime system.

However, Synopticism, although having the potential to render the Foucauldian model obsolete, has yet to completely do so. No doubt, modes of surveillance are shifting away from Foucault’s confined bodies and punished souls towards more absolute conditions of control as illustrated in the latter chapters. But, currently, synoptic and panoptic forms of the gaze are working concurrently. The former is most noticeable in society as the masses watch celebrities and desire goods via mediated images on television and the Internet. All the while the government agencies and corporations continually gather, sort and process infinite amounts of information disseminated by citizens. However, the residual panoptic gaze is not as concerned with traditionally disciplining individuals as it is with surveilling subjects to gather information that can ultimately be used to controlling them when coupled with synoptic modes. In these ways, currently, both panopticism and synopticism work to synergistically monitor,
predict and direct the actions of individuals, continually restricting options of consumers that dictate both the physical and hyper realities of human consciousness.

In the twenty-first century, we are experiencing the duality of hyperreal control and panoptic coercion that Orwell predicted in *1984*. We look to “telescreens” for information, entertainment, assistance, even approval. It is reasonable, then, to claim that we will continue moving towards a system and culture that demands more information from and the transparency of its citizens, as seen in *The Children of Men* and “The Minority Report,” propagating an atmosphere of control rather than discipline.

The Decentralized Gaze

The new mobility of the formerly static Foucauldian gaze is one of the most defining elements of post-Foucauldian surveillance. The Panopticon depends upon a central tower or gazing spot and inert subjects, physically isolated and eternally illuminated. Each is a pole in a dialectic relationship, i.e. gazer and subject. However, modern technologies have decentralized the gaze from this static model. Surveillance is even more capillary in that not only are deviants subject to the state’s gaze, depending upon internalization of that gaze to self-police themselves, but nearly all in society are also subjected to surveillant assemblages that they willingly carry. Cell phones, GPS systems, PDAs and handheld video cameras, have “mobilized” the gaze. The gaze is no longer covert and unassuming. It is completely visible, desired and freely engaged by citizens.

This shift in how humans are interacting and the frequency of digital means connecting us is not surprising considering that John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, in their
text Born Digital, (2008) have dubbed the most recent generation as the first “digital natives.” Palfrey and Gasser posit, “Digital Natives live much of their lives online, without distinguishing between the online and offline…. They have created a 24/7 network that blends the human and the technical, and it is transforming human relationships in fundamental ways. Digital natives are constantly connected [to others in virtual spaces]. Even as they sleep, connections are made online” (4-5). Digital doubles are making connections and being connected to daily even without their original referents knowing.

A few pressing issues arise considering the evolutionary nature of surveillance in conjunction with these advancements in technology. And these changes are occurring rapidly. Since the body of the dissertation has been completed technological developments such as the Apple iPad, a more advanced and capable PDA and media source, has since been released. The iPad continues to push human interaction, information gathering and monitoring deeper into the hyperreality of cyberspace as the single mobile interface is providing a lone digital window to view the world. As Mark Winokur remarked, “Like television, the Internet also renders all spaces as one space – the monitor-user space.” Continual developments of these hyperreal windows continues reduces experience, reality and spaces to one digitally mediated space.

In addition, legal battles have surfaced regarding a Pennsylvania school that used remote access to photographs students who borrowed laptops equipped with surveillant capabilities. As a result, Lawrence Lessig has asserted that a number of issues have arisen from the application of terrestrial law to cyberspaces because the latter is evolving so rapidly that customized legal implications and parameters have not been completely applied. One reason is due to the fact that virtual boundaries continue
to grow so fast that moral and legalities have not been assessed and applied. Palfrey and Gasser concur: “data-collection practices of corporations, among others, are changing at a rate that is faster than the rate of change of society’s methods of protecting that data. In other words, the market for information about individuals is developing more quickly than the social norms that govern how people protect data about themselves” (39-40).

Digital Personae and Exiled Bodies

Representations of the body are the focus of post-Foucauldian surveillance, not the physical bodies critical to panoptic surveillance. Data flows come to embody the digital personae, which represent the individual in cyber space. Furthermore, identities once defined by corporeal bodies are reduced to login names and passwords. Rather than create a social dichotomy between the masses and individual to enhance control, as seen in the texts in Chapter II, individuals are reduced to discarnate “packets of information” that are continually disassembled, reassembled, coded, recoded and processed dependent on what criteria the system or authorized users desire in cyberspace. The resulting creation and recreation of numerous identities in cyberspace, or “fractal subjectivity” as Bogard defines it, can continually be manipulated and mutated readily by those privy to the system. These disparate identities, called “digital personae” by Lyon, are ultimately separated, and disembodied from their original physical subjectivities.

After the separation, the physical body lags behind its simulation, never fulfilling the future intent of the body as illustrated in “The Minority Report”. Precrime eliminates
the physical body’s commission of a future crime that has been committed by its simulacrum. Ultimately, hyperreality dictates the actions and outcomes occurring in physical reality. In fact, the simulacra of bodies nullify the agency of physical bodies in physical spaces. The hyperreality has always already occurred by the time corporeal bodies can enact or experience the events in physical reality. Most importantly, Foucault’s concept of the docile body is nullified in the new paradigm. The body need no longer be rendered “docile,” because it has been removed of its agency via the new system of control. Instead, the individual is now resituated from a physical space into a cyber hyperreality, where those in control of the system can encode, recode, process and catalog it without interference or influence from the analog subject. The gaze no longer evokes discipline in self-policing individuals. Instead, the gaze watches to gather information about, construct and control the data doubles of individuals. Bodies, therefore are discarded or exiled as seen in *Children of Men, Senseless, and Minority Report*.

**Questions**

A number of questions surface after illustrating the shifting paradigms and outlining facets of the post-Foucauldian surveillance. Some of the most pressing questions are mentioned and briefly explored in this section.

• *Considering the evidence presented here and that the Foucauldian docile body and surveillant method of discipline may be rendered obsolete in the paradigm shift, do we still need prisons if entering a Society of Control?*

    As illustrated in Chapter IV, prediction of the crime and criminal occurs prior to the act of deviance in “The Minority Report” and also in actual police profiling. However,
in Dick’s short story, there is still a need to remove and contain “would-be criminals” (72). (Future) deviants are transported quite far away from the general population on another planet utilized solely for pre-criminal incarceration. In this way, it appears that despite the condition of predictive control over the actions of all citizens, there is still need for a place to house discarded bodies from society. In the film adaptation, *Minority Report*, pre-criminals were rendered inanimate, sequestered in the Panopticon-like arena illustrated in Chapter IV. Here, their bodies were incarcerated, completely controlled, while their minds remained “busy, busy.”

What this points to is that despite a paradigm shift from a culture of discipline to one of control, there is still a need for “punishment” in the transition. Absolute control would eliminate a need for both discipline and resulting punishment because there would not be those who could rebel. However, in the transition from a disciplinary society to the Society of Control, where Bogard and Staples claim that we are currently as a collective society, punishment still has a place. Therefore, if modern capabilities in profiling continue to evolve, another question arises: how will punishment and prisons be used in the mean time?

However, unlike the fictive works in Chapters III and IV, which remove criminals from society, prisons still practice measures of reform, at least in theory. So even though prisoners are exiled, most are only sequestered for limited amounts of time. They are then rereleased back into the population. Those facing life in prison, however, are exiled but not rereleased. In extreme cases, capital punishment is enacted to end one’s existence. But these considerations are for the corporeal body.

More significant is the mobile prisoner. Julian V. Roberts writes that prisons are cutting costs buy increasing the usage of “electronic monitoring” devices for criminals
Rather than take up space in prisons, selected criminals are sequestered in their homes and monitored remotely. In fact, “House arrest, accompanied by electronic monitoring has emerged as a highly visibly feature of . . . the 'new age of surveillance'” (14). Institutionally, if this trend continues, prisons could be modified to only contain the most dangerous prisoners. Or, depending on what the surveillant technologies will be capable of, institutional prisons could become obsolete. Instead, all criminals could still be incarcerated but in their homes, possibly. In the transitional period from the Disciplinary Society to the Society of Control, the classic Foucauldian gaze, now mediated via a digital guard gazing upon the criminal in the home-prison, still keeps watch over the subject. The criminal is still confined, yet always visible in space. Electronic monitoring via ankle bracelets, CCTV and possibly inferred would apply punishment to deviants who are continually invigilated on a virtual rather than corporeal level.

• **How are other social institutions affected by this paradigm shift?**

   Obviously, it is impossible to know the full extent until more observation and time has passed. However, one institution that is most interesting to follow is that of the Church because most popular religions incorporate forms of Foucauldian surveillance. They are based upon a deity scrutinizing the deeds of followers, some of which promise the reward of an afterlife if successfully completing the challenges of life. These circumstances are mediated by the deities’ abilities of “seeing” the followers’ actions. In addition, in the Christian religion, primarily the Catholic denomination, confession of sins is a critical part of the faith. However, in the western world, it appears that less and less
of the younger generations are committing to organized religions and attending religious services, which have begun to fade out in terms of numbers.

Consequently, in the new paradigm, the parishioner is no longer coerced by the gaze of the priest or omnipotent deity to pursue absolution of her sins, hidden in the church confessional for only the priest to hear her indiscretions. Instead, online, the virtual parishioner seeks out the very public forum of the virtual confessional of cyberspace on the religious site. The classic Foucauldian fear of being seen committing and sequestered while repenting a transgression is being replaced with the need to be seen and acknowledged in ones guilt by multiple witnesses reading the written confessions online. Regarding the paradigm shift, the new social consciousness seems to convey that the more who know of one’s transgressions the better the confessor feels via a transparency of one’s sin and display of guilt. Furthermore, readers can assume the role of “priest” by commenting on another’s confession if the site is equipped with that feature. In fact, even the most casual of readers contributes to the synoptic gaze upon the virtual confessor.

Again, the trend continues as more and more intimate information about individuals is willingly submitted for all to synoptically gaze upon online, which is one major facet of the paradigm shift towards the “Society of Control.” The spectacle again materializes in this regard similar to Hester Prynne’s punishment in *The Scarlet Letter*. Both forms of expiation are dependent on the deviant’s society participating in and witnessing the acceptance of and feeling sorry for one’s spiritual crime. However, unlike Hester, modern-day sinners and digital confessors desire to be acknowledged as such. This acknowledgement of the witnesses not only contributes to the reaffirmation of the law but also is a final step in the deviant’s punishment – having knowledge of the
accused deviant actions. In the case of the online religious sites, the virtual congregation holds some of the responsibility in the confessor’s atonement, but acknowledging the transgression as well as the confession of the crime.

However, control rather than discipline comes into play here because, unlike Hester Prynne, the online parishioner willingly seeks out and displays her sins for all in that virtual community to witness. No use of force or direct coercion from the church or state institution has dictated this action. This is another form of Lyon’s “panopticcommodity” in that one’s “self-disclosure apparently equates with freedom and authenticity. But you individuate only by submitting to mass surveillance.” In this way, the parishioner fulfills her duty or role as such by conforming as a willing “consumer” of her religions, which in cyberspace, now requires her to post her indiscretions online, which she willingly does to authenticate her devotion to her beliefs.

Another issue that arises is one of identity and performance. We must assume that the confession is truthful and intentional. The lack of identity creates an uncertainty of intent in that there is no associated body to match with the confession in the classic Foucauldian sense. Instead, online, identity is embodied by detached bits of data as the individual transforms into data streams, codes that computer programs and few humans can decipher. With little accountability as a result of the lack of identity online, intent becomes an issue as false, humorous confessions can be posted. In some circumstances and websites, login names and passwords seemingly attempt to validate identity. However, “logging in” only provides the individual temporary access to a system that itself has eternal access to the individual’s digital personae and digital dossier. Even with so-called “secure” sites, identity theft is still an issue. In fact, the US government has issued warnings about the possibility of “hacking” into secure
databases as well as “phishing” and “spoofing” schemes to steal personal data, i.e. Social Security numbers, credit card access or other personal information, which has been entered into the system (Marcia Smith).

The same concerns apply to other social institutions. Education, specifically colleges and universities, are increasingly utilizing more online courses. Thereby, online students are always virtual in identity, never associated with the physical bodies and appearances that would make them known to their instructor or peers. This could cause foreseeable problems with academic dishonesty, specifically someone completing the work other than the student enrolled in the class. One study in higher education points out “Because both students and faculty believe it is easier to cheat in a distance learning class, … as the number of distance learning class (sic) increases so will academic dishonesty” (Grijalva, et al. 1). Furthermore, without the students’ assignments and exams proctored by their instructor, students could easily have assistance from others when completing graded work. To combat issues resulting from this problem, Napa Valley College in California has implemented specific rules for online courses to help prevent increases in academic dishonesty. The “Online Education” section of the college website states:

You are expected to *keep confidential your username and password and to never allow anyone else to log-in to your account*. Sharing access or passwords to Blackboard is considered a breach of academic integrity and could result in you being removed from your class.

When you log-in to Blackboard, you do so with the understanding and agreement to produce your own work, to complete course activities
yourself, and to *take course exams without the assistance of others.*

Allowing others to complete your course work or to take your exams is considered cheating and could subject you to receiving an "F" for the course. In addition, this type of dishonesty can result in formal disciplinary action being taken against you by the college.

It is obvious here, that the college acknowledges the issue of authorship as it applies to the identity of who is truly doing the student’s work. However, there is a “blind spot” in the monitoring if someone is helping the student in his assignments since only the login name is required to identify each student not the physical person in class whose face matches that upon his college ID card or in the classroom. Instead, the simulacra of the virtual students become “real” to the instructor. This leads to the next question regarding the creation of identity in cyberspace.

• *Is one’s identity no longer established primarily by the individual who the identity represents?*

Palfrey and Gasser claim “the digital identity of any citizen of a wired society is composed not only of the data elements that this person contributes voluntarily, but also of the elements that the *other* people contribute and collect about him or her” (262). For example, Facebook pages represent individuals who post their interests, photos and information on line. In addition, “friends,” who are granted access to one’s page can add photos, text, links and other information about that particular person.

However, identity online becomes malleable, produced and altered not only by one’s own changing actions, desires and characteristics that make up the profile, but by
the information posted by others or even posing as the individual. False posts and social networking pages, claiming to represent specific individuals are easy to construct, complete with pictures and personal information gathered from one’s authentic or “official” site. In 2008, a UK court ruled in favor of a man who was victimized by a fabricated Facebook page, citing that a former coworker constructed a profile falsely representing the victim by stating fictitious claims about his “sexuality and political affiliations” (NextAdvisor). Apparently, these imposter sites, used to defame individuals online, are created quite frequently as “Facebook makes it relatively easy for anyone to create a fake profile page in your name since it requires little or no actual identity verification” (NextAdvisor). According to this single, yet popular example, identity online can never truly remain static but is always in flux, and can never be completely trusted as authentic.

• How is sex and the expression of sexuality altered in the new paradigm?

   Futurist Ray Kurtzweil, in The Singularity is Near (2005), claims that currently “Sex has largely been separated from its biological function. For the most part, we engage in sexual activity for intimate communication and sensual pleasure, not reproduction. Conversely, we have devised multiple methods for creating babies without physical sex…” (301). In these ways, the procreative nature of sex has become secondary to its use as a vehicle for intimate pleasure between individuals physically. However, engaging in virtual sex as a means to intimate pleasure has steadily grown over the past decade and now accounts for a huge consumer market. In fact, virtual sex has eliminated the need for a material partner present to achieve sexual gratification, similar to what the character Doug illustrates in Alone with Her. In accord, Jensen and
Draffen assert that “this may explain at least some of the popularity of pornography: people who are powerless in every other aspect of their lives get to feel some power as they look at these pictures” (Welcome to the Machine 26-27).

Furthermore, the concept of the “Pornography of the Self,” introduced in Chapter IV, becomes even more applicable in this regard. Not only is the information produced by the body targeted and propagated online, but the most intimate space of all, the exposed body itself, is displayed, commodified and “consumed” in economic terms within the virtual space. Sex and sexual desire have also become commodified and are easily accessible to consumers online with countless sites dedicated to delivering uninhibited bodies and sexual acts, some in real time. In this way, online pornography in the new paradigm is just another consumer good to be searched for and utilized, satisfying desire and the need for pleasure.

Only now, sex has also become simulated, a product of human interface with a digital monitor. The nude body or bodies are gazed upon, displayed on the monitor. However, now the “consumer” does not physically engage in the sexual act as before. Instead, he gazes upon those individuals participating in his place. As a result, a large portion of physical contact is removed and the utility of sex for procreation is disregarded online. Sex is reduced to another consumer desire accessed and paid for services rendered.

• Post-Foucauldian surveillance depends upon the decentered gaze embodied in consumer technologies. How does the shift account for those who cannot afford or refuse to purchase these goods? Do socio-economics play a role in the twenty-first century determining how individuals may be monitored?
In Orwell’s 1984, the lives of the proles were consumed with winning the lottery, gathering and rationing food, engaging in uninhibited sexuality and alcohol abuse. Furthermore, denying the proles any education or leisure time by demanding a rigorous work schedule, combined with the conditions listed above, the Party had little to fear from the proles and need not waste energy attempting to discipline the bodies of each individual. Instead, this massification allowed for a regulation of the social body via biological processes. In the end, the social body was rendered docile.

This fictive situation is not far beyond what some “underprivileged” communities in the United States experience at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Like the proles in 1984, some communities appear to be contained in specific areas by specially designed public transportation routes, lack of funding for public works and schools, therefore, not needing ready observation. Police forces are designed to concentrate on areas of high crime, which are typically also areas of high poverty. The lack of resources and state sanctioned programs like welfare and food stamps both limit the kinds and amounts of food that can be purchased, thereby tracking and regulating consumption. In this way, similar to the proles, food rationing and acquisition becomes a very important part of daily life. In addition, rigorous work schedules would be needed to maintain a relative quality of life for individuals with limited educational opportunities as a result of poor public schools and economics, all which stem from the socio-economic landscape that the individuals are unable to leave, again due to a lack of resources. Naturally, these conditions lead to a dependence on the hope of winning the lottery, which has nearly impossible odds to achieve.

So, perhaps, socio-economics has dictated the development of technologically advanced surveillance systems in regards to how and where specific forms of
monitoring is used. In addition, those able to afford digital devices that possess surveillance capabilities have engaged in the post-Foucauldian system. However, those whose socio-economic backgrounds do not allow for the purchasing of these mobile technologies must still be primarily observed through the classic Foucauldian means. This dictates a need for some usage of the classic Foucauldian assemblages to monitor these citizens who cannot buy into the consumer desire of willingly purchasing goods that insert the individual into the scrutinizing arena of cyberspace.

Furthermore, some individuals may refuse to engage in a post-Foucauldian world even though they have the resources to purchase consumer electronics capable of accessing cyberspaces. Again, reliance upon classic Foucauldian monitoring via Social Security numbers, driver’s licenses, birth certificates, and other legal manifestations of the gaze must be relied on to monitor this minority. Resistance of post-Foucauldian surveillance can also be countered, in part, by third party data gathering and posting online of these individuals. Phone numbers, home addresses and other information are freely posted on line without the consent or at times the knowledge of individuals.

Perhaps those resistant to or unable to access the hyperreal system and freely assert themselves in virtual spaces to the same degree as the majority will come to constitute a new social class. Those “invisible” to or less visible to the system, and as a result to most others synoptically gazers in hyperreal spaces could be seen as less important, and thereby “othered” in the newly colonized space of hyperreality.

However while further research is needed regarding the monitoring of those few who are resistant to the system, suffice to say, these two scenarios make the case that no Society of Control can afford to entirely disregard usage of classic Foucauldian surveillance mechanisms.
• How the Foucauldian concept of “bio-power” been altered in the “Society of Control”? Has the docile body’s “bio-power” been reconfigured into the consumer’s “buying-power”?

Foucault’s concept of the docile body is rendered irrelevant in the new paradigm shift because disciplinary surveillance depends upon the condition of docility instilled in the subject. In the Society of Control, discipline becomes antiquated. As a result, bio-power, which Foucault described as “discipline increasing the force of the body in economic terms of utility and production, all the while diminishing the forces of the body in political terms of disobedience” (Discipline and Punish 208), lacks its key component “discipline” in the paradigm shift.

However, what the classic Foucauldian bio-power achieved is analogous to the buying-power referred to by economists and marketers in consumer societies. Bio-power, in a sense, has adapted to address and predominantly involve consumer purchasing. In the Society of Control, dictated in part by consumer buying trends, an individual’s “buying-power” echoes Foucault’s utility of bio-power in that the “force of the body in economic terms of utility” are put to work purchasing goods, but does not rely on disciplined docile bodies to do so. The new paradigm, in theory, restricts disobedience and controls the actions and purchasing of citizens. So, in essence, the subject fulfils its duty in both scenarios despite whether the motive is coerced or controlled.

**Topics for Further Research**

Research and composition of the dissertation has produced a myriad of areas to explore in more detail in the future. In addition to continued research into the Society of
Control, probing the overlapping spaces of the disciplinary and control centered paradigms – primarily the application of both Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian surveillance within – is rich with possibility. Furthermore, to my knowledge, very little if any research has been produced regarding this concomitant application of surveillant assemblages. In the end, the dissertation has generated copious research possibilities, but below are some of the most appealing at this moment.

“Synergistic Gazing”

I am interested in doing more in depth research on how Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian surveillance are and can be utilized together. The paradigm shift appears inevitable according to the theory and fictive works, However the transition has abundant possibilities in researching how the two currently work conjointly. Discipline and Control work synergistically in the transition of the paradigm shift, creating even greater transparency in society.

Performance

“Performance” as related to modern surveillance is also appealing and worthy of in depth study. As Foucault illustrated the coercive nature of the gaze, in the post-Foucauldian world that is devoid or at least loosens the emphasis on discipline in exchange for control of the individual, there are still elements of performance that occur when scrutinized via cyber/hyperreal spaces. For example, online forums can allow for some anonymity for some members' identities in regards to other members'
perspectives, which allows for a seemingly freer space in which to interject one’s opinions. On the other hand, veiled identities online can lead to exaggerated forms of expression since there can be less accountability for what one states when the interlocutor is anonymous or posting under another name or avatar. In this sense, sites like Second Life allow for individuals to virtually “live” other lives in cyber space. Aspects of online avatars and “lives” could have overlap with research on performance elements. In addition, performance relates to issues of identity as well.

“The Spectacle”

The Spectacle has resurfaced as a crucial element of digital culture. Social networking and Youtube.com based websites catalyze the reemergence of “the spectacle” in these synoptic contexts, parading images of bodies by the thousands online. Physical landscapes give way to the spectacle of digital “LANscapes,” which has endless potential for research.

Art

The Surveillance Camera Players perform brief adaptations of famous plays and films for the surveyors of digital monitors showing what the gaze of security cameras pick up. A good example is Banksy, an English “street artist” who depicts pop culture references, political commentary and satire on the streets, sidewalks and buildings of London primarily. One of his popular themes involves surveillance cameras.
Legal issues

Technological advances and capabilities are developing at a rapid rate – much faster than legalities can adapt or be created to address the changes or new scenarios created. One place to begin is with Lawrence Lessig’s *Code, Version 2.0* (2006), which confronts legalities regarding cyberspace, a space that, as he claims, “is highly regulable where behavior will be much more tightly controlled than in real space.”

Identity

As mentioned above, identity is even more malleable in cyberspace. Some areas to investigate regarding identity are how individuals can/cannot control identity, website or virtual systems management of identity, personae asserted: social vs. personal or online vs offline, and limitations in changing/improving/blemishing “reputations.”

Resistance

How and what are the motives to resist the cyber system and Society of Control. Further research into human resistance to the Society of Control is called for. As pointed out above, there are some loopholes to opt out of the system, at least partially, and not assert one’s self as openly as others in cyberspace. Again, identity is malleable and individuals can pose as others in cyberspace by creating false personae, hacking into another’s account, or helping an online student with his work. These elements demand more attention in this regard.
All in all, it is difficult to deny that we are currently living in a post-Foucauldian era. Although residual classic Foucauldian techniques do and may forever remain, the previous era, dependent upon society’s fear of being seen, has given way to a new epoch where the majority of individuals willingly display their bodies and personal information for others to gaze upon. In this same regard, individuals can openly gaze upon others; we require to be seen by as well to see others, utilizing a synergistic gazing. As a result, social consciousness dictates that it is no longer desirable or even acceptable on some accounts to blend into the crowd; one must stand apart from the masses in every conceivable way. So much so, that we create disembodied personae to represent ourselves or contribute to digital dossiers that catalog our actions, purchases and interests in another space and reality online. In addition, we embrace television programming such as “reality shows,” which allow us to gaze on others or technology like cell phones, GPS systems and PDAs that continually monitor where we are, who we communicate with or what information and spaces we access online. Furthermore, we have even grown dependent on the Internet for countless reasons, even for simple, daily activities. Ultimately, contemporary culture has evolved into one that not only desires to be watched, but in some ways demands it. And it is this that epitomizes the Society of Control.
Notes


Universal Pictures. 2007.


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